No Presumption of Credit for Time Under Temporary Suspension: Nebraska Supreme Court Disbars Elected County Attorney for Misuse of Office and Repeated DUIs

Introduction

In State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline v. Glass, 320 Neb. 201 (Oct. 24, 2025), the Nebraska Supreme Court imposed the sanction of disbarment on Oliver J. Glass, the former elected Dodge County Attorney. The Court’s opinion addresses two central matters: (1) the appropriate sanction for a cascade of professional and criminal misconduct, including misuse of a restricted law enforcement database, intimidation of a private individual, and three DUI offenses, and (2) the effective date and crediting of time served under a prior temporary suspension. This case is notable for its express clarification that, in Nebraska attorney discipline, there is no presumption that an attorney will receive “credit” for time spent under temporary suspension during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings.

The proceeding came to the Court on a joint motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the facts; thus, the only question was the sanction. A referee recommended disbarment retroactive to February 24, 2021 (the date of the Court’s temporary suspension order). Glass argued for a suspension with credit to that same date. After a de novo review, the Court disbarred Glass, making the disbarment effective retroactively to July 6, 2024—the date of his third DUI—expressly declining to credit the period of temporary suspension because his misconduct continued during that time.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court adopted the referee’s factual findings via judgment on the pleadings and found that Glass violated:
- His oath of office, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-104,
- Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond. §§ 3-504.4(a) (respect for rights of third persons), 3-505.3 (responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants), and 3-508.4(a), (b), (c), and (d) (professional misconduct).
Sanction: Disbarment from the practice of law in Nebraska.
Effective date: Retroactive to July 6, 2024 (date of third DUI), not to February 24, 2021 (date of temporary suspension).
Clarified principle: There is no presumption that a lawyer will receive credit for time under temporary suspension or for the pendency of proceedings; discipline is case-specific and credit may be denied where misconduct continues during suspension.
Aggravation: Misconduct committed by an attorney holding elected office and misuse of law enforcement resources for personal purposes.
Mitigation considered but limited: Cooperation, character evidence, and treatment efforts were acknowledged; repeated relapses and continued misconduct substantially reduced mitigating weight.

Background and Key Facts

Admitted to the Nebraska bar in 2006, Glass served as Dodge County Attorney, elected in 2014 and reelected in 2018. After the dissolution of his marriage began and upon learning of his estranged wife’s new relationship, Glass misused his official access to the Nebraska Criminal Justice Information System (NCJIS) for personal purposes. He and two nonlawyer subordinates accessed NCJIS roughly 15 times to obtain personal and vehicle data about the boyfriend, then used the information to surveil him and Glass’s estranged spouse. Glass also sent intimidating and derogatory messages referencing data obtained from NCJIS.

Glass incurred three DUI offenses: March 23, 2020 (first offense, probation and violations), January 28, 2021 (while on probation, second DUI), and July 6, 2024 (third DUI while on federal supervised release and during the pendency of these disciplinary proceedings). He was federally charged with cyberstalking but ultimately pled to a misdemeanor count of conspiracy to deprive rights under color of law, receiving a nine-month prison sentence followed by a year of supervised release. The July 2024 DUI led to a violation of his federal supervised release conditions.

The Nebraska Supreme Court temporarily suspended Glass on February 24, 2021. He resigned as county attorney on March 1, 2021. Formal charges issued on December 6, 2024; Glass admitted the core facts and several rule violations. The referee recommended disbarment retroactive to the temporary suspension date. The Supreme Court, however, chose an effective disbarment date of July 6, 2024.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Informed the Decision

State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Miller, 316 Neb. 899, 7 N.W.3d 642 (2024): Reiterated that attorney discipline cases are original proceedings; the Supreme Court reviews de novo on the record and independently assesses appropriate discipline. Miller also articulates the sanction factors: nature of the offense; deterrence; reputation of the bar; protection of the public; respondent’s attitude; and current/future fitness. The Court applied these factors to Glass.
State ex rel. NSBA v. Douglas, 227 Neb. 1, 416 N.W.2d 515 (1987): Government lawyers must be more circumspect than private attorneys; they hold public trust and have enhanced visibility. This principle heightened the aggravation in Glass’s case because he was an elected county attorney who misused state law enforcement databases and staff for personal ends.
State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Council, 289 Neb. 33, 853 N.W.2d 844 (2014): Cited for two points: misconduct is aggravated when committed by an attorney holding elected office, and as an example of a case in which the Court applied retroactivity. The Court contrasted that retroactivity outcome with cases where credit was denied, emphasizing the case-specific nature of the sanction calculus.
Retroactivity cases cited by the parties:
- Retroactivity granted: Vanderford, 317 Neb. 771, 12 N.W.3d 219 (2024); Castrejon, 311 Neb. 560, 973 N.W.2d 701 (2022); Council, supra; Finney, 276 Neb. 914, 758 N.W.2d 622 (2008); NSBA v. Miller, 225 Neb. 261, 404 N.W.2d 40 (1987).
- Retroactivity denied (no credit): Campbell, 318 Neb. 23, 13 N.W.3d 97 (2024); Gage, 316 Neb. 443, 4 N.W.3d 885 (2024); Nelson, 311 Neb. 251, 971 N.W.2d 777 (2022); Jorgenson, 302 Neb. 188, 922 N.W.2d 753 (2019).
These decisions collectively show that retroactive effective dates and credits are not automatic; they turn on the specific misconduct, timing, and the protection of the public.

Legal Reasoning and Application of Principles

The Court reaffirmed that the purpose of attorney discipline is protective, not punitive: to decide whether it is in the public interest to allow an attorney to practice, which includes safeguarding the public. It weighed the six Miller factors:

Nature of the offense: The misconduct was serious and multifaceted: Glass violated criminal laws; misused a restricted law enforcement database (NCJIS) and directed subordinates to do so; intimidated a private citizen using information obtained via his office; and committed multiple DUI offenses. He ultimately incurred a federal conviction for conspiracy to deprive rights under color of law.
Deterrence: The Court emphasized the need to deter similar conduct, particularly by government lawyers, noting that “improper conduct on the part of a government attorney is more likely to tarnish the entire system of justice and erode public trust.”
Reputation of the bar: Glass’s high-profile criminal cases generated negative publicity, undermining public confidence in the legal profession and the criminal justice system.
Protection of the public: Repeated impaired driving, continued misconduct during suspension and while under federal supervision, and misuse of state resources raised acute concerns about public safety and the integrity of legal processes.
Respondent’s attitude: Glass cooperated with the disciplinary authorities and acknowledged his alcohol problem. He pursued treatment, but relapsed repeatedly, including a third DUI in July 2024. The letters of support, largely predating the third DUI, carried limited weight.
Present/future fitness: The continued pattern of misconduct during suspension and while on supervised release, combined with ongoing probation projected until October 2027, defeated the Court’s confidence in a responsible return to practice.

The Court also identified a key aggravator: misconduct by an elected public official. Citing the heightened obligations of government attorneys (Douglas and comment 5 to Rule 3-508.4), the Court deemed Glass’s misuse of office to be especially corrosive to public trust.

The Retroactivity Ruling and the New Clarification

On retroactivity, the Court set the effective date of disbarment as July 6, 2024—the date of the third DUI—rejecting the referee’s recommendation to backdate to February 24, 2021, when the Court temporarily suspended Glass. The central rationale was that Glass’s misconduct continued during the period of temporary suspension; thus, crediting that time would be inconsistent with the protective purposes of discipline and the facts of this case.

In a noteworthy clarification, the Court stated:

There is no presumption that an attorney who receives a disciplinary sanction will receive credit for time during which the attorney is suspended or during the investigations and pendency of the disciplinary proceedings.

The Court also noted that if an attorney seeks reinstatement at least five years after the final order of disbarment, there is no presumption that reinstatement will be granted. See § 3-310(T) through (V).

Why Disbarment (Not Suspension) Was Appropriate

Although Glass urged a suspension (with credit), the Court concluded disbarment was warranted because:

The misconduct was cumulative and sustained over time, not a single lapse.
It involved a criminal conviction tied to misuse of government authority “under color of law,” plus repeated DUIs, including during federal supervision and while disciplinary proceedings were pending.
It directly implicated public trust in the justice system, especially given Glass’s elected office.
Despite treatment and expressions of remorse, the recent third DUI demonstrated unresolved risk factors incompatible with the responsible practice of law at this time.

Impact and Implications

1) Retroactivity and “Credit” Going Forward

Attorneys should not expect credit for the period of a temporary suspension. Whether any sanction is backdated is entirely case-specific.
Where misconduct continues after a temporary suspension or while investigations are pending, credit is especially unlikely.
The Court’s express clarification resolves any perceived default presumption in favor of crediting time under suspension.

2) Government Lawyers Are Held to a Higher Standard

Misuse of office—particularly leverage of criminal justice tools for personal ends—will be viewed as an aggravating factor.
Agencies should reinforce training and auditing around access to systems like NCJIS; elected prosecutors must implement strict controls over staff access and use.

3) Supervisory Duties Over Nonlawyers

Rule 3-505.3 makes lawyers responsible for ensuring nonlawyer assistants act in accordance with professional obligations. Directing staff to engage in misconduct (e.g., improper database queries) squarely triggers supervisory liability.

4) Substance Use, Mitigation, and Public Protection

While treatment efforts and cooperation are mitigating, repeated relapses—especially resulting in criminal offenses during supervision or disciplinary pendency—substantially diminish their weight.
Public protection remains paramount; serious or repeated impaired-driving offenses weigh heavily against reinstatement or lesser sanctions.

5) Reinstatement Expectations

Under § 3-310(T)-(V), an application for reinstatement may be made at least five years after the final order of disbarment; there is no presumption of reinstatement.
Candidates must demonstrate rehabilitation, sobriety, and fitness; the burden is substantial, particularly where misconduct involved abuse of public office or the justice system.

Complex Concepts Simplified

De novo review in “original proceedings”: The Supreme Court does not defer to the referee on the sanction; it independently reviews the record and imposes discipline it deems appropriate.
Temporary suspension vs. disbarment: Temporary suspension is an interim measure during investigation or proceedings; disbarment is a final sanction severing the right to practice, subject to future reinstatement procedures. There is no automatic credit for time spent under temporary suspension.
Retroactive effective date: The Court may make the sanction effective as of an earlier date (e.g., the date of an offense or temporary suspension), but whether and to what date is a fact-dependent decision—there is no default rule.
NCJIS misuse: NCJIS is a restricted law enforcement database. Access is limited to official purposes. Using it (or directing staff to use it) for personal surveillance breaches ethical and legal duties and can constitute criminal conduct.
“Color of law” and conspiracy to deprive rights: Acting “under color of law” means using authority granted by the state to commit acts that violate someone’s rights. Glass pled to a misdemeanor conspiracy to deprive rights under color of law, reflecting misuse of his prosecutorial power.
Rule 3-504.4(a): Requires respect for rights of third persons, prohibiting means with no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden them. Using official data to harass or intimidate violates this principle.
Rule 3-505.3: Lawyers must supervise nonlawyer assistants and ensure their conduct is compatible with professional obligations; directing or ratifying their misconduct makes the lawyer responsible.
Rule 3-508.4(a)-(d): Prohibits violating the professional rules; committing criminal acts that reflect adversely on fitness; engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Attorney’s oath (§ 7-104): Nebraska’s statutory attorney’s oath imposes fundamental duties of fidelity to the law and ethical conduct; violating it is independently sanctionable.
Supervised release: A period of federal supervision following incarceration; violating conditions (e.g., by committing a DUI) exposes the individual to additional sanctions and further reflects adversely on fitness to practice.

Conclusion

Glass establishes a clear, two-part message in Nebraska attorney discipline. First, the Court will not hesitate to impose the strongest sanctions where an attorney—especially an elected government lawyer—leverages public authority and resources for personal ends, engages in intimidation, and commits repeated criminal offenses. Second, and doctrinally significant, the Court expressly clarifies that there is no presumption of credit for time under temporary suspension or during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings; retroactivity is case-specific and can be denied when misconduct continues.

By disbarring Glass effective as of his third DUI, the Court grounded discipline in the actual chronology of continuing misconduct, prioritized the protection of the public and the reputation of the bar, and signaled heightened accountability for attorneys in public office. Any future bid for reinstatement will face a substantial burden under § 3-310(T)-(V), without any presumption in the applicant’s favor. For Nebraska practitioners—particularly those in government—the opinion underscores the profession’s core expectations: integrity, restraint in the use of official tools, diligent supervision of staff, and unwavering respect for the public trust.