No Policy from a Single Incident: Tenth Circuit Clarifies Plausibility Pleading for Title VII Disparate-Impact Claims Based on Criminal-Record Screening

Introduction

In Lawrence v. Nightingale Management, Inc., No. 25-1116 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a pro se Title VII disparate-impact claim arising from an employer’s decision not to hire an applicant after conducting a criminal background check. The panel (Judges McHugh, Moritz, and Carson) held that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to plausibly allege the existence of a specific, facially neutral employment policy or practice—a foundational element of disparate-impact liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The decision, issued as a nonprecedential order and judgment, offers a clear pleading lesson: a single hiring episode, without more, does not plausibly support the inference that an employer maintains a broad “no-hire for anyone with a criminal conviction” policy. The court further explained that citing a state regulation (here, a Colorado assisted-living regulation) is irrelevant to whether the complaint states a federal Title VII claim and, in any event, the appellant abandoned that argument on appeal.

This commentary explains the factual and procedural background, the court’s reasoning, the precedents the panel relied upon, and the opinion’s practical impact on pleading disparate-impact claims—especially those challenging criminal-record screening practices.

Summary of the Opinion

Michael Lawrence, a disbarred attorney proceeding pro se, applied to be a cook at Nightingale’s senior living facility. After a “working interview,” Nightingale extended an offer and began onboarding, including a criminal background check authorization. Hours later, Nightingale rescinded the offer. Lawrence alleged he was rejected because of his felony record and sued under Title VII, asserting a disparate-impact theory premised on an alleged Nightingale policy barring employment for anyone with a criminal conviction “more serious than a traffic offense,” regardless of the conviction’s age or job relevance. He also pointed to a Colorado regulation governing assisted living facilities and claimed Nightingale should have applied a five-factor analysis instead of imposing a blanket ban.

The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that Lawrence had not plausibly alleged a specific employment policy and that a single episode could not support the inference of a blanket rule. The court also found no basis for importing a state regulation into the Title VII analysis. The Tenth Circuit affirmed de novo. It underscored that, at the pleading stage, courts accept well-pleaded facts but not conclusory assertions or unwarranted inferences. The alleged “blanket policy” was not plausibly supported by the complaint’s facts, particularly because Lawrence had multiple felony convictions involving dishonesty, which were not obviously irrelevant to a cook position in a senior living setting. The court also noted that Lawrence abandoned reliance on the Colorado regulation on appeal and, in any event, it was irrelevant to the Title VII claim.

The court granted Lawrence leave to proceed in forma pauperis but affirmed dismissal. The order is nonbinding except under standard preclusion doctrines, though it may be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

Case Background

Employer and position: Nightingale Management, Inc., operating a senior living facility in Littleton, Colorado; position was a cook.
Applicant and events: After a working interview and an offer, Lawrence completed onboarding paperwork authorizing a criminal background check. The offer was rescinded the same day. Lawrence alleged the chef confirmed the background result as the reason, despite proffered alternative explanations.
EEOC proceedings: Lawrence filed a charge alleging Title VII discrimination based on national origin/ancestry (Hispanic). He received a right-to-sue letter in December 2023.
District court action: Lawrence’s complaint asserted disparate impact under Title VII, alleging Nightingale maintained a “no-criminal-conviction” hiring policy and should have applied a five-factor test from a Colorado regulation (6 Colo. Code Regs. § 1011-1:7-7). Nightingale moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Magistrate recommendation and district court ruling: The magistrate recommended dismissal, concluding Lawrence failed to plausibly allege a specific employment policy or practice and offering no authority that failure to follow a state regulation can ground a Title VII disparate-impact claim. The district court overruled objections and dismissed without prejudice.
Appeal: Lawrence appealed; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)

Teamsters footnote 15 is a canonical touchstone distinguishing disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) from disparate impact (facially neutral practices with adverse effects on protected groups). The Tenth Circuit invoked Teamsters to emphasize that a disparate-impact claimant must identify a “facially neutral employment policy or practice” that allegedly produced the disparity. Without a specific policy or practice, courts cannot assess causation or apply Title VII’s framework (including potential employer defenses such as job-relatedness and business necessity).

2. Gaddy v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 148 F.4th 1202 (10th Cir. 2025)

Gaddy supplied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard: courts accept well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences for the plaintiff but need not accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions. Relying on Gaddy, the panel concluded that alleging a sweeping, categorical “no-hire for anyone with a conviction” policy from a single rescinded offer is an unwarranted inference, particularly where the plaintiff’s own circumstances (multiple convictions for dishonesty) do not fit the “no matter whether the conviction relates to the job” phrasing.

Legal Reasoning

A. The indispensable “specific policy or practice” element

The court held that Lawrence’s complaint did not plausibly allege a specific, facially neutral policy or practice. Although the complaint asserted Nightingale “has an employment policy” barring anyone with convictions more serious than a traffic offense, the only factual support was Lawrence’s single experience. That lone episode, the panel explained, “bears little relation to the employment policy alleged” because:

Lawrence had three felony convictions, not one.
His convictions were “significantly more serious than a traffic offense.”
All involved fraud, deceit, or dishonesty—factors not obviously irrelevant to working in a senior living facility.

On these facts, alleging a categorical, across-the-board ban “no matter whether the conviction has any relation to the job” was not a reasonable inference. It was a conclusory statement disconnected from the pleaded event. Under Gaddy’s plausibility standard, such a mismatch between factual context and the alleged policy dooms the complaint.

B. Why one incident is not enough

The court underscored a familiar but often overlooked pleading principle in disparate-impact cases: isolated decision-making does not itself reveal an employer-wide, facially neutral practice. The inference that “this happened to me, therefore it is the policy” is insufficient. Plaintiffs generally need facts suggesting the existence of a rule, standard, or recurring practice—such as written policy language, consistent HR procedures applied to multiple applicants, publicized criteria, or other indicators that transform a one-off decision into a policy or pattern.

C. The Colorado assisted-living regulation was irrelevant to Title VII’s elements

The complaint’s reliance on a Colorado regulation prescribing a five-factor approach for assisted-living facilities (6 Colo. Code Regs. § 1011-1:7-7) did not assist the Title VII claim. The panel noted the issue was abandoned on appeal and, in any event, was immaterial to the federal analysis. Title VII requires a plaintiff to plead and prove the federal elements of a disparate-impact claim; a state regulation neither supplies a private right of action under Title VII nor substitutes for the necessary federal showing of a specific policy and a causal disparity.

D. Pleading plausibility and “unwarranted inferences”

The panel recited and applied the bedrock Rule 12(b)(6) principle: well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, but courts will not credit conclusory allegations or “unwarranted inferences.” The unwarranted inference here was the leap from a single rescinded offer to a sweeping, categorical “no-hire” policy that disregards job-relatedness—an allegation that did not reasonably flow from the facts alleged about the plaintiff’s own convictions and the job context.

Impact and Practical Implications

1. What this decision clarifies

Pleading a disparate-impact claim requires more than an anecdote: Plaintiffs must allege facts plausibly suggesting a specific, facially neutral policy or practice. A single rescinded offer after a background check, without more, does not reasonably imply a blanket policy.
Allegations must fit the facts: Courts will measure the reasonableness of inferences against the pleaded facts. If the facts suggest job-related concerns (e.g., crimes of dishonesty in a setting serving vulnerable populations), a “no matter job relevance” allegation will look implausible.
State regulations do not substitute for Title VII’s elements: Failing to follow a state regulation does not, without more, state a federal disparate-impact claim under Title VII.

2. For plaintiffs considering criminal-record disparate-impact theories

The opinion does not foreclose disparate-impact challenges to criminal-record screening. It reinforces that such claims must be pled with specificity and plausibility:

Identify the specific employer practice (e.g., “no-hire for any felony,” “X-year lookback on theft-related felonies,” or a particular scoring matrix used by a vendor).
Plead facts supporting the practice’s existence (policy documents, application forms, consistent communications, public postings, or multiple comparable instances).
Connect that practice to a statistically significant disparity for a protected group in the relevant applicant or labor pool—not just statewide crime statistics divorced from the employer’s applicant base or locality.
If available, allege the lack of job-relatedness or business necessity, or the availability of less discriminatory alternatives, while recognizing these are typically addressed after a policy and disparity are plausibly alleged.

3. For employers and counsel

Policies matter: Written, consistently applied screening criteria are more defensible and make it easier to show job-relatedness and consistency with business necessity if challenged.
Avoid overbroad categorical bans: Even at the pleading stage, a policy that appears to disregard job-relatedness can invite scrutiny. Tailored policies that consider the nature of the offense, time elapsed, and job duties are safer.
Document the decision basis: Where permissible, contemporaneous documentation can show individualized assessment and reduce the risk that a single adverse action is miscast as a sweeping policy.

4. The opinion’s limits

Nonprecedential: The order is not binding precedent in the Tenth Circuit, though it may be cited for persuasive value under FRAP 32.1 and the Tenth Circuit’s local rule.
Narrow holding: The court resolved only the sufficiency of the pleading. It did not decide whether a well-pled disparate-impact challenge to a criminal-record policy could succeed, nor did it reach defenses like job-relatedness and business necessity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Title VII disparate impact: A theory of liability where a facially neutral policy (one that applies to everyone) disproportionately harms a protected group (such as race or national origin), even without discriminatory intent.
Facially neutral policy or practice: A rule or criterion that does not explicitly reference a protected trait but can still produce unequal outcomes. Examples include standardized tests, background-check thresholds, or minimum experience requirements.
Specificity requirement: Plaintiffs must identify the particular policy or practice they allege caused the disparity; vague references to “hiring practices” are insufficient.
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss: A mechanism for testing whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Courts accept factual allegations as true but disregard legal conclusions and unreasonable inferences.
Plausibility standard: A complaint must plead enough factual content to allow a reasonable inference of liability; it must show more than a mere possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully.
Unwarranted inference: A leap from facts to a conclusion that does not reasonably follow. In this case, inferring a broad policy from a single adverse decision.
Right-to-sue letter: A notice from the EEOC authorizing a complainant to file a Title VII lawsuit after the agency has processed the charge.
In forma pauperis: Permission to proceed without paying filing fees due to indigence; granted here on appeal.

How the Court Applied These Principles to the Facts

The panel assessed whether the complaint plausibly alleged that Nightingale maintained a blanket rule barring applicants with any convictions more serious than a traffic offense, regardless of job relevance or time elapsed. It concluded no, because:

The complaint relied on a single event—one rescinded offer.
The plaintiff’s own criminal history (multiple felonies involving dishonesty) and the work setting (senior living) undercut the allegation that Nightingale’s decision disregarded job relevance.
The alleged policy’s breadth (covering “any” conviction above a traffic offense and “no matter” job relation) was not reflected in the described interaction.

Additionally, although the complaint referenced a Colorado assisted-living regulation that contemplates a multi-factor approach to applicant screening, the Tenth Circuit deemed that regulatory reference irrelevant to whether the complaint stated a federal Title VII claim, and noted that the appellant did not press the point on appeal.

What the Court Did Not Decide

Whether a properly pled challenge to a categorical “no felonies” policy could proceed under Title VII’s disparate-impact framework.
Whether Lawrence’s statistical assertions (e.g., felony conviction rates among Hispanics in Colorado) would suffice to demonstrate disparity in the relevant labor pool had a specific policy been plausibly alleged.
Whether Nightingale could demonstrate job-relatedness and business necessity for any criminal-record policy, or whether less discriminatory alternatives were available.

Takeaways and Practice Guidance

For plaintiffs

Anchor the claim to a clearly described policy or practice. Consider attaching or quoting policy language, job postings, onboarding materials, or consistent employer statements that reveal the criterion.
Allege facts beyond your own case if available—other applicants treated similarly, public representations, or patterns observed through credible sources.
Tie your disparity allegations to the employer’s actual applicant pool and relevant geography; generic statewide statistics are often insufficient standing alone.
Avoid overbroad characterizations of the policy (e.g., “no matter job relevance”) that the specific facts of your experience do not support.

For employers

Draft and train on narrowly tailored screening policies that consider nature of the offense, job duties, time since conviction, and evidence of rehabilitation.
Vet third-party background-screening practices to ensure they align with your tailored criteria and applicable law.
Maintain documentation of individualized assessments where appropriate; consistency and records can help defeat allegations of a blanket rule.

Conclusion

Lawrence v. Nightingale Management clarifies, in persuasive terms, a crucial pleading threshold for Title VII disparate-impact claims in the Tenth Circuit: plaintiffs must plausibly allege a specific, facially neutral employment policy or practice, and they cannot bootstrap a sweeping “company policy” from a single, fact-bound decision—especially when the alleged policy’s features do not fit the pleaded facts. The opinion also underscores that state regulatory frameworks do not displace Title VII’s elements and that reliance on such regulations, without more, is immaterial to the federal pleading analysis.

While nonprecedential, the decision provides concrete guidance to litigants and courts grappling with criminal-record screening challenges: specificity and plausibility are paramount. Plaintiffs who identify a discrete policy and tether it to credible, employer-specific disparities stand the best chance of proceeding beyond the pleading stage; employers that tailor and document their screening criteria are best positioned to defend them.