No Monell or Supervisory Liability Without a Predicate Constitutional Violation; Failure to Challenge an Independent Ground Forfeits the Appeal — Williams v. Luther (3d Cir. 2025)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Third Circuit’s non-precedential decision in Norman Williams, Jr. v. Jamey Luther, et al., No. 24-2391 (3d Cir. Oct. 31, 2025), affirming summary judgment for Department of Corrections officials in a pro se prisoner’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case arises from an eight-day delay in providing contact lens cleaning supplies to an incarcerated person with keratoconus following his temporary transfer and placement in the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) at SCI–Laurel Highlands (SCI–LH).

Two issues drive the resolution:

Whether the record supported a finding that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need during the eight-day window, and
Whether the plaintiff could bypass proof of individual deliberate indifference by framing his claim as a challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional “policy” requiring Program Review Committee (PRC) approval for medical supplies.

On appeal, Williams focused on the alleged unconstitutionality of the approval policy, but he did not challenge the district court’s core holding that deliberate indifference was not shown on this record. The panel affirmed, emphasizing two established principles: (1) policy-based and supervisory theories of § 1983 liability require an underlying constitutional violation; and (2) failure to challenge an independent ground for the judgment forfeits appellate review of that ground.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The court held:

Forfeiture on appeal: Williams did not challenge the district court’s determination that no reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference by any defendant. That non-challenged, independent basis for the judgment was dispositive and, by itself, fatal to the appeal.
Policy/supervisory liability requires a predicate violation: Framing the claim as a policy challenge did not relieve Williams of the burden to prove a constitutional violation. Both municipal (Monell) and supervisory-liability theories require an underlying constitutional violation.
Merits (even if not forfeited): The record did not support deliberate indifference. Daily records reflected no complaints of eye pain or irritation during the eight-day delay, and although Williams filed two grievances, nothing in the record showed that defendants knew their delay posed a substantial risk of serious harm and consciously disregarded that risk. At most, the delay reflected negligence or bureaucratic miscommunication between Medical and the PRC.

Because deliberate indifference was neither preserved on appeal nor supported by the record, the court did not need to reach further questions (including the district court’s alternative causation analysis).

Factual and Procedural Background

On September 1, 2017, Williams was transferred from SCI–Somerset to SCI–Laurel Highlands and placed in the RHU. He had a known diagnosis of keratoconus, a progressive corneal disease often managed with rigid contact lenses, which require regular removal and cleaning. While at SCI–Somerset, he had kept cleaning supplies in his cell, even in the RHU. At SCI–LH, however, access to his equipment was conditioned on PRC approval.

The intake nurse (James Maimone) was told Williams wore hard lenses requiring regular cleaning but did not chart this information. Nursing staff approved Williams’s request for the lens equipment “if approved by PRC” and forwarded it the same day. The PRC met on September 7, 2017 and approved the supplies, but delivery lagged two additional days. Williams thus lacked equipment for approximately eight days. During that time, he submitted one sick call slip and two grievances, and mental health staff saw him daily but recorded no eye-related complaints. In responding to a grievance, the PRC acknowledged a “misunderstanding between Medical and PRC” and implemented a new procedure to prevent recurrence.

Over the ensuing month, Williams reported worsening vision and pain; external specialists ultimately recommended a corneal transplant, which he underwent in February 2018. He alleged significant pain and serious complications from the surgery.

After originally suing under state law in 2019 (case later removed), Williams filed a fifth amended complaint (April 2023) asserting § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims against SCI–LH supervisory and medical officials, including Superintendent Luther, Food Services Manager McDermott, Program Manager Cree, Deputy Superintendent Houser, Nurse Maimone, Nurse Saylor, and Nurse Practitioner Brant (Brant was later dismissed from the appeal by clerk’s order). He alleged deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, contending the eight-day delay caused pain and ultimately necessitated the risky corneal transplant, and that supervisory defendants knew or should have known the PRC-approval policy posed an unreasonable risk to inmates’ health.

The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding: (1) the record could not support a finding of deliberate indifference by any defendant; and (2) even if it could, Williams had not shown causation between any deliberate indifference and his later harms. Williams appealed; the Third Circuit affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978): The panel quoted Monell’s core rule: municipalities (and, by extension, policy-based § 1983 claims) are liable only when execution of a policy or custom inflicts the injury. The court used Monell to underscore that policy-based liability cannot exist without a constitutional violation. Although Monell addresses municipal entities, its predicate-violation logic is routinely applied to supervisory-liability theories as well.
Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010): The Third Circuit cited Santiago for the principle that supervisory liability premised on directing subordinates to violate the Constitution requires, as an element, an actual constitutional violation by subordinates. This aligns supervisory-liability doctrine with the predicate-violation requirement recognized in Monell.
Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th 884, 896 (6th Cir. 2025): Quoted as persuasive authority for the general proposition that there is no Monell liability without an underlying constitutional violation. The Third Circuit used Codrington to reinforce the predicate-violation requirement.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994): The Supreme Court’s canonical standard for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference: an official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. The panel applied Farmer to the record and concluded that, even aside from forfeiture, no rational jury could find the required subjective awareness and disregard.
Pearson v. Prison Health Services, 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017): Cited to support the distinction between negligence and deliberate indifference and to illustrate that delay or miscommunication, without subjective knowledge and disregard of a substantial risk, does not meet the constitutional threshold.
LabMD Inc. v. Boback, 47 F.4th 164, 191 (3d Cir. 2022): The panel invoked LabMD for the appellate forfeiture principle: failure to challenge an independent basis for the district court’s decision is fatal to an appeal. Williams’s brief did not contest the district court’s deliberate-indifference ruling, so affirmance was warranted on that ground alone.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Recited for the summary judgment standard: no genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law; a genuine dispute exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. The Third Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo (see Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014)).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two layers—procedural and substantive:

Procedural layer: Forfeiture
Williams framed his appeal around the alleged unconstitutionality of the PRC-approval policy, asserting that he need not show individual deliberate indifference. The panel rejected this, emphasizing that policy-based or supervisory theories do not relieve plaintiffs of proving an actual constitutional violation. Because Williams did not challenge the district court’s holding that no defendant acted with deliberate indifference, he forfeited the issue. Under LabMD, that failure to contest an independent, dispositive ground requires affirmance.
Substantive layer: No deliberate indifference on the record
Even setting forfeiture aside, the panel agreed with the district court’s merits assessment. Applying Farmer, the court found no evidence that any defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Williams’s health. Key record features included:
- Timeline: Request for supplies was forwarded to the PRC the day of intake; the PRC met six days later and approved; two more days elapsed before delivery—an eight-day total.
- Contemporaneous records: Daily mental health contacts recorded no complaints of eye irritation or pain; Williams submitted only one sick call during the eight-day period, though he filed two grievances.
- Nature of delay: The PRC conceded a “misunderstanding between Medical and PRC” and instituted a new procedure to prevent recurrence, suggesting bureaucratic miscommunication rather than conscious disregard of a known substantial risk.
Negligence—even gross negligence—or delay rooted in administrative missteps does not equate to the subjective culpability demanded by Farmer. The record did not show that defendants had reason to understand that waiting for routine PRC approval posed a substantial risk to Williams’s health, nor that they disregarded such a risk.

Because both the procedural forfeiture and the substantive absence of deliberate indifference defeat liability, the Third Circuit did not need to address the district court’s alternative ruling on causation. Nonetheless, the district court had concluded that Williams failed to show a causal connection between the eight-day delay and the need for a corneal transplant months later.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although non-precedential, the decision is instructive in several respects:

Appellate preservation is critical. Pro se or represented, appellants must challenge each independent ground supporting the judgment. Failure to brief the deliberate-indifference element here doomed the appeal before the court reached the merits.
Policy and supervisory claims still require a predicate violation. Litigants cannot avoid the subjective component of Eighth Amendment liability by repackaging a claim as one against a policy or supervisor. Absent proof that someone violated the Constitution, policy and supervisory theories fail.
Medical-device gatekeeping policies are not per se unconstitutional. Requiring PRC approval for medical supplies, without more, does not amount to deliberate indifference. Liability turns on evidence that officials knew such a policy, as applied, created a substantial risk to a specific inmate and disregarded that risk.
Record-building for medical claims matters. Daily logs reflecting no complaints, sparse sick calls, and a prompt internal acknowledgment-and-fix of a “misunderstanding” undermined the deliberate-indifference showing. For plaintiffs, repeated, documented complaints and medical chart entries are often decisive. For institutions, accurate charting and swift corrective measures are powerful defenses.
Causation remains a hurdle. Even if deliberate indifference could be shown, plaintiffs must link the specific delay or denial to the later harm. An eight-day delay followed by a corneal transplant months later is the kind of chronology that typically requires competent medical evidence to establish causation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Deliberate Indifference (Eighth Amendment): A two-part test. First, the medical need must be objectively serious. Second, officials must be subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm and consciously disregard it. Mistakes, negligence, or bureaucratic delay, without knowing disregard of a substantial risk, do not meet this standard (Farmer).
Monell Liability: Municipalities can be liable under § 1983 only when a governmental policy or custom causes a constitutional violation. No constitutional violation, no Monell liability. Although DOC officials here are state employees (and states are not “persons” under § 1983 for damages purposes), the court invoked Monell’s predicate-violation logic to reject a “policy-only” theory and paired it with Third Circuit supervisory-liability precedent (Santiago).
Supervisory Liability: Supervisors can be liable for their own deliberate indifference in implementing or maintaining policies that cause constitutional violations, or for directing or knowingly acquiescing in subordinates’ violations. But there must be an actual underlying constitutional violation (Santiago).
Forfeiture on Appeal: If an appellant does not challenge an independent basis for the decision below, the issue is forfeited; the unchallenged ground stands and usually ends the appeal (LabMD).
Summary Judgment: A case can be resolved without trial if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A dispute is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant on that evidence (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson).
Program Review Committee (PRC): An internal prison committee that, among other things, approves inmate property (including medical supplies) in restricted housing. Its involvement can create administrative delays; such delays are not constitutional violations unless officials knowingly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm stemming from the delay.

Additional Observations

Effect of grievance responses: The PRC’s acknowledgment of a “misunderstanding” and the implementation of a new procedure weighed against deliberate indifference by suggesting institutional responsiveness rather than culpable disregard.
Charting at intake: The intake nurse’s failure to record the contact-lens information might be negligent but does not, without more, rise to deliberate indifference absent proof of subjective awareness and disregard of a substantial risk.
Scope of the holding: The panel affirmed without creating new law. The opinion is expressly non-precedential under the Third Circuit’s Internal Operating Procedures. It is nonetheless a useful reminder of preservation rules and the predicate-violation requirement for policy and supervisory claims.
Parties on appeal: Nurse Practitioner Jill Brant was dismissed from the appeal by Clerk’s Order dated April 9, 2025.

What the Court Did Not Decide

Causation: The district court alternatively held that causation was not shown between the eight-day delay and the later corneal transplant and complications. The Third Circuit did not need to reach this ground given forfeiture and its agreement on the absence of deliberate indifference.
Broader constitutional validity of PRC policies: The court did not hold that PRC approval requirements are constitutional or unconstitutional in the abstract; it held only that, on this record, there was no deliberate indifference and thus no predicate constitutional violation.
Qualified immunity, Eleventh Amendment, or damages measures: These issues were not addressed, as the case was resolved on the absence of a constitutional violation and appellate forfeiture.

Practice Pointers

For plaintiffs:
- Document symptoms and risks contemporaneously in medical records and sick-call slips; ensure repeated, specific complaints are charted.
- When asserting policy or supervisory claims, identify and prove the predicate constitutional violation with record evidence showing subjective awareness and disregard (e.g., notice to specific officials, prior similar incidents, or expertise indicating obvious risk).
- Develop causation with competent medical evidence where a delay is temporally removed from the injury.
- On appeal, address every independent ground supporting the judgment; do not assume policy allegations obviate the need to prove the elements of the underlying claim.
For correctional institutions:
- Streamline medical supply approvals for RHU inmates with time-sensitive needs; document interdepartmental handoffs and timelines.
- Train intake staff on charting critical medical-device dependencies, and implement redundancy checks to catch omissions.
- Respond in writing to grievances, and implement corrective measures; both can demonstrate the absence of deliberate indifference.

Conclusion

Williams v. Luther reinforces two bedrock principles in § 1983 litigation. First, policy-based and supervisory claims rise and fall with the existence of an underlying constitutional violation: without proof of deliberate indifference, Monell-like and supervisory theories fail. Second, appellate preservation is essential: neglecting to challenge an independent ground for the judgment—here, the absence of deliberate indifference—is fatal to the appeal.

On the merits, the panel’s application of Farmer and Pearson underscores that short, bureaucratically explained delays—absent evidence of subjective awareness and disregard of a substantial risk—do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. And even where a delay is proven, plaintiffs must tether it causally to the claimed harm with competent proof.

Although non-precedential, this decision offers clear guidance: constitutional claims grounded in prison medical care must be built on concrete, contemporaneous evidence of risk, knowledge, and disregard; policymaker and supervisor liability cannot substitute for that predicate showing; and appellate success depends on confronting every basis for the judgment below.