Introduction

In Corsnitz v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (3d Cir. Apr. 3, 2025) (not precedential), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a federal civil rights suit brought by Scott and Gwendolyn Corsnitz against the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and several DEP employees sued in their official capacities. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims because the suit was effectively against the Commonwealth, that neither congressional abrogation nor state waiver applied, and that the Ex parte Young exception did not save the official-capacity claims where the alleged wrongs were past and the requested injunction was reparative, not prospective. The panel modified the judgment to clarify that the dismissal should be without prejudice, in keeping with Third Circuit practice for sovereign-immunity dismissals.

The case arises out of DEP’s enforcement of Pennsylvania environmental laws against the Corsnitzes’ 72-acre farm. After administrative and judicial proceedings concluded in the Commonwealth’s favor—including a 2016 DEP Administrative Order (AO) upheld by the Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) and a 2022 Commonwealth Court order with $100-per-day noncompliance fines—the Corsnitzes filed a § 1983 action in federal court seeking declarations of unconstitutional trespass and taking, an injunction halting DEP enforcement, and money damages. The district court dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, and the Third Circuit affirmed, emphasizing two pillars: the stringent limits of Ex parte Young and the requirement that Eleventh Amendment dismissals be without prejudice.

Summary of the Opinion

• Parties and posture. Plaintiffs Scott and Gwendolyn Corsnitz sued the Pennsylvania DEP and five DEP employees (Felicia Lamphere, Ron Ebert, Andrea Blosser, Scott Williamson, and Derek Enders) in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds; the plaintiffs appealed pro se.
• Holding. The Eleventh Amendment bars all claims against DEP (a state agency) and the DEP employees sued solely in their official capacities. The Ex parte Young exception does not apply because (i) the complaint did not allege an ongoing violation of federal law—only past actions and the lingering effects of completed state proceedings; and (ii) the requested relief was not truly prospective, but rather a “reparative” injunction aimed at undoing past harm.
• Waiver/abrogation rejected. Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for § 1983 claims, and Congress did not abrogate that immunity in enacting § 1983.
• Disposition. The Third Circuit affirmed, but modified the judgment so that the entire dismissal is without prejudice, aligning with its decision in Merritts v. Richards.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Merritts v. Richards, 62 F.4th 764 (3d Cir. 2023).
  • The court analogized the Corsnitzes’ claims to those in Merritts: both involved attempts to use Ex parte Young against state officials after state proceedings had concluded. Merritts clarifies that Young requires an ongoing violation of federal law and truly prospective relief; “lingering effects” of past actions do not suffice.
  • Merritts also instructs that sovereign-immunity dismissals should normally be without prejudice—a point the court directly applied here to modify the judgment.
• Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
  • Establishes a narrow fiction allowing suits for prospective relief against state officials to halt ongoing violations of federal law. The panel applied Young’s requirements strictly, finding neither an ongoing violation nor prospective relief here.
• Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
  • Reaffirmed the breadth of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment absent waiver or valid congressional abrogation. The court cited Pennhurst to ground the immunity analysis.
• Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) and Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1990).
  • Clarify the distinction between official-capacity and personal-capacity suits. The district court, and the panel, treated the claims as official-capacity only, which meant the suit was effectively against the state.
• A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Center, 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004).
  • Confirms that official-capacity suits are suits against the government entity, implicating sovereign immunity.
• Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) and 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8521(b).
  • Pennsylvania has not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity; its Sovereign Immunity Act expressly preserves it for federal suits.
• Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2020).
  • § 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity, foreclosing a federal abrogation argument.
• Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988).
  • Emphasizes personal involvement for § 1983 liability. The panel used Rode to explain why an argument premised on judicially imposed fines (by the Commonwealth Court) could not be pinned on the named DEP officials.
• Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2010).
  • Permits consideration of public records (like EHB and Commonwealth Court decisions) at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The panel expressly relied on this to contextualize the complaint.
• Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 1996).
  • Provides the plenary standard of review for sovereign immunity dismissals; cited for the appellate posture.
• Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755 (3d Cir. 2023).
  • Addresses forfeiture of arguments not developed below or on appeal. The court invoked Higgins to deem forfeited the plaintiffs’ late-raised “daily fine as ongoing violation” theory.
• Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373 (3d Cir. 2016).
  • The Third Circuit has authority to modify a judgment to reflect dismissal without prejudice where immunity bars suit, which the panel did here.
• Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504 (3d Cir. 2018); Pennsylvania v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 681 F.3d 503 (3d Cir. 2012).
  • Additional support for the core sovereign immunity propositions: states and their arms are generally immune from suit in federal court absent waiver or valid abrogation.

Legal Reasoning

The Third Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three steps: identification of the defendants as immune entities under the Eleventh Amendment; rejection of Ex parte Young based on the absence of an ongoing violation and prospective relief; and confirmation that neither waiver nor abrogation applied. It then adjusted the disposition to ensure that the immunity-based dismissal is without prejudice.

1) The defendants are the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes

The plaintiffs sued the Pennsylvania DEP—a state agency—and named five DEP employees solely in their official capacities. Under Kentucky v. Graham, A.M. v. Luzerne County, and related authority, official-capacity suits are treated as suits against the state itself. The Eleventh Amendment, per Pennhurst and its progeny, bars such suits in federal court unless an exception applies.

2) The Ex parte Young exception does not apply

Ex parte Young permits federal suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in ongoing violations of federal law. The panel, following Merritts, held that two prerequisites were not satisfied:

• No ongoing violation. The complaint alleged past entries onto the property and past administrative enforcement culminating in a concluded Commonwealth Court proceeding (the March 2022 order). “Lingering effects of that discrete past action do not convert it into an ongoing violation.” The plaintiffs attempted, on appeal, to recast the Commonwealth Court’s $100-per-day sanction as an ongoing violation, but that argument was forfeited (not raised below and undeveloped on appeal). Even if considered, the complaint did not plausibly allege the personal involvement of the named DEP officials in the imposition of those fines; they emanate from the Commonwealth Court itself.
• No truly prospective relief. The relief sought aimed to undo or “repair” the effects of past actions—what Merritts called a “reparative injunction”—rather than to halt a continuing federal-law violation. For Young to apply, the injunction must be forward-looking in the sense of preventing future unlawful conduct, not nullifying the consequences of completed state action.

3) No waiver or abrogation of immunity

Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for § 1983 claims, a proposition codified in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8521(b) and reaffirmed in Lavia. Nor did Congress abrogate state sovereign immunity when it enacted § 1983; Downey confirms that point. Accordingly, no immunity override applied.

4) Remedy and disposition: without prejudice

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s immunity-based dismissal but modified the judgment so that all claims are dismissed without prejudice. Citing Merritts and Curry, the panel reiterated that sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar to the forum, not a decision on the merits, and the appropriate disposition is therefore without prejudice. This preserves the possibility—if any exists—of refiling in a forum and posture where immunity does not bar the claims (for example, in state court, or against different defendants not shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity, subject to other defenses).

Impact and Practical Implications

Although non-precedential, the decision offers clear, practical guidance in the Third Circuit on the overlap between environmental enforcement disputes and federal constitutional litigation:

• Ex parte Young is narrow and exacting. Plaintiffs challenging state enforcement actions must plead—with specificity—an ongoing violation of federal law attributable to the named state officials and must seek genuinely prospective relief aimed at stopping that ongoing violation. Past conduct and the residual consequences of concluded state proceedings are not enough.
• Official-capacity pleading choices are outcome determinative. Suing only in official capacities dooms § 1983 claims in federal court against state agencies and their officers unless Young applies. Where appropriate, plaintiffs may consider personal-capacity claims (subject to qualified immunity and other defenses) or suits against non-immune entities (e.g., municipalities), recognizing the distinct elements and exposures of each.
• Attribution matters. If a continuing harm flows from a state court’s order (e.g., daily fines), plaintiffs must connect that harm to specific state officials’ ongoing conduct (and overcome additional doctrines not addressed in this opinion) rather than to the court itself. Generalized supervisory roles or historical involvement do not establish personal involvement for § 1983 purposes.
• Forum selection and timing are critical. The panel’s reliance on public records (Mayer) shows federal courts will examine the administrative and judicial history at the pleading stage. Litigants anticipating federal constitutional claims should evaluate earlier opportunities—administrative appeals, timely state-court review—and consider whether subsequent federal litigation will be jurisdictionally barred or otherwise constrained.
• Procedural clarity on remedy. The modification to “without prejudice” underscores that Eleventh Amendment dismissals do not adjudicate the merits. While this preserves theoretical re-filing options, many claims may still face other obstacles (statutes of limitation, preclusion, abstention, or other immunities) in any future action.

Environmental enforcement contexts often tempt federal constitutional framing (e.g., takings or trespass theories). This opinion, echoing Merritts, signals that when state agencies are defendants and official-capacity relief is sought, the Young pathway is viable only where plaintiffs can identify an ongoing, official enforcement conduct that violates federal law and can be enjoined prospectively.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity: A doctrine preventing private parties from suing states and their arms (like state agencies) in federal court, unless the state consents (waiver) or Congress validly overrides that immunity (abrogation) using a constitutional power (often § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
• Official-capacity vs. personal-capacity suits: Suing an official in an official capacity is the same as suing the state; sovereign immunity applies. Suing personally seeks damages from the individual for his or her own actions and does not trigger Eleventh Amendment immunity, though other defenses (like qualified immunity) may apply.
• Ex parte Young exception: A legal “gateway” allowing federal courts to enjoin state officials (in their official capacities) from continuing to violate federal law. It requires (1) an ongoing federal-law violation and (2) prospective relief to stop it. It does not allow undoing completed state actions or awarding damages from the state treasury.
• Prospective vs. reparative injunctions: Prospective injunctions prevent future unlawful conduct; reparative injunctions seek to remedy or unwind past harm. Only the former fit under Ex parte Young.
• Personal involvement (Rode): For § 1983 liability, a defendant must be personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation—through direct action, knowledge and acquiescence, or established policies—mere supervisory status is insufficient.
• Without prejudice dismissal: When a court lacks jurisdiction (as with Eleventh Amendment immunity), it dismisses without prejudice, meaning the plaintiff is not barred from trying again in a proper forum or posture. This contrasts with a merits dismissal, which is typically with prejudice.
• Use of public records on a motion to dismiss: Courts may consider certain public records (like administrative decisions and court orders) without converting a motion to dismiss into summary judgment, to ensure the complaint is evaluated in the correct procedural and factual context.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s opinion in Corsnitz reinforces two core lessons for litigants seeking to challenge state environmental enforcement in federal court. First, the Eleventh Amendment erects a robust barrier against suits targeting state agencies and officials in their official capacities, and Ex parte Young is a narrow exception that demands both a present-tense federal violation and truly prospective relief. Attempts to recast the ongoing effects of closed state proceedings as continuing violations will not suffice—particularly where the alleged ongoing harm emanates from a court order rather than from the named officials’ current conduct.

Second, the court’s modification to a universal “without prejudice” dismissal aligns with circuit law and preserves the conceptual distinction between jurisdictional bars and merits adjudications. While that leaves theoretical space for alternative proceedings (for example, in state court or against different defendants), it also underscores the importance of strategic pleading and timing. For future cases in the Third Circuit, Corsnitz—paired with Merritts—offers a clear roadmap: if plaintiffs seek to invoke Ex parte Young, they must identify concrete, ongoing official conduct violating federal law and tailor their requested relief to prevent that conduct going forward. Absent that, sovereign immunity will foreclose the federal forum.