No New Trial Required When Charged Drug Quantity Fails: Lesser-Included Conspiracy Judgment and § 1957 Proof May Rest on Cumulative Drug-Proceeds Evidence

Introduction

In United States v. Alfonso Leon Wilson (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Alfonso Leon Wilson’s convictions arising from an investigation into fentanyl distribution in the Middle District of Florida. A grand jury charged Wilson with (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute “400 grams or more” of fentanyl under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A); (2) possession with intent to distribute “40 grams or more” of fentanyl; and (3) two counts of unlawful monetary transactions under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 for cash purchases of a Dodge Durango and a gold necklace.

At trial, the government relied on surveillance, phone records, physical cash-related evidence, testimony from a cooperating witness (Christopher Thomas), and financial records reflecting payments labeled “drugs” and “da weed.” The jury convicted Wilson of the drug-conspiracy count (including a special finding of 400 grams or more of fentanyl) and the § 1957 counts, but acquitted him of the possession count. Post-trial, the district court ruled the evidence was insufficient to support the charged conspiracy drug quantity, but it denied a new trial and (as Wilson framed the issue on appeal) entered judgment on a lesser-included drug-conspiracy offense.

On appeal, Wilson presented two principal issues: (a) whether the failure of proof on the charged conspiracy drug quantity required a new trial rather than a lesser-included conviction; and (b) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the Durango and necklace were purchased with “criminally derived property” exceeding $10,000 as required by § 1957.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held:

• No new trial was required on the conspiracy count merely because the government failed to prove the drug quantity charged in the indictment; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 33 relief because the evidence did not “preponderate heavily against the verdict.”
• Sufficient evidence supported the § 1957 convictions; the jury could reasonably infer the purchases were funded by drug proceeds based on a broader evidentiary picture than the cooperating witness’s fentanyl-buy totals alone (including marijuana dealing, corroborative payment descriptors, surveillance of suspected transactions, and seized cash-management tools).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) United States v. Laines

The panel used United States v. Laines, 69 F.4th 1221 (11th Cir. 2023), to frame the controlling sufficiency standard: de novo review, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing reasonable inferences in the government’s favor, and affirming if any reasonable construction supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This lens is critical to both holdings—particularly the § 1957 counts—because Wilson’s arguments asked the court to reweigh inferences about the source of funds.

2) United States v. Albury

The court relied on United States v. Albury, 782 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2015), for Rule 33 principles: a district court may weigh evidence and consider credibility, but a new trial is warranted only when the evidence “preponderates heavily against the verdict,” such that letting the verdict stand would be a miscarriage of justice. Applying Albury, the panel concluded that the conspiracy verdict (at least as to the existence of a drug-distribution conspiracy) was supported by more than the cooperator’s testimony, including surveillance showing repeated suspected hand-to-hand transactions and cash evidence.

3) United States v. Duldulao

Wilson argued that the jury’s acquittal on the possession count demonstrated that the jury rejected Christopher Thomas’s testimony, which—he contended—should undermine the conspiracy conviction and warrant a new trial. The panel invoked United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239 (11th Cir. 2023), for the proposition that a jury may credit some portions of a witness’s testimony while rejecting others. That principle allowed the court to reconcile the mixed verdict: the acquittal on possession did not compel the conclusion that the jury rejected all of Thomas’s testimony or that the conspiracy conviction was unjust.

4) Allison v. United States and 5) United States v. Cortez-Nieto

Wilson urged the court to consider the test from Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in assessing whether the district court should have ordered a new trial rather than entering judgment on a lesser-included offense once the charged drug quantity failed. The Eleventh Circuit declined to treat Allison as controlling and, in any event, reasoned (citing United States v. Cortez-Nieto, 43 F.4th 1034 (10th Cir. 2022)) that such a framework would be relevant only where an appellate court determines there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict itself. Here, the panel concluded that the conspiracy conviction was supported by sufficient evidence (even if the specific drug-quantity enhancement was not), so Allison did not carry the day.

Legal Reasoning

A) Drug-conspiracy: quantity failure did not compel a new trial

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in two steps:

1. Rule 33’s demanding miscarriage-of-justice threshold was not met. Even recognizing the district court’s authority to weigh evidence and evaluate credibility on a new-trial motion, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that a new trial is exceptional relief. It found the evidentiary record supported a conspiracy verdict through surveillance of numerous suspected drug exchanges and the seizure of substantial cash and cash-handling implements, meaning the evidence did not “preponderate heavily against the verdict.”
2. Strategic-tradeoff arguments did not justify retrial. Wilson contended that the high drug quantity alleged in the indictment constrained his trial strategy—particularly impeachment of Thomas—because aggressive cross-examination might elicit additional drug-quantity testimony harmful to him. The panel rejected this as a basis for a new trial, stating that defendants in drug cases commonly face strategic choices about contesting culpability versus contesting drug weight, and that this dynamic did not transform the outcome into a miscarriage of justice.

Notably, the opinion treats the post-trial reduction to a lesser-included conspiracy outcome (following the district court’s drug-quantity insufficiency finding) as compatible with denying a new trial, so long as the record still supports guilt of a conspiracy offense.

B) § 1957: “criminally derived property” may be proved circumstantially and cumulatively

For 18 U.S.C. § 1957, the government had to prove Wilson knowingly engaged in a monetary transaction over $10,000 involving property derived from specified unlawful activity (here, drug dealing). Wilson’s sufficiency attack focused on arithmetic: based on Thomas’s testimony about fentanyl purchases beginning in June 2022, Wilson claimed the government proved no more than about $18,000 in proceeds—short of what he characterized as the necessary proof.

The panel rejected that narrow framing. It held the jury could draw a reasonable inference that the purchases were funded by drug proceeds based on:

• Broader drug-dealing evidence: Thomas testified not only to fentanyl purchases starting in June 2022, but also to a longer relationship involving marijuana dealings.
• Corroborative financial indicators: payments in Wilson’s records (including Cash App) contained descriptors such as “drugs” and “da weed,” supporting an inference of drug-derived income.
• Cash-centric lifestyle evidence: large cash purchases (nearly $60,000 for the vehicle and $10,500 for jewelry) were not funded by bank accounts, and later-seized items (cash bundles, ~$12,000 in a backpack, and a money counter) were probative of an ongoing pattern of drug distribution and cash management, from which the jury could infer the earlier August 2022 purchases were likewise funded by proceeds.

Applying Laines’s sufficiency framework, the panel held that—even though some physical cash evidence was seized after the purchases—its probative value as to Wilson’s continuing drug business supported the inference that the earlier transactions involved criminally derived property.

Impact

1) Drug quantity setbacks do not automatically trigger retrials

The decision signals that, at least where a drug conspiracy is otherwise adequately supported, a failure of proof as to a charged quantity does not itself entitle the defendant to a new trial under Rule 33. The operative question remains whether the verdict (as adjusted to the properly supported offense level or lesser-included offense) is so against the weight of evidence that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let it stand.

2) Mixed verdicts do not necessarily undermine witness-based conspiracy cases

By relying on United States v. Duldulao, the panel reinforces that juries can partially credit cooperators. Practically, defendants will find it harder to leverage an acquittal on one count (e.g., possession) into a claim that the jury must have rejected the cooperator wholesale, especially where independent evidence corroborates the broader criminal scheme.

3) § 1957 prosecutions can be sustained with “pattern” and corroboration evidence

The § 1957 holding underscores that the government need not “match” a single revenue stream (e.g., one witness’s purchases) dollar-for-dollar to the transaction amount. Circumstantial evidence—cash purchases untethered to legitimate accounts, payment descriptors suggesting drug sales, surveillance suggesting distribution, and cash-handling tools—can collectively support the inference that the transacted funds were derived from specified unlawful activity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Lesser-included offense: a less serious crime whose elements are contained within a greater charged offense. If the government proves the elements of the lesser offense but fails on an additional element (such as a charged drug quantity affecting penalty range), courts may enter judgment on the lesser offense rather than ordering a new trial—provided the record supports it and the defendant’s rights are not otherwise violated.
• Rule 29 (judgment of acquittal) vs. Rule 33 (new trial): Rule 29 asks whether evidence was legally sufficient for any rational jury to convict; Rule 33 allows the judge to weigh evidence and credibility, but grants a new trial only in the “interest of justice,” a demanding standard in the Eleventh Circuit (miscarriage of justice / verdict heavily against the weight of evidence).
• Drug quantity in conspiracy cases: quantity often affects statutory penalties (e.g., § 841(b)(1)(A) vs. lower tiers). Failing to prove the charged quantity can reduce exposure, but it does not necessarily negate that an unlawful agreement to distribute drugs existed.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (“unlawful monetary transactions”): prohibits knowingly engaging in monetary transactions over $10,000 involving property derived from specified unlawful activity (including drug trafficking). Proof often relies on circumstantial evidence connecting large transactions to criminal proceeds.
• Inconsistent or mixed verdicts: an acquittal on one count does not automatically invalidate a conviction on another count; juries may accept some testimony and reject other portions, and different counts can require different factual findings.

Conclusion

United States v. Alfonso Leon Wilson reinforces two practical rules in federal criminal litigation. First, the failure to prove a charged conspiracy drug quantity does not, without more, entitle a defendant to a new trial; Rule 33 relief remains tied to whether the evidence heavily weighs against the remaining verdict such that letting it stand would be a miscarriage of justice. Second, § 1957 convictions may be sustained by a cumulative evidentiary showing that large cash purchases were funded by drug proceeds, even where no single witness’s testimony alone “accounts for” the entire transaction amount. The opinion thus strengthens the government’s ability to defend conspiracy and money-transaction convictions through corroborated inference, while constraining attempts to convert quantity shortfalls or mixed verdicts into automatic retrials.