Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date: November 7, 2025

Docket No.: 24-13279 (Non-Argument Calendar; Not for Publication)

Panel: ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and WILSON, Circuit Judges (per curiam)

Introduction

In this unpublished per curiam decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. in a Georgia dram shop action brought by Jamila Hambrick, administrator of the estate of her late husband, Derrick Khalid Hambrick. The central evidentiary issue was whether a statement recorded in a police report—attributed to the intoxicated driver (and Wells Fargo employee) Maurice Watson, who allegedly told an officer he was leaving “a work function”—could be considered at summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The case sits at the intersection of federal evidentiary rules and Georgia’s dram shop statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b). It tests how plaintiffs can (and cannot) oppose summary judgment where their key proof of a vendor’s/host’s “furnishing” alcohol is a single out-of-court assertion captured by law enforcement in the immediate aftermath of a crash. The Eleventh Circuit held that:

• Police reports do not automatically admit third-party statements under the public records exception, Rule 803(8);
• Statements against interest under Rule 804(b)(3) require true unavailability under Rule 804(a), which was not met here; and
• The residual exception under Rule 807 is narrow and not satisfied by a lone, uncorroborated statement from an intoxicated declarant.

Without that statement, the plaintiff had no admissible evidence that Wells Fargo “sold, furnished, or served” alcohol to Watson, an indispensable element of Georgia dram shop liability. The decision underscores the high evidentiary bar plaintiffs face at summary judgment in dram shop litigation and the limited role of police-report hearsay in federal court.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary and summary judgment rulings. It held that Watson’s purported statement to an officer—“he was coming from a work function” after consuming two whiskies—was inadmissible hearsay and could not be considered at summary judgment. The statement did not qualify as:

• a public record under Rule 803(8), because it was a third-party assertion embedded in a police report;
• a statement against interest under Rule 804(b)(3), because Watson was not “unavailable” within the meaning of Rule 804(a); or
• a residual-exception statement under Rule 807, due to insufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and the availability of more probative, admissible proofs (which were, in fact, lacking).

Absent that statement, the record contained no admissible evidence that Wells Fargo furnished alcohol to Watson on the night in question—no event records, no corporate charges, and no corroborating witnesses. Because Georgia’s dram shop statute requires proof that the defendant actually “sold, furnished, or served” alcohol (in addition to knowledge elements), summary judgment for Wells Fargo was proper.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

• Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 802: Defines hearsay and the general rule of exclusion. The court anchored its exclusion of Watson’s out-of-court statement on these baseline principles.
• Fed. R. Evid. 803(8): Public records exception. The court relied on Eleventh Circuit precedent to hold that while a police report may be admissible for an officer’s factual observations, it does not sweep in a witness’s statements embedded in the report.
• United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2009): Clarifies that third-party statements within police reports are not admissible under Rule 803(8). This case provided the controlling framework for rejecting the plaintiff’s public-records argument.
• Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) and 804(a): Statement-against-interest exception requires declarant unavailability (e.g., death, privilege, complete lack of memory of the subject matter). The court emphasized that the proponent bears the burden to establish unavailability.
• Carrizosa v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 47 F.4th 1278 (11th Cir. 2022): Burden on proponent to prove unavailability. Guided the court’s conclusion that unavailability was not shown here.
• Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013): Memory-based unavailability under Rule 804(a)(3) applies only if the declarant lacks memory of the events to which the hearsay relates. Watson recalled his encounter with police and disputed that he came from a work event; thus, he was not “unavailable.”
• Fed. R. Evid. 807: Residual exception. The court applied the “exceptional circumstances” standard, requiring both circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and superior probative value over other reasonably obtainable evidence.
• Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2015): Factors for trustworthiness under Rule 807 (motivation, circumstances, knowledge, corroboration). These weighed against admissibility here, given the declarant’s intoxication and lack of corroboration.
• United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156 (11th Cir. 1984): Temporal proximity may support trustworthiness, but it is not dispositive where other factors detract from reliability. The court found contemporaneity insufficient to overcome reliability concerns in this record.
• Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012): At summary judgment, hearsay may be considered only if it can be reduced to admissible form at trial. Plaintiff failed to show the statement could be made admissible at trial via any exception.
• Kappa Sigma Int’l Fraternity v. Tootle, 473 S.E.2d 213 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996): On Georgia dram shop law, liability requires evidence that the defendant “sold, furnished, or served” alcohol. This authority reinforced the necessity of admissible proof on the furnishing element—completely absent here.
• Standards of Review: Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings); United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011) (abuse of discretion definition); Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2013) (de novo review of summary judgment). These framed how the appellate court evaluated the district court’s decisions.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The Police Report Did Not Make Watson’s Statement Admissible (FRE 803(8) and 805)

The plaintiff argued that because Watson’s statement appeared in a police report, it was admissible as a public record under Rule 803(8). The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, applying United Techs. v. Mazer: a police report can admit the officer’s own observations, but it does not automatically admit an un-sworn, out-of-court statement by a third party who is under no duty to report. This is classic “hearsay within hearsay” (Rule 805), and each layer must independently satisfy an exception. Here, the embedded statement did not.

B. Statement Against Interest Failed for Lack of Unavailability (FRE 804(b)(3) + 804(a))

Plaintiff alternatively invoked Rule 804(b)(3). That exception applies only when the declarant is “unavailable” under Rule 804(a). The court emphasized that the proponent bears the burden of proving unavailability. Watson had been deposed twice and could be called at trial; he remembered his interaction with police and specifically denied attending a work event, claiming officers misheard him because of slurred speech. This does not satisfy memory-based unavailability under Rule 804(a)(3), which requires a lack of memory of the underlying subject matter. Because unavailability was not shown, the Rule 804(b)(3) pathway was closed.

C. The Residual Exception Did Not Apply (FRE 807)

Plaintiff lastly sought refuge in Rule 807, the residual exception. The court reiterated that Rule 807 is reserved for truly exceptional situations and demands robust circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and a showing that the statement is more probative than other evidence that could be obtained through reasonable efforts. Although temporal proximity to the accident might sometimes support trustworthiness, here other factors cut strongly against it: the declarant’s intoxication (slurred speech, unsteadiness) and the lack of corroboration (no corporate records, no charge activity on a company card, no witnesses to a work event). The statement therefore lacked sufficient reliability and was not more probative than reasonably obtainable alternative evidence. Rule 807 did not apply.

D. No Admissible Evidence on the “Furnishing” Element of Georgia’s Dram Shop Act

With the hearsay excluded, the record did not contain admissible proof that Wells Fargo “sold, furnished, or served” alcohol to Watson on the night of the crash—an essential element under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b). The company’s corporate representative testified that no company event was held that day or the next, and corporate protocols would have generated records (e.g., vendor or catering contracts) for any such event involving alcohol. Watson testified he was “networking,” not at a work-sponsored event, and that his company card reflected no charges. Mere proof of employment, without admissible evidence that the employer actually furnished alcohol, is not enough. Under Kappa Sigma v. Tootle, the “furnishing” requirement is a threshold gate; absent proof on that element, the claim fails. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted.

3) Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and therefore non-binding, this decision has meaningful persuasive value in Eleventh Circuit district courts and offers concrete lessons for dram shop litigation and summary judgment practice:

• Police-report hearsay is not a shortcut. Plaintiffs cannot rely on witness statements embedded in police reports to create triable fact issues unless they can independently satisfy a hearsay exception for each layer of hearsay. Rule 803(8) does not automatically admit such statements.
• Rule 804(b)(3) is unavailable without true “unavailability.” A declarant who has been deposed and remembers the encounter cannot be deemed “unavailable” due to partial memory lapses or changed narratives. Parties must meet the strict requirements of Rule 804(a).
• The residual exception remains exceptional. Reliance on Rule 807 requires strong indicia of reliability and necessity. An intoxicated declarant’s uncorroborated statement will rarely suffice.
• Dram shop plaintiffs must marshal affirmative, admissible proof of “furnishing.” Employment status, job title, or equivocal references to “networking” are not enough. Expect courts to look for: vendor contracts, event notices, bar/catering invoices, corporate card charges, attendee/witness testimony, and other corroboration.
• Summary judgment posture matters. Under Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, hearsay can be considered at summary judgment only if it can be reduced to admissible form at trial. Parties should be prepared to identify the precise exception and plan for admissible presentation.
• Scope-of-employment statements were not reached. The opinion did not analyze Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) (agent/employee admissions), and such an approach is often difficult where (a) the statement is not within the scope of agency, (b) is made to law enforcement after the fact, or (c) is otherwise unreliable. Plaintiffs contemplating this route should anticipate rigorous scrutiny.

The upshot is a litigation environment where plaintiffs in Georgia dram shop cases must secure non-hearsay evidence of the defendant’s role as the alcohol provider. Defendants, conversely, can expect that courts will strictly enforce hearsay rules and require concrete proof on the “furnishing” element before allowing a case to reach a jury.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hearsay (FRE 801(c)): An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts. Generally inadmissible unless an exception applies.
• Hearsay within Hearsay (FRE 805): When one hearsay statement contains another. Each layer must independently fit an exception to be admissible.
• Public Records Exception (FRE 803(8)): Admits certain records of public offices (like police reports) for the officer’s observations. It does not automatically admit third-party statements recorded in those reports.
• Statement Against Interest (FRE 804(b)(3)): Admits a statement so self-inculpatory that a reasonable person wouldn’t make it unless true, but only if the declarant is “unavailable” (FRE 804(a)).
• Residual Exception (FRE 807): A last-resort route for hearsay that has exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness and is more probative than other reasonably obtainable evidence. Rarely applied.
• Reducible to Admissible Form at Trial: At summary judgment, courts may consider hearsay only if the proponent shows it can be presented at trial through admissible evidence (e.g., live testimony from the declarant).
• Georgia Dram Shop Liability (O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b)): Imposes liability on one who sells/furnishes/serves alcohol to a person of lawful drinking age who is noticeably intoxicated, with knowledge the person will soon drive, when that furnishing proximately causes injury. A separate prong covers furnishing to minors who will soon drive. Proof that the defendant was the alcohol “furnisher” is essential.
• Summary Judgment: Granted when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Courts view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, but inadmissible evidence cannot defeat summary judgment.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hambrick v. Wells Fargo reinforces the discipline of federal evidentiary law at the summary judgment stage and the substantive rigor of Georgia’s dram shop statute. Plaintiffs cannot rely on third-party hearsay embedded in police reports to prove the indispensable “furnishing” element, nor can they shoehorn such statements into the statement-against-interest or residual exceptions without meeting the strict prerequisites of unavailability, trustworthiness, and necessity.

On the merits, the absence of admissible evidence that Wells Fargo served or supplied alcohol to its employee was fatal. The opinion underscores that dram shop liability in Georgia demands concrete, admissible proof that the defendant was the provider of alcohol and possessed the requisite knowledge regarding intoxication and imminent driving. As a practical matter, litigants must build their cases with authenticated records, live witness testimony, and corroborating documentation—not isolated hearsay statements in police reports.

Though unpublished, the ruling is a clear signal: in dram shop and similar negligence claims, federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit will rigorously police the evidence gate at summary judgment. The path to trial lies through admissibility.