No Per Se Rule: Intoxication Does Not Automatically Invalidate Consent; Apparent Authority Can Validate a Roommate-Consent Search — United States v. Boone (2d Cir. 2025) [Summary Order]

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order, non-precedential)

Date: October 30, 2025

Panel: Walker, Jacobs, and Bianco, Circuit Judges

Docket: 24-2483-cr

Disposition: Affirmed (denial of motion to suppress)

Introduction

United States v. Boone is a Fourth Amendment suppression appeal arising from a warrantless search of a Bronx apartment following a 911 call reporting a shooting. The search occurred on the basis of third-party consent given by the leaseholder, Benjamin Fortune, who had been drinking before police arrived. During the consent search, officers retrieved a small safe from the defendant’s bedroom; they later obtained a warrant to open the safe and found a firearm and ammunition inside. DNA evidence linked the defendant, Deron Boone—a previously convicted felon—to the firearm. A jury convicted Boone of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8), and 2, and the district court imposed a sentence of 97 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

On appeal, Boone challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, raising three principal issues:

Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in evaluating the effect of Fortune’s intoxication on the voluntariness of his consent to search.
Whether, on the totality of the circumstances, Fortune’s consent was voluntary notwithstanding intoxication.
Whether the officers could reasonably rely on Fortune’s apparent authority to consent to the search of Boone’s separate bedroom.

The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court used the proper legal framework, made no clearly erroneous factual findings, and correctly determined that Fortune’s voluntary consent and apparent authority justified the search. Although issued as a “summary order” without precedential effect, the decision offers a clear and practical reaffirmation of governing Fourth Amendment consent principles in roommate-settings and intoxication scenarios.

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that:

There is no per se rule that intoxication negates voluntary consent. Intoxication is one factor within the familiar totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. The government bears the burden by a preponderance of the evidence to establish voluntariness.
The district court’s finding that Fortune’s consent was voluntary—supported by officer testimony and body-worn camera footage demonstrating Fortune’s coherence—was not clearly erroneous.
Even if Fortune lacked actual authority to consent to searching Boone’s bedroom, officers could reasonably rely on Fortune’s apparent authority. As the leaseholder who invited police in and signed a written consent to search, and in the absence of any objection from Boone while present, Fortune reasonably appeared to have authority over the premises, including Boone’s room.
Because the consent search was valid, the district court properly denied suppression of the firearm ultimately seized from the safe pursuant to a separate search warrant.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973): The bedrock standard that voluntariness of consent is judged under the totality of the circumstances. The panel quotes Second Circuit precedent invoking Schneckloth’s framework.
United States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023 (2d Cir. 1996): Reiterates that a warrantless search is valid when authorities secure voluntary consent from someone authorized to grant it. This frames the third-party consent doctrine applied here.
United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2004): Clarifies two points central to Boone:
- The government’s burden is by a preponderance to prove voluntary consent.
- Voluntariness is assessed using an objective lens—whether the officers had a reasonable basis to believe consent was given—within the totality analysis. The panel also cites Isiofia to support the proposition that intoxication is only one factor and is not dispositive.
United States v. Vega, No. 20-4135, 2021 WL 6116823 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2021) (summary order): Illustrates that an intoxicated individual can still voluntarily consent where the record shows coherence and comprehension; used to reinforce the absence of any per se intoxication rule.
Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980): Emphasizes that the standard governing voluntariness of consent to search is distinct from the standard for a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. The panel cites Rosado to reject Boone’s invitation to import guilty-plea voluntariness criteria into the Fourth Amendment consent context.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974): The Supreme Court’s foundational third-party consent case. It recognizes searches based on consent from a co-occupant with common authority, and emphasizes that mere property interests are not determinative; mutual use and joint access/control are key. The district court, and in turn the Second Circuit, relied on Matlock’s focus on “mutual use” to find Fortune lacked actual authority over Boone’s bedroom while still finding apparent authority for officers to rely upon.
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990): Establishes the “apparent authority” doctrine: a search is valid when the facts available to officers at the time would “warrant a man of reasonable caution” in believing the consenting party had authority. This is central to the panel’s conclusion that officers reasonably relied on Fortune’s authority to consent to the search of Boone’s bedroom.
United States v. McGee, 564 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2009): Distinguishes actual from apparent authority and confirms that apparent authority suffices if it reasonably appears that the consenting party can authorize the search.
Moore v. Andreno, 505 F.3d 203 (2d Cir. 2007): Details the test for actual authority: access to the area plus common authority, a substantial interest, or permission to gain access. The district court applied this framework to conclude Fortune lacked actual authority over Boone’s private bedroom—yet apparent authority remained.
United States v. Iverson, 897 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018): Supplies the standard of review—legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error—and reiterates the totality-of-circumstances inquiry.
United States v. Colasuonno, 697 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2012): Defines clear error as a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2013) and United States v. Iodice, 525 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008): Stress the “special” and “particularly strong” deference due to district court witness credibility findings—critical here given the district court’s choice to credit officers’ testimony and bodycam footage over Boone’s account.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985): Teaches that where a district court credits one plausible witness over another and that finding is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, it “can virtually never be clear error.” The panel relies on this in upholding the district court’s credibility determinations.

Legal Reasoning and Application

1) The voluntariness standard and intoxication

The court rejects any per se rule that intoxication nullifies consent. Instead, intoxication is a factor within Schneckloth’s totality-of-the-circumstances test. The government must show by a preponderance that consent was voluntary; the inquiry is objective insofar as the question is whether officers had a reasonable basis to believe consent was given (Isiofia).

Boone sought a remand urging application of a “guilty plea” voluntariness standard to intoxication, but the Second Circuit refused, citing Rosado to underscore that the guilty-plea standard is distinct from the search-and-seizure voluntariness inquiry. In other words, the cognition and formality demanded to enter a valid guilty plea in open court does not govern the more fluid, field-based assessment of whether a resident voluntarily consented to a search.

2) The district court’s voluntariness finding was not clearly erroneous

The record included both officer testimony and body-worn camera footage. Officers Wanzer and Mora acknowledged that Fortune had been drinking and smelled of alcohol, yet they uniformly described him as coherent and responsive; the bodycam footage corroborated their testimony. The only moment of confusion involved writing the time in military format—a commonplace difficulty unrelated to comprehension of consent. The district court carefully parsed the footage, observed Fortune’s demeanor (lucid answers, normal gait, purposeful actions such as rummaging in a drawer and retrieving a soft drink), and concluded he was sufficiently coherent to consent. The Second Circuit held these findings were well supported and entitled to deference.

3) Apparent authority justified the search of Boone’s bedroom

The panel distinguishes actual from apparent authority. Although the district court concluded Fortune lacked actual authority to consent to a search of Boone’s private bedroom—because neither occupant had access to or control over the other’s bedroom (Matlock; Moore)—the search was nonetheless valid under apparent authority (Rodriguez; McGee).

On the facts known to officers at the time, Fortune was the leaseholder, he summoned police by 911 after a shooting, he permitted officers to enter, he then signed a written consent-to-search, and Boone—who was present—did not object before the safe was discovered. Under Rodriguez’s objective test, these facts would “warrant a man of reasonable caution” to believe Fortune could consent to a search of the premises, including Boone’s room.

Boone testified that he objected before and immediately after Fortune signed the consent form, but the district court expressly rejected this account as not credible due to contradictions and implausibilities, crediting instead the officers’ testimony and bodycam-supported narrative that Boone remained silent. The Second Circuit emphasized the “particularly strong deference” owed to the district court’s credibility calls (Iodice) and the near-impossibility of clear error where two plausible stories exist and the trial judge chooses one (Anderson v. Bessemer City).

The panel also noted contextually that the occupants had called the police to investigate a shooting—making it reasonable for officers to accept the leaseholder’s consent unless and until a co-occupant objected. Because no such objection was credited, apparent authority validated the officers’ reliance on Fortune’s consent to search Boone’s bedroom.

4) The safe and the warrant

Officers found a small black safe in Boone’s bedroom during the consent search, moved it to the living room, then obtained a warrant to open it. The firearm and ammunition discovered inside, later tied to Boone via DNA, formed the basis of the § 922(g)(1) charge. The appellate opinion did not need to resolve independent issues related to seizure of the safe because the core dispute centered on the lawfulness of entering and searching the bedroom at all. Once that entry/search was upheld on consent grounds, the subsequent warrant for the safe insulated the evidence from suppression.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although this is a non-precedential summary order (see FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1), Boone provides a detailed, well-illustrated application of consent doctrine with three noteworthy takeaways:

No per se intoxication bar: The Second Circuit again declines to adopt a categorical rule that intoxication vitiates consent. Police, prosecutors, and courts will continue to look to objective indicia of comprehension and voluntariness, with bodycam footage often proving decisive.
Apparent authority remains robust in roommate contexts: Even where a leaseholder lacks actual authority over a co-occupant’s private bedroom, officers may reasonably rely on apparent authority if the facts—lease status, written consent, absence of objection by the co-occupant—indicate authority. The presence of a physically present, objecting co-occupant can change the analysis; absent an objection, officers may proceed based on apparent authority.
Deference to district courts on credibility and video evidence: The court reiterates the heavy appellate deference to trial judges’ credibility assessments, particularly where body-worn camera footage supports those findings. Defense challenges to consent in similar circumstances will likely require compelling, objective counter-evidence to succeed.

Beyond doctrine, Boone offers practical guidance:

For law enforcement:
- Document consent carefully. Seek written consent and ensure body-worn cameras capture the explanation and execution of consent forms.
- Probe authority. Ask simple clarifying questions about who lives where and who has access to which rooms; record the answers.
- Assess intoxication, but focus on coherence. Note speech, demeanor, gait, ability to track questions, and appropriateness of responses.
- Secure warrants for closed containers. The officers’ decision to obtain a warrant for the safe exemplifies best practice even when rooms were lawfully entered based on consent.
For defense counsel:
- Develop a record on intoxication that goes beyond mere consumption—e.g., medical evidence, expert testimony, or video showing incoherence or confusion.
- If the client is present, an express objection matters. Silence can support apparent authority; an explicit objection can negate consent-based entry into private spaces.
- Establish exclusive control. Evidence of locks, explicit rules against entry, or other indications of exclusivity can defeat actual and apparent authority claims.
- Scrutinize bodycam footage. It often controls the narrative; where the footage diverges from officer testimony, highlight those gaps.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Voluntary consent (Fourth Amendment): A person can allow police to search without a warrant if consent is voluntary. Courts consider all circumstances—tone, environment, understanding, absence of coercion, sobriety, and whether the person appeared to comprehend what was happening.
Totality of the circumstances: No single factor controls. The court weighs everything—timing, setting, behavior, statements, and corroborating evidence (like bodycam footage).
Preponderance of the evidence: The government must prove it is more likely than not that consent was voluntary.
Actual authority: The consenting person truly has common authority over the place searched (shared use, joint access/control) or another substantial interest or permission to enter.
Apparent authority: Even if the person lacks actual authority, the search is valid if officers reasonably believed the person had authority, based on the facts known at the time.
Standard of review on appeal:
- De novo for legal rulings (no deference).
- Clear error for factual findings (highly deferential). Credibility calls by the trial judge are rarely disturbed, especially when supported by video.
Summary order: A decision that does not have precedential effect, though it may be cited under FRAP 32.1 and local rules. It can be persuasive but is not binding precedent.

Conclusion

United States v. Boone reaffirms two enduring features of Fourth Amendment consent doctrine. First, intoxication alone does not invalidate consent; what matters is whether, on the totality of the circumstances, the consenting person appeared coherent and voluntarily agreed—and officers reasonably believed that consent was given. Second, in shared-living situations, police may rely on a co-occupant’s apparent authority to consent to searches of private rooms where a reasonable officer would believe the co-occupant possessed such authority and the present subject of the search does not object.

Although non-precedential, Boone is an instructive, evidence-weighted application of these principles. It underscores the pivotal role of body-worn camera footage, the centrality of trial-level credibility determinations, and the practical value of written consent and targeted warrants for closed containers. For law enforcement, it validates careful, documented reliance on consent and apparent authority. For defense practitioners, it highlights the importance of contemporaneous objection, demonstrating exclusive control, and building a concrete record of impairment where intoxication is asserted. In the broader legal landscape, Boone harmonizes with Supreme Court and Second Circuit doctrine, providing a clear and pragmatic roadmap for future consent disputes in multi-occupant dwellings.