No Plain Error on Excluding Good-Time Credits from U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(2) “Served Time” Calculations Absent Binding Precedent

Case: United States v. Eduardo Ortiz-Cervantes (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2025) (unpublished)
Posture: Pro se appeal from denial of compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)

1. Introduction

Eduardo Emilio Ortiz-Cervantes sought a sentence reduction (commonly called “compassionate release”) under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He argued (1) the district court applied the wrong version of the Sentencing Guidelines, (2) his medical circumstances were “extraordinary and compelling,” and (3) the court miscalculated the amount of time he had served—particularly as it related to age-based relief under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(2), which requires that an eligible older defendant has “served at least 10 years or 75 percent” of the term.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Although the decision is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” it is a useful illustration of the circuit’s approach to (i) issue preservation and plain-error limits in compassionate-release litigation, (ii) how courts treat minor citation mistakes in orders applying the 2023 version of § 1B1.13, and (iii) the evidentiary showing required to fit medical claims within the enumerated “extraordinary and compelling” categories in § 1B1.13(b)(1).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that the district court did not err in denying relief because:

The “good credit time” argument regarding the “served” requirement of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(2) was raised for the first time on appeal and therefore reviewed only for plain error; Ortiz-Cervantes cited no on-point binding precedent requiring district courts to include good-time credits sua sponte in that calculation, so there was no plain error.
The claim that the wrong Guidelines version was applied failed; the district court’s stray reference to “1B1.13(b)(1)” in a footnote was treated as a typographical error because the order otherwise quoted and applied the correct 2023 subsection, § 1B1.13(b)(2).
Ortiz-Cervantes did not “plainly and prominently” argue on appeal why the medical-condition ruling was wrong; the challenge was deemed abandoned, which independently supported affirmance.
Even if not abandoned, the district court correctly concluded the asserted medical grounds did not satisfy § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A)–(D) (no terminal illness with end-of-life trajectory; no showing of inability to provide self-care; no supported showing that needed long-term/specialized care was not being provided; and COVID risk was mitigable under BOP procedures of which the court could take judicial notice).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is built from a set of Eleventh Circuit procedural and compassionate-release decisions, plus standards for appellate review:

United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2021): Used for two key propositions. First, eligibility for § 3582(c)(1)(A) relief is reviewed de novo and denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Second, the district court need not reach the § 3553(a) factors if it finds no extraordinary and compelling reason (or finds dangerousness). This supports streamlined denials when one prerequisite fails.
United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2021): Provides the definition and contours of abuse-of-discretion review, emphasizing appellate deference (“range of choice”) and identifying what constitutes reversible error (wrong legal standard, improper procedure, clearly erroneous facts, or clear error of judgment). The opinion also uses Harris to support reliance on record evidence about medical treatment and to frame judicial notice of BOP mitigation measures in the COVID context.
United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2011): Supplies the “definite and firm conviction” standard for clearly erroneous factual findings—relevant to disputes over what medical records show and whether treatment is being provided.
United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2020): Establishes that issues raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error. This case is the gateway to rejecting the late-raised good-time-credit theory.
United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2012): Sets out the four-part plain-error test (error; plain; substantial rights; fairness/integrity). The panel used Pena to conclude that, without binding authority, Ortiz-Cervantes could not satisfy the “plain” requirement.
United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003): Tightens the “plainness” requirement: absent explicit statutory/rule language resolving the issue, there is no plain error without Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent directly on point. This is the decisive doctrinal lever against the good-time-credit argument.
United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789 (11th Cir. 2009): Reaffirms liberal construction of pro se filings. Importantly, liberal construction does not excuse preservation failures or the requirement to make appellate arguments clearly.
United States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2019), quoting Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014): Establishes abandonment on appeal when an argument is not “plainly and prominently” raised. This principle allowed affirmance even before reaching the medical merits.
United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2015): States that district courts have no inherent authority to modify sentences and may do so only when authorized by statute or rule—framing § 3582(c)(1)(A) as a narrow exception.
United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234 (11th Cir. 2021): Provides the now-standard Eleventh Circuit three-part compassionate-release framework: (1) § 3553(a) favors reduction; (2) extraordinary and compelling reasons exist; (3) reduction is consistent with § 1B1.13 (including safety). Tinker also supplies the crucial sequencing rule: the district court may consider factors in any order, and failure on any one is fatal.

Together, these precedents show the court treating compassionate release as a constrained, rule-bound modification mechanism, and treating appellate review as highly deferential on facts while strictly enforcing preservation and briefing norms.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Framing the legal standard (Tinker/Giron/Harris): The court began by identifying the governing review standards and the three prerequisites to relief (Tinker), plus the rule that a district court may deny without reaching every factor (Giron).
Time-served calculation and good-time credits (Innocent/Pena/Lejarde-Rada): Ortiz-Cervantes argued, for the first time on appeal, that the “served at least 10 years or 75 percent” requirement in § 1B1.13(b)(2) should include_sector good-time credits. Because it was not raised below, the court applied plain-error review (Innocent). Under Lejarde-Rada, an issue is not “plain” absent direct Supreme Court/Eleventh Circuit authority (or explicit text) resolving it. The panel found no binding precedent requiring inclusion of good-time credit in the district court’s calculation, and thus no plain error under Pena.

Practical rule emerging from the case: In the Eleventh Circuit, a defendant who wants the “served” computation to incorporate good-time credit must raise and support the argument in the district court; otherwise, the claim will almost certainly fail on appeal under the circuit’s strict plain-error doctrine.
Guidelines-version and citation accuracy: Although the district court’s order initially referenced “1B1.13(b)(1)” in a footnote when discussing age-based criteria, the Eleventh Circuit treated this as a non-material typographical mistake because the court otherwise recited and quoted the correct 2023 guideline subsection, § 1B1.13(b)(2). The appellate court looked to the substance of the analysis rather than the isolated miscitation.

Operational principle: A stray, non-substantive citation error will not justify reversal where the record shows the district court applied the correct standard.
Medical extraordinary-and-compelling reasons and abandonment (Corbett/Sapuppo): The panel first held that Ortiz-Cervantes failed to make “specific arguments” on appeal explaining why the district court’s medical ruling was erroneous, and therefore abandoned the issue. This is a recurring appellate theme: an appellant must do more than reassert disagreement; he must confront the district court’s reasoning.
Medical merits under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A)–(D): The court nevertheless addressed the merits and agreed with the district court:
- § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) (terminal illness/end-of-life trajectory): none of the conditions were shown to be terminal with an end-of-life trajectory.
- § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) (serious condition impairing self-care): Ortiz-Cervantes did not allege facts showing diminished capacity for self-care; the record supported that he could perform daily tasks.
- § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C) (needed specialized care not being provided): assertions about untreated blindness/spinal issues were not supported by evidence overcoming the medical records indicating treatment; thus no showing of withheld necessary care.
- § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D) (infectious disease emergency and unmitigable risk): COVID susceptibility did not qualify because BOP had mitigation procedures; the court noted it could take judicial notice of BOP materials.

3.3. Impact

Issue-preservation matters in compassionate release: The decision underscores that even in § 3582(c)(1)(A) proceedings—often litigated pro se—new theories (like good-time-credit inclusion) raised only on appeal face the near-insurmountable barrier of the Eleventh Circuit’s strict approach to “plain error” (Lejarde-Rada).
Evidence, not prediction, drives medical claims: Claims about potential future deterioration (e.g., “may become fully blind” or “may be confined to a wheelchair”) are insufficient without record support showing present qualifying impairment, inability to self-care, or that needed specialized care is not being provided under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)–(C).
COVID arguments continue to narrow: By relying on BOP mitigation procedures and judicial notice, the opinion reflects a post-emergency posture: generalized COVID vulnerability typically will not satisfy § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D) without facility-specific, timely, and unmitigable risk evidence.
Harmless miscitation principle in Guidelines application: The court’s treatment of the § 1B1.13 citation error signals that appellate review will focus on whether the correct substantive test was applied, limiting reversals based on clerical mistakes where the analysis is otherwise correct.
Appellate briefing discipline: The abandonment holding (Corbett/Sapuppo) is a warning that failure to directly challenge the district court’s reasoning—especially in multi-factor compassionate-release rulings—can end the appeal regardless of potential merits.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate release (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)): A limited statutory process allowing a court to reduce an already-imposed sentence if specific conditions are met. It is not a resentencing; it is a constrained modification.
“Extraordinary and compelling reasons” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13): Categories defined by the Sentencing Commission. For medical claims, the guideline focuses on terminal illness, severe self-care impairment, lack of necessary specialized care, or unmitigable infectious-disease risk.
§ 1B1.13(b)(2) (age-based relief): Requires (A) at least 65 years old, (B) serious deterioration due to aging, and (C) having “served at least 10 years or 75 percent” of the term (whichever is less).
Plain-error review: A narrow appellate standard applied when an argument wasn’t raised in the trial court. In the Eleventh Circuit, without binding precedent directly resolving the issue, an error generally cannot be “plain.”
Abandonment on appeal: If an appellant does not clearly present and develop an argument (with reasons the lower court was wrong), the appellate court may treat it as forfeited and affirm on that basis alone.
Judicial notice: A court may accept certain facts as true without formal proof when they are not reasonably disputable (here, the existence of BOP COVID operational materials).
Good-time credit (conceptually): Time credits that can reduce the amount of time a prisoner must serve. This case does not decide whether such credit must be included in the § 1B1.13(b)(2) “served” calculation; it holds only that, raised late and without binding precedent, exclusion is not “plain error.”

5. Conclusion

United States v. Eduardo Ortiz-Cervantes reinforces three practical lessons for compassionate-release litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: (1) new theories raised for the first time on appeal—such as counting good-time credits toward § 1B1.13(b)(2)’s “served” requirement—will almost never succeed under the circuit’s restrictive plain-error doctrine absent binding precedent; (2) medical-based extraordinary-and-compelling claims must be supported with concrete evidence tied to the specific § 1B1.13(b)(1) categories, particularly self-care limitations or non-provision of necessary care; and (3) appellate outcomes can turn on briefing discipline—failure to specifically challenge the district court’s reasoning may result in abandonment and automatic affirmance.