Introduction

In Arethea Hurbert, an incompetent person, by and through her guardian ad litem and next friend, Leslie Barineau v. Stephon Green and The City of Birmingham (Supreme Court of Alabama, Sept. 5, 2025), the Court squarely addressed how a criminal court’s pretrial stand‑your‑ground immunity finding under § 13A‑3‑23(d), Ala. Code 1975, interacts with later civil litigation arising from the same incident. The case arises from a violent encounter at UAB Hospital where Birmingham Police Officer Stephon Green struck detainee Arethea Hurbert while she was restrained on a gurney, causing serious injuries. After a criminal court dismissed Green’s assault charge based on stand‑your‑ground immunity (under a preponderance standard), the civil trial court treated that ruling as creating a “presumption” of self‑defense and granted summary judgment for Green and, derivatively, for the City of Birmingham.

The Alabama Supreme Court reversed. It held that the trial court “departed from the summary‑judgment standard” by effectively giving preclusive or presumptive weight to the criminal immunity order. The decision clarifies that:

• Criminal adjudications—even stand‑your‑ground immunity determinations—do not create a presumption or otherwise shift Rule 56 burdens in a subsequent civil case between different parties.
• At summary judgment, courts may not weigh evidence or assign credibility; the movant still must show no genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
• The City’s derivative summary judgment falls with the reversal of the officer’s summary judgment.

The ruling leaves intact the availability of a statutory pretrial immunity hearing in civil cases under § 13A‑3‑23(d), and it declines to decide constitutional challenges to that procedure or the precise evidentiary effect a prior criminal immunity order might have within a civil pretrial immunity hearing (as opposed to a Rule 56 proceeding).

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the Jefferson Circuit Court’s summary judgments for Officer Green and the City of Birmingham and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held:

• The trial court erred by treating the criminal court’s stand‑your‑ground immunity order as creating a presumption that Green acted in self‑defense, thereby shifting to the civil plaintiff a higher, undefined burden to “call into question” the criminal order.
• Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applies to bind a civil plaintiff to a criminal ruling because the parties are different and the purposes and burdens in criminal and civil cases differ.
• Findings in a criminal case may, at most, be evidentiary in a civil case; they are not dispositive of whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists under Rule 56.
• Because the City’s judgment depended on Green’s, the City’s summary judgment must also be reversed.

The Court expressed no view on the ultimate merits of Green’s self‑defense/stand‑your‑ground defense in the civil case. Two concurrences and a dissent further explore the procedural posture and evidentiary effect of a criminal immunity order in later civil litigation.

Factual and Procedural Background

In August 2019, while assigned to the Birmingham jail, Officer Green transported 51‑year‑old detainee Arethea Hurbert—who was experiencing a schizophrenic episode—to UAB for a psychological evaluation. At UAB, Hurbert was restrained to a gurney. Accounts diverge about what precipitated the blows: Hurbert says Green approached and “whaled on her” after she protested tight shackles and feigned a throw of a sandal; Green says Hurbert struck him with a sandal and her fist, prompting him to punch “two or three” times to regain control. UAB personnel intervened; Hurbert sustained serious facial injuries, including a broken orbital socket. The police department fired Green; he was indicted for second‑degree assault.

In the criminal case, after an evidentiary hearing under § 13A‑3‑23(d) (preponderance standard), the criminal court dismissed the assault charge, finding Green’s force justified in self‑defense and thus immune from prosecution. Separately, in the civil case, Hurbert sued Green and the City for negligence and wantonness. The civil court, over time, treated the criminal immunity order as creating a presumption of self‑defense, later converted the scheduled statutory pretrial hearing to a Rule 56 summary‑judgment hearing (without objection by Green), and granted summary judgment to Green, reasoning that Hurbert had not presented “substantial evidence … that would call into question the Criminal Court’s Order Granting Immunity.” The court then granted summary judgment to the City on vicarious liability. Hurbert appealed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Bredeson v. Croft, 295 Ala. 246, 326 So. 2d 735 (1976) — Central to the Court’s reasoning. Bredeson held that criminal adjudications are not dispositive in civil cases. An acquittal simply means the State failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not resolve all factual issues for civil purposes. While a “record of conviction” may carry a prima facie presumption, a criminal acquittal (and, by extension, a criminal ruling favorable to the accused) is not conclusive in civil litigation. The Court analogized from this framework to emphasize that findings in criminal proceedings may be considered as evidence in civil cases but are not dispositive at summary judgment.
• City of Gadsden v. Head, 429 So. 2d 1005 (Ala. 1983) and Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. Gunn — These authorities reiterate that criminal and civil proceedings involve different parties and different purposes (public right vs. private right), and that collateral estoppel/res judicata generally do not cross-apply from criminal to civil due to lack of mutuality and differing burdens.
• Equity Resources Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 1998); Stewart v. Brinley, 902 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2004) — These cases outline the elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel in Alabama and underscore that identity of parties and issues is required—criteria not met here because the State prosecuted the criminal case while Hurbert pursues the civil case.
• Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949 (Ala. 2004); Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin Cnty., 538 So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1989); Black v. Comer, 920 So. 2d 1083 (Ala. 2005) — These decisions reiterate the two‑part summary‑judgment standard (no genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement as a matter of law) and, critically, that courts must not weigh evidence or assess credibility at the Rule 56 stage.
• Caton v. City of Pelham, 329 So. 3d 5 (Ala. 2020) — When a defendant moves for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense, it is proper only if no genuine issue of material fact exists as to any element of that defense. This underscores the heavy burden on a defendant invoking stand‑your‑ground immunity at summary judgment.
• Ex parte Teal, 336 So. 3d 165 (Ala. 2021) and 392 So. 3d 992 (Ala. 2023) — These cases discuss the statutory pretrial immunity hearing contemplated by § 13A‑3‑23(d) and the policy that immunity protects from suit, not merely from liability at trial. The majority here notes the officer waived any complaint about converting that hearing to a Rule 56 proceeding, so the Court did not decide Teal’s implications for this civil case.
• Kumar v. Patel, 227 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2017) — Cited approvingly by the trial court and noted by the Supreme Court for the proposition that a criminal stand‑your‑ground immunity decision cannot bind a civil plaintiff who was not a party to the criminal proceeding. Alabama’s holding aligns with this non‑preclusion approach.

Legal Reasoning

• No preclusion, no presumption. The Court rejected the trial court’s “species of res judicata/collateral estoppel” approach. Because the State—not Hurbert—prosecuted the criminal case, the “same parties” element fails. A criminal court’s immunity ruling cannot bind a civil plaintiff who was not a party, nor can it create a presumption that shifts Rule 56 burdens.
• Rule 56 must be applied as written. The trial court announced a “higher” and undefined evidentiary burden, crediting the criminal order as conclusive of the defendant’s prima facie showing and obliging the plaintiff to “call into question the Criminal Court’s Order.” That moved the goalposts. Summary judgment requires the court to determine only whether a genuine issue for trial exists—not to weigh or credit one side’s proof. The trial court’s process improperly gave weight and credibility to the criminal order and constrained the plaintiff’s evidence by focusing on what “could have been” presented in the criminal case—an error compounded by due‑process concerns because the plaintiff was not a party in the criminal case and had no control over that record.
• Criminal findings can be evidentiary, not dispositive. Echoing Bredeson, the Court emphasized that criminal adjudications may constitute evidence in a civil proceeding but cannot be dispositive of whether material factual disputes exist. Even assuming admissibility, a criminal immunity order cannot, by itself, establish that no genuine dispute exists as to all elements of civil stand‑your‑ground immunity.
• Reversal of the City’s judgment followed. Because the City’s summary judgment was derivative of the officer’s, it fell with the reversal of Green’s judgment.

Separate Opinions

• Shaw, J. (concurring in the result): Treats the criminal immunity order as “substantial evidence”—a prima facie showing—supporting immunity, but concludes that Hurbert’s affidavits from eyewitnesses (UAB technician Ebony Griffin and UAB Officer Demarko Gaines) create a genuine dispute over whether Green’s force was reasonable and necessary. He would reverse without remand for re‑consideration under a corrected standard.
• Bryan, J. (concurring in the result): Emphasizes the statutory pretrial hearing in § 13A‑3‑23(d) is the Legislature’s chosen vehicle for early immunity determinations in both criminal and civil cases, and cautions against conflating that hearing with Rule 56 summary judgment. He underscores that the opinion should not be read as foreclosing renewed summary‑judgment motions on remand, properly supported by evidence and evaluated under the correct standard.
• Sellers, J. (dissenting): Would affirm. He would treat the criminal dismissal as creating a presumption in favor of self‑defense and stand‑your‑ground immunity in the civil case and finds Hurbert’s rebuttal insufficient, noting other tribunals’ favorable determinations for Green (including employment review proceedings).

Impact and Practical Implications

• Clear rule for Alabama: No presumption from criminal immunity order at civil summary judgment. Defendants cannot rely on a criminal § 13A‑3‑23(d) immunity ruling to shift the Rule 56 burdens or to secure civil summary judgment absent a record showing no genuine dispute of material fact. Trial courts must not weigh evidence or credit the criminal court’s findings when deciding Rule 56 motions.
• Pretrial hearing vs. summary judgment. The Court leaves open that civil defendants may seek a statutory pretrial immunity hearing under § 13A‑3‑23(d). Parties should carefully choose the procedural track and preserve objections; converting a § 13A‑3‑23(d) hearing to Rule 56 (as occurred here) waives distinct features of the statutory hearing, including the judge’s authority to find facts by a preponderance before trial.
• Civil plaintiffs may present new evidence. Plaintiffs are not confined to the criminal proceeding’s record and may present additional testimony and documents in the civil case—even if such material “could have been” presented earlier by the State. The trial court’s earlier view to the contrary was rejected.
• Municipal liability remains derivative of the officer’s status. If the officer is not conclusively immune, the municipality generally cannot secure vicarious summary judgment solely by pointing to the officer’s criminal immunity order. Municipal defenses under § 6‑5‑338 (peace‑officer immunity) and § 11‑47‑190 (municipal liability) will turn on a properly developed civil record and the correct standards.
• Alignment with other jurisdictions. The decision harmonizes Alabama’s approach with Florida’s Kumar v. Patel and the broader principle that non‑parties cannot be bound by criminal immunity determinations in civil cases.
• Open questions preserved.
  • What precise evidentiary effect does a criminal immunity order have in a civil § 13A‑3‑23(d) pretrial hearing? The Court did not decide.
  • Are there constitutional constraints on conducting fact‑finding immunity hearings in civil cases (e.g., jury‑trial rights)? The Court expressly declined to reach such arguments here.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Stand‑Your‑Ground Immunity (§ 13A‑3‑23): Alabama’s self‑defense statute provides that a person who justifiably uses force is immune from both criminal prosecution and civil action—unless the force is determined to be unlawful. The statute authorizes a pretrial hearing where the defendant must prove immunity by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Preponderance vs. Summary Judgment: The statutory immunity hearing allows a judge to weigh evidence and make credibility determinations (preponderance = more likely than not). By contrast, Rule 56 summary judgment does not permit weighing or credibility findings; the question is only whether a genuine dispute exists for trial.
• Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel: These doctrines prevent re‑litigation of claims or issues already decided—but generally require the same parties (or privies) and identical issues. A criminal case between the State and the accused does not bind a civil plaintiff who was not a party to the criminal case.
• Prima Facie Showing vs. Presumption: A prima facie showing is enough to shift a burden of production at summary judgment. A “presumption” (especially an undefined one) improperly elevates evidentiary weight and can distort burdens if not rooted in law. The Court rejected converting a criminal immunity order into a presumption that defeats Rule 56’s framework.
• Genuine Issue of Material Fact: A factual disagreement that could affect the outcome under the governing law. If reasonable people could differ based on the evidence, summary judgment must be denied.
• Peace‑Officer and Municipal Immunity (§ 6‑5‑338; § 11‑47‑190): Peace officers have immunity for discretionary acts within the scope of law‑enforcement duties; municipalities are generally not liable unless injury is caused by the “neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness” of municipal employees acting within the line and scope. Municipal vicarious liability typically rises or falls with the officer’s liability or immunity.

Practice Pointers

• For defendants: Decide early whether to pursue a civil § 13A‑3‑23(d) pretrial immunity hearing (fact‑finding by a judge) or a Rule 56 motion (no weighing). Do not rely on a criminal immunity order to carry summary judgment; build a civil record demonstrating no genuine dispute as to each element of justification (reasonable belief of imminent unlawful force; degree of force reasonably necessary).
• For plaintiffs: Your evidence need not “call into question” the criminal order; it must create a genuine dispute of material fact under Rule 56. Eyewitness affidavits, medical evidence, video records, and policy/procedure evidence can be crucial. Preserve jury demands and resist attempts to import criminal findings as dispositive.
• For trial courts: Keep Rule 56 and § 13A‑3‑23(d) tracks distinct. If the parties choose summary judgment, do not weigh or credit the criminal immunity ruling as a presumption; consider it, at most, as part of the evidentiary mix. If proceeding under § 13A‑3‑23(d), articulate findings under the preponderance standard and clarify the evidentiary weight, if any, accorded to criminal rulings.
• For municipalities: Derivative motions should not rely exclusively on an officer’s criminal immunity order. Tie arguments to the civil evidentiary record and, where applicable, independent municipal defenses.

Conclusion

The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision establishes a clear procedural rule: a criminal stand‑your‑ground immunity order does not create a presumption and does not alter Rule 56 burdens in later civil litigation. Criminal adjudications may inform—but not decide—whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Trial courts must apply summary‑judgment standards faithfully, without weighing evidence or assigning credibility based on a criminal record to which the civil plaintiff was not a party.

The ruling realigns Alabama practice with fundamental notions of party identity, due process, and the distinct purposes of criminal and civil proceedings, and it harmonizes state law with persuasive authority like Florida’s Kumar v. Patel. While leaving open the contours of civil pretrial immunity hearings under § 13A‑3‑23(d), the Court’s message is unequivocal for Rule 56: defendants must meet the traditional summary‑judgment standard on a properly developed civil record; plaintiffs remain free to marshal their own evidence to create triable disputes. On remand, the parties—and trial courts statewide—have a clarified roadmap for navigating the difficult junction of criminal immunity determinations and civil liability.