No Plain Error in Failing to Explain Rejection of Mandatory Minimum Sentence: Commentary on United States v. Gito St. Fort (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. Gito St. Fort, No. 25‑10369 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), arising from a 320‑month sentence imposed for distributing fentanyl resulting in death. The case unfolds against the backdrop of the federal sentencing framework for opioid‑related offenses, which frequently involves high statutory maximums, mandatory minimums, and substantial advisory Guideline ranges.

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and thus non‑precedential in a formal sense, the opinion is doctrinally significant in how it applies—and further solidifies—several interlocking strands of Eleventh Circuit sentencing law:

• It reinforces the high bar defendants face on plain-error review when they did not object to the adequacy of the sentencing explanation in the district court.
• It clarifies that, absent on‑point binding authority, there is no plain error in a district court’s failure to:
  • explain why a statutory mandatory minimum sentence would be inadequate, or
  • spell out why specific mitigating factors do not justify a lower sentence.
• It underscores the sharp distinction between procedural reasonableness (including the adequacy of the explanation) and substantive reasonableness (the length of the sentence itself).

The central issues on appeal were:

1. Whether the district court committed a procedural error by inadequately explaining its above‑mandatory‑minimum sentence; and
2. Whether the 320‑month sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of the mitigating evidence and the request for a downward variance.

The Eleventh Circuit answered both questions in the negative and affirmed the sentence.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The defendant, Gito St. Fort, was convicted of distributing fentanyl that caused a fatal overdose. The statute at issue (although not named in the opinion, it is the familiar death‑resulting provision in the federal drug laws) carries a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a maximum of life. The district court sentenced him to 320 months—substantially above the mandatory minimum, but still well below the statutory maximum and within the advisory Guidelines range.

On appeal, St. Fort raised two arguments:

• Procedural unreasonableness: The judge allegedly failed to adequately explain the reasoning for imposing a sentence above the mandatory minimum and for denying a downward variance.
• Substantive unreasonableness: The judge allegedly failed to give proper weight to mitigating factors like his personal history, substance abuse, and family circumstances.

The Eleventh Circuit:

• Applied plain-error review to the procedural challenge because St. Fort did not object to the sentencing explanation in the district court.
• Held there was no procedural error—let alone plain error—because the district court:
  • explicitly stated it had considered the presentence investigation report (PSI), the parties’ arguments, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and
  • specifically addressed the key mitigating factors and the seriousness of the offense.
• Rejected the notion that the district court was required to:
  • explain why the mandatory minimum or defendant’s requested sentence was inadequate, or
  • explicitly state why each mitigating factor did not warrant a lower sentence.
• Found the sentence substantively reasonable under the abuse‑of‑discretion standard, emphasizing:
  • the seriousness of the offense (distribution leading to death),
  • the defendant’s significant and escalating criminal history,
  • the need for specific and general deterrence, and
  • that the sentence was within the advisory Guidelines range and well below the maximum of life.

The judgment was therefore affirmed.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Plain Error and Statement-of-Reasons Requirements

The opinion’s treatment of the procedural issue is rooted in the Eleventh Circuit’s post‑Booker sentencing jurisprudence and, especially, in its recent en banc decision in United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc).

1. United States v. Steiger (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc)

Steiger is central to the court’s approach. It clarified that:

• The adequacy of a district court’s statement of reasons under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) is a procedural issue.
• The primary purpose of § 3553(c)’s oral and written explanation requirement is to ensure the defendant can “meaningfully appeal the sentence.”
• Even if there is a technical § 3553(c) error, the defendant’s substantial rights are not affected—and thus there is no reversible plain error—if the rest of the record is “clear enough to allow meaningful appellate review of the sentence.”

The St. Fort panel leans heavily on this framework. It asks essentially: Does the record make clear why the sentence was imposed, so that we can review it? Because the answer is “yes,” any alleged insufficiency in formal explanation does not rise to the level of plain error.

2. United States v. Turner (11th Cir. 2007)

The opinion quotes Turner for the classic three‑part plain‑error test: the defendant must show:

1. an error,
2. that is plain, and
3. that affected substantial rights.

Even then, the court may exercise discretion to correct the error only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Turner is also invoked for a more practical proposition: “an acknowledgment by the district court that it considered the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient” to satisfy the obligation to consider those factors. The panel uses this to reject the idea that a sentencing court must verbally enumerate or discuss each factor on the record.

3. United States v. Innocent (11th Cir. 2020)

Innocent provides the Eleventh Circuit’s definition of when an error is “plain”:

An error is plain if “the explicit language of a statute or rule or precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolves the issue.”

This standard is critical in St. Fort. Because he could not identify any binding precedent (Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit) holding that a sentencing judge must:

• explain why a proposed lower sentence or the mandatory minimum is inadequate, or
• expressly explain why each mitigating factor does not justify a reduced sentence,

the panel concludes that even if there were an error, it would not be “plain” in the technical sense. This is perhaps the most important doctrinal move: it effectively forecloses plain‑error reversal on this theory in the Eleventh Circuit absent new binding authority.

B. Sentencing Reasonableness Framework: Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit

1. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) and Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)

The panel quotes Gall through United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008), for the two‑step reasonableness review:

1. Procedural reasonableness: the court checks for errors like failure to calculate the Guidelines, treating them as mandatory, failing to consider § 3553(a), using clearly erroneous facts, or failing to explain the sentence and any deviation from the Guidelines.
2. Substantive reasonableness: if procedurally sound, the sentence is then reviewed for substantive reasonableness under an abuse‑of‑discretion standard, considering the “totality of the circumstances.”

From Rita, the opinion cites the core explanation standard:

A sentencing court must “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.”

In St. Fort, the Eleventh Circuit finds this standard satisfied by the district court’s explicit references to the PSI, the § 3553(a) factors, the seriousness of the offense, and the defendant’s criminal and personal history.

2. Eleventh Circuit Decisions on Sentencing Explanations and Factor Weighing

The panel relies on several Eleventh Circuit precedents to define the contours of explanation duties and the scope of appellate deference:

• United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020): The district court is not required to state on the record that it explicitly considered each § 3553(a) factor. It is enough that the record reflects such consideration.
• United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): Failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not mean the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evidence.” This is used to rebut any implication that the district court’s relative brevity equaled inattention.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Clarifies that adequacy of findings and explanation is a “classic procedural issue” and expounds the abuse‑of‑discretion framework for substantive review.

On the weighing of § 3553(a) factors and substantive reasonableness, the panel cites:

• United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018): Emphasizes the “due deference” owed to district courts in how they weigh the sentencing factors.
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): The district court need not give all factors equal weight and may attach great weight to one, such as criminal history or seriousness of the offense.
• United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009): District courts have considerable discretion in deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance.
• United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007): Articulates that reversal for substantive unreasonableness is appropriate only when the appellate court has a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.
• United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2006): Warns that unjustified reliance on a single § 3553(a) factor may suggest unreasonableness, but does not mandate equal weighting.

3. Indicators of Reasonableness: Guidelines and Statutory Maximums

The panel also cites:

• United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014): A sentence well below the statutory maximum is an indicator—not a guarantee—of reasonableness.
• United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 2008): A sentence within the Guideline range is “expected, but not presumed” reasonable.
• United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010): The defendant bears the burden of proving substantive unreasonableness based on the § 3553(a) factors.

These cases collectively bolster the panel’s conclusion that a within‑Guidelines, well‑below‑maximum sentence such as 320 months (when the statutory maximum is life) is, absent clear error, substantively reasonable.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in St. Fort

A. Procedural Reasonableness: Explanation and Plain Error

1. Standard of Review

Because St. Fort did not object in the district court to the adequacy of the sentencing explanation, he forfeited ordinary appellate review and triggered plain-error review. The panel thus asked:

1. Was there an error?
2. If so, is it “plain” in light of binding law?
3. If so, did it affect substantial rights (usually meaning a reasonable probability of a different outcome)?
4. Even then, should the court exercise its discretion to correct it?

The opinion effectively ends at step one (no error) and, alternatively, step two (not plain).

2. Adequacy of the District Court’s Explanation

The Eleventh Circuit carefully catalogs what the district court did do:

• Expressly stated that it:
  • considered the parties’ statements,
  • reviewed the PSI, including Guidelines calculations, and
  • took into account the § 3553(a) factors.
• Addressed the mitigating evidence—even though not required to do so individually:
  • Discussed the death of St. Fort’s sister and clarified that his drug-trafficking started before her death, undermining the claim that his criminal conduct stemmed from post‑bereavement addiction.
  • Noted his “familial foundation”: that he had family support and notable achievements (such as in basketball), yet still chose drug dealing, suggesting a high degree of culpability.
  • Recognized his substance abuse issues but explicitly distinguished his personal addiction from his conduct in spreading drug addiction through trafficking, which in this case resulted in a death.
• Explained the nature and circumstances of the offense and his criminal history:
  • Outlined his prior convictions, including a serious earlier conviction for sale of heroin.
  • Characterized the instant offense as an escalation of his criminal conduct and as part of ongoing, serious drug trafficking.
  • Repeatedly emphasized the gravity of the offense: selling narcotics to a person who overdosed and died.

In light of Rita, Pugh, Turner, and Cabezas‑Montano, the panel holds that these comments “went beyond merely acknowledging” the factors and arguments and were more than sufficient to demonstrate a reasoned basis for the sentence. Thus, no procedural error.

3. No Requirement to Explain Rejection of the Mandatory Minimum or Defense Proposal

The heart of the defendant’s procedural argument was that the court should have explained:

• Why the mandatory minimum was inadequate; and
• Why his proposed sentence (or any lower term) would not satisfy the § 3553(a) purposes.

The Eleventh Circuit responds in two overlapping ways:

1. On the merits (error/no error): The court implicitly rejects the notion that such granular explanation is required at all, especially when the sentencing judge has explicitly tied the sentence to § 3553(a) factors and particularized case facts.
2. On plainness (plain/no plain error): Even if one could argue for such a requirement as a policy matter, there is no binding precedent in the Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit imposing it.

Under Innocent, that absence of “on point binding authority” is fatal to a claim of plain error. The panel states:

Further, to the extent St. Fort argues that the district court must explain why a defendant's proposed sentence, or the mandatory minimum sentence, is inadequate, he has not pointed to any on point binding precedent. St. Fort also failed to identify binding authority holding that the court must explain why a defendant's mitigating factors do not warrant a lesser sentence.

This is a crucial doctrinal move: it strongly signals that in the Eleventh Circuit, there is no existing right—clearly established in binding case law—to such a detailed comparative explanation. Without that, a plain‑error claim cannot succeed.

4. Meaningful Appellate Review and § 3553(c)

Returning to Steiger, the panel emphasizes that the goal of § 3553(c) is to enable “meaningful appeal.” Because the record in St. Fort:

• documents the Guideline range,
• articulates the significant aggravating circumstances (death, escalation, history), and
• addresses the central mitigating claims (addiction, family, sister’s death),

the Eleventh Circuit has all it needs to conduct appellate review. Thus, any alleged shortcoming in the form or exhaustiveness of the explanation does not affect substantial rights and is not reversible.

B. Substantive Reasonableness: Deference to the District Court’s Weighing of Factors

1. Abuse-of-Discretion and the “Range of Reasonable Sentences”

Having found no procedural error, the court turns to substantive reasonableness. Under Pugh, Irey, Shaw, and McBride, a sentence is substantively unreasonable only if the district court:

• failed to consider a factor that deserved significant weight,
• gave significant weight to an improper factor, or
• committed a clear error of judgment in balancing proper factors, such that the sentence falls outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts.

The Eleventh Circuit has often described this standard as highly deferential: so long as the sentence rests within a “range of reasonable sentences,” the appellate court must affirm.

2. The District Court’s Factor Analysis

The panel meticulously recounts the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors:

• Criminal history:
  • The court emphasized that St. Fort had a prior conviction for the serious offense of sale of heroin, just a few years after his successes (e.g., in basketball) and despite strong family support—suggesting a deliberate choice to engage in drug dealing.
  • It found that his “additional convictions and criminal history were very significant,” painting a picture of repeated criminality.
• Specific and general deterrence:
  • Given the prior drug‑trafficking convictions, the court stressed the need to deter St. Fort personally from further crimes.
  • The court also recognized the need for general deterrence, especially for serious drug‑distribution offenses involving fentanyl and other deadly substances.
• Nature and circumstances of the offense:
  • The present offense involved selling narcotics to an individual who overdosed and died.
  • The court deemed this conduct “very serious” and an escalation of his criminal activity.
  • It noted that the case involved “a diverse amount of deadly drugs,” suggesting a broad, dangerous trafficking operation.
• Mitigating factors:
  • The court discussed the mitigating factors already noted (family background, sister’s death, addiction, acceptance of responsibility).
  • It acknowledged his acceptance of responsibility as a mitigating factor but found it outweighed by the severity of his conduct and his history.
• Substance abuse vs. trafficking:
  • The court distinguished his personal substance abuse from his role as a distributor who “spread drug addiction to the community,” culminating in a death.
  • This distinction justified treating his addiction as only partially mitigating.
• Timing of prior offenses relative to sister’s death:
  • Some prior drug‑trafficking convictions occurred before his youngest sister’s death, undermining any narrative that his criminal behavior was chiefly a reaction to that trauma.

After “weighing all of the factors,” the district court concluded that the case presented a “disturbing picture of drug-trafficking in a serious and repeated way” involving multiple deadly drugs. Based on this, it declined a downward variance.

3. The Eleventh Circuit’s Deferential Review

The appellate court finds no abuse of discretion in this weighing. It highlights:

• The court was entitled under Rosales‑Bruno to place heavy emphasis on criminal history and offense seriousness.
• There is no indication that the court relied on any improper factor (e.g., race, religion, uncharged conduct in an improper way).
• The sentence fell within the Guidelines range and was well below the statutory maximum of life—both strong indicators of reasonableness under Dougherty and Hunt.

Given this record, the panel concludes:

St. Fort has not met his burden of establishing that the district court made a clear error of judgment in considering the § 3553(a) factors and the facts of this case.

The sentence is thus substantively reasonable.

C. The Key Doctrinal Takeaways

Although unpublished, the opinion reinforces several important principles in Eleventh Circuit practice:

1. Explanation sufficiency is modest, especially absent objection. A district court that:
   • invokes the PSI,
   • mentions § 3553(a), and
   • highlights core aggravating and mitigating facts
   will rarely be found procedurally unreasonable, particularly where no contemporaneous objection was made.
2. No clear law requires explaining rejection of the mandatory minimum or defense proposal. The panel explicitly notes the absence of binding authority that would demand an explanation of why the mandatory minimum (or the defendant’s preferred sentence) is inadequate. This absence is decisive under plain‑error review.
3. Mitigating evidence need not be itemized or expressly rejected factor by factor. So long as it is clear the court considered the mitigation, silence on each particular point does not signal reversible error.
4. Within‑Guidelines, below‑maximum sentences remain strongly insulated on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit continues to treat such sentences as falling comfortably within the “range of reasonable sentences,” absent clear error of judgment.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

When a defendant challenges a sentence, there are two distinct types of arguments:

• Procedural reasonableness focuses on how the sentence was imposed. Was the Guideline range correctly calculated? Did the judge consider the § 3553(a) factors? Did the court rely on clearly erroneous facts? Did the judge give some explanation for the sentence?
• Substantive reasonableness focuses on what the sentence is. Is the length of the sentence—say, 320 months—too long or too short in light of the offense and the defendant’s history?

Courts look at procedural issues first. If the procedure is sound, they then ask whether the result is substantively reasonable.

B. Plain-Error Review

If a defendant fails to object at sentencing, he usually forfeits ordinary review and must show “plain error” on appeal. That requires:

1. A real error (something the judge did wrong);
2. The error is “plain,” meaning clearly contrary to settled law from the Supreme Court or the local Court of Appeals;
3. The error affected substantial rights (likely changed the outcome); and
4. The error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

This standard is deliberately difficult to meet. In St. Fort, the defendant failed especially at step 2: he could not show that existing law in the Eleventh Circuit clearly required the detailed explanation he demanded.

C. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors

Section 3553(a) lists the considerations a judge must weigh when imposing a federal sentence. In simplified form, these include:

• The offense and the offender: nature of the crime; the defendant’s history and characteristics.
• Purposes of punishment: reflecting seriousness, promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment, deterring crime, protecting the public, and rehabilitating the defendant.
• Mechanics and constraints: available sentences, advisory Guideline range, policy statements.
• Systemic concerns: avoiding unwarranted disparities, providing restitution.

In St. Fort, the district court clearly emphasized:

• Seriousness of the offense (fentanyl distribution causing death),
• Need for deterrence and protection of the public, and
• Defendant’s criminal history and personal circumstances.

D. Mandatory Minimums, Guidelines, and Variances

Three different sentencing concepts often get conflated:

• Mandatory minimum: The minimum sentence Congress requires for a given offense (e.g., 20 years). The court cannot go below this unless certain statutory exceptions apply (such as “safety valve” or substantial assistance).
• Statutory maximum: The maximum sentence allowed by law (e.g., life imprisonment). The court cannot exceed this.
• Guideline range: The advisory range produced by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, based on the offense level and the defendant’s criminal history.

A downward variance is when the court decides, under § 3553(a), to impose a sentence below the Guideline range (but not below a mandatory minimum, absent an exception). In St. Fort:

• The mandatory minimum was lower than the Guideline range.
• The court imposed a sentence within the Guideline range, higher than the minimum but well below the maximum.
• The court declined the defendant’s request for a downward variance, finding the seriousness and history outweighed mitigation.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Practical Consequences for Defense Counsel

For defense lawyers in the Eleventh Circuit, St. Fort sends a clear message:

• Make specific objections at sentencing. If counsel believes the explanation is inadequate—especially where the court rejects a requested sentence or imposes a significantly above‑minimum term—counsel must object then and there. Without that, appellate review will be under the stringent plain‑error standard.
• Do not assume a right to a point‑by‑point rejection of mitigation. Courts do not have to explain why each piece of mitigating evidence failed to carry the day.
• Frame sentencing arguments in terms of clearly established law. Because “plainness” depends on explicit statutory or precedential language, future appellate challenges should root any alleged error in specific Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit holdings, not abstract fairness concerns.

B. Guidance for District Courts

For district judges, St. Fort reinforces a pragmatic approach:

• A succinct but clear explanation—linking the sentence to the § 3553(a) factors and key facts—will generally suffice.
• Judges are not required to:
  • explicitly state that the mandatory minimum is insufficient, or
  • give a detailed comparative analysis of each proposed alternative sentence.
• Nevertheless, best practice remains to:
  • identify the most salient aggravating factors (here, death resulting, criminal history, escalation), and
  • acknowledge the main mitigating themes (addiction, family background, remorse) and briefly explain why they do not justify a lower sentence.

Such explanations not only survive appellate review; they also enhance public legitimacy and transparency in a sentencing system frequently criticized as opaque.

C. Sentencing in Fentanyl and Opioid Cases

Substantively, the opinion reflects an increasingly familiar federal sentencing pattern for serious opioid offenses:

• Distribution of fentanyl resulting in death is treated as an extremely serious offense warranting severe punishment.
• Past drug‑trafficking conduct, especially involving heroin or other opioids, is viewed as a powerful aggravating factor, showing dangerous recidivism.
• Personal addiction, while not ignored, does not significantly excuse conduct that spreads addiction and causes overdose deaths.

In this sense, the case illustrates how the Eleventh Circuit applies its sentencing philosophy to a contemporary public‑health crisis: emphasizing deterrence, incapacitation, and the protection of the community.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Gito St. Fort is a concise but instructive application of Eleventh Circuit sentencing law. On the procedural side, it affirms that a district court’s relatively brief explanation—so long as it ties the sentence to the § 3553(a) factors and the specific facts of the case—will generally withstand plain‑error scrutiny, even where the court imposes a sentence above the statutory mandatory minimum. The opinion squarely rejects any suggestion that, under current binding law, judges must:

• explain why the mandatory minimum or a proposed lower sentence is insufficient, or
• articulate why each mitigating factor fails to justify a variance.

On the substantive side, the decision illustrates the highly deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard. A within‑Guidelines, below‑maximum sentence for a serious drug offense resulting in death—especially against a background of prior drug-trafficking—will almost always fall within the broad range of reasonable sentences, absent a clear error of judgment.

Although unpublished, St. Fort is a clear and practical guidepost for litigants and judges in the Eleventh Circuit: it cements the modest scope of the sentencing explanation requirement under § 3553(c) on plain‑error review, clarifies the limited expectations regarding the treatment of mitigating evidence, and underscores the continued centrality of deterrence and public protection in federal drug‑sentencing jurisprudence.