No Prejudice, No Brady Claim: Anderson v. Baltimore County and Pleading Standards for Probable Cause in Passenger-Drug Arrests

No Prejudice, No Brady Claim: Anderson v. Baltimore County and Pleading Standards for Probable Cause in Passenger-Drug Arrests

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Fourth Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in Na'Im Anderson v. Baltimore County, Maryland, No. 24-1314 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025), affirming dismissal of a § 1983 and state-law civil action arising from an arrest and prosecution for marijuana possession. Although designated “unpublished” and thus nonbinding, the opinion offers useful guidance on:

  • How to plead lack of probable cause in the context of drugs found in a vehicle occupied by multiple people, in light of Maryland v. Pringle.
  • The limits of Brady-based § 1983 claims where criminal charges are ultimately dismissed (no prejudice, no Brady damages claim).
  • The boundaries of absolute prosecutorial immunity and its implications for claims against the State.
  • The strict standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Maryland law.
  • Appellate waiver and the limited obligation of courts to “re-write” complaints drafted by licensed counsel.

The case pits plaintiff–appellant Na'Im Anderson against multiple governmental defendants: Baltimore County, the State of Maryland, the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore County, and two Baltimore County Police Department (BCPD) officers, Nicholas Wolferman and Chad A. Sholter. Anderson claimed he was stopped, arrested, and prosecuted for marijuana without probable cause and that exculpatory evidence relating to laboratory testing problems was withheld.

The district court (Judge James K. Bredar) dismissed Anderson’s amended complaint in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6); the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background (as Pleaded)

  • On July 13, 2021, Anderson was a backseat passenger in a car stopped by Officer Wolferman of BCPD.
  • Anderson alleged:
    • He did not own or drive the vehicle.
    • He entered the vehicle about a minute before the stop.
    • He brought no contraband, did not know of any, and could not access the locked glovebox or trunk.
  • Officer Wolferman searched the car, located suspected marijuana, and arrested all occupants; Officers Wolferman and Sholter charged Anderson with marijuana possession.
  • Anderson was:
    • Held without bail for six months (July 13, 2021 – January 13, 2022).
    • Then placed on home monitoring and pretrial supervision.
  • BCPD had been sending marijuana samples to National Medical Services (NMS), a Pennsylvania lab:
    • On August 5, 2021, Maryland State Police informed the officers that NMS would stop marijuana testing due to chemist certification issues.
    • On January 18, 2022, NMS notified the State’s Attorney’s Office it could not determine if the sample was marijuana and would discard it absent objection; no objection was made.
  • Charges against Anderson were dismissed on January 23, 2023.

Anderson alleged economic losses, physical and emotional injuries, and various non-economic harms stemming from his arrest, detention, and prosecution.

B. Procedural History

  • Anderson filed suit in Maryland state court on April 25, 2023.
  • Defendants removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.
  • Anderson filed an Amended Complaint asserting eight causes of action:
    • Common law:
      • False arrest
      • False imprisonment
      • Malicious prosecution
      • Abuse of process
      • Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
    • Constitutional:
      • Unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Maryland Declaration of Rights Articles 24 & 26
      • Violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
      • Monell claim against Baltimore County for municipal liability
  • The district court granted all defendants’ motions to dismiss.
  • Anderson appealed; the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed.

C. Holdings in Brief

  1. State’s Attorney: All claims barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity; any challenge to that ruling was waived on appeal and, in any event, misread Fourth Circuit precedent.
  2. State of Maryland: Not vicariously liable for the State’s Attorney’s conduct; sovereignly immune from § 1983; plaintiff’s “negligence” theory against the State was never actually pleaded and need not be addressed.
  3. Officers:
    • Abuse of process: challenge on appeal waived due to conclusory briefing.
    • False arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution: all dismissed because the Amended Complaint failed to plead facts showing lack of probable cause from the officers’ perspective.
    • Constitutional Brady claim: failed for lack of prejudice, because all charges were dismissed; no damages claim without adverse outcome.
    • IIED: failed to plead the requisite “severe” emotional distress (inability to function or tend to necessary matters).
  4. Baltimore County: Properly dismissed; plaintiff did not challenge the district court’s dispositive reasons (immunity on common-law claims, no underlying constitutional violation, and no viable Monell theory); argument that the State’s Attorney was a County employee was contrary to plaintiff’s own pleadings.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and Pleading

The Fourth Circuit reiterates standard Rule 12(b)(6) principles:

  • De novo review: Appellate court re-examines the complaint assuming all facts are true and drawing reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.
    Cited: Benjamin v. Sparks, 986 F.3d 332, 351 (4th Cir. 2021); Prince v. Sears Holdings Corp., 848 F.3d 173, 176 (4th Cir. 2017); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011).
  • Plausibility standard: Complaint must contain “sufficient facts to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Cited: Corder v. Antero Res. Corp., 57 F.4th 384, 401 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

The court emphasizes that conclusions (“no probable cause,” “illegal search,” “severe emotional distress”) are not enough; the complaint must allege underlying facts that make those conclusions plausible from the legally relevant perspective (e.g., what officers knew).

B. The State’s Attorney: Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity and Appellate Waiver

1. Claims Asserted

Against the State’s Attorney for Baltimore County, Anderson alleged:

  • State-law malicious prosecution and abuse of process: prosecution allegedly without probable cause and for improper purpose.
  • Federal constitutional claims:
    • Failure to disclose exculpatory evidence (Brady violation).
    • Negligent failure to train assistant prosecutors on their Brady obligations.

2. Prosecutorial Immunity

The district court held, and the Fourth Circuit accepted, that these claims are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity, which shields prosecutors from damages for actions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”—including:

  • Decisions to initiate or continue prosecutions.
  • Alleged misuse of process for improper motives.
  • Failures to disclose exculpatory evidence (Brady violations).

Authorities cited:

  • Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir. 2018) (absolute immunity for failure to meet disclosure obligations).
  • State v. Rovin, 246 A.3d 1190, 1207 (Md. 2021) (Maryland common law: prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for acts in their role in the judicial process).

3. Waiver on Appeal

Crucially, the Fourth Circuit finds waiver: Anderson’s opening brief did not meaningfully attack the prosecutorial immunity ruling. Under circuit precedent:

  • An argument is waived when not presented in the opening brief or not developed with supporting reasoning.
    • Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017).
    • Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 923 (4th Cir. 2015).

The only attempt to contest prosecutorial immunity came in Anderson’s reply brief, which is too late. Even then, the argument mischaracterized Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2014), as authority limiting prosecutorial immunity for “administrative” failures in disclosure procedures. The panel corrects this:

  • The cited portion of Owens analyzed police officers’ qualified immunity, not prosecutorial immunity.
  • Owens mentioned “prosecutorial immunity” only in a footnote, observing that a prosecutor had waived that defense by not raising it. It did not narrow the doctrine.

Thus, even aside from waiver, Anderson’s attempted reliance on Owens fails.

C. The State of Maryland: Sovereign Immunity and Unpled Negligence Theory

1. Vicarious Liability for Prosecutors

Anderson’s Amended Complaint asserted only vicarious liability against the State of Maryland, contending that the State should be liable for its State’s Attorney’s misconduct.

Once the State’s Attorney is held absolutely immune, that immunity effectively extends to the State for those acts; there is no derivative liability when the primary actor is not legally answerable for damages. The district court also found the State immune from § 1983 claims under sovereign immunity (Eleventh Amendment principles), which treat the State as not a “person” under § 1983 for damages suits.

On appeal, Anderson did not challenge these rulings. They stand as independent grounds for affirmance.

2. Attempt to Add a Negligence Theory on Appeal

Instead, Anderson argued the district court should have considered the State’s alleged negligence in vetting the NMS lab as a basis for liability. The Fourth Circuit responds bluntly:

  • No negligence cause of action was pleaded.
    • The Amended Complaint listed only eight specific counts—none was negligence.
  • Court obligations differ for pro se vs. represented litigants:
    • Courts construe pro se pleadings liberally. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012).
    • But when a licensed attorney drafts the complaint, courts need not hunt for or invent unarticulated causes of action.
      • Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001).
      • Huffman v. Lindgren, 81 F.4th 1016, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2023) (collecting similar cases).

Therefore, the district court committed no error in failing to address a negligence claim that was never actually asserted.

D. Claims Against the Officers

1. Abuse of Process – Waived on Appeal

The panel disposes of Anderson’s abuse-of-process claim straightforwardly: his opening brief offers only conclusory assertions with no developed argument. Under Fourth Circuit practice, this is insufficient:

  • Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 653 n.7 (4th Cir. 2006): conclusory remarks do not preserve a merits-based challenge.
  • Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A): arguments must be supported with reasoning, authorities, and record citations.

Accordingly, the abuse-of-process challenge is treated as waived.

2. Common-Law False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution

a. Elements under Maryland Law

False Arrest / False Imprisonment

  • These are closely related in Maryland law (false arrest is often treated as a species of false imprisonment).
  • Key element: deprivation of liberty “without legal justification.”
    Cited: Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 133 (Md. 2000).
  • “Legal justification” equates to legal authority—in this context, probable cause for a warrantless arrest.
    Cited: Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 916, 926 (Md. 1995); Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447, 472 (Md. 1995); Md. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 2‑202.

Malicious Prosecution

  • Elements (Maryland):
    1. Criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff.
    2. Without probable cause.
    3. With malice or an improper motive.
    4. Termination in plaintiff’s favor.

    Cited: Heron v. Strader, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (Md. 2000).

All three torts here rise or fall primarily on the existence (or absence) of probable cause.

b. Probable Cause from the Officer’s Perspective

The court underscores two essential points:

  1. What is probable cause?
    Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances would warrant a prudent person in believing the suspect committed an offense.
    Cited: Okwa, 757 A.2d at 130 (quoting DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 361 (Md. 1999)).
  2. Whose perspective matters?
    Probable cause is evaluated from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer on the scene, not the plaintiff’s subjective knowledge or innocence.
    Cited: Wengert v. State, 771 A.2d 389, 398 (Md. 2001) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).

In civil-pleading terms: to allege lack of probable cause, a plaintiff must plead a set of facts making it unjustifiable for a reasonable officer to conclude the plaintiff had committed a crime. The court cites its own precedent:

  • Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 368 (4th Cir. 2002): plaintiff must allege facts that would make it unjustifiable for an officer to think a crime occurred.
c. Deficiency in Anderson’s Pleadings

Anderson’s Amended Complaint centered on facts known only to him:

  • He did not own or drive the car.
  • He had only been in the car for a minute.
  • He brought no illegal substances.
  • He did not know of any contraband and could not access the trunk or glove box.

Critically, Anderson did not allege that the officers:

  • Were aware of the brief duration of his occupancy.
  • Knew he had no access to the compartments where the drugs were located.
  • Observed anything differentiating him from other occupants (e.g., distancing from or disclaimers regarding the drugs).

His pleading never tied his private knowledge (I did nothing; I just got in) to facts about what a reasonable officer could observe or infer. Without such linkage, the complaint did not plausibly allege that probable cause was lacking from the officers’ vantage point, as required by Okwa, Wengert, and Brown v. Gilmore.

The Fourth Circuit therefore agrees with the district court: Anderson failed to plead a lack of probable cause, dooming his false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims. The court also notes that Anderson alleged no non-conclusory facts suggesting the officers had any role in the prosecution’s continuation beyond the initial arrest and charging decision—foreclosing malicious prosecution based on later events.

d. The Misuse of Pringle

A striking part of the opinion is the panel’s criticism of Anderson’s “heavy” reliance on Pringle v. State, 805 A.2d 1016 (Md. 2002), in which Maryland’s highest court had held there was no probable cause to arrest a car passenger where drugs were found in the vehicle. The critical problem: that decision was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003).

The Supreme Court held:

“We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants [of the car] had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.”
— Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 372.

The Fourth Circuit notes that the district court explicitly told Anderson that Pringle (Md.) had been reversed, but his appellate briefing still relied on the discredited state decision. The panel comments that his continued reliance is “confounding” and admonishes:

“Appellant’s counsel should know better — and do better.”

Substantively, Maryland v. Pringle supports the officers’ position: when drugs are found in a vehicle, a reasonable inference is that any or all occupants may jointly exercise dominion and control, often creating probable cause to arrest each occupant absent exculpatory facts.

3. Constitutional Brady Claim Against the Officers

a. Elements of a Civil Brady Claim

The court treats Anderson’s claim that officers suppressed exculpatory evidence about the NMS lab as a Brady-type claim. To state such a claim against police officers, the Fourth Circuit applies the following elements:

  1. The evidence was favorable to the plaintiff (exculpatory or impeaching).
  2. The officers suppressed the evidence in bad faith.
  3. Prejudice ensued—a reasonable probability of a different result had the evidence been disclosed.

Authorities:

  • Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 396–97 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying Brady framework to § 1983 claim; citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
b. The Prejudice Requirement and Dismissal of Charges

The Fourth Circuit affirms dismissal of the Brady claim but on a legal ground slightly different than the district court’s. It focuses on the prejudice element:

  • Brady prejudice typically means there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the outcome would have been different (e.g., acquittal instead of conviction).
  • In Anderson’s case, the charges were eventually dismissed. He got the outcome any defendant seeks: no conviction and no ongoing prosecution.

The court, citing the Sixth Circuit, holds that in such circumstances there is no Brady prejudice capable of supporting a damages claim:

  • McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1988): no prejudice from suppression of exculpatory evidence where charges are dropped.

Because Anderson’s own pleading acknowledges that all charges were dismissed, the court concludes he cannot show Brady prejudice and therefore cannot state a Brady-based § 1983 claim. In effect:

No adverse adjudication, no Brady damages claim.

Note: The panel does not delve into whether pretrial detention or other interim harms might some day ground a different type of due process claim; it confines itself to the classical Brady framework, which is conviction-focused, and disposes of the claim for lack of prejudice.

4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

a. Elements Under Maryland Law

Maryland imposes stringent requirements for IIED, making it a “balm reserved for those wounds that are truly severe and incapable of healing themselves.”
Cited: Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 502 A.2d 1057, 1065 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).

Elements (from Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977)):

  1. Intentional or reckless conduct.
  2. Extreme and outrageous conduct.
  3. Causal connection between the conduct and the emotional distress.
  4. Severe emotional distress.

“Severe” is interpreted strictly:

  • Distress must be “so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.”
    Cited: Harris, 380 A.2d at 616 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j (1965)).
  • The plaintiff must effectively allege an inability “to function or to tend to necessary matters.”
    Cited: Haines v. Vogel, 249 A.3d 151, 165 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2021).
b. Application to Anderson’s Allegations

Anderson alleged:

“[H]e suffered physical and/or non-physical injury, sustained economic damages for the cost of medical/mental health care expenses and lost wages as well as non-economic damages for the pain, suffering, fear, fright, humiliation, inconvenience, embarrassment and severe emotional distress for the totality of the events that he was forced to endure.”
— J.A. 60

These are the sorts of harms typically alleged in tort actions (pain, suffering, humiliation, embarrassment). What is missing is any allegation that:

  • He could no longer function in daily life, or
  • He was unable to handle basic “necessary matters” (work, family, self-care, etc.).

Under Maryland’s narrow view of IIED, such a showing is required. Because Anderson’s pleading stops at generalized assertions of distress and financial harm, the Fourth Circuit agrees that he failed to state an IIED claim. The bar remains high and is not satisfied by ordinary emotional consequences of arrest and prosecution, however serious those may feel.

E. Claims Against Baltimore County

1. District Court’s Reasons for Dismissal

The district court dismissed Baltimore County on three distinct grounds:

  1. Common-law tort immunity: County immune from suit for certain common-law torts (false arrest, false imprisonment, etc.) under Maryland governmental immunity doctrines.
  2. No underlying Maryland constitutional violation: Without such a violation, the County cannot be vicariously liable for any alleged Maryland Declaration of Rights claims.
  3. No underlying federal constitutional violation / Monell: A Monell claim requires an underlying constitutional deprivation and a municipal policy or custom that is its “moving force.” The district court found both lacking.
    • Cited in the opinion’s footnote: Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978); Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999).

2. Lack of Appellate Challenge

On appeal, Anderson did not directly confront any of these three determinations. Instead, he advanced a different theory:

  • That the State’s Attorney was acting as a County (not State) employee.
  • That the County therefore should be liable for the State’s Attorney’s alleged Brady violations.

The Fourth Circuit quickly rejects this for two reasons:

  1. Contradiction with the pleadings:
    Anderson’s own Amended Complaint alleged:
    “[A]t all relevant times [the] attorneys within the Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore County were State employees whose actions were committed within the scope of their employment and for the benefit of the State.”
    — J.A. 51 (emphasis added)
    Having affirmatively pleaded that prosecutors were State employees, Anderson cannot argue on appeal that they were County employees to create County liability.
  2. Court’s limited role in rewriting complaints:
    The court reiterates that neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals is obliged to rewrite an attorney-drafted complaint to add theories the plaintiff never alleged. This ties back to the earlier discussion regarding leniency for pro se litigants vs. expectations for licensed counsel.

Because the district court’s unchallenged grounds already support dismissal, and because Anderson’s new County-employee theory conflicts with his own pleadings, the County’s dismissal is affirmed.

F. Appellate Practice Lessons and Structural Themes

The opinion, though brief, underscores several important systemic points:

  1. Waiver and briefing discipline:
    • Arguments not properly developed in the opening brief are waived.
    • Conclusive one-line assertions do not preserve issues (abuse of process, prosecutorial immunity, several constitutional claims).
  2. Distinction between represented parties and pro se litigants:
    • Counsel-drafted complaints are not liberally construed to create unpled causes of action.
    • Counsel is expected to know—and respect—controlling precedent (e.g., Maryland v. Pringle).
  3. Pleading from the right perspective:
    • For probable cause, it is not enough to allege personal innocence; plaintiffs must address what a reasonable officer in the defendants’ position knew or could infer.
  4. Brady damages claims are outcome-dependent:
    • Without an adverse adjudicative outcome (conviction or similar), Brady prejudice is generally absent, barring damages claims framed under Brady.
  5. High bar for IIED:
    • Maryland’s IIED cause of action is exceptional; courts demand concrete allegations of incapacitating emotional harm, not merely distress in the ordinary sense.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Probable Cause in Vehicle-Drug Arrests

Probable cause is a “reasonable belief” standard. Officers do not need proof beyond a reasonable doubt, only enough facts to justify a reasonable person in believing the suspect committed a crime.

In the vehicle-drug context (under Maryland v. Pringle):

  • If drugs are found in a car and no one admits ownership, officers can often reasonably conclude any or all occupants may jointly possess the drugs.
  • Absent facts clearly exculpating a specific occupant (e.g., the person clearly just entered, drugs located only in another’s personal container), officers may have probable cause to arrest everyone.

Therefore, to allege no probable cause, a civil plaintiff must explain:

  • What the officers saw or knew; and
  • Why, from that viewpoint, it was unreasonable to believe the plaintiff was involved.

2. Brady Obligations and Civil Brady Claims

Under Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83 (1963)), prosecutors (and police, through them) must disclose evidence favorable to the accused when it is material to guilt or punishment. A classical Brady violation requires:

  1. Favorable evidence.
  2. Suppression by the prosecution.
  3. Materiality—reasonable probability of a different result in the criminal case.

In the § 1983 damages context, many courts, including the Fourth Circuit here, assume that if the criminal charges are dropped before conviction, there is no Brady prejudice because the defendant achieved the relief Brady is meant to protect: no criminal penalty based on an unfair trial.

3. Absolute vs. Qualified Immunity

  • Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity:
    • Shields prosecutors from damages suits for actions closely tied to the judicial process—charging decisions, prosecuting, advocacy in court, and Brady disclosures (or non-disclosures).
    • Applies even if the actions are alleged to be malicious or in bad faith.
  • Qualified Immunity (for officers):
    • Shields police officers from damages unless they violated “clearly established” constitutional rights.
    • Analyzed case-by-case; not at issue in this appeal because claims were disposed of at the pleading stage.

4. Monell Municipal Liability

Under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., a city or county is not automatically liable for its employees’ constitutional violations. Liability attaches only if:

  1. A municipal “policy” or “custom” exists (could be a formal rule, a widespread practice, or a decision by a final policymaker); and
  2. That policy or custom is the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.

Thus, to sue a county under § 1983, a plaintiff must:

  • Plead an actual constitutional violation (e.g., arrest without probable cause); and
  • Allege that the county’s policy or failure to train/ supervise caused that violation.

Anderson’s Monell theory failed because the court found no adequately pleaded constitutional violations, and he did not meaningfully press the Monell issues on appeal.

5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

IIED in Maryland is an extraordinary tort. It is not meant for every distressing or humiliating experience. Instead, it is reserved for:

  • Truly shocking, outrageous conduct; and
  • Emotional harm that essentially disables the plaintiff from functioning in ordinary life.

Saying “I suffered severe emotional distress” is not enough; plaintiffs must plead facts showing:

  • Diagnosed psychiatric injury, or
  • Long-term inability to work, socialize, or perform basic tasks, etc.

V. Impact and Significance

1. Persuasive, Not Binding, but Still Important

Because the opinion is unpublished, it does not constitute binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit. However, district courts and practitioners will likely treat it as persuasive in several recurring contexts:

  • Civil suits arising from arrests of passengers in vehicles where drugs are found.
  • Brady-based § 1983 claims where charges ended in dismissal rather than conviction.
  • IIED claims arising from ordinary law-enforcement encounters.

2. Clarifying Pleading Requirements for Lack of Probable Cause

The opinion reflects and reinforces post-Iqbal expectations:

  • Plaintiffs must allege fact-based reasons why a reasonable officer, knowing what the officer actually knew (or should have known), lacked probable cause.
  • Subjective claims of innocence, detached from the officer’s perspective, are insufficient.
  • In the wake of Maryland v. Pringle, plaintiffs in passenger-drug cases face a steep uphill battle unless they can point to concrete facts that would have exonerated them in the eyes of a reasonable officer.

3. Limiting Civil Brady Damages to Adverse Outcomes

By holding that charges dismissed without conviction foreclose Brady prejudice, the opinion:

  • Signals that Brady-based § 1983 claims in the Fourth Circuit will generally require a conviction or comparable adverse judgment.
  • Aligns with other circuits (e.g., the Sixth in McCune) that treat dismissal as negating Brady prejudice.
  • Encourages plaintiffs’ counsel to consider alternative theories (e.g., wrongful detention under the Fourth Amendment) rather than Brady when the prosecution ends favorably.

4. Reinforcing Maryland’s High Bar for IIED

The decision confirms that IIED remains a rarely successful cause of action in Maryland, particularly in the criminal-justice context, unless there is extraordinary, incapacitating emotional harm. Lawyers should consider reserving IIED for the most extreme scenarios rather than adding it as a routine “catch-all” count.

5. Appellate and Litigation Practice

The opinion carries several practice messages for the bar:

  • Respect binding precedent. Reliance on a state-court decision reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court drew explicit judicial rebuke.
  • Preserve issues properly. Failure to argue issues in the opening brief (or to argue them at all in the district court) leads to waiver.
  • Plead your theories clearly. Courts will not invent negligence claims or County-employee theories where the complaint pleads otherwise, especially when drafted by counsel.

VI. Conclusion

Anderson v. Baltimore County is an unpublished but instructive Fourth Circuit decision clarifying multiple aspects of civil litigation arising from arrests and prosecutions:

  • To challenge vehicle-drug arrests of passengers, plaintiffs must plead facts from the officer’s point of view that negate the reasonable inferences recognized by Maryland v. Pringle.
  • Absolute prosecutorial immunity continues to bar damages suits for prosecutorial actions closely tied to the judicial process, including alleged Brady violations and decisions to prosecute.
  • Brady-based § 1983 damages claims require prejudice, which typically means an adverse adjudicative outcome; dismissal of charges cuts against such claims.
  • Maryland’s IIED doctrine demands allegations of incapacitating emotional harm, not merely pain, humiliation, or distress.
  • Counsel must plead all intended causes of action and theories cleanly and must brief issues fully on appeal to avoid waiver.

For practitioners, the case underscores the need for careful fact pleading, rigorous attention to governing precedent, and precise appellate advocacy. While it breaks no doctrinal ground, it consolidates and applies existing principles in ways that will shape how similar cases are litigated and decided in the Fourth Circuit and in Maryland federal courts.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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