No Order, No Restitution: Colorado Supreme Court Holds That Complete Deferral of Restitution at Sentencing Creates an Illegal Sentence and Requires Vacatur and a Subsection (1)(d) “No Restitution” Order

Introduction

In Snow v. People, 2025 CO 32, 569 P.3d 835, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed a recurring problem in criminal sentencing practice: whether a trial court may “reserve restitution” in its entirety at the sentencing hearing and later cure that omission by entering a post-sentencing order fixing the amount of restitution. The Court answered decisively: it may not. Because Colorado law makes restitution a component of every sentence, a sentencing court must enter one or more of the four restitution orders authorized by section 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. (2024), at or before sentencing. Simply reserving the issue wholesale is not among the authorized options and renders the sentence “not authorized by law” (i.e., an illegal sentence) subject to correction at any time under Crim. P. 35(a).

The Court’s ruling resolves two principal issues. First, it clarifies that where the sentencing court fails to enter any statutorily authorized restitution order, a postconviction challenge is cognizable as an “illegal sentence” claim—not merely an “illegal manner” claim subject to a 126-day limit—because the sentence itself was unauthorized when imposed. Second, it reaffirms and extends the remedy announced in People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, 498 P.3d 142: when the statutory restitution procedures and timing are not followed, the post-sentencing restitution order must be vacated and replaced with an order under § 18-1.3-603(1)(d) stating that no restitution is owed.

The petitioner, Shaun Jeff Snow, pled guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for dismissal of other charges and a stipulated 16–24-year range. The plea agreement and the providency hearing record did not mention restitution. At sentencing, the prosecutor did not request restitution but asked the court to “reserve restitution,” which the court did for 60 days. Seventy-eight days later the prosecution filed a restitution motion identifying the Crime Victim Compensation Board and an amount of $13,852.60; 108 days after sentencing, the court entered a restitution order. Years later, Snow collaterally attacked the restitution order. A Court of Appeals division treated his claim as an “illegal manner” claim and found it time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed.

Summary of the Opinion

Restitution is a required component of every sentence (with one rare, inapplicable exception), and section 18-1.3-603(1) authorizes only four types of restitution orders that may be entered at or before sentencing. A court cannot simply “reserve” the issue in its entirety. Doing so renders the sentence illegal because it is not authorized by law.
An illegal sentence under Crim. P. 35(a) (“a sentence that was not authorized by law or that was imposed without jurisdiction”) may be corrected at any time. The Court holds Snow’s challenge is an “illegal sentence” claim, not an “illegal manner” claim subject to the 126-day limit in Crim. P. 35(b).
Remedy: Following People v. Weeks, the Court vacates the untimely post-sentencing restitution order and directs entry of an order under § 18-1.3-603(1)(d) that no restitution is owed. Crucially, the Court clarifies that a subsection (1)(d) “no restitution” order is a proper corrective remedy not only when there are no pecuniary losses, but also when the court fails to timely and lawfully determine restitution.
The Court rejects the People’s attempt to treat the post-sentencing order as a subsection (1)(a) order (an order of a specific amount) that could cure the illegal sentence after the fact. Subsection (1)(a) orders, like all restitution orders, must be entered by the time of sentencing.
The Court reverses the Court of Appeals and remands with instructions to vacate the post-sentencing restitution order and enter an order of no restitution.

Analysis

I. The Statutory Framework: Section 18-1.3-603

Colorado’s restitution scheme, overhauled in 2000, makes timely restitution an integral, mandatory component of criminal sentencing. Section 18-1.3-603(1) requires that every judgment of conviction “shall include one or more” of the following four orders, entered at or before sentencing:

Subsection (1)(a): An order of a specific amount of restitution.
Subsection (1)(b): An order finding the defendant liable for restitution with the amount to be determined within 91 days after sentencing (or longer on a good-cause finding).
Subsection (1)(c): An order requiring payment for the actual costs of future treatment for any victim, in addition to or in place of an amount certain.
Subsection (1)(d): An order stating that no payment of restitution is required because no victim suffered a pecuniary loss.

Crim. P. 32(b) mirrors and reinforces the statutory requirement that sentencing courts must consider and include an order or finding regarding restitution. The legislature’s declarations also stress timeliness and uniformity in assessing restitution. See § 18-1.3-601(1)(e)-(g).

II. Illegal Sentence vs. Illegal Manner

Crim. P. 35(a) distinguishes between:

Illegal sentence: A sentence not authorized by law or imposed without jurisdiction—correctable at any time.
Sentence imposed in an illegal manner: Procedural errors in how a lawful sentence was imposed—generally subject to the 126-day limit in Crim. P. 35(b).

The Court holds Snow’s case falls into the first category. At sentencing, the judge entered no authorized restitution order; instead, the court “reserved” restitution wholesale, which is not among the options in § 18-1.3-603(1). Because restitution is a component of every sentence, the judgment of conviction lacked a statutorily required component and was therefore “not authorized by law.” See Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 2, 569 P.3d 815; Meza v. People, 2018 CO 23, ¶¶ 13–14, 415 P.3d 303, 307–08; Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576 (Colo. 2008).

III. Precedents and Their Role in the Decision

People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, 498 P.3d 142

Weeks involved a different procedural posture: the sentencing court there entered a subsection (1)(b) order at sentencing (finding liability, reserving the amount) but then missed the 91-day deadline to set the amount (and lacked good cause to extend). The Supreme Court vacated the untimely restitution order and directed that no restitution be ordered, emphasizing that allowing a late amount determination would “knock out all the deadline’s teeth.” The remedy of vacatur was chosen to enforce the statute’s timing requirements and the legislature’s demand for timely restitution assessments.

Snow’s case is “not on all fours” with Weeks because here the court never entered any subsection (1)(b) order at sentencing; it simply deferred restitution in its entirety. Yet the Court explains that Weeks is “at least on twos.” The same remedial logic applies: permitting a post-sentencing order to cure the omission would eviscerate the statutory framework, frustrate the legislature’s intent, and enable untimely restitution orders—potentially years later.

Tennyson I and Tennyson II

A Court of Appeals division in People v. Tennyson (Tennyson I), 2023 COA 2, treated certain restitution timing challenges as “illegal manner” claims. In Tennyson v. People (Tennyson II), 2025 CO 31, the Supreme Court clarified that when a sentence fails to include one of the four subsection (1) restitution orders, the sentence is illegal and may be corrected at any time. Snow relies on this clarification. The Court also notes that even before Weeks, Colorado law recognized automatic vacatur of post-sentencing restitution orders entered without statutory authority.

Other Authorities

Meza v. People, 2018 CO 23: A judgment of conviction must include an order or finding regarding restitution.
Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576 (Colo. 2008): Within constitutional limits, the legislature prescribes sentences; restitution is a statutory sentencing component.
Whiteaker v. People, 2024 CO 25, ¶ 28, 547 P.3d 1122: Illegal sentences may be corrected without time limitation.
Fransua v. People, 2019 CO 96: No preservation requirement for a Crim. P. 35(a) challenge.
Veith v. People, 2017 CO 19: Legality of a sentence is reviewed de novo.
People v. Baker, 2019 CO 97M, and Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO 83: De novo interpretation of statutes and rules.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court proceeds in two steps.

Identifying the defect at sentencing. Because subsection (1) contains the exclusive list of restitution orders that may be entered at sentencing, and because restitution is part of every sentence, a court that simply “reserves” restitution violates the statute. The sentence is therefore illegal when imposed. This makes Snow’s postconviction challenge an illegal sentence claim, not an illegal manner claim. Illegal sentences are correctable at any time, and no preservation is required.
Choosing the remedy consistent with legislative intent. The People argued the court’s post-sentencing order could be treated as a late subsection (1)(a) order (amount certain), thereby curing the original illegality and avoiding the 91-day rules tied to subsection (1)(b). The Court rejects this approach for multiple reasons:
- It would make subsection (1)’s command that a restitution order be included “at sentencing” meaningless by allowing courts to fix the omission at any time.
- Subsection (1)(a) contains no independent post-sentencing deadline precisely because it must be entered by the time of sentencing. Treating a much-later amount order as subsection (1)(a) would invite untimely restitution orders.
- It would run counter to the 2000 legislative amendments whose express purpose was to ensure effective, uniform, and timely restitution assessments.
Consistent with Weeks and the legislative scheme, the only remedy that both corrects the illegal sentence and preserves the statute’s teeth is to vacate the untimely post-sentencing order and enter a subsection (1)(d) order that no restitution is owed.

A notable clarification flows from this remedy: a subsection (1)(d) “no restitution” order is not confined to cases with no pecuniary loss. It is also the proper corrective remedy when the court fails to timely determine restitution in the manner the statute prescribes. Otherwise, defendants would be left without a remedy, and courts could ignore the statute’s timing mechanisms with impunity—results the legislature did not intend.

V. Impact and Practical Consequences

For trial courts

At sentencing, the court must enter one or more of the authorized restitution orders under § 18-1.3-603(1). A generic “reservation” of restitution in its entirety is not authorized and renders the sentence illegal.
If the court uses subsection (1)(b), it must find restitution liability at sentencing and ensure that the amount is set within 91 days or within a longer period supported by an express good-cause finding.
Post-sentencing attempts to “cure” a missing restitution order by entering a subsection (1)(a) amount will be untimely and are subject to vacatur.
Failure to comply can result in a mandatory “no restitution” order to correct the illegal sentence.

For prosecutors and victim advocates

Signal your intent to seek restitution at sentencing. Choose the correct statutory path:
- Subsection (1)(a): if the amount is known and can be ordered at sentencing.
- Subsection (1)(b): if the amount is not yet known, expressly secure a finding of liability at sentencing and comply with the 91-day timeline or obtain a good-cause extension.
- Subsection (1)(c): for future treatment costs.
- Subsection (1)(d): if no restitution will be sought.
Coordinate early with victims and compensation boards so that restitution information is ready by sentencing or within the statutory window.
Understand the risk: noncompliance may lead to vacatur and a no-restitution order even where victims suffered actual pecuniary loss.

For defense counsel

Scrutinize the sentencing colloquy and minute orders. If the court “reserves” restitution in its entirety, the sentence is illegal under Snow and can be challenged at any time under Crim. P. 35(a).
Where a subsection (1)(b) order is entered, track the 91-day deadline and whether any good-cause extension is justified and memorialized. An untimely amount determination without authority is subject to vacatur under Weeks.
Ensure the judgment of conviction includes a proper restitution order. Absent one, move to correct the illegal sentence; the remedy is vacatur of any untimely post-sentencing order and entry of a subsection (1)(d) order of no restitution.

Systemic implications

Expect stricter sentencing practices: Judges will need to pick one of the four statutory options at sentencing and document liability and timing with precision.
Collateral relief: Because illegal sentence claims are cognizable “at any time,” some old cases with “reserved” restitution may be vulnerable to challenge.
Legislative alignment: The decision tightly aligns judicial practice with the legislature’s 2000 reforms emphasizing timely and uniform restitution.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

Illegal sentence vs. illegal manner
- Illegal sentence: The sentence itself is unauthorized (e.g., missing a required component). Can be corrected at any time under Crim. P. 35(a).
- Illegal manner: The sentence is lawful in kind, but imposed with procedural defects. Generally subject to the 126-day limit in Crim. P. 35(b).
The four restitution orders under § 18-1.3-603(1)
- (1)(a): Amount certain—use when the amount is known at sentencing.
- (1)(b): Liability now, amount later—requires a liability finding at sentencing and a timely amount determination (within 91 days or longer for good cause).
- (1)(c): Future treatment costs.
- (1)(d): No restitution required.
91-day deadline under (1)(b)
- Time limit to set the amount after a liability finding at sentencing; the court may extend for good cause if it makes that finding and sets the longer period.
Vacatur
- To “vacate” an order is to nullify it. Here, the untimely post-sentencing restitution order is vacated and replaced with an order that no restitution is owed.
Standing to challenge restitution timing
- The People argued defendants lack standing to challenge timeliness. The Court rejected that contention, reiterating that a party to the case may appeal without any additional “standing” showing.

VII. Practice Pointers and Checklists

For sentencing courts

At sentencing, state on the record which subsection of § 18-1.3-603(1) you are invoking and include it in the written judgment.
If using (1)(b), explicitly find restitution liability, calendar the 91-day deadline, and make any good-cause extension findings in a written order before the deadline expires.
Do not “reserve restitution” in its entirety. If the amount is unknown, (1)(b) is the correct tool; if no restitution will be sought, use (1)(d).

For prosecutors

Be prepared at sentencing: either present a concrete amount (with supporting documentation) for (1)(a) or request a (1)(b) liability finding and meet the 91-day schedule.
If a (1)(b) track is chosen, submit the restitution information early. If more time is truly needed, move for a good-cause extension before the deadline and secure an order setting a new deadline.

For defense

Object to any attempt to “reserve” restitution wholesale. If the court proceeds anyway, preserve the issue and later seek relief under Crim. P. 35(a) if necessary.
When a (1)(b) order is used, monitor deadlines and oppose late filings absent a proper good-cause order.

Conclusion

Snow v. People cements a simple but powerful rule: a sentencing court must include one of the statutorily authorized restitution orders at the time of sentencing. A generic “reservation” of restitution is not an authorized option and renders the sentence illegal—correctable at any time under Crim. P. 35(a). To enforce the statute’s timing mechanisms and legislative purpose, the Court reaffirms Weeks and directs that untimely, post-sentencing restitution orders be vacated and replaced with a subsection (1)(d) order of no restitution—even if victims suffered actual pecuniary loss—when the court fails to timely determine restitution as the statute demands.

The decision will reshape day-to-day sentencing practice in Colorado: judges must select and document one of the four subsection (1) paths at sentencing; prosecutors must clearly state intent to seek restitution and comply with the 91-day schedule (or establish good cause to extend it); and defense counsel should vigilantly police compliance, knowing that the remedy for noncompliance is strong and clear. Above all, Snow aligns practice with the legislature’s insistence on timely, effective restitution and ensures that statutory deadlines have real consequences.