No Posthumous Payments Under IRA § 22007(e): Sixth Circuit Holds “Financial Assistance” Is Forward‑Looking and Limited to Living Farmers

Introduction

In Black Farmers & Agriculturalists Association v. Rollins, the Sixth Circuit resolved whether Congress’s directive in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA), § 22007(e), authorizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) “to provide financial assistance … to farmers … determined to have experienced discrimination in USDA farm lending programs,” permits payments on applications submitted on behalf of deceased farmers (so‑called “legacy claims”). The panel held it does not. Reading “assistance” in its ordinary, forward‑looking sense, the court concluded the statute requires that the recipient be alive and able to be “assisted.” Consequently, the USDA’s Discrimination Financial Assistance Program (DFAP) could not accept applications reporting only discrimination against individuals who were already deceased when the application was filed.

The plaintiffs—Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association, Inc. and several individual members—challenged the USDA’s exclusion of legacy claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Judge Readler authored the opinion for the court, joined by Judge Mathis. Judge White concurred in part and dissented in part, emphasizing that Congress’s chosen metric for relief reflects compensatory features and urging a narrower rule: legacy claims should be eligible where the discriminated-against farmer was alive when the statute took effect.

Background

Decades of allegations of racial discrimination in USDA farm lending culminated in the Pigford I and Pigford II settlements (together exceeding $2 billion).
In 2021, Congress enacted ARPA § 1006, which used race-based classifications to deliver debt relief to “socially disadvantaged farmers,” precipitating equal protection challenges and prompting repeal and replacement in 2022 by IRA § 22007.
IRA § 22007(e) appropriated $2.2 billion “to provide financial assistance” to farmers “determined to have experienced discrimination.” USDA implemented DFAP and deemed applications “reporting only discrimination against an individual who was deceased at the time of the application” “facially ineligible.”
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the legacy-claim exclusion and to compel USDA to accept applications on behalf of deceased relatives. The district court denied preliminary relief and dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs appealed and separately sought emergency relief pending appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and denied as moot the request for an injunction pending appeal. Central to the decision is statutory interpretation: before evaluating an APA challenge under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, a court must first determine the boundaries of the agency’s delegated authority. Applying Loper Bright’s post‑Chevron framework, the court independently construed § 22007(e) and held that “financial assistance” is forward‑looking help for a living person—either task‑based or need‑based—and cannot be paid to someone already deceased. Because the statute itself forecloses posthumous awards, USDA lacked discretion to accept legacy claims, and the APA claim failed at the threshold.

The court rejected a host of counterarguments: that “assistance” should be read to include compensation; that ARPA § 1006 supplied an operative definition; that paying estates would “assist” farmers indirectly; that policy fairness and program consistency compelled a different reading; and that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 required a contrary outcome. The court also found the due process claim forfeited and, independently, meritless because § 22007(e) creates no protected entitlement to benefits for the plaintiffs.

Judge White concurred in part and dissented in part. While agreeing that § 22007(e) contemplates applicants capable of being assisted, she underscored that Congress tied eligibility to “consequences” of past discrimination, a compensatory framing. She would allow legacy claims where the injured farmer was alive when the statute took effect, even if the farmer died before application or payment.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024): The court relied on Loper Bright’s instruction that, before reviewing an agency action for arbitrariness, courts must independently “fix the boundaries of the delegated authority.” Applying that first‑principles, no‑deference approach, the Sixth Circuit interpreted § 22007(e) de novo and found no discretion for USDA to accept legacy claims.
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983): Cited to frame what “arbitrary and capricious” review entails—but the court did not reach that inquiry because the statute foreclosed USDA’s purported discretion.
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012): Directed the court to ordinary meaning, prompting a dictionaries‑and‑usage analysis of “assistance,” “help,” and “aid,” all of which point to present/future support, not backward‑looking compensation to the dead.
McMullen v. Wakulla County Board of County Commissioners, 650 F. App’x 703 (11th Cir. 2016), and Harpole v. Arkansas DHS, 820 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1987): These decisions distinguish “financial assistance” (subsidy/support) from “compensation” (payments for past injury), reinforcing the court’s textual reading.
In re Griffith, 206 F.3d 1389 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), and Thompson v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 821 (2025): Invoked for the proposition that Congress knows how to authorize compensatory, including posthumous, payments when it wishes. The court contrasted the Civil Liberties Act’s explicit allowance of payments for deceased persons with § 22007(e)’s silence on posthumous awards.
Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999) and In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation (Pigford II), 820 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2011): Used to situate Congress’s and USDA’s prior compensatory approach to discrimination in farm lending, which expressly contemplated payments to estates and survivors—unlike § 22007(e), which uses the forward‑looking term “assistance.”
Badgerow v. Walters, 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022): Cited to emphasize that policy concerns cannot overcome a clear statutory text. Even robust fairness arguments could not expand “assistance” to cover legacy claims.
Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, 668 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2012): Supports the inference that omission of a definition or term in the replacement statute signals Congressional choice not to import the prior scheme or meaning.
Weatherford U.S., L.P. v. U.S. Department of Labor, Admin. Review Board, 68 F.4th 1030 (6th Cir. 2023): Explained survivability of compensatory claims—relevant only to show why Pigford could properly pay estates, but inapposite because § 22007(e) does not create a compensatory cause of action.
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639 (2012), and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810): Used to dispose of plaintiffs’ reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1982—an earlier, more general statute cannot override a later, more specific enactment, and in any event there was no impairment of a property interest caused by § 22007(e).
Fields v. Henry County, 701 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2012), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972): Provided the framework for procedural due process and the need for a cognizable “claim of entitlement,” which plaintiffs lacked under § 22007(e).
Joseph Forrester Trucking v. Director, OWCP, 987 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2021), and Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail, 53 F.4th 939 (6th Cir. 2022): Applied to hold several arguments forfeited for inadequate briefing, cabining the case to the legacy‑claims exclusion and due process challenge.
Holman v. Vilsack, 117 F.4th 906 (6th Cir. 2024): Contextualized why Congress replaced ARPA § 1006 with IRA § 22007—ARPA’s race‑based regime drew equal protection defeats, leading Congress to pivot to a race‑neutral, discrimination‑focused standard in § 22007.

Legal Reasoning

Threshold statutory interpretation controls. The court began not with APA harshness review but with Loper Bright’s threshold inquiry: whether the statute authorizes the agency’s policy choice. Section 22007(e) authorizes “financial assistance” to farmers “determined to have experienced discrimination.”
Ordinary meaning of “assistance.” Consulting dictionaries, the court identified two ordinary senses—task‑based and need‑based assistance—and emphasized both are forward‑looking. A deceased person can neither complete tasks nor have present needs relieved by money. Thus, “money … cannot ‘assist’ a deceased farmer.”
Assistance versus compensation. Plaintiffs’ claims are better characterized as seeking “compensation” for past harm suffered by deceased farmers. Congress uses “compensation” when it intends backward‑looking payments (e.g., the Civil Liberties Act’s explicit provision for payments to “deceased persons”), underscoring the import of § 22007(e)’s different choice of words.
Statutory structure and context. The surrounding subsections of § 22007 fund forward‑looking activities: outreach, mediation, land access, commission work, research, education, and extension. Section 22007 originated in pandemic‑relief legislation with a prospective bent. Against that backdrop, reading “assistance” to authorize posthumous remedial payments would be discordant.
Pigford comparison. Pigford settlements dealt in compensatory claims, which by their nature can survive the claimant’s death. That logic does not carry to § 22007(e), which creates no cause of action and provides assistance—not compensation.
Rejection of counterarguments:
- ARPA § 1006 supplied no operative definition of “assistance.” A section heading is not a definition; Congress chose not to define “assistance” in § 22007, and the omission is meaningful.
- Assisting heirs or estates is not assisting “farmers.” An estate is a collection of property, not a “farmer who experienced discrimination.” Assistance must be to the farmer.
- Policy fairness cannot override text. Badgerow forecloses policy‑driven expansions of clear statutory commands. Anyway, present farmers can apply if they themselves experienced discrimination (e.g., as current holders of discriminatory debt), as the government conceded.
- DFAP’s acceptance of “Potential Producers” does not change the meaning of “assistance.” That goes to the USDA’s interpretation of “farmers,” not at issue here.
- Alleged inconsistency in payments to applicants who later die lacks record support and, in any event, does not affect the statute’s meaning. Agencies cannot know at filing whether an applicant will die.
- Statutory purpose arguments fail. The court declined to import a compensation‑centric purpose into text that speaks only of “assistance,” particularly given the structure and the compensatory work already done by Pigford I & II.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1982. No conflict exists: § 22007(e) does not impair anyone’s right to inherit property; any diminution flows from prior discrimination, not from § 22007(e). And specific, later statutes govern over earlier general ones.
- Loper Bright. Plaintiffs asked the court not to defer to USDA; the court agreed and applied independent judgment, arriving at the same conclusion USDA reached for different reasons.
Due process. Plaintiffs forfeited their procedural due process argument. Independently, they lack a protected property interest because § 22007(e) confers no entitlement to benefits for legacy claims.

The Concurrence/Dissent: A Narrower Limitation and a Recognized Compensatory Element

Judge White agreed that § 22007(e) contemplates recipients capable of being assisted, but she stressed that Congress measured relief by the “consequences” of past discrimination, which sounds in compensation. Noting DFAP’s acknowledgment of former farmers and “Potential Producers,” she argued the program is not confined to assisting ongoing operations. On that reading, she would permit “legacy claims brought on behalf of farmers who were alive when the statute took effect,” rejecting the categorical ban the majority endorsed.

Practically, Judge White’s view would preserve eligibility where Congress’s benefits vested while the injured farmer lived, preventing abatement by death before filing or payment. The majority did not resolve this vesting‑at‑enactment question, leaving it as a potential site of further litigation.

Impact and Implications

Immediate Programmatic Effects

Within the Sixth Circuit, DFAP cannot consider applications reporting only discrimination against individuals deceased at the time of application. USDA’s exclusion of such legacy claims is not merely permissible; it is required by § 22007(e).
Applicants with inherited, still‑outstanding discriminatory debts may apply in their own right as “current holders,” consistent with USDA’s concession and the court’s reading of “experienced discrimination.” Applicants may also attempt to show how discrimination against their predecessors constituted discrimination against them personally.
Estate‑based strategies are foreclosed absent an express statutory authorization for posthumous or estate payments.

Textual Drafting Lessons for Congress

Word choice matters. If Congress intends backward‑looking remedial payments, it should use “compensation,” define the term, and expressly authorize payments to estates or survivors—as it did in the Civil Liberties Act. Using “assistance” without more will be read as forward‑looking support limited to living recipients.
Structural context will be read holistically. Placement among prospective, programmatic appropriations and a pandemic‑relief lineage will tilt meaning toward forward‑looking aid.

Administrative Law After Loper Bright

Statutory boundary‑setting is a gatekeeper. Plaintiffs cannot leap to arbitrary‑and‑capricious review where the statute admits of no discretion for the agency to do what plaintiffs want. Expect more APA cases to be resolved at the threshold by textual analysis rather than policymaking review.
Headings and non‑operative text have limited weight. Courts will be reluctant to import definitions from headings or prior, repealed statutes.

Equity and Civil Rights Remediation

The opinion underscores a legal boundary: forward‑looking assistance programs are not a vehicle to re‑open or expand compensatory regimes unless Congress speaks clearly.
For communities alleging historical discrimination, the path to estate or survivor relief will likely require explicit legislative authorization. Pigford remains the exemplar of that approach; § 22007(e) is not its continuation.

Unresolved Questions and Potential Litigation

Vesting and abatement: Judge White’s suggestion raises whether eligibility “vests” for a farmer alive on the statute’s effective date such that subsequent death does not bar payment. The majority did not decide this, and future cases may test it.
Definition of “farmer”: DFAP’s inclusion of “Potential Producers” might invite litigation over whether USDA correctly construed “farmers,” though that issue was not presented in this case.
Circuit alignment: No countervailing circuit decisions are identified. If other circuits adopt different readings—especially on the vesting/abatement question—a split could emerge.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Financial “assistance” versus “compensation”: Assistance is forward‑looking help for current needs or tasks (e.g., subsidies, training, debt restructuring). Compensation is backward‑looking money to make amends for past harm (e.g., damages, redress payments), and it can often be paid to estates if a statute or cause of action allows.
Legacy claims: Applications filed on behalf of deceased persons based on harms they suffered in life. This decision holds DFAP cannot entertain them because § 22007(e) speaks in terms of assistance to farmers—not estates—and the deceased cannot be “assisted.”
Forfeiture on appeal: Arguments not adequately briefed are generally treated as forfeited and will not be addressed.
Due process “property interest”: To claim procedural due process, a plaintiff needs a legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit under law. A discretionary or inapplicable benefit confers no protected interest.
Specific governs the general: When two statutes conflict, the more specific (and often the later‑enacted) statute controls over the broader one.

Conclusion

Black Farmers & Agriculturalists Association v. Rollins establishes a clear and consequential rule: IRA § 22007(e)’s authorization of “financial assistance” is forward‑looking and limited to living farmers; it does not permit posthumous payments on legacy claims. Anchored in ordinary meaning, statutory structure, and legislative context—and framed by Loper Bright’s insistence on independent judicial boundary‑setting—the decision forecloses an APA challenge to USDA’s categorical exclusion of legacy claims and defeats a due process theory predicated on a non‑existent entitlement.

Judge White’s partial dissent highlights a plausible middle path grounded in the statute’s compensatory features: allowing claims where the injured farmer was alive at enactment. Whether courts will adopt that narrowing principle remains to be seen. For now, the Sixth Circuit’s textualist reading reinforces a drafting lesson for Congress: if the legislative goal is to compensate for past discrimination—including paying estates—it must say so expressly. Absent such language, agencies and courts will treat programs like § 22007(e) as prospective assistance schemes, not vehicles for posthumous redress.