No Need to Reach Both Equitable Tolling Prongs When One Fails: Mandate Rule Clarified in Jane Doe v. United States (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s summary order in Jane Doe v. United States, et al., No. 24-2374-cv (2d Cir. Nov. 24, 2025), which arises from a deeply troubling factual background involving alleged sexual and physical abuse by an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer against an informant, and a protracted procedural battle over statutes of limitations and equitable tolling.

Formally, the document is a Summary Order, and therefore nonprecedential under the Second Circuit’s rules. Nonetheless, it is citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, and it offers an instructive clarification on:

• how the mandate rule operates when a case is remanded for equitable tolling fact-finding, and
• whether a district court must make explicit findings on both elements of equitable tolling.

The court holds that once the district court properly finds that a plaintiff failed to establish reasonable diligence, it is not required to reach or expressly resolve the separate element of “extraordinary circumstances,” even when the prior appellate remand had emphasized the need for clearer factual findings on equitable tolling. This clarification, read together with earlier authority, provides a practical guide on how lower courts may structure their equitable tolling analyses after remand.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Context

Jane Doe served as an ICE informant between 2007 and 2014. She alleges that during that period, ICE officer Wilfredo Rodriguez:

• sexually assaulted and abused her in multiple locations (including a hotel, a government vehicle, and his home);
• subjected her to physical and psychological abuse; and
• threatened her and her family with deportation or violence if she ever disclosed the abuse.

Doe filed suit in October 2019, asserting federal and state law claims against:

• the United States,
• the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
• United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
• two senior DHS officials in their official capacities, and
• Rodriguez himself, in both his official and individual capacities.

Her claims, by the time of the litigation, were admittedly untimely on the face of the applicable statutes of limitations. The litigation thus came to focus almost entirely on whether equitable tolling could save her otherwise time-barred claims.

B. Doe I: Initial District Court Disposition

In Doe v. United States, No. 19-CV-1649, 2022 WL 903368 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2022) (“Doe I”), Judge Kari A. Dooley granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court:

• held that the relevant statutes of limitations had expired; and
• rejected Doe’s argument that equitable tolling should apply.

The district court treated the equitable tolling issue largely as a question resolvable in the traditional summary judgment posture, without full fact-finding or explicit weighing of credibility.

C. Doe II: First Appeal and Remand

On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded in Doe v. United States, 76 F.4th 64 (2d Cir. 2023) (“Doe II”).

In Doe II, the court held that:

• equitable tolling is a matter of equitable discretion, not a pure matter of law;
• the district court erred in treating the issue in a “prototypical summary judgment posture,” without making factual findings or properly exercising its equitable discretion; and
• the record could reasonably support a finding that Doe faced extraordinary circumstances and acted with reasonable diligence, making summary judgment inappropriate.

The Second Circuit emphasized that factual questions relevant to equitable tolling must be resolved “clearly” and directed the district court to:

• act in its fact-finding capacity, and
• determine whether Doe had satisfied the two equitable tolling prerequisites:
  • (1) that extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing, and
  • (2) that she exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing her rights.

D. Doe III: Evidentiary Hearing on Remand

On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. The central points from Doe v. United States, No. 19-CV-1649, 2024 WL 4224467 (D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2024) (“Doe III”) were:

• Doe did not dispute that her claims were time-barred absent equitable tolling.
• The hearing focused on whether:
  • Rodriguez’s threats and abuse created “extraordinary circumstances,” and
  • Doe exercised “reasonable diligence” in pursuing her legal rights.

Doe testified that:

• Rodriguez repeatedly abused and sexually assaulted her from 2007–2014; and
• he threatened her and her family with deportation or violence if she told anyone.

She asserted that fear explained her silence and justified tolling. However, the district court noted several critical factual points:

• Doe acknowledged she understood she had a potential legal claim as early as 2007, after the first sexual assault.
• She had no contact with Rodriguez after 2014.
• Despite having:
  • an immigration attorney,
  • contacts with law enforcement in unrelated incidents,
  • interactions with FBI agents she worked with after her ICE cooperation ended, and
  • medical providers treating her for depression allegedly resulting from the abuse,
  she never disclosed the alleged abuse to any of them.
• The court found evidence that Doe understood that these relationships (particularly with her attorneys and medical providers) were confidential, and that these individuals could have “safely assisted her.”
• When Doe finally raised the abuse in 2018, it was, according to the court, in the context of trying to avert her father’s deportation and as a “proposed quid pro quo” – she allegedly asked what benefit she would receive for sharing the allegations.

The district court ultimately:

• found Doe’s assertion that a lasting fear of Rodriguez explained her silence to be not credible, especially after 2014 when she had no further contact with him; and
• concluded that Doe did not act with reasonable diligence in pursuing her claims.

Because reasonable diligence was lacking, the court declined to make an explicit finding on the extraordinary circumstances prong, and again denied equitable tolling, effectively reaffirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

E. The Second Appeal (2025)

Doe appealed once more, arguing primarily that the district court had failed to comply with the Second Circuit’s mandate in Doe II because it:

• addressed only the diligence prong;
• declined to make an express factual finding on extraordinary circumstances; and
• thus allegedly ignored the “overarching premise” and explicit instructions of the remand order.

The Second Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Disposition

The appellate court’s key holdings and conclusions can be summarized as follows:

1. Mandate Compliance: The district court did comply with the Second Circuit’s mandate in Doe II. Once it properly found that Doe failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence, it was not required to make an explicit finding on “extraordinary circumstances” before denying equitable tolling.
2. Equitable Tolling Elements Are Disjunctive in Application: Because equitable tolling requires a plaintiff to show both (1) extraordinary circumstances and (2) reasonable diligence, a court may deny tolling if either element is not satisfied, without needing to resolve the other.
3. Doe Forfeited Any Challenge to the Diligence Finding: Doe did not meaningfully challenge the district court’s factual finding that she lacked reasonable diligence in her opening appellate brief. Under Second Circuit law, that omission constitutes forfeiture of the issue.
4. No Clear Error and No Abuse of Discretion: Even assuming the diligence issue had not been forfeited, the Second Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings and no abuse of discretion in its ultimate decision that equitable tolling was inappropriate.
5. Judgment Affirmed: The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of equitable tolling and thus the dismissal of Doe’s claims as untimely.

Although issued as a nonprecedential summary order, the decision clearly articulates how the mandate rule interacts with the two-element structure of equitable tolling and reinforces established practice that courts may resolve equitable tolling by focusing on whichever prong is decisively lacking.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Equitable Tolling Framework and Precedents

The court’s analysis rests on well-established precedent that equitable tolling requires a plaintiff to establish two separate elements:

1. Extraordinary circumstances that prevented timely filing; and
2. Reasonable diligence in pursuing one’s rights.

The order cites and builds upon these core authorities:

• A.Q.C. ex rel. Castillo v. United States, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011)
  The Second Circuit there emphasized that equitable tolling is an “extraordinary” remedy and that both prongs must be satisfied. The court reiterated that a litigant must show:
  • extraordinary circumstances, and
  • that she has been pursuing her rights diligently.
• Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 256 (2016)
  The Supreme Court clarified that the two equitable tolling requirements are “distinct elements,” both of which must be proved. The Second Circuit invokes this to underscore that each element is an independent prerequisite; the failure to establish either one suffices to defeat tolling.

The order also cites several district court cases to illustrate routine practice in this area:

• Contrera v. Langer, 278 F. Supp. 3d 702, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
  The court denied equitable tolling without reaching the “extraordinary circumstances” prong because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence. This case exemplifies the approach the Second Circuit endorses here: where one prong fails, the other need not be decided.
• Collazo v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 2004 WL 1498130, at *3 (D. Conn. June 23, 2004)
  The district court declined to decide whether the circumstances were extraordinary because the plaintiff had not acted with reasonable diligence. Again, this supports the idea that courts may short-circuit the analysis once one prong fails.
• Sinclair v. Vermont, 2012 WL 5285388, at *3 (D. Vt. Sept. 28, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 5285387 (D. Vt. Oct. 25, 2012)
  There, the court took the reverse path: it found the claim failed on the second prong, making it unnecessary to consider diligence. This further illustrates that each element is independently dispositive.

By cataloguing these decisions, the Second Circuit situates Doe within a consistent line of authority that treats equitable tolling as a two-gate system: the plaintiff must pass through both gates; failing either one ends the inquiry.

B. The Mandate Rule and Scope of Remand

Doe’s principal argument on this appeal is essentially a mandate rule argument: she contends that the district court failed to carry out the Second Circuit’s directives in Doe II because it did not make an express finding on the “extraordinary circumstances” prong.

The Second Circuit frames and answers that argument by reference to key mandate rule precedents:

• Puricelli v. Argentina, 797 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2015)
  The court explains that district courts have “no discretion in carrying out” an appellate mandate. Where a mandate directs a district court to conduct specific proceedings and decide certain questions, the district court must do so.
• Callahan v. County of Suffolk, 96 F.4th 362, 367 (2d Cir. 2024)
  When assessing compliance, the appellate court considers both the express terms and the broader spirit of the mandate. The Second Circuit applies this standard here to ask what, exactly, Doe II required.
• United States v. Brooks, 98 F.4th 417, 418 (2d Cir. 2024) (per curiam)
  The order notes that a claim that the district court failed to make a required finding on remand is effectively a challenge to the court’s compliance with the appellate mandate. This clarifies the doctrinal framing of Doe’s argument.

The Second Circuit’s reasoning proceeds as follows:

1. Mandate Content: In Doe II, the court directed the district court to act in its fact-finding capacity to determine whether Doe met the two elements of equitable tolling, reiterating that equitable tolling requires both extraordinary circumstances and diligence, and that “the law prohibits a judge from exercising her discretion where these two elements are missing.”
2. Interpreting “Decide These Questions”: Doe reads the mandate as requiring an express finding on both extraordinary circumstances and diligence, regardless of whether one element alone fully disposes of the tolling claim.
3. Circuit’s Response: The Second Circuit rejects that interpretation. It emphasizes that under established law:
   • equitable tolling cannot be granted unless both elements are present, but
   • a court can deny equitable tolling upon finding that either element is not met.
   Thus, the mandate did not require “needless” additional findings once the district court had properly and clearly found that Doe failed to exercise reasonable diligence.

In other words, the “spirit” and “express terms” of the mandate did not require the district court to engage in an advisory ruling on extraordinary circumstances once it was apparent that tolling was unavailable due to lack of diligence.

The takeaway: the mandate rule demands fidelity to appellate directions, but it does not convert every remand for a multi-prong analysis into an obligation to generate detailed findings on all prongs when one is concededly fatal.

C. The District Court’s Fact-Finding on Reasonable Diligence

Central to the Second Circuit’s affirmance is the district court’s factual determination that Doe failed to act with reasonable diligence.

Key elements of the district court’s reasoning (as summarized in the order) include:

• Early Awareness of a Legal Claim (2007):
  Doe testified that she knew she had a potential cause of action at the time of the first sexual assault in 2007. This shows early recognition of her legal rights.
• No Contact After 2014:
  Rodriguez’s alleged abuse ended by 2014, and Doe had no further contact with him thereafter. This is significant because, from 2014 forward, her fear was no longer tied to ongoing control or direct encounters.
• Multiple Safe Opportunities to Disclose:
  The district court emphasized Doe’s failure to disclose the abuse to numerous individuals who could have “safely assisted her,” including:
  • her immigration attorney;
  • law enforcement officers involved in unrelated incidents;
  • FBI agents she collaborated with after her ICE informant role ended; and
  • medical providers treating her for depression linked to the alleged abuse.
  Evidence suggested she understood these relationships to be protected and confidential, undermining the notion that fear alone explains the complete silence.
• Pattern of Non-Disclosure:
  The court perceived a pattern in Doe’s failure to disclose, even in contexts where she reasonably could have expected support and protection. This pattern was inconsistent with the degree of diligence equitable tolling requires.
• 2018 “Quid Pro Quo” Disclosure:
  The district court attached importance to the fact that Doe eventually raised the allegations in 2018, when she was trying to avert her father’s deportation, and did so as a proposed “quid pro quo,” asking what benefit she might receive in return. The court saw this as further evidence that her decision not to speak earlier was not simply driven by fear.
• Credibility Assessment:
  The court expressly found Doe’s testimony that her fear of Rodriguez had a lasting “silencing effect” not credible, particularly after 2014. It noted that she was “an intelligent and resourceful person,” understood her options, and had even at times threatened Rodriguez with disclosure.

On this record, the district court concluded:

• even assuming “extraordinary circumstances” could be shown,
• Doe did not exercise reasonable diligence, and
• therefore equitable tolling was unavailable.

The Second Circuit, applying a deferential clear error standard to those factual findings, saw no basis to disturb them.

D. The Second Circuit’s Legal Reasoning

The appellate court’s legal reasoning proceeds in three main steps:

1. Characterizing Doe’s Appeal as a Mandate Challenge
   The court interprets Doe’s argument as a claim that the district court failed to follow the mandate in Doe II by not making a finding on extraordinary circumstances. It notes that Doe did not cite legal authority requiring the district court to decide both prongs once one was dispositive.
2. Clarifying District Court Obligations Under the Mandate
   Drawing on Callahan and Puricelli, the court reiterates that:
   • the district court must carry out the specific instructions given on remand, but
   • those instructions must be read in harmony with established substantive law – here, the two-prong structure of equitable tolling.
   Because prevailing law (including A.Q.C. and Menominee) makes clear that:
   • both elements are required to grant tolling; but
   • failure on either prong is independently sufficient to deny tolling,
   the district court was not obligated to address extraordinary circumstances after deciding that Doe lacked diligence.
3. Reaffirming the Two-Prong Structure as Dispositive of the Appeal
   The Second Circuit underscores that:
   • Doe’s position conflicts with the basic principle that courts may deny equitable tolling if either prong fails, without making unnecessary findings on the other; and
   • district courts within the circuit have long followed that approach (as exemplified by Contrera, Collazo, and Sinclair).
   Thus, the district court’s decision to stop at the diligence prong was not only permissible but squarely in line with established practice.

In addition, the Second Circuit notes that Doe did not challenge the underlying diligence finding in her opening brief. Under McCarthy v. S.E.C., 406 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2005), arguments not raised in the opening brief are deemed forfeited. That forfeiture alone strongly undercuts her appeal.

The court finally confirms the applicable standard of review from DeSuze v. Ammon, 990 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 2021):

• legal premises of an equitable tolling decision are reviewed de novo,
• factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and
• the ultimate equitable tolling determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Under these standards, and given the forfeiture of any direct challenge to the diligence findings, the court concludes there is no basis to reverse.

E. Relationship to Doe I, Doe II, and Doe III

The path from Doe I to this second appeal illustrates how the Second Circuit expects district courts to handle equitable tolling issues:

• In Doe I, the district court addressed equitable tolling in a summary judgment posture, without adequate fact-finding or explicit exercise of equitable discretion.
• In Doe II, the Second Circuit:
  • vacated and remanded, emphasizing the need for:
    • factual findings on whether Doe faced extraordinary circumstances,
    • factual findings on diligence, and
    • a genuine exercise of equitable discretion by the district court;
  • highlighted that “the record allows for a finding that Doe faced extraordinary circumstances and acted with reasonable diligence,” thereby making summary judgment inappropriate.
• In Doe III, after an evidentiary hearing, the district court:
  • made reliability and credibility determinations based on testimony and the record; and
  • ultimately concluded that Doe had not shown reasonable diligence, while expressly leaving the extraordinary circumstances prong undecided.
• In the 2025 summary order, the Second Circuit confirms that:
  • this process satisfies the mandate in Doe II,
  • district courts may limit their findings to the dispositive prong, and
  • once diligence is rejected on a factually supported basis, equitable tolling is properly denied.

The narrative arc underscores that the error the Second Circuit sought to correct in Doe II was procedural (improper use of summary judgment), not substantive (forcing findings on both prongs regardless of necessity).

F. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

While nonprecedential, this order has several practical and doctrinal implications.

1. For District Courts: Structuring Equitable Tolling Analysis After Remand

The decision reassures district courts that:

• they may structure equitable tolling analysis flexibly,
• they need not address every prong in detail when one is plainly dispositive, and
• they remain bound, even on remand, by the underlying substantive rule that both elements are independently required.

In remand scenarios, courts should:

• comply with directives to make necessary factual findings and to exercise discretion, but
• feel free to resolve tolling on the prong that is most clearly unsupported by the evidence.

2. For Litigants: Appellate Strategy and Preservation of Issues

The case offers a clear reminder on appellate practice:

• A party who seeks equitable tolling must be prepared to defend both prongs—extraordinary circumstances and diligence—on appeal.
• Failure to challenge a critical factual finding (here, lack of diligence) in the opening brief risks forfeiture under McCarthy.
• Arguments framed purely as mandate violations cannot substitute for direct engagement with unfavorable factual findings.

For plaintiffs in trauma-related or abuse-based cases, this underscores the importance of:

• developing a robust factual record that explains delayed disclosure in a way that aligns with the diligence requirement; and
• squarely challenging adverse credibility and diligence findings on appeal, particularly when those findings turn on the availability of “safe” disclosure opportunities.

3. For Equitable Tolling Doctrine: Emphasis on Diligence

Substantively, the order reinforces that:

• the diligence requirement remains a demanding and often outcome-determinative hurdle,
• even in cases involving serious allegations of sexual and psychological abuse, and
• courts will scrutinize plaintiffs’ opportunities and choices over extended periods in evaluating diligence.

The decision also implicitly acknowledges the tension between:

• traditional conceptions of “reasonable diligence”; and
• the realities of trauma, coercion, immigration vulnerability, and power imbalances that may reasonably delay disclosure.

Here, the district court’s conclusion that Doe was an “intelligent and resourceful person” who “opted to remain silent” despite numerous safe avenues was crucial. The Second Circuit, applying clear-error review, declined to second-guess that assessment.

4. For Mandate Rule Jurisprudence

Doctrinally, the order adds nuance to the mandate rule by:

• confirming that remand directives to “determine whether” elements of a multi-prong test are satisfied do not necessarily require findings on all prongs when one is conclusively fatal;
• clarifying that mandates must be interpreted in light of substantive legal structure, here the conjunctive nature of equitable tolling’s elements; and
• illustrating how the “express terms and broader spirit” standard from Callahan operates in practice.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

For non-specialists, several core concepts in the order merit brief, simplified explanation.

1. Statute of Limitations

A statute of limitations is a law that sets a deadline for bringing a legal claim. Once the deadline expires, a claim is normally barred, regardless of its merit. The purpose is to:

• protect defendants from stale claims, and
• encourage plaintiffs to act promptly.

2. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling is a judge-made doctrine that allows a court, in rare circumstances, to pause or extend the limitations period. It does not apply automatically; the plaintiff must prove:

1. Extraordinary circumstances – something beyond the plaintiff’s control that prevented timely filing (e.g., serious misconduct by the defendant, extreme trauma, or external obstacles); and
2. Reasonable diligence – the plaintiff took reasonable steps, under the circumstances, to pursue her rights, even if she could not file on time.

If either of these elements is missing, equitable tolling cannot be granted.

3. The Mandate Rule

The mandate rule governs what a lower court must do when a case is sent back (“remanded”) by an appellate court. It requires:

• strict compliance with the appellate court’s instructions; and
• no deviation from those instructions absent further appellate permission.

However, the lower court is not required to do more than the mandate reasonably demands, especially where doing more would conflict with or go beyond established substantive law.

4. Standards of Review

On appeal, different issues are reviewed under different standards:

• De novo review: The appellate court reconsiders the legal question from scratch, with no deference to the lower court.
• Clear error review (for facts): The appellate court will uphold the lower court’s factual findings unless it has a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made.
• Abuse of discretion: The appellate court asks whether the lower court’s decision was within the range of permissible outcomes; it will reverse only if the decision was arbitrary, irrational, or based on a clear error of law or fact.

Equitable tolling decisions are reviewed:

• de novo for the legal standards applied,
• for clear error as to the underlying facts, and
• for abuse of discretion as to the ultimate judgment about whether tolling is appropriate.

5. Forfeiture of Arguments on Appeal

Under cases like McCarthy v. S.E.C., if a party fails to raise an argument in their opening brief on appeal, that argument is generally treated as forfeited and will not be considered. This rule encourages parties to:

• present their best arguments clearly and promptly; and
• prevent “sandbagging” by raising new issues only at reply or oral argument.

VI. Conclusion

Jane Doe v. United States is a nonprecedential summary order, but it provides a clear and instructive application of both the equitable tolling framework and the mandate rule.

On the facts as found by the district court after an evidentiary hearing, Doe:

• knew she had a potential claim as early as 2007;
• had no further contact with Rodriguez after 2014;
• had multiple opportunities to disclose the abuse to attorneys, law enforcement, and medical professionals who could have safely assisted her; and
• only raised the allegations years later, in the context of seeking an immigration-related benefit for her father.

The district court deemed her explanation—that persistent fear alone justified her silence and delayed filing—not credible, and concluded that she failed to exercise reasonable diligence. The Second Circuit:

• held that the district court complied with the mandate of Doe II by making this factual finding and exercising equitable discretion on remand;
• clarified that a district court need not reach the “extraordinary circumstances” prong once it concludes that the plaintiff acted without reasonable diligence; and
• affirmed the denial of equitable tolling and the dismissal of Doe’s claims as time-barred.

In the broader legal context, the order:

• reaffirms the two-prong, conjunctive structure of equitable tolling,
• illustrates the importance of diligence as a limiting principle on late-filed claims, even in sensitive abuse cases,
• clarifies how remand instructions interact with substantive legal requirements, and
• underscores the need for litigants to challenge adverse factual findings directly and promptly on appeal.

Although not controlling precedent, Jane Doe v. United States will likely be cited as persuasive authority in future disputes over equitable tolling and mandate compliance, particularly in complex cases involving allegations of long-term abuse, trauma, and delayed disclosure.