No Plain-Error Duty to Advise Juveniles of Murphy’s “Appreciable Period” Requirement for § 1201 Kidnapping

Case: United States v. Doe, No. 25-9902 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 2025)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Panel: Phillips, Murphy, and Eid, JJ.; opinion by Murphy, J.; Eid, J., dissenting

Introduction

In this published decision, the Tenth Circuit addresses whether, in a federal juvenile delinquency proceeding, a district court commits plain constitutional error by accepting an admission to kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 without specifically advising the juvenile that the “holds” element carries a temporal limitation—namely, that the victim must be held for an appreciable period beyond the time necessary to commit any related offense. That limitation was articulated in the Tenth Circuit’s intervening decision in United States v. Murphy, 100 F.4th 1184 (10th Cir. 2024).

John Doe, an enrolled member of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe and a juvenile under the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), admitted to several counts, including kidnapping on tribal land. After the district court entered a judgment of delinquency, the Tenth Circuit decided Murphy. On appeal, Doe argued that his admission was not knowing and voluntary under due process (and the Rule 11 analogue applied to juveniles) because he had not been advised of Murphy’s “appreciable period” requirement for the “holds” element. He relied principally on Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), and related authority governing the constitutional validity of guilty pleas and admissions.

The majority affirmed, holding that on plain-error review the district court did not plainly err: Murphy did not clearly or obviously convert the temporal limitation into an essential element that must be specifically conveyed during a plea/admission colloquy, and the record did not otherwise show misadvisement or lack of “real notice” of the nature of the charge. Judge Eid dissented, concluding that Murphy imposed a substantive limitation on the scope of the kidnapping offense that effectively narrowed an essential element; in her view, the failure to apprise Doe of that limitation was plain error affecting substantial rights.

Summary of the Opinion

The court reviewed Doe’s unpreserved challenge to the voluntariness of his admission for plain error. To establish plain error, a defendant must show (1) error that is (2) plain, (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. While acknowledging that juvenile proceedings must satisfy the “essentials of due process and fair treatment” (In re Gault), and that courts generally ensure a knowing and voluntary plea/admission by reciting the nature and elements of the offense (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G), as applied through Rule 1(a)(5)(D)), the majority concluded that:

Murphy applied “judicial gloss” to the “holds” element of § 1201 by clarifying an evidentiary requirement, but did not clearly or obviously designate the temporal limitation as an essential element of kidnapping that must be specifically explained in a colloquy.
Because the asserted error was not “clear or obvious” under well-settled law at the time of appeal, Doe could not satisfy the second prong of plain-error review (citing United States v. Starks; United States v. Salas; United States v. Olano).
Bousley did not dictate reversal: unlike the post-plea clarification in Bailey regarding § 924(c)’s “use” prong—where defendants had been affirmatively misinformed—Murphy resolved an unsettled question without contradicting binding precedent, and the record here did not show misadvisement.
The record suggested awareness that Doe kept the victim confined to facilitate escape (“keep her in [the closet] so he could get away”) and included admissions such as telling the victim to stay put after he left—facts consistent with knowledge of “holding” beyond the immediate assault.

The majority therefore affirmed the judgment of delinquency. Judge Eid dissented, reasoning that Murphy’s appreciable-period requirement narrowed the true nature of the kidnapping offense and therefore had to be conveyed as part of the essential elements; in her view, the failure to advise was plain, prejudicial error warranting reversal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion stands at the intersection of juvenile due process, plea/admission colloquy requirements, and the substantive law of federal kidnapping. The court canvassed and applied several strands of precedent:

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). These foundational juvenile-due-process cases require that juvenile delinquency proceedings “measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment,” including constitutionally adequate notice of charges. They frame the constitutional overlay for juvenile admissions.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(G); Rule 1(a)(5)(D); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002); United States v. Dominguez, 998 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. Carillo, 860 F.3d 1293 (10th Cir. 2017). Rule 11 requires courts to ensure a defendant understands the nature of each charge, typically by reciting elements. Rule 1(a)(5)(D) extends Rule 11 concepts to juvenile proceedings unless inconsistent with the JDA; the court found no inconsistency. Carillo emphasizes that, at a minimum, defendants must understand the “essential elements.”
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Hicks v. Franklin, 546 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2008). Henderson recognized that some elements (e.g., intent for second-degree murder) are so critical that lack of notice renders a plea involuntary. Hicks applied that logic under state law. The majority used Henderson’s “critical element” concept to ask whether Murphy’s temporal limit is of that essential kind; it answered no on plain-error’s “plainness” prong.
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Bousley allows collateral attack on pleas that were not knowing and intelligent because the parties misunderstood the elements, as clarified by Bailey. But Bousley also warns that a plea does not become invalid simply because later decisions show the defendant did not “correctly assess every relevant factor.” The majority distinguished Bousley: Murphy resolved an unsettled question without repudiating binding law, and the record showed no affirmative misadvice.
Plain-error triad: United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Starks, 34 F.4th 1142 (10th Cir. 2022); United States v. Weeks, 653 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Knight, 659 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ruiz-Gea, 340 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003). These cases govern the four-prong plain-error framework, including the requirement that the error be “clear or obvious” under well-settled law at the time of appeal. Weeks notes a “less rigid” approach for constitutional errors, but the majority emphasized that “plainness” still requires clarity in the law—which was absent regarding whether Murphy’s temporal limit is an essential element for colloquy purposes.
United States v. Murphy, 100 F.4th 1184 (10th Cir. 2024); Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946); Gov’t of V.I. v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Gabaldon, 389 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Jackson, 24 F.4th 1308 (9th Cir. 2022). Murphy “definitively” addressed the meaning of “holds” in § 1201, holding the government must prove an appreciable period of detention beyond that necessary to commit any other offense. It relied on Chatwin and other circuits. The majority characterized Murphy as adding “judicial gloss”—clarifying the evidentiary burden and scope of § 1201—rather than announcing a new, freestanding element that must be separately explained in a plea colloquy.
United States v. Muskett, 970 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); United States v. Harper, 118 F.4th 1288 (10th Cir. 2024). “Judicial gloss” is the process by which courts give meaning to ambiguous statutory terms. Harper noted that pattern jury instructions would need updating post-Murphy—underscoring that Murphy affects trial proof and instructions, a point the majority distinguishes from colloquy requirements.
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005). A plea may be valid if the record shows competent counsel explained the nature of the charge. The majority cited defense counsel’s articulation that Doe kept the victim confined to facilitate escape as evidence of awareness.
United States v. Trujillo, 960 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2020). Knowledge of the “substance of the charge,” not every technical evidentiary nuance, is required for a valid plea. The majority relied on this to reject an obligation to advise on Murphy’s precise temporal contours.
Juvenile-specific sources: United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Duboise, 604 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gordon K., 257 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. A.R., 81 F.4th 13 (1st Cir. 2023); United States v. D.B., 61 F.4th 608 (8th Cir. 2023); DOJ Justice Manual §§ 9‑8.002, 9‑8.003. These authorities explain the civil status of JDA proceedings, the structure of juvenile informations and admissions (instead of guilty pleas), and the applicability of Rule 11 concepts in juvenile cases.
Fifth Circuit alignment: United States v. Nyandoro, No. 23-10579, 2025 WL 2205980 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2025). Cited by the majority as contra Doe’s expansive reading of Bousley, Nyandoro reiterates that a voluntary plea “intelligently made in the light of then-applicable law” does not become invalid simply because later decisions expose a faulty premise.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s logic turns on two linked propositions: (1) what due process and Rule 11(b)(1)(G) require a court to convey during a plea/admission; and (2) whether Murphy transformed the temporal limitation into an “essential element” that must be specifically recited—or instead clarified the evidentiary showing the government must make to prove an existing element (“holds”) at trial.

First, the court reaffirmed that juvenile admissions must be knowing and voluntary, which is typically ensured when the judge recites the nature and elements of the offense. Under Carillo, due process and Rule 11 require understanding of the “essential elements,” not every judicial gloss or evidentiary detail. Henderson illustrates that some elements are so critical that omission can invalidate a plea; the question, then, is whether Murphy’s temporal limitation qualifies as such an “essential element.”

Second, the court characterized Murphy as a clarifying, evidentiary ruling rather than a transformation of the elements of § 1201. Murphy drew from Chatwin and other circuits to emphasize that “holding” involves an appreciable period; it addressed an unsettled question, refined the scope of liability, and has obvious implications for jury instructions (see Harper). But the majority emphasized that Murphy “did not clearly identify the temporal requirement as an element, let alone a critical or essential element” that must be itemized in a colloquy. That distinction proved dispositive under plain-error review, particularly prong two’s “plainness” requirement. Put differently, even assuming error, it was not “clear or obvious” that the court needed to go beyond reciting “holds” and specifically explain the appreciable-period nuance at the time of Doe’s admission—or even at the time of appeal.

Third, the court rejected Doe’s alternative reliance on Bousley. Unlike in Bousley—where Bailey flatly disapproved a broader interpretation of “use” under § 924(c) that had been applied across the system—Murphy resolved an unsettled question without repudiating binding precedent and against a backdrop of decisions (including Chatwin and Jackson) already discussing the temporal component of “holding.” On these facts, the majority found no affirmative misadvice by the judge, counsel, or prosecutor; indeed, defense counsel’s own framing (“keeping [the victim] in [the closet] so he could get away”) and Doe’s admissions (telling the victim to stay in the closet upon his exit) reflected cognizance of a holding that extended beyond the immediate assault. Under Bradshaw, counsel’s explanations can satisfy the constitutional requirement, and under Trujillo, a defendant need not be apprised of every technical proof requirement to understand the substance of the charge.

Having found Doe’s theory fails at plain error’s second prong, the court did not need to reach prongs three and four. It nonetheless noted that the record undermines prejudice as well: the admissions suggest that Doe had reason to understand the “holding” concept in a temporally meaningful way, weakening any claim that, but for the omission, he would have declined to admit and insisted on trial.

The dissent would have reached the opposite conclusion on the first two prongs. In Judge Eid’s view, Murphy “definitively” interpreted “holds” to include an appreciable period and thereby “changed the true nature” of kidnapping by narrowing an essential element. Because plain error is measured at the time of appeal (Salas), and because Murphy’s rule was now settled in the circuit, the failure to advise was “plain.” She also would find prejudice under the Perez-Perez standard (reasonable probability the defendant would not have pleaded had he known of the missing element), and the parties did not dispute prong four if the first three were met. The debate between the majority and dissent thus turns on whether Murphy’s temporal requirement is itself “essential and elemental” or an evidentiary clarification of an existing element.

Impact

This opinion sets practical boundaries for plea/admission colloquies involving § 1201 kidnapping—particularly in juvenile proceedings—after Murphy:

Plea/admission colloquies post-Murphy. In the Tenth Circuit, failure to specifically advise a defendant (or juvenile) of Murphy’s “appreciable period” requirement for the “holds” element does not, without more, constitute plain error. District courts may continue to satisfy Rule 11(b)(1)(G) by reciting the offense’s elements and ensuring the defendant understands the nature of the charge, without necessarily itemizing every judicial gloss on those elements.
Trial instructions vs. colloquy obligations. The court highlights an important distinction: Murphy requires the government at trial to prove a holding that extends beyond the time necessary to commit any related offense; pattern jury instructions must reflect that (see Harper). But the colloquy obligation remains focused on the “nature” and “essential elements,” not every evidentiary refinement.
Juvenile proceedings and Rule 11. The decision reaffirms that Rule 11’s core protections apply in juvenile cases through Rule 1(a)(5)(D). Judges should ensure juveniles understand the essential elements and the rights they are waiving; however, the Tenth Circuit resists transforming every clarifying interpretation into a colloquy mandate.
Plain-error constraints on retroactive plea attacks. Defendants seeking to unravel pleas or admissions based on intervening clarifications face a high bar. Absent a clear indication that the law required different advisements at the time (or that the defendant was affirmatively misinformed), relief will often be unavailable under prong two of plain error.
Potential for divergent approaches. The dissent’s view would impose a more robust colloquy duty when an intervening decision narrows the scope of an element. While this case does not create a direct circuit split, the opinion references a Fifth Circuit decision (Nyandoro) embracing a similar restraint to the majority. If other circuits align with the dissent’s approach, the issue may ripen for further review.
Best practices. Although not required by this decision, district judges taking pleas/admissions to § 1201 kidnapping—especially where kidnapping accompanies other violent offenses—may prudently explain that “holding” requires more than incidental or coterminous restraint. Such advisements can preempt later challenges and reflect the practical significance of Murphy at trial.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Juvenile delinquency vs. criminal conviction: Under the JDA, juveniles are adjudicated “delinquent” rather than “convicted.” Proceedings are civil in form but must satisfy core criminal due process protections. Juveniles “admit” or “deny” charges rather than “plead guilty” or “not guilty.”
Rule 11(b)(1)(G): Before accepting a guilty plea, a judge must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charge. This typically involves reciting the elements and confirming understanding. In juvenile cases, these principles apply via Rule 1(a)(5)(D).
Essential element vs. evidentiary requirement (“judicial gloss”): An essential element is a fundamental building block of the offense (e.g., “intent” in certain homicides); it must be admitted or proved and is typically recited in colloquies. A judicial gloss clarifies how to prove an element (e.g., what “holds” means in § 1201), guiding trial proof and jury instructions without necessarily creating a new, freestanding element for colloquy purposes.
Murphy’s “appreciable period” requirement: To prove kidnapping under § 1201, the government must show the victim was “held” for more than the time needed to carry out any related offense (e.g., an assault). This prevents incidental or momentary restraint inherent in other crimes from automatically becoming kidnapping.
Plain error: An appellate standard for unpreserved errors. The defendant must show an error that is clear or obvious under current law, affected substantial rights (a reasonable probability of a different outcome), and seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the proceedings. Constitutional context can relax application, but “plainness” still requires well-settled law.
Bousley and later changes in law: A plea can be invalid if the defendant, counsel, and court fundamentally misunderstood the elements, as later clarified. But not every post-plea clarification undermines voluntariness; courts look for affirmative misadvice and whether the change concerns an essential element.

Conclusion

United States v. Doe clarifies an important post-Murphy question: on plain-error review, the Tenth Circuit will not treat Murphy’s appreciable-period requirement for § 1201’s “holds” element as an “essential element” that must be specifically recited in a juvenile admission colloquy. The court distinguishes between the evidentiary burden at trial (which Murphy plainly affects, and which jury instructions must reflect) and the core set of “essential elements” that due process and Rule 11(b)(1)(G) require judges to ensure defendants understand during colloquies. Absent a clear, binding directive that such temporal nuances are elemental—or evidence of affirmative misadvice—post-plea/admission challenges predicated on Murphy will generally fail under plain-error prong two.

The dissent’s contrary view underscores the stakes: whether interpretive decisions narrowing an element’s scope must be treated as part of the “true nature” of the offense for colloquy purposes. For now, the Tenth Circuit’s published holding guides district courts and practitioners: recitation of the kidnapping elements, coupled with a record showing understanding of the charge’s substance, satisfies due process in juvenile admissions. At the same time, Murphy continues to reshape trials by insisting that “holding” must be temporally appreciable and not merely incidental to another offense—an adjustment of proof that protects against overextension of kidnapping liability.