No Parental Standing to Assert a Child’s Ineffective-Assistance Claim in Termination Proceedings:
Commentary on Matter of C.M.B., 2025 MT 272 (Mont.)

I. Introduction

The Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Matter of C.M.B., 2025 MT 272, addresses two important questions in child protection and termination-of-parental-rights litigation:

Whether a parent has standing to argue, on appeal, that the child’s separately appointed attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the termination hearing; and
Whether the district court abused its discretion in terminating the mother’s parental rights without adequately accounting for the child’s mental health and without sufficient evidence that the mother’s condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

The case arises from a Youth in Need of Care (“YINC”) and termination proceeding concerning C.M.B., born in 2018. Following years of domestic violence, criminal conduct, and concerns about substance use and instability in the home, the Department of Public Health and Human Services (through Child and Family Services, “CFS” or “the Department”) removed the child and ultimately sought termination of both parents’ rights. The child’s father consented to adoption and relinquished his rights; the appeal concerns only the mother (T.C., “Mother”).

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed termination. In doing so, it made a significant clarification: a parent may not, as a matter of prudential standing, litigate the child’s alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) or violations of the child’s independent right to counsel. The Court also reaffirmed the broad discretion given to district courts in assessing whether a parent’s conduct or condition is “unlikely to change within a reasonable time” under Montana’s child protection statutes.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural and Factual Background

Key background points:

Between 2017 and 2023, CFS received around 20 reports involving concerns about domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental health in Mother’s household.
In 2017 Mother was arrested and charged with stabbing the father (J.B.) in the children’s presence.
There had been a prior emergency protective services (EPS) and temporary legal custody (TLC) case in 2022, later dismissed, but Mother was then facing unreported felony charges from an October 2022 robbery.
On May 10, 2023, after a 5:40 a.m. call from an older half-sibling and finding Mother injured and uncooperative, police entered the home, found it unsanitary, and discovered three children alone (including C.M.B.).
C.M.B. told CPS that Mother and her boyfriend frequently hit each other, with both open- and closed-fist hitting, and that the boyfriend was “unsafe.”
CFS removed C.M.B. and her siblings and placed them first in kinship care, then ultimately in a foster home near Sidney, Montana, to promote sibling contact.

The district court adjudicated C.M.B. as a Youth in Need of Care in June 2023. Mother stipulated to the adjudication and signed onto a treatment plan. However, Mother’s engagement was poor: she missed visits, violated release conditions (failed urinalysis), struggled with housing, and did not consistently work with her caseworker on treatment goals.

By September 2024, after more than 15 of the previous 22 months in foster care, the Department petitioned to terminate both parents’ rights under § 41‑3‑609(1)(f), MCA, and invoked the statutory presumption under § 41‑3‑604(1), MCA, that termination is in the child’s best interest after 15/22 months in care.

At the December 2024 termination hearing, witnesses testified about:

C.M.B.’s mental health – Diagnosed with PTSD and generalized anxiety disorder; therapy sessions showed disturbing play themes regarding the “parent” figure; her therapist testified that she did not trust Mother and needed permanence and consistency.
Mother’s criminal justice status and substance use – Her probation officer reported ongoing noncompliance, missed UAs, continued drug use, and failure to maintain employment.
CPS testimony – Major non-engagement with the treatment plan, continuing substance abuse, instability, and inability to demonstrate “sustained change.”
Support for Mother – A peer support specialist, a family support resource specialist, and Mother’s grandmother described Mother’s positive participation in treatment, leadership in recovery programs, and the bond between Mother and child.
Youth’s stated wishes – An older sibling testified that C.M.B. said she did not want to be adopted.
C.M.B.’s counsel’s position – The child’s appointed attorney, Shannon Hathaway, formally joined the Department’s proposed findings and conclusions supporting termination, explaining she was acting under a “substituted judgment” theory given C.M.B.’s diminished capacity as a minor to understand the proceeding and Mother’s history of instability, criminality, and relapse.

The district court issued a detailed order terminating Mother’s parental rights and granting permanent legal custody to the Department. It found:

Mother did not provide a safe and stable home.
Mother’s long absences severely impacted C.M.B.’s well-being.
Mother minimally engaged with the treatment plan and did not take accountability for the reasons for removal.
Mother’s conditions—substance abuse, mental health issues, criminal behavior, and inability to protect the child from unsafe individuals—were unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

B. Issues on Appeal

Mother raised two principal issues:

Standing and ineffective assistance of the child’s counsel:
Mother argued that C.M.B.’s lawyer rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advocate for the child’s expressed wishes (to maintain her relationship with Mother and not be adopted) and by improperly invoking substituted judgment despite no actual diminished capacity. She contended this violated C.M.B.’s statutory and constitutional rights to counsel.
Abuse of discretion in termination:
Mother asserted that the district court failed to fully credit her recent progress in addiction treatment and housing planning and did not adequately account for the child’s emotional distress and desire to be with Mother, leading to an erroneous conclusion that Mother’s condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

C. Holdings

The Montana Supreme Court:

Denied Mother standing to challenge the effectiveness of the child’s counsel.
Applying its prudential standing doctrine, the Court held that Mother cannot assert C.M.B.’s separate statutory and constitutional right to counsel, including any claim of ineffective assistance. Those rights belong to the child, who is an independent party in the proceeding, and must be asserted by or through the child’s own legal representatives.
Affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
The Court concluded that the district court’s findings were supported by substantial credible evidence. It held that the court properly considered:
- the statutory factors in § 41‑3‑609(2), MCA (mental illness, substance abuse, violent behavior);
- the child’s mental health and diagnoses;
- Mother’s history and minimal, recent progress; and
- the statutory presumption that termination is in the child’s best interest after 15 months in care under § 41‑3‑604(1), MCA.
There was no abuse of discretion.

III. The New Clarification: Children’s Independent Rights and Limits on Parental Standing

While the decision largely applies existing law, it crystallizes an important principle in Montana child protection jurisprudence:

A parent lacks standing to litigate a child’s alleged ineffective assistance of counsel or violations of the child’s independent right to counsel in YINC and termination proceedings, absent a showing that the parent’s own constitutional rights were directly infringed.

The Court explicitly grounds this in:

the status of the child as an independent party entitled to assert her own constitutional rights, and
the prudential rule that litigants generally may assert only their own rights, not those of others.

At the same time, the Court leaves the door slightly open by noting that, as a prudential rule, this limitation is not immovable and could be altered by future statutory revisions or truly exceptional circumstances. But under existing law and the facts of this case, the “general rule” applies, and Mother cannot raise her child’s IAC claim.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Standing and Prudential Limitations

F.H. v. C.P.H. (In re D.A.H.), 2005 MT 68
Defines standing as the right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.
Dick Anderson Constr., Inc. v. Monroe Constr. Co., L.L.C., 2009 MT 416
Characterizes standing as a justiciability doctrine and a “threshold requirement” that courts must address sua sponte (on their own initiative) even if the parties do not raise it.
Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 2011 MT 91
Reiterates that a party must have a personal stake in the dispute and that, as a prudential matter, litigants generally may assert only their own constitutional rights.
Jones v. Montana University System, 2007 MT 82
Cited for the proposition that “a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities.”
Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality, 1999 MT 248
Explains that standing requires a past, present, or threatened injury to a property or civil interest that the court can remedy in the proceeding.
Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433 (1997)
Underpins the injury requirement for standing used in later cases.

Collectively, these decisions create a consistent framework: a litigant must show a personal, legally cognizable injury; prudential doctrines limit third-party standing; and courts must examine standing at the outset.

B. Key Precedent on Third-Party Assertions in Child Proceedings – In re B.F.

The Court’s most directly relevant standing case is In re B.F., 2004 MT 61. There, a mother (S.W.) attempted to assert the statutory and due process rights of her children’s biological fathers, claiming that foster parents failed to provide them proper notice.

The Court held that S.W. lacked standing:

She herself had full notice and could participate.
Any defects in notice would have impacted the fathers’ rights, not hers.
Citing the “general rule,” the Court concluded that she could not assert third-party constitutional rights (the fathers’ rights) on their behalf.

In Matter of C.M.B., the Court explicitly analogizes Mother’s attempt to raise her child’s right to effective counsel to S.W.’s attempt to raise the biological fathers’ rights in B.F. Both efforts fail for the same reason: the asserting party has not suffered the constitutional injury she seeks to litigate.

C. Children as Independent Parties – In re K.H.

The Court relies heavily on In re K.H., 2012 MT 175 to frame the child’s status in a YINC case:

The children in K.H. were recognized as parties to the proceeding.
They were entitled to counsel under § 41‑3‑425, MCA.
Section 41‑3‑101(1), MCA, expressly states that a child is entitled “to assert the child’s constitutional rights.”
The Court held the children could appeal the district court’s decision independently, via their own counsel; their guardian ad litem did not have an exclusive right to control appeals.

Most importantly, K.H. examined the role of a child’s counsel when the child’s expressed wishes conflict with what the lawyer believes is in the child’s best interest. The Court held that a lawyer may advocate for adjudication as a YINC—and effectively for removal—even if the minor client wants to return home, when the child’s decision-making is impaired by minority.

D. Substituted Judgment and Children’s Expressed Wishes – Rolfe and K.M.

In re Marriage of Rolfe, 216 Mont. 39, 699 P.2d 79 (1985)
Recognizes that minority may impair a client’s ability to make adequately considered decisions. It underscores that a child’s wishes deserve “serious consideration,” but they do not rigidly control the outcome.
In re K.M. (case not fully cited in the opinion)
The Court invokes K.M. for the proposition that a child’s attorney must inform the court of the child’s wishes whenever counsel believes those wishes conflict with the child’s best interests.

In Matter of C.M.B., the Court reiterates these principles: children’s wishes must be given serious consideration and must be communicated to the court, but counsel may still employ a substituted judgment approach when minor status impairs judgment and when best interests diverge from the child’s expressed preferences.

E. Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel – In re A.D.B.

The Court cites In re A.D.B., 2013 MT 167 for the principle that Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution (Due Process Clause) guarantees parents in termination proceedings the right to effective assistance of counsel. This foundation is important context: Montana recognizes IAC claims for parents in termination cases.

The question in Matter of C.M.B. is not whether IAC claims are allowed in these proceedings—they are—but whether a parent can assert IAC on behalf of the child’s attorney. The Court answers that question in the negative.

F. Termination Standards and Review

In re M.D.M., 2002 MT 305 – Termination decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Matter of C.P., 2001 MT 187 – A court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, fails to employ conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.
In re A.R., 2004 MT 35, and In re D.T.H., 2001 MT 138 – Findings of fact in YINC proceedings are reviewed for clear error, meaning:
- no substantial credible evidence supports the finding, or
- the court misapplied the effect of the evidence, or
- the reviewing court is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

These authorities underpin the highly deferential standard applied to the district court’s factual findings in Matter of C.M.B..

V. Legal Reasoning in Matter of C.M.B.

A. Issue 1 – Standing to Assert the Child’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. The Court’s Analytical Framework

The Court begins from first principles:

Standing is a threshold issue of justiciability reviewed de novo (fresh, without deference).
A litigant must show a personal, remediable injury to a property or civil interest.
Under the “prudential rule,” litigants ordinarily may not assert third-party constitutional rights.

Applying these rules, the Court examines:

Who holds the statutory and constitutional right to counsel in a YINC/termination proceeding?
Has Mother shown that her own rights were violated by the manner in which C.M.B.’s counsel performed her role?

2. Children as Independent Rights-Holders

Relying on In re K.H. and § 41‑3‑101(1)(e), MCA, the Court emphasizes:

The child is a party to the proceeding.
The child is statutorily entitled to counsel under § 41‑3‑425, MCA.
The child is specifically entitled “to assert the child’s constitutional rights.”

Thus, C.M.B. is not a passive object of litigation but a participant with her own rights and her own lawyer. Accordingly:

The alleged ineffective performance is a violation (if at all) of the child’s right to counsel—not Mother’s.

3. No Personal Injury to Mother

The Court analogizes to In re B.F., where the mother’s attempt to raise the fathers’ notice rights failed because:

she suffered no personal deprivation of notice, and
any failure affected only the fathers’ participation and rights.

Similarly, in Matter of C.M.B.:

Mother had her own counsel and her own due process protections.
The actions of the child’s attorney—aligning with the Department and advocating for termination—did not deprive Mother of her own right to counsel or to a fair hearing.
Any potential shortfall by the child’s lawyer would injure the child’s interests, not Mother’s legal interests.

Mother tried to argue that, because C.M.B. was the “subject matter” of the case and Mother’s own fundamental right to parent was at stake, she should be allowed to object to violations of the child’s right to counsel. The Court rejects that view: the fact that Mother’s rights are implicated by the outcome does not entitle her to litigate the child’s separate constitutional claims.

4. Substituted Judgment and Adequacy of Representation

Although the Court does not reach the merits of the claimed ineffective assistance (having found no standing), it still clarifies the framework governing a child’s counsel:

Under Rolfe and K.H., an attorney’s duty to pursue a client’s lawful objectives is affected when the client’s ability to make adequately considered decisions is impaired by minority.
Under K.M., counsel must inform the court of the child’s wishes, even if the lawyer believes they conflict with the child’s best interests.

The Court notes that Hathaway:

Invoked a “substituted judgment” approach based on the child’s age and diminished capacity to fully understand proceedings.
Joined the Department’s proposed findings and conclusions in favor of termination.
Explained that Mother’s history—criminal behavior, use of dangerous drugs, failure to engage in prior and current proceedings—showed a continued risk of future state involvement and instability if the parent-child legal relationship was preserved.

This description reads more like an endorsement than a critique of Hathaway’s actions. While the Court formally declines to rule on whether there was ineffective assistance (because Mother lacks standing), it implicitly signals that Hathaway’s use of substituted judgment is consistent with existing law.

5. Prudential, Not Absolute, Limitation

The Court stresses that the bar on Mother’s standing is a prudential rule, not a categorical constitutional bar:

Prudential limits are “discretionary” and “cannot be defined by hard and fast rules” (Heffernan).
The Court acknowledges that “circumstances could arise, including statutory revisions,” under which someone else might be permitted to assert rights on behalf of children.

However, “those circumstances are not present here,” and there is “no basis to depart” from the general rule that litigants may only assert their own constitutional rights.

In effect, the Court is signaling:

Under current law, only the child, through her own counsel or legal representative, may bring claims related to the child’s right to counsel or effectiveness of that counsel.
Any systemic change to allow parents to police the quality of the child’s representation would likely have to come from the Legislature or from a very different factual posture.

B. Issue 2 – Whether Termination Was an Abuse of Discretion

1. Statutory Framework

Termination of parental rights based on failure of a treatment plan under Montana law requires, in relevant part:

§ 41‑3‑609(1)(f), MCA – The court may terminate parental rights if:
- a court-approved treatment plan has not been complied with or has been unsuccessful; and
- the condition or conduct rendering the parent unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 41‑3‑609(2), MCA – The court must enter a finding that continuation of the parent-child legal relationship would likely result in continued abuse or neglect, or that the parent is unfit, unable, or unwilling to give adequate parental care. In making this determination, the court considers a non-exclusive list of factors, including:
- emotional illness or mental illness;
- history of violent behavior; and
- excessive use of intoxicants.
§ 41‑3‑609(3), MCA – The primary consideration is the emotional, mental, and physical well-being of the child.
§ 41‑3‑604(1), MCA – If a child has been in foster care or State custody for 15 of the last 22 months, termination is presumed to be in the child’s best interests.

2. Mother’s Arguments

Mother argued that:

The district court failed to sufficiently credit her recent efforts: inpatient treatment, peer support participation, leadership in recovery programs, and steps toward stable housing.
The court did not adequately consider that the child was in distress—experiencing “uncertainty and sadness” and wanting to be with Mother—which should have weighed against termination and in favor of giving Mother more time.

3. The Court’s Evaluation of the Record

The Supreme Court emphasizes that the district court’s factual analysis was “lengthy and detailed” and that there was an “extensive record” to guide the termination decision. It highlights several key findings:

Child’s mental health and trauma
- CASA reports documented that C.M.B. suffered emotionally and mentally from:
  - over 15 months of foster care; and
  - nearly six months with no contact with Mother.
- C.M.B. was diagnosed with PTSD and generalized anxiety disorder.
- The therapist described troubling therapy sessions, including “borderline scary” doll play reflecting parental figures.
Source of the child’s trauma
- The Court notes that these conditions “arose from Mother’s inability to provide proper care to C.M.B., progress on her treatment goals, achieve stability, and advance in her visitation sessions.”
- Prior to removal, domestic violence between Mother and her boyfriend in the children’s presence was “active and ongoing.”
Mother’s longstanding patterns
- Repeated involvement in domestic violence.
- Criminal conduct, including the stabbing of Father and later felony charges from the 2022 robbery.
- Substantial non-compliance with her treatment plan:
  - missed visits with the child,
  - failure to coordinate with CPS on treatment goals,
  - continued use of illegal drugs and missed UAs.
- Unstable housing, sometimes living in her car.
Limited and late progress
- Mother’s sobriety and engagement with inpatient treatment were relatively recent.
- The district court concluded that these late improvements did not amount to “significant demonstrable changes” showing she could remain stable and sober in the community long-term.

The Supreme Court accepts the district court’s view that:

Mother “has not made significant demonstrable changes that show she can be stable and sober in the community and that would ensure [the child] would no longer be subjected to trauma and neglect.”

4. Weight Given to the Child’s Wishes and Mental State

Mother emphasized that:

the child wanted to be with her mother;
the child told her sister that she did not want to be adopted; and
the child was experiencing “uncertainty and sadness” in foster care.

The Court acknowledges that:

The district court considered the child’s mental health—including the emotional impact of foster care and separation from Mother.
Under § 41‑3‑609(3), MCA, the emotional, mental, and physical well-being of the child is the primary concern.

Nevertheless, the Court defers to the district court’s conclusion that:

The child’s trauma was directly tied to Mother’s long-standing instability, exposure to violence, and failure to provide a safe environment.
The child needed permanence and stability, which Mother had not demonstrated she could provide within a reasonable time frame.

Importantly, the Court’s framework, informed by Rolfe and K.H., treats the child’s wishes as important but not controlling. Where they conflict with what the court views as the child’s long-term best interests and safety, the latter governs.

5. The 15-of-22-Month Presumption

The Court underscores that:

Under § 41‑3‑604(1), MCA, if a child has been in foster care or State custody for 15 of the most recent 22 months, termination is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.
C.M.B. had been in foster care since May 11, 2023—more than 15 of the last 22 months by the time of the petition and hearing.

This presumption reflects legislative policy favoring timely permanency over protracted efforts to rehabilitate parents where progress is uncertain. The Court does not explicitly discuss whether Mother rebutted the presumption; instead, it treats the evidence and the presumption together as supporting termination.

6. Conclusion on Abuse of Discretion

Having found:

substantial credible evidence supporting the district court’s findings,
consideration of statutory factors (mental illness, substance use, violent behavior),
attention to the child’s mental health and best interests, and
application of the 15/22-month presumption,

the Court holds there was no abuse of discretion in concluding that Mother’s conditions were unlikely to change within a reasonable time and that termination was warranted.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Reinforcement of Children’s Independent Procedural Rights

Matter of C.M.B. solidifies the view that:

Children in YINC/termination cases are separate parties, with their own counsel and their own constitutional rights.
Those rights are to be asserted by the child (through her attorney or other legal representative), not indirectly via parents.

This may have several practical consequences:

Increased importance of children’s appeals. Children, through their attorneys, may independently appeal termination orders or raise IAC claims about their own representation. Appellate courts may see more child-initiated or child-centered appeals.
Heightened expectations for youth counsel. Attorneys representing children must be trained and prepared to:
- distinguish between the child’s expressed wishes and the child’s best interests;
- use substituted judgment appropriately; and
- ensure the court is aware of the child’s preferences, consistent with K.M.
Limits on parental appellate strategies. Parents disappointed by the alignment of the child’s attorney with the Department cannot simply reframe their grievances as IAC claims on behalf of the child; they must instead focus on errors affecting their own rights.

B. Clarifying the Role of “Substituted Judgment” in Montana

The opinion further normalizes the use of a substituted judgment framework in child representation:

Where the child’s age and developmental status impair decision-making, counsel may advocate for what she reasonably believes serves the child’s long-term interests—even against the child’s expressed preferences.
This often arises in termination cases where younger children express a desire to return to a parent despite long-term exposure to violence, instability, or neglect.

Matter of C.M.B. implicitly endorses Hathaway’s use of substituted judgment:

She joined the Department’s termination request.
She did so explicitly under a substituted judgment theory based on the child’s age and capacity.
The Court recounts this without criticism and within a discussion of correct legal standards.

Attorneys in Montana representing children in dependency proceedings can read this as confirmation that, if they carefully document their reasoning and inform the court of the child’s wishes, they may ethically support termination when, in their professional judgment, the risks of reunification are too high.

C. Deference to Trial Courts on “Unlikely to Change” Findings

The decision also reinforces the deference given to trial courts in:

weighing a parent’s long-term behavior versus recent improvements;
balancing ongoing trauma and the need for permanency against the possibility of future rehabilitation; and
applying the 15-of-22-month presumption in § 41‑3‑604(1), MCA.

For practitioners, this underscores:

Factual challenges to termination orders are difficult to win on appeal; courts require a “clear error” or abuse of discretion showing, not simply a different interpretation of the evidence.
Late-stage improvements by a parent, while important, will not necessarily overcome a multi-year pattern of instability and harm, particularly once a child has been in care for over 15 months.

D. Potential Future Developments

The Court’s reference to possible future “circumstances” or statutory changes that might allow third-party assertion of children’s rights hints at:

Legislative reform that could, for example, authorize parents or guardians in narrowly defined scenarios to trigger review of the adequacy of children’s representation.
Future litigation exploring exceptions—such as where the child’s counsel has an unaddressed conflict of interest or has entirely abandoned the client on appeal.

For now, however, the rule is clear: under Montana law as it stands, parents cannot piggyback on their children’s independent right to counsel to raise ineffective-assistance claims about the child’s attorney.

VII. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

A. “Standing”

Standing is about who is allowed to bring a legal claim. To have standing, a person must:

be personally affected by the issue (have a real stake in the outcome), and
show that the court can fix or address that injury.

In this case, the question was: Is Mother personally injured when her child’s lawyer (allegedly) fails to advocate for the child’s wishes? The Court says no. Any injury would belong to the child, not the parent.

B. “Youth in Need of Care” (YINC)

A YINC is a child who has been found by a court to be abused, neglected, or otherwise in need of State intervention and protection. Once a child is adjudicated as a YINC:

the State can remove the child from the home,
develop a case plan (treatment plan) for the parents, and
seek, as a last resort, termination of parental rights if the parents cannot safely care for the child.

C. “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” (IAC)

IAC means a lawyer’s performance was so poor that it violated the client’s constitutional right to a fair proceeding. In parental rights cases, parents can claim that their own lawyer was ineffective. In Matter of C.M.B., Mother tried to argue that the child’s lawyer was ineffective, which is different—and the Court holds she cannot do that.

D. “Substituted Judgment”

Substituted judgment is when a lawyer, recognizing that a client (often a child) cannot fully understand the situation or make a mature decision, makes a judgment about what is in the client’s best long-term interest. The lawyer may:

tell the court what the child wants (for example, “I want to live with my mom”), but
still argue for a different outcome (for example, continued foster placement or termination) if the lawyer believes the child would choose that option if they had full information and maturity.

E. “Abuse of Discretion” and “Clear Error”

Abuse of discretion – An appellate court will overturn a trial judge’s decision only if the judge acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without careful judgment, resulting in a serious injustice.
Clear error – A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if:
- no substantial credible evidence supports it, or
- the reviewing court is convinced a mistake was made after looking at the entire record.

These standards are deliberately hard to meet. They explain why appellate courts rarely overturn termination decisions unless something has gone seriously wrong at the trial level.

F. “Unlikely to Change Within a Reasonable Time”

This phrase from § 41‑3‑609(2), MCA, asks whether the problems that made a parent unfit—such as addiction, violence, or mental illness—are likely to be resolved in a time frame that is reasonable from the child’s perspective. It does not mean “never,” but focuses on:

how long the child has already waited,
the severity and duration of the parent’s problems, and
the need for the child to have a stable, permanent home.

G. “15 of the Most Recent 22 Months” Presumption

If a child has been in foster care or State custody for 15 of the last 22 months, Montana law presumes that terminating parental rights is in the child’s best interest. This does not automatically require termination, but it significantly shifts the balance in favor of permanency for the child.

VIII. Conclusion

Matter of C.M.B., 2025 MT 272, is a significant clarification in Montana child protection law. The Supreme Court:

Affirms that children in YINC and termination proceedings are independent rights-holders with their own counsel and their own constitutional rights.
Holds that parents lack standing to assert the child’s ineffective assistance of counsel or other violations of the child’s right to counsel, absent a violation of their own rights.
Reaffirms that child’s counsel may, in appropriate cases, use substituted judgment to advocate for outcomes that differ from the child’s expressed wishes, provided the court is informed of those wishes and the child’s best interests are the focus.
Applies a deferential standard of review to uphold a termination order based on:
- a long history of domestic violence, instability, criminal conduct, and substance use;
- minimal late-stage progress by the parent; and
- the child’s documented trauma and need for permanency, reinforced by the 15-of-22-month statutory presumption.

For Montana practitioners, the case is an important reminder that:

Appellate challenges must be framed around the parent’s own legal rights and due process, not the child’s separate rights.
Child’s counsel has both the responsibility to convey the child’s preferences and the professional flexibility, in appropriate cases, to advocate for what they honestly believe is in the child’s long-term best interest.
Trial courts retain broad discretion in weighing evidence of parental change against a history of harm and the child’s urgent need for safety and stability.

In the broader legal context, Matter of C.M.B. continues Montana’s trend toward recognizing children as active participants, not mere subjects, in child protection litigation, while reinforcing the centrality of permanency and well-being in termination decisions.

No Parental Standing to Assert a Child’s Ineffective-Assistance Claim in Termination Proceedings: Commentary on Matter of C.M.B., 2025 MT 272 (Mont.)