No Nexus for Intrafamilial Land Disputes: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Personal-Motive Bar and Treats Nexus as a Factual Finding in Asylum Claims

Introduction

In Masud Ahmed v. Pamela Bondi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (not recommended for publication) denied a petition for review challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The case arises from a Bangladesh inheritance dispute in which the petitioner, Masud Ahmed, alleged persecution by paternal cousins over the transfer of family property. Ahmed advanced a particular social group (PSG) theory—“Bangladeshi landowners”—and contended that his assault and threats constituted persecution on account of membership in that group.

The court assumed without deciding that “Bangladeshi landowners” could be a cognizable PSG, but held that Ahmed failed to establish the required nexus between any harm and his protected status. The panel also highlighted issue-preservation rules: Ahmed waived internal relocation and CAT arguments before the BIA, and any CAT claim was unexhausted for judicial review. The opinion clarifies two recurring points in Sixth Circuit asylum law: (1) personal, intrafamilial land disputes and retaliatory attacks for reporting to police generally lack the required nexus to a protected ground; and (2) nexus is a factual determination reviewed for substantial evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Judges Nalbandian, Mathis, and Ritz; opinion by Judge Mathis) denied Ahmed’s petition. The court reviewed the BIA decision as the final agency action, also considering the IJ’s decision to the extent adopted by the BIA. Applying de novo review to legal determinations and substantial-evidence review to factual findings, the panel:

• Assumed, without deciding, that “Bangladeshi landowners” is a cognizable PSG, but concluded the claim failed on nexus.
• Affirmed the BIA’s finding that the harm arose from a personal property dispute (and later, retaliation for a police report), not on account of any protected characteristic.
• Noted that Ahmed waived challenges to internal relocation and CAT before the BIA; any attempt to revive the CAT claim on judicial review was unexhausted and not cognizable.

Because Ahmed could not meet the (less demanding) nexus standard for withholding of removal (“a reason”), his asylum claim (which requires “one central reason”) necessarily failed as well.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Jurisdiction and review posture:
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and Umana-Ramos v. Holder (6th Cir. 2013) establish jurisdiction to review final BIA orders.
  • Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch (6th Cir. 2015): When the BIA issues a separate opinion, that decision is the final agency determination reviewed by the court, while the IJ’s findings are reviewed to the extent adopted.
  • Juan Antonio v. Barr (6th Cir. 2020): Confirms that approach to combined BIA/IJ review.
• Standards of review:
  • Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland (6th Cir. 2024): Legal questions are reviewed de novo; factual findings under the substantial-evidence standard.
  • Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland (6th Cir. 2024): Substantial evidence means the BIA’s findings will be upheld if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the whole record.
  • Khalili v. Holder (6th Cir. 2009): A reviewing court will not reverse factual findings unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise.
• Asylum and withholding legal framework:
  • 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1101(a)(42)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A): Define eligibility and bar removal where persecution or threats are “on account of” a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, membership in a PSG, political opinion).
  • Patel v. Bondi (6th Cir. 2025): Reiterates that both asylum and withholding require a nexus between risk of persecution and a protected ground.
  • Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland (6th Cir. 2023): Nexus is about motive; the persecutor must seek to overcome a protected characteristic. Also confirms that a nexus determination is a factual finding reviewed for substantial evidence.
  • Cruz-Guzman v. Barr (6th Cir. 2019): Emphasizes that nexus is a question of motive, not mere causation.
  • Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr (6th Cir. 2020): Asylum requires that a protected ground be “one central reason” for persecution; withholding requires only that a protected ground be “a reason.” If a claim fails the lower “a reason” threshold, it necessarily fails the higher asylum threshold.
• Personal-dispute line of cases:
  • Kamar v. Sessions (6th Cir. 2017): Neither asylum nor withholding protects against retribution for personal disputes.
  • Zaldana Menijar (6th Cir. 2015): Pervasive crime or violence alone is not persecution on account of a protected ground.
  • Solis-Nolasco v. Holder (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished): Mistreatment based on a land dispute is not on a protected ground.
  • Spaqi v. Holder (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished): A blood feud over land is a personal problem insufficient to show persecution on a protected ground.
• Exhaustion and waiver:
  • Mazariegos-Rodas (6th Cir. 2024): Issues not raised before the BIA are unexhausted and generally cannot be reviewed by the court of appeals.

These authorities collectively guided the court to treat nexus as a factual inquiry that asks why the persecutors acted, and to reject claims where the record shows individualized, personal motives rather than a class-based, protected-ground motive. The exhaustion holdings underscored the court’s refusal to reach arguments not preserved before the BIA.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in three principal steps:

1. Framing the legal standard. The court set out the familiar two-tiered nexus threshold:
   • For asylum, a protected ground must be “one central reason” for the persecution.
   • For withholding, a protected ground must be “a reason.”
   Because “a reason” is a lower bar than “one central reason,” failure on the withholding nexus ends the asylum claim as well. The panel also reaffirmed that nexus is a factual finding reviewed for substantial evidence.
2. Assuming cognizability but denying for lack of nexus. Without deciding whether “Bangladeshi landowners” is a cognizable PSG, the court assumed it could be and focused on the persecutors’ motive. The IJ found—and the BIA affirmed—that Ahmed’s cousins sought to take his specific plot (a personal, intrafamilial dispute) and later assaulted him in retaliation for reporting to the police, not to overcome or target the characteristic of being a landowner as such. The record contained no evidence that the cousins harbored animus toward landowners as a class or targeted other landowners; they targeted Ahmed because he inherited property they desired, and because he complained to police. Under Sebastian-Sebastian, Cruz-Guzman, and Kamar, such individualized, personal motives are not persecution “on account of” a protected ground.
3. Waiver and exhaustion. Ahmed did not challenge the IJ’s internal-relocation or CAT rulings before the BIA; the BIA deemed those issues waived. The court of appeals therefore declined to consider internal relocation. Regarding CAT, the panel invoked exhaustion principles and refused to reach the claim on the merits.

Applying substantial-evidence review, the panel held that the BIA’s motivation findings were supported by the record and that no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. Having failed to show that his proposed PSG was even “a reason” for his harm, Ahmed’s withholding claim failed; by extension, the more demanding asylum nexus failed too.

Impact and Implications

Although unpublished and therefore non-precedential within the Sixth Circuit, the opinion reinforces established doctrinal lines with practical consequences:

• Personal disputes remain outside the Refugee Act’s protection. Intrafamilial property conflicts and retaliatory violence for going to the police will ordinarily be framed as personal vendettas, absent evidence that the persecutors targeted the applicant because of a protected status or to overcome a protected characteristic.
• Nexus is the fulcrum in property-based PSG claims. Even where an applicant proposes a facially plausible PSG (e.g., “landowners”), the case will likely turn on proof of motive. Applicants must present evidence that the persecutors harbor hostility toward the group as a group—such as statements denigrating landowners generally, a pattern of targeting other landowners, or country-conditions showing socially distinct hostility toward the group—and not merely a desire to seize a particular plot.
• Record-building and issue preservation are critical. The outcome underscores two practice imperatives:
  • Develop affirmative evidence of persecutor motive tied to a protected ground, and directly address alternative, personal explanations (e.g., greed, intra-family rivalry, retaliation) with contrary proof.
  • Preserve all issues before the BIA. Failure to challenge internal-relocation findings or to press a CAT claim on administrative appeal will typically foreclose judicial review in the Sixth Circuit.
• Standards of review shape outcomes. With nexus treated as a factual question, substantial-evidence review gives significant deference to the agency’s motivation findings. Absent glaring contrary proof, federal courts are unlikely to disturb the BIA’s determination that a case is about personal retribution rather than protected-ground persecution.
• CAT strategy. Even if local police are politically influenced or unresponsive, a CAT claim requires proof that torture is more likely than not and that public officials would inflict, instigate, consent to, or acquiesce in it. Because Ahmed did not exhaust the CAT argument, the court did not address how the police’s inaction here might have been evaluated under CAT standards.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Nexus: This asks why the persecutor acted. It is not enough that harm happened while the applicant possessed a protected trait. The protected ground must motivate the persecutor. For asylum, it must be “one central reason”; for withholding, simply “a reason.”
• Particular Social Group (PSG): A PSG generally must be defined by an immutable characteristic, be particular (clear boundaries), and be socially distinct in the relevant society. The court here assumed without deciding that “Bangladeshi landowners” met these criteria and resolved the case on nexus grounds.
• Personal vs. protected-ground motive: Harm from private grudges, family feuds, property disputes, or retaliation for reporting to police is typically considered personal unless evidence shows the persecutor was motivated by the victim’s protected status (e.g., landowners as a class, political opinion, etc.).
• Government unwilling or unable to control: Asylum law also examines whether the government is willing and able to protect against non-state persecutors. Even if officials are unwilling or unable, the applicant must still prove the harm is “on account of” a protected ground. The two elements are separate.
• Internal relocation: If it is reasonable to avoid persecution by moving elsewhere in the country, asylum/withholding can be denied. Failure to contest an IJ’s internal-relocation finding before the BIA generally waives the issue.
• CAT protection: Requires showing it is more likely than not that the applicant would be tortured, and that the torture would be by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. CAT does not require a protected-ground nexus, but it does require exhaustion before the BIA for judicial review.
• Substantial evidence review: A deferential standard. The court will uphold the agency’s factual findings unless the record compels the opposite conclusion.
• Unpublished opinion: “Not recommended for publication” means the decision is non-precedential in the Sixth Circuit, though it may carry persuasive value.

Conclusion

Ahmed v. Bondi reiterates a core principle of asylum and withholding jurisprudence: where the record shows that harm flows from an intrafamilial property dispute or from retaliation for contacting police—rather than from animus toward a protected group—nexus is not satisfied. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion also reinforces that nexus determinations are factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence, making agency conclusions on persecutor motive difficult to overturn on appeal. Finally, the decision underscores the importance of preserving issues before the BIA; unraised challenges to internal relocation and CAT will almost certainly be deemed waived or unexhausted on judicial review.

For future litigants, the case provides a roadmap for both sides. Applicants should marshal direct and circumstantial evidence tying a persecutor’s motive to the protected ground and preempt personal-motive explanations. The government, in turn, will continue to prevail where the record supports personal motives such as greed, family rivalry, or retaliation, especially when those findings are made by the IJ and affirmed by the BIA. Even in the challenging posture of personal disputes, a different record—showing class-wide hostility, patterned attacks on similarly situated individuals, or explicit statements targeting the group—could produce a different result. But without that evidence, as here, the claims fail at the nexus step.