No Parole Revocation Fine When Sentence Is Death Plus Only Indeterminate Terms

People v. Alvarez, Supreme Court of California (Aug. 18, 2025)

Introduction

People v. Alvarez is a capital case arising from the murders of two young children, five‑month‑old Tyler Ransom (1994) and four‑year‑old Dylan Vincent (1996), each killed while in the care of their mothers’ boyfriend, Francisco Jay Alvarez. After a first trial yielded guilty verdicts and a death sentence but resulted in a new trial due to juror misconduct, a second jury again convicted Alvarez of both murders (first degree) and assault on a child causing death (Pen. Code §273ab), found true the multiple-murder special circumstance (§190.2(a)(3)), and returned a death verdict.

On the automatic appeal, the Supreme Court (Groban, J.) addressed a wide array of issues: change of venue, severance, alleged juror misconduct during trial, admissibility of psychological risk assessment testimony without a Kelly hearing, admission of hearsay under Evidence Code §1360 and Crawford, correctness of the torture‑murder instruction’s “sadistic purpose” language, the sufficiency of the evidence for both premeditated and torture murder, penalty-phase constitutional attacks, and restitution fines. The Court affirmed the judgment in all respects except one: it struck a $200 parole revocation restitution fine imposed under Penal Code §1202.45.

That last holding marks the decision’s principal doctrinal contribution: the Court clarified that where a defendant is sentenced to death and, in addition, only to indeterminate imprisonment (here, 25 years to life under §273ab), §1202.45 does not apply because the “sentence” does not “include[] a period of parole” within the meaning of the statute. The Court distinguished its own earlier decision upholding such a fine when the death sentence is accompanied by a determinate term. Chief Justice Guerrero concurred in part and dissented on this point; Justices Liu and Evans filed separate concurrences highlighting, respectively, concerns about the aura of infallibility around certain expert testimony and the risks of seating jurors who are aware of prior guilty verdicts or death sentences.

Summary of the Opinion

• Change of venue: Claim forfeited for failure to renew after voir dire when the trial court denied “without prejudice” (citing People v. Staples and People v. Oyler).
• Severance: No abuse of discretion; counts were properly joined and cross‑admissible under Evid. Code §1101(b) to show intent and absence of mistake/accident given striking factual parallels between the two child killings.
• Juror misconduct: Even assuming an improper out‑of‑court remark by a juror identifying himself and calling the case “crazy” or “stupid,” no substantial likelihood of bias; brief, nonsubstantive, promptly addressed.
• Expert testimony (CAPI‑6): No Kelly hearing required where a psychologist’s Child Abuse Potential Inventory was used as one tool among many within a clinical assessment (not a novel technique commanding an “aura of infallibility”).
• Improper testimony about excluded matter: Trial court permissibly allowed cross‑examination into defendant’s knowing violation of an in limine ruling; no constitutional violation.
• Impeachment with prior misconduct: Admission of two prior sexual assaults (one resulting in a misdemeanor conviction) and impersonation of an officer was within Evid. Code §352 discretion for credibility impeachment; limiting instructions given.
• Child hearsay (Evid. Code §1360) and Crawford: Child’s statements to the defendant’s father and sister were non‑testimonial and sufficiently reliable; implicit §352 balancing sufficient.
• Torture‑murder instruction: CALJIC No. 8.24 was proper; “sadistic purpose” does not require proof of sexual gratification and needs no special legal definition.
• Sufficiency of the evidence: Ample proof of both premeditation/deliberation and murder by torture for each child.
• Penalty-phase constitutional challenges: Rejected per settled precedent (no unanimity or beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt requirements for weighing, no written findings requirement, adequate narrowing, no presumption of life instruction, etc.).
• Restitution fines: The court declined to reach Dueñas because the minimum restitution fine was suspended indefinitely; but it struck the §1202.45 parole revocation fine because the sentence (death plus an indeterminate term) does not include a period of parole.

Analysis

1) The New Rule: Section 1202.45 and Death Plus Indeterminate Sentences

The Court’s most concrete doctrinal development concerns the parole revocation restitution fine under Penal Code §1202.45. The statute mandates a fine “[i]n every case where a person is convicted of a crime and his or her sentence includes a period of parole,” with payment suspended unless parole is later revoked. The Court reaffirmed a crucial distinction:

• Death sentence plus a determinate term: §1202.45 applies because determinate sentences, by law, “include a period of parole.” The Court cited and followed People v. Brasure and People v. Baker.
• Death sentence plus only indeterminate terms: §1202.45 does not apply because an indeterminate term confers only eligibility for parole consideration at a later date; it does not itself include a period of parole at sentencing. The Court aligned with a line of Court of Appeal decisions (People v. Oganesyan; People v. Jenkins; People v. Battle; People v. McInnis; People v. Montes), making this rule binding statewide.

Holding: Because Alvarez received a death sentence and a stayed indeterminate term of 25 years to life, the trial court erred in imposing a §1202.45 fine; the Supreme Court struck it. Chief Justice Guerrero dissented on this point, reasoning that an indeterminate term imposed under Pen. Code §1168, paired with §3000(a)(1), “includes a period of parole” in the statutory sense, and that Brasure’s logic should extend to indeterminate terms.

Practical impact:

• In capital cases, trial courts must ask whether any noncapital components of the sentence are determinate. If yes, impose and suspend a §1202.45 fine matching the restitution fine; if only indeterminate terms (or LWOP), do not impose §1202.45.
• In mixed noncapital cases (e.g., LWOP plus indeterminate terms), the same reasoning disfavors §1202.45—confirming the Oganesyan line.
• The Court left intact the practice of imposing but staying minimum restitution fines under §1202.4, and avoided the federal/state due process debate about ability‑to‑pay for minimum fines (Dueñas), because the fine here was indefinitely suspended in light of the death sentence.

2) Severance and Cross‑Admissibility (Evid. Code §1101(b))

The Court applied settled principles to affirm joinder of the two murders and the §273ab count. Because the murders shared numerous distinctive features, evidence from each was cross‑admissible to rebut accident or mistake and to prove intent:

• Each child was the son of Alvarez’s girlfriend; Alvarez lived with each immediately prior to death and was last alone with the child.
• Injuries and bruising began after Alvarez moved in; both deaths involved assaultive trauma of substantial force.
• Alvarez “found” each child in crisis and directed 911 interactions; his demeanor was not demonstrably grief‑stricken.
• Prior nighttime entries into the children’s rooms; ear injuries; arguments with the mothers proximate to the fatal events.

Using these similarities, the Court concluded that in hypothetical separate trials each body of evidence would be admissible under §1101(b) to show intent and absence of accident, defeating the principal prejudice concerns (People v. Gomez; People v. Kraft; People v. Soper). The prosecutor’s exhortation to “consider the evidence together” was consistent with cross‑admissibility, and the jury received a standard instruction to decide each count separately.

3) Juror Misconduct: Nonsubstantive Barroom Remark, No Bias

Juror No. 9 admitted possibly telling a nonjuror at a bar he was on the “crazy” or “stupid” Alvarez case. After inquiry of the juror and witness, the Court assumed error but found no substantial likelihood of bias because the conversation was brief, nonsubstantive, and promptly terminated; no external information reached the juror, and the juror expressed no views on guilt. The Court carefully distinguished People v. Cissna, where a juror’s prolonged daily communications functionally added a thirteenth juror. The ruling reflects the two‑track prejudice test for juror misconduct: either inherent and substantial likelihood of influence, or proof of actual bias (Hamilton; Johnsen; Miranda‑Guerrero; Miles; Lewis; Stewart).

4) Kelly and Psychological Tools: CAPI‑6 as One Element of Clinical Judgment

Alvarez challenged rebuttal testimony by psychologist Dr. Dean Haddock, who administered the CAPI‑6 (Child Abuse Potential Inventory) and opined that the mother of one victim was not at risk of physically abusing children in 1998. The Court held Kelly does not apply because the testimony did not introduce a novel scientific technique purporting to deliver “definitive truth”; instead, CAPI‑6 was used as one empirical component among many in a holistic clinical evaluation (consistent with People v. Stoll and People v. Therrian). The Court emphasized Dr. Haddock’s acknowledgment of probabilistic prediction, the time‑limited nature of his opinion (1998 only), and the use of multiple corroborating instruments and interviews.

Justice Liu’s concurrence flagged this as a close question: isolated statements risked an aura of infallibility (echoing concerns in People v. Leahy), but Dr. Haddock’s clarifications about statistical prediction and the limited temporal scope sufficed to avoid Kelly.

5) Relevance and Rebuttal Scope

Dr. Haddock’s testimony was admitted to rebut defense evidence of a 2000 CPS investigation alleging abuse by the mother; even though the psychologist’s opinion concerned 1998, the Court found the rebuttal fit the character trait put at issue (propensity for physical abuse) and rested within the trial court’s broad discretion to define rebuttal relevance (Gurule; Hart).

6) Defendant’s Violation of In Limine Order and Cross‑Examination

Alvarez violated a pretrial ruling by volunteering that Tyler’s father had a prior child‑molestation conviction. After admonishment outside the jury’s presence, the court allowed cross‑examination to explore whether Alvarez knowingly violated the court’s order, as bearing on credibility. The Court held there was no violation of the rights to presence or due process because the sanction decision was made at a subsequent proceeding with defendant present and after consultation with counsel, and the cross‑examination went to credibility and was relatively brief. Any arguably argumentative phrasing by the prosecutor was harmless in view of the record’s breadth.

7) Impeachment with Prior Sexual Misconduct and Impersonation

The Court upheld admission of (a) a misdemeanor sexual assault conviction and the underlying facts; (b) an uncharged rape supported by a nurse examiner; and (c) episodes of impersonating a correctional officer, all offered to impeach Alvarez’s credibility after he took the stand. Weighing probative value against undue prejudice under Evid. Code §352, the Court emphasized the centrality of credibility contests in the case, the recency of the misconduct, and limiting instructions. The prosecution was not required to accept a defense stipulation to a sanitized “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude”; prosecutors may present live, probative evidence rather than stipulate away its force (Carter; Dalton).

8) Child Hearsay (Evid. Code §1360) and Crawford

Statements by Dylan to Alvarez’s father and sister identifying Alvarez as the source of injuries were admitted under §1360. The Court held:

• Non‑testimonial under Crawford: Statements to family members, not law‑enforcement, are much less likely to be testimonial; no formal forensic context (Clark; Giles; Cage).
• Reliability: The trial court’s findings of reliability (time, content, circumstances) were within discretion. Although Dylan had a speech delay and gave inconsistent responses on other occasions, one statement was simple and direct; other evidence corroborated a pattern of abuse. An implicit §352 balancing sufficed where the court expressly reviewed the submissions and focused on reliability.

9) Torture‑Murder Instruction and “Sadistic Purpose”

The Court reaffirmed that “sadistic purpose” does not require proof of sexual gratification; the term carries a common‑sense meaning and needs no legal definition (Raley; D’Arcy; Healy; Smith). The prosecutor’s argument that Alvarez’s anger at the child’s crying supported sadistic purpose was consistent with cases allowing juries to infer an intent to inflict extreme pain for its own sake from persistent, gratuitous violence toward a vulnerable child (Pensinger; Powell; Hajek & Vo).

10) Sufficiency of the Evidence

For each child, the Court found substantial evidence of:

• Premeditation and deliberation: Evidence of planning (isolating the child out of the mother’s view; nighttime access), motive (jealousy, anger at crying, control conflicts), and manner (repeated severe assaults with time to reflect) satisfied the Anderson factors (Streeter; Stitely; Isby). The brutality was tied to deliberation through the prolonged, multi‑incident nature of the attacks, not merely their severity.
• Murder by torture: The pattern of non‑lethal injuries over time, extreme force, and deliberate infliction of pain beyond that necessary to kill supported a finding of a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to cause extreme pain for a sadistic purpose (§189; Steger distinguished; Walkey distinguished given Alvarez’s nonparent status, calculated isolation, and repeated violence).

11) Penalty‑Phase Constitutional Claims

The Court rejected familiar constitutional challenges to California’s death penalty framework, including claims requiring unanimous findings on aggravating factors, a beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for weighing, written findings, proportionality review, a presumption-of-life instruction, overbreadth, disparate prosecutorial discretion, and international law; it cited established authority (e.g., McDaniel; Rangel; Sánchez; Williams; Rhoades; Bracamontes; Suarez; Brooks; Schmeck; Salcido; Parson; Prince; Ghobrial; Becerrada; Hoyt).

12) Concurrences

• Justice Liu concurred, warning that expert descriptions of actuarial or “empirical” instruments can project an aura of infallibility if not carefully couched in probabilistic terms; he also condemned a racially derogatory phrase the trial judge used early in voir dire, underscoring the harm such language causes to public confidence and the imperative to avoid stereotypes.
• Justice Evans concurred, urging close attention to venue and voir dire practices in high‑profile retrials where many venire members may know of prior guilty verdicts or death sentences; she highlighted the elevated potential for prejudice when jurors perceive a defendant as having “gotten off on a technicality.”
• Chief Justice Guerrero concurred in part and dissented as to the §1202.45 fine, arguing that an indeterminate term “includes a period of parole” by statute (Pen. Code §3000(a)(1)), and that Brasure’s rationale should control.

Impact

• Restitution practice: Trial courts must not impose §1202.45 fines where a death sentence is accompanied only by indeterminate terms (or LWOP); they must impose and suspend such fines when any determinate term is included. This Supreme Court clarification harmonizes and elevates the Oganesyan line of Court of Appeal decisions.
• Kelly boundaries: Courts may continue to admit psychological risk tools used within holistic clinical assessments without Kelly hearings, but experts and trial judges should frame such evidence carefully to avoid an aura of certainty. Expect litigants to cite Liu’s concurrence when challenging similar testimony.
• Joinder strategy: Prosecutors can join temporally separated child‑abuse homicides where distinctive commonalities allow cross‑admissibility for intent/absence of accident; defense counsel should prepare robust §352 arguments and request precision limiting instructions.
• Voir dire and venue: The opinion encourages vigilant, individualized voir dire and record-building where venire familiarity with prior verdicts is widespread; renewal of venue motions after voir dire remains essential to preserve appellate review.
• Child hearsay: Non‑testimonial statements to family members remain admissible under §1360 if reliability is established; practitioners should make a clear §352 record and corroborate or challenge reliability factors (simplicity, timing, consistency, and corroboration).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Determinate vs. indeterminate terms: A determinate term is a fixed length; it “includes” a parole period by operation of law. An indeterminate term (e.g., 25‑to‑life) confers eligibility for parole consideration later but does not itself include a parole period at sentencing.
• Parole revocation fine (§1202.45): A second restitution fine equal to the §1202.4 fine, imposed only when the sentence includes a period of parole, and suspended unless parole is revoked. Under Alvarez, it is improper if the sentence is death plus only indeterminate terms.
• Kelly rule: Applies to new scientific techniques that might unduly impress juries with certainty; not required for expert clinical opinions using recognized tools as part of a broader, judgment‑based assessment, especially when the expert conveys probabilistic conclusions.
• Cross‑admissibility (Evid. Code §1101(b)): Prior or contemporaneous acts can be admitted, not to show bad character, but to prove intent, motive, identity, plan, or absence of mistake or accident when sufficiently similar in salient respects.
• Child hearsay (§1360): A statutory exception allowing a child’s out‑of‑court statements describing abuse when reliability factors are met and the statements are non‑testimonial under the Confrontation Clause.
• Torture‑murder: First degree murder by torture requires acts causing death involving a high probability of death and a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to cause extreme pain for revenge, extortion, persuasion, or a sadistic purpose; “sadistic purpose” does not require a sexual motive.

Practice Pointers

• Venue: If a trial court denies a venue change “without prejudice,” renew the motion after voir dire with specific data about venire exposure and disqualification rates.
• Joinder: Anticipate §1101(b) cross‑admissibility arguments; if resisting joinder, emphasize dissimilarities that go to mental state, not merely superficial overlap, and press for tailored limiting instructions.
• Experts: When offering actuarial or questionnaire‑based tools, frame conclusions in probabilistic terms and anchor them in a broader clinical evaluation; when opposing, highlight any unqualified claims of certainty.
• Juror contacts: Investigate promptly and build a record on the content, duration, and context of any unauthorized juror communication; focus prejudice analysis on substance and likelihood of influence.
• Restitution fines: In capital or LWOP settings, distinguish determinate from indeterminate terms at sentencing; object to §1202.45 fines where only indeterminate terms are present.

Conclusion

People v. Alvarez reaffirms much of California’s settled doctrine in homicide and capital litigation: the broad permissibility of joinder where evidence is cross‑admissible; rigorous but practical juror‑misconduct standards; the ordinary admissibility of clinical psychological opinions without Kelly; the reliable‑hearsay pathway for child statements; the sufficiency frameworks for premeditated and torture‑murder; and the continued vitality of California’s capital statutory scheme against constitutional challenges.

Its clearest precedential advance is in the restitution arena: a parole revocation fine under §1202.45 is improper when a death sentence is paired only with indeterminate terms. By distinguishing death‑plus‑indeterminate sentences from death‑plus‑determinate sentences, the Court harmonized practice statewide and resolved a recurring sentencing question. The separate concurrences serve as cautionary notes—about how expert testimony is presented and how juror exposure to prior verdicts is managed—and about the judiciary’s responsibility to avoid language that undermines public trust. Together, these opinions offer both doctrinal clarity and practical guidance for future capital and serious felony prosecutions in California.