Introduction

This precedential opinion addresses multiple issues arising from a major heroin-trafficking and witness-tampering prosecution in the Western District of Pennsylvania. Defendants Price Montgomery and James Perrin were convicted after a jury trial of drug and firearms offenses; Montgomery was also convicted of tampering with witnesses by murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, the most consequential legal question concerned the validity under Title III of wiretap evidence authorized by the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office while the Attorney General was abroad, where a First Deputy signed the application under state law delegation. The appellants argued the application violated 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) and Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act because the written designation was not personally signed by the Attorney General. The Third Circuit rejects these suppression arguments and articulates a clear rule: Title III defers to state law on delegation by a state’s “principal prosecuting attorney,” and there is no federal “personal review” requirement once a lawful delegation occurs. The court further invokes the substantial-compliance doctrine to deny suppression based on technical state-law defects that do not undermine Title III’s core accountability purpose.

The court also resolves issues on constructive amendment of a § 924(c) count, sentencing under Apprendi/Alleyne for witness-tampering-by-murder, the proper forum for resolving a Rosemond-based ineffective assistance claim, the sufficiency of evidence on attempted witness tampering (§ 1512(a)(1)(C)), and the impact of Lora v. United States on § 924(j) sentencing.

Summary of the Judgment

• Wiretap suppression: Denied. The court holds that Title III’s § 2516(2) allows delegations as dictated by state law; no federal “personal review” requirement exists. Even assuming a state-law procedural irregularity, substantial compliance with Title III’s core aims defeats suppression.
• Constructive amendment (Count 5, § 924(c)): Even assuming error, no relief under plain-error review. Evidence that firearms furthered the June 8 trafficking offense was overwhelming; defendants also proposed the instruction (invited error).
• Witness tampering by murder (Count 7, § 1512(a)(1)(C)): Life sentence affirmed. The jury expressly found first-degree murder elements on Count 8; those findings satisfy Apprendi/Alleyne for Count 7 sentencing.
• Ineffective assistance (Rosemond): Not reached on direct appeal; claim denied without prejudice to collateral review.
• Attempted witness tampering (Count 9, § 1512(a)(1)(C)): Conviction affirmed; sufficient evidence supported intent and likelihood elements.
• § 924(j) sentencing (Count 8): Consecutive 25-year term vacated and remanded under Lora; district court must exercise discretion.
• Bottom line: All convictions and sentences affirmed for Perrin; for Montgomery, all affirmed except the § 924(j) consecutive term, which is vacated and remanded for resentencing.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) and United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974): Define Title III’s suppression regime—only violations of requirements that “directly and substantially” implement Congress’s intent warrant suppression; substantial compliance can suffice.
• United States v. Acon, 513 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975): Third Circuit’s early embrace of substantial compliance, refusing suppression for technical defects not undermining Title III’s core protections.
• United States v. Johnson, 696 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982): Emphasizes that § 2516(2) defers to state law regarding who may apply for state wiretaps.
• United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1977) and United States v. Perez‑Valencia, 727 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2013): Practical recognition that Title III cannot require a halt to wiretap activity whenever the named official is absent; supports delegation.
• United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702 (1st Cir. 2014); Villa v. Maricopa County, 865 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2017): Appellants cited these to press for a “personal review/familiarity” requirement by the principal prosecutor. The Third Circuit declines to adopt such a federal requirement.
• United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1978) and United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1975): Federal analogs: no duty for the federal Attorney General or designee to explain reasons for authorization; identification of a proper authorizer suffices. The Third Circuit extends similar deference to state counterparts.
• Plain error trilogy: United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985): Framework for unpreserved claims; applied to several issues here.
• § 924(c) “in furtherance”: United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 2004) and United States v. Ceballos‑Torres, 218 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2000): Factors for connecting firearms to drug trafficking; court finds evidence overwhelming under these factors.
• Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99 (2013): Facts increasing statutory maximum/minimum must go to the jury. The Third Circuit affirms life sentence based on jury findings made on a companion count.
• United States v. Stevenson, 832 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2016): Count-by-count notice rule for indictments; court distinguishes indictment notice from use of jury findings at sentencing across counts.
• Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003): Ineffective assistance normally reserved for collateral review; applied to defer Rosemond-based IAC claim.
• Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014): Aiding and abetting § 924(c) requires advance knowledge of gun use; the merits issue is deferred to collateral review here.
• United States v. Tyler, 956 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020): Four elements of § 1512(a)(1)(C) (killing/attempted killing to prevent communication about a federal offense); applied to affirm the attempted murder of Patsy Crawford.
• Pugin v. Garland, 599 U.S. 600 (2023): “Relating to” is broad; court uses it to interpret § 1512’s “information relating to” language.
• Lora v. United States, 599 U.S. 453 (2023): § 924(j) has no mandatory consecutive-sentencing mandate; triggers resentencing here.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Title III Authorization: Delegation and Substantial Compliance

The appellants advanced two distinct Title III theories: (i) delegation is categorically barred under § 2516(2); and (ii) even if delegation is permissible, Pennsylvania law required a written designation actually signed by the Attorney General, which was missing here.

• Delegation under § 2516(2): The court rejects a categorical bar. The text of § 2516(2) repeatedly defers to “applicable State statute,” signaling Congress’s intent that state law determines which state official(s) may apply for a wiretap. Legislative history confirms that “not name but function” controls and that delegation is a matter of state law. Practical considerations reinforce the point—Congress did not intend wiretaps to halt whenever the principal prosecutor is absent.
• No federal “personal review” requirement: The court refuses to engraft a federal rule requiring the principal to personally review or be “personally familiar” with the wiretap application once a lawful delegation occurs. Doing so would intrude on state governance and asymmetrically burden state officials (where no analogous rule exists for the U.S. Attorney General under § 2516(1)). The court’s holding prioritizes Title III’s accountability goal: identifying a publicly responsible official who can be held to account for policy on electronic surveillance.
• Substantial compliance defeats suppression: Even assuming a state-law defect (e.g., the Attorney General’s non-signed written designation), suppression is unwarranted if the central purposes of Title III—uniform standards and centralized accountability—were satisfied. The district court found, and the panel accepted, that the Attorney General orally authorized the First Deputy to sign and present the application and did not repudiate it. On these facts, Title III’s core accountability requirement was met; hence, substantial compliance applied and suppression was denied.

2) Constructive Amendment of § 924(c) (Count 5)

The indictment linked the § 924(c) count (possession of firearms “in furtherance”) to the June 8 substantive possession count; the instruction allowed conviction if the firearms furthered either the June 8 offense or the broader conspiracy. Applying plain-error review, the court declines relief at the fourth prong because:

• Overwhelming, uncontroverted evidence under Sparrow/Ceballos‑Torres: 16 firearms stored with ammunition in proximity to large quantities of heroin and currency; guns acquired with heroin as barter; illegal possession status; accessibility; gun types (handguns, TEC‑9, AK‑style); and the role firearms played in the operation (including the murder) rendered the “in furtherance” nexus overwhelming.
• Invited error: Defendants jointly proposed the challenged instruction, further undermining a claim that the error “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation” of the proceedings.

3) Apprendi/Alleyne and the Life Sentence for Witness Tampering by Murder (Count 7)

Montgomery argued that because Count 7 did not specify “murder,” a life sentence exceeded the range for manslaughter absent jury findings. The court rejects this for two reasons:

• Substantive elements: Killing a witness under § 1512(a)(1)(C) is an intentional killing offense; the statute encompasses murder (malice aforethought) under 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
• Jury findings on a companion count: The jury expressly found first-degree murder elements on Count 8 (§ 924(j)), via instructions that incorporated “willful, deliberate, malicious, premeditated” killing. Those findings, made beyond a reasonable doubt in the same trial, lawfully informed sentencing on Count 7 under Apprendi/Alleyne. Stevenson’s count-by-count notice rule for indictments does not bar reliance on jury findings across counts at sentencing.

4) Ineffective Assistance (Rosemond) Reserved for Collateral Review

Although the aiding-and-abetting instruction for § 924(c) did not explicitly require “advance knowledge” of firearm use (Rosemond), the court follows Massaro and declines to evaluate counsel’s performance on an undeveloped record. The claim is denied without prejudice to § 2255 proceedings, preserving the ability to develop facts as to strategy, prejudice, and the overall representation.

5) Sufficiency of the Evidence: Attempted Witness Tampering (Count 9)

Applying Jackson/Caraballo‑Rodriguez and the Third Circuit’s Tyler elements, the court affirms that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Montgomery attempted to kill Patsy to prevent her from communicating information “relating to” Tina’s murder to federal law enforcement:

• Attempt: Multiple shooters fired 24 rounds; Patsy was shot and critically injured contemporaneously with Tina’s murder; the record supports either direct attempt or aiding and abetting an attempt to kill her.
• Intent to prevent communication: The statute covers communications by “any person” of information “relating to” a federal offense—both terms read broadly (Pugin). Patsy was an eyewitness to a federal crime (murder of a federal witness). Common-sense inferences support that Montgomery intended to eliminate her as a witness.
• Federal offense: Tina’s murder (witness tampering) was a federal offense.
• Reasonable likelihood of communication with federal officers: Tina was a known target; she was scheduled to meet with federal prosecutors; the post-murder ATF involvement confirmed the federal investigative overlay. Evidence established a reasonable likelihood that Patsy would speak to federal officers.

6) Sentencing Under § 924(j) After Lora

The district court, following then-controlling Third Circuit precedent (Berrios), imposed a mandatory consecutive 25-year term for the § 924(j) count. After Lora, § 924(j) contains no consecutive-sentence mandate. The panel finds plain error affecting substantial rights and remands for resentencing so the district court can exercise its discretion—even though the term runs consecutive to a life sentence. The court emphasizes the systemic importance of accuracy and legality in sentencing.

C. Impact

• Wiretap practice in the Third Circuit (PA, NJ, DE, V.I.):
  • State attorneys general and local principal prosecutors may rely on state-law delegation structures to approve and submit wiretap applications.
  • There is no federal “personal review” requirement once a valid delegation is in place. Counsel seeking suppression must now show more than technical defects; they must show Title III’s core accountability purpose was undermined.
  • Agencies should still document delegation chains and actual authorization (oral and written) to fortify substantial-compliance arguments if challenged.
• Inter-circuit dynamics:
  • In aligning with the Second and Ninth Circuits on the permissibility of delegation, the Third Circuit diverges from arguments (and some dicta) suggesting a federal “personal familiarity” requirement (e.g., Villa, Smith/Lyons discussions). This opinion underscores federalism and statutory text, limiting federal courts’ intrusion into state internal allocation of prosecutorial authority.
• Trial management:
  • Defense counsel should preserve Title III authorization arguments in suppression motions—failure shifts review to plain error, often fatal.
  • Be cautious about jointly proposing jury instructions; invited-error considerations can defeat plain-error relief.
• Sentencing and jury findings across counts:
  • Courts may rely on jury findings on one count to support sentencing on another count under Apprendi/Alleyne, so long as the relevant facts were found beyond a reasonable doubt in the same trial.
  • Post-Lora, counsel must request discretionary sentencing on § 924(j) counts and object to any characterization of consecutive terms as mandatory.
• Witness tampering prosecutions (§ 1512(a)(1)(C)):
  • This case illustrates that “information relating to” a federal offense and “any person” are capacious terms. Juries may infer intent to prevent communication from the circumstances, common sense, and the violent elimination of percipient eyewitnesses.
• Ineffective assistance posture:
  • Rosemond issues frequently turn on record deficits when raised on direct appeal. Practitioners should prepare to litigate such claims in collateral proceedings where strategy and prejudice can be explored.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Title III (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522): The federal scheme regulating electronic surveillance. It strictly controls who may authorize and apply for wiretaps and under what circumstances; violation can trigger suppression, but only for breaches of core statutory safeguards.
• § 2516(2) State Wiretaps: Lets a state’s “principal prosecuting attorney” (e.g., an Attorney General) apply for a state court wiretap if authorized by state statute. The Third Circuit confirms state law controls delegation; no federal rule demands the principal personally review the application once a lawful delegation exists.
• Substantial Compliance: Even if there is a technical misstep (e.g., unsigned written designation), suppression is not required if Title III’s central aims (uniformity and accountability—pinning responsibility on a publicly answerable senior official) are satisfied.
• Constructive Amendment: When the proof or jury instruction effectively alters an element, time frame, or theory charged by the grand jury. Under plain-error review, reversal requires showing the error seriously undermined the trial’s fairness; overwhelming evidence that the crime as charged was proved can defeat relief.
• § 924(c) “In Furtherance Of”: Requires a nexus between firearm possession and drug trafficking—factors include accessibility, proximity to drugs/proceeds, weapon type, whether loaded/stored with ammo, legality of possession, and circumstances of discovery.
• Apprendi / Alleyne: Any fact that increases the statutory maximum (Apprendi) or mandatory minimum (Alleyne) must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. A court may rely on such jury findings made on a different count in the same trial.
• § 1512(a)(1)(C) Witness Tampering by Killing/Attempting: Criminalizes killing or attempting to kill someone to prevent their communication of information relating to a federal offense to federal officers. “Any person” and “relating to” are read broadly; intent can be inferred from circumstances.
• Rosemond Aiding and Abetting: To aid and abet a § 924(c) violation, the defendant must have advance knowledge that a gun will be used or carried during the predicate offense.
• Lora and § 924(j): The Supreme Court held there is no mandatory consecutive-sentence requirement for § 924(j) offenses; district courts retain discretion to run such sentences concurrently or consecutively.
• Plain Error Review: An appellate safety valve for unpreserved errors, requiring (1) error, (2) that is clear/obvious, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Conclusion

United States v. Price Montgomery cements two pivotal propositions for Third Circuit practitioners. First, the court holds that Title III’s authorization regime for state wiretaps defers to state law for delegation by a state’s principal prosecuting attorney. There is no federal “personal review” requirement; suppression will not follow from technical defects that do not undermine Title III’s essential accountability aims. This is an important federalism-forward clarification that aligns with the statute’s text and practical law-enforcement needs.

Second, the court demonstrates a pragmatic approach to trial and sentencing issues: constructive-amendment claims will fail under plain error in the face of overwhelming evidence and invited-error dynamics; Apprendi/Alleyne concerns are satisfied by jury findings on companion counts; Rosemond-based ineffective assistance claims must proceed via collateral attack; and § 924(j) sentences must be revisited in light of Lora to ensure the court exercises its discretion.

The opinion’s lodestar is accountability and accuracy: hold senior officials publicly responsible for wiretap policy while eschewing rigid formalism that would thwart legitimate investigations, and ensure that jury-found facts drive sentencing outcomes while correcting sentences that exceed statutory constraints. Going forward, Title III challenges in the Third Circuit will need to grapple with this decision’s robust embrace of state-law delegation and substantial compliance; prosecutors and defense attorneys alike should calibrate their strategies accordingly.