No Mid‑Crime Withdrawal: Accomplice Liability and Termination of Complicity in Henry v. State

Introduction

In Henry v. State, No. 519, 2024 (Del. Dec. 9, 2025), the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the first-degree murder conviction of Jhalir Henry arising from the shooting death of Corey Mumford at the Wexford Village apartment complex in Laurel, Delaware.

Three men—Henry, Donregus Holland, and Shyheem Latham‑Purnell—were originally charged with Mumford’s killing. The State’s theory was that they traveled together in a coordinated caravan to Wexford Village to carry out a shooting, and that during this coordinated gun attack, Mumford was killed by Latham‑Purnell. After a bench trial, the Superior Court acquitted Holland but convicted Henry on all charges, including first-degree murder, and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

On appeal, Henry focused on the denial of his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal. He raised two core arguments:

He could not be convicted of first-degree murder because the State allegedly failed to prove that he had a specific intent to kill Mumford, who was an unintended victim of the shooting.
Even if his co-defendant committed first-degree murder, the State failed to prove that Henry was an accomplice to that murder, or, in the alternative, that he did not effectively terminate his complicity before the offense was committed.

The Delaware Supreme Court chose a narrow and focused path. It affirmed solely on the basis of accomplice liability under 11 Del. C. §§ 271 and 636, and the doctrine of ineffective withdrawal under 11 Del. C. § 273. Rather than addressing whether first-degree murder requires an intent to kill the specific victim who died, the Court held that Henry could be convicted because:

He was an “active participant from start to finish” in a coordinated shooting that foreseeably caused a death; and
He did not terminate his complicity in the manner required by § 273.

The opinion is particularly significant for two reasons:

It reaffirms and operationalizes Delaware’s broad conception of accomplice liability in homicide cases: a non-shooter can be convicted of first-degree murder if he intentionally promotes or facilitates a coordinated shooting in which a death is a foreseeable consequence.
It clarifies that “termination of complicity” under § 273 requires effective, pre-offense withdrawal; partial or symbolic disengagement during the crime—such as standing in front of a building, firing in a different direction, or only partially approaching the scene—does not suffice.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reviewed de novo the denial of Henry’s motion for judgment of acquittal, applying the standard articulated in Hopkins v. State: the question is whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense.

Applying this standard, the Court held:

Under 11 Del. C. § 271(2), a person is guilty of an offense committed by another if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of that offense, he aids, counsels, or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it. The Court emphasized that under prior Delaware precedents interpreting § 271, the relevant inquiry is whether the accomplice intended to promote the principal’s conduct constituting the offense, not whether the accomplice personally possessed the specific intent to commit that offense or to kill that particular victim.
The evidence showed that Henry:
- Traveled in a three-car caravan from Hollybrook to Wexford Village with the other shooters;
- Exited the vehicles at roughly the same time with the other participants;
- Fired shots in the parking lot while other shooters moved into their positions;
- Walked toward the back or back corner of Building 105, where the fatal shots were fired;
- Was seen holding a firearm near Mumford; and
- Fled the scene in concert with the other vehicles.
From these facts, a rational factfinder could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Henry aided and abetted the killing of Mumford and thus was an accomplice to first-degree murder.
Under 11 Del. C. § 273, an accomplice can avoid liability only if he effectively terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense, and either:
- Wholly deprives his earlier assistance of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or
- Gives timely warning to law enforcement or otherwise makes a proper effort to prevent the offense.
The Court held that Henry did not meet this standard. Simply standing in the parking lot “for a short while,” firing in a direction different from the fatal shots, and only walking “partway down the path” toward the back of the building did not constitute an affirmative withdrawal that deprived his earlier actions of effectiveness.
The Court also agreed with the Superior Court’s interpretation that § 273 requires termination to occur before the commission of the offense itself—not during its execution. Henry’s continued presence, gunfire, and coordinated behavior during the shooting episode showed he remained an active participant, not a withdrawing accomplice.

On this basis, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Analysis

1. Precedents and Authorities Cited

a. Statutory Framework

The Court’s reasoning is grounded in three key provisions of the Delaware Criminal Code:

11 Del. C. § 636(a)(1) – Murder in the First Degree
A person is guilty of first-degree murder if he “intentionally causes the death of another person.” This is the underlying substantive offense.
11 Del. C. § 271(2) – Accomplice Liability
A person is guilty of an offense committed by another when, “intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense,” the person:
- Solicits, requests, commands, or attempts to cause the other person to commit it; or
- Aids, counsels, or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it.
11 Del. C. § 273 – Termination of Complicity
An accomplice can escape liability if he:
- Terminates his complicity prior to commission of the offense, and
- Either wholly deprives his complicity of effectiveness in the commission of the offense, or gives timely warning to authorities or otherwise makes a proper effort to prevent the offense.

The Court also relied on the Commentary to the 1973 Delaware Criminal Code, which provides concrete examples of effective withdrawal: taking back a weapon previously supplied to an intending killer, or urging reconsideration and abandonment of the plan. These examples highlight that “termination” of complicity requires affirmative steps that meaningfully undo or neutralize the accomplice’s earlier assistance.

b. Hopkins v. State – Standard for Judgment of Acquittal

In Hopkins v. State, 293 A.3d 145 (Del. 2023), the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the standard for reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal:

“[W]hether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime.”

By invoking Hopkins, the Court in Henry framed the appeal as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence review, not as a reweighing of credibility or factual disputes. Under this deferential standard, the Court asks whether the conviction could be supported on any rational view of the evidence, not whether it necessarily would be the view that the appellate judges themselves might adopt.

c. Kellam v. State – Accomplice Liability for Murder

The Court cited Kellam v. State, 341 A.3d 475 (Del. 2025), for the proposition that a defendant is guilty of first-degree murder if, as an accomplice, he aids and abets a killing under § 271(2). The opinion invokes Kellam to underscore the uncontroversial but important point that the law of accomplice liability applies fully to first-degree murder: a person need not be the shooter to be convicted of the homicide itself.

d. Hassan‑El v. State and Claudio v. State – Intent Under § 271 and Foreseeable Consequences

The Court relied heavily on prior interpretations of § 271 in:

Hassan‑El v. State, 911 A.2d 385 (Del. 2006)
Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278 (Del. 1991)

From these cases, the Court reaffirmed two critical principles:

Under § 271, the key question is not whether each accomplice had the specific intent to commit murder, but whether he intended to promote or facilitate the principal’s conduct constituting the offense.
If a murder is a “foreseeable consequence of the underlying felonious conduct,” the accomplice’s intent includes the intent to facilitate that result. A jury (or, here, a judge) need not find that the accomplice specifically intended the result (a death) of the consequential crime; it is enough that the death was a foreseeable outcome of the conduct the accomplice helped bring about.

In other words, Delaware law recognizes a kind of “foreseeable-consequence” doctrine in accomplice liability: when a defendant intentionally participates in dangerous felonious conduct (such as an armed attack), he can be held responsible for a homicide that foreseeably results, even if he did not personally pull the trigger or harbor a specific desire to kill that particular victim.

e. Lee v. State – Ineffective Renunciation/Withdrawal

The Court cited Lee v. State, 44 A.3d 922 (Table), 2012 WL 1530508 (Del. Apr. 30, 2012), to illustrate the high bar for effective withdrawal or renunciation under 11 Del. C. §§ 541 and 273. The Court summarized Lee as holding that even though a defendant told co-conspirators they were robbing the wrong house, he did not terminate his participation when he continued participating in the robbery and shared in the proceeds.

Lee thus supports the principle that:

Words alone, especially when followed by continued participation, are not enough to constitute effective withdrawal.
True withdrawal must be demonstrated through actions that unequivocally sever the defendant’s involvement and undermine or prevent the crime.

By analogizing Henry’s conduct to that in Lee, the Court reinforced that merely modifying one’s role while the crime is still being carried out does not amount to termination of complicity.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Accomplice Liability for the Homicide Despite Not Being the Shooter

The Court’s core holding on accomplice liability can be distilled into the following propositions:

Henry intentionally participated in a coordinated armed attack at Wexford Village:
- He was part of a synchronized three-car caravan from Hollybrook to Wexford Village.
- Witnesses observed the vehicles parking “back-to-back” and the occupants exiting in a coordinated manner.
- Henry exited his vehicle at approximately the same time as the others.
- He fired shots in the parking lot as others took up shooting positions.
- He moved toward the back or corner of Building 105.
- He was seen holding a firearm near Mumford.
- All the cars fled together immediately after the shooting.
Henry’s actions showed he intended to promote or facilitate the shooting:
From this pattern of conduct, the Court inferred—consistent with the Superior Court—that the defendants arrived with a plan to carry out a shooting. Henry’s synchronized arrival, movements, gunfire, and coordinated departure with the other shooters evidenced an intentional contribution to that plan.
The murder of Mumford was a foreseeable consequence of this coordinated armed attack:
Relying on Claudio, the Court held that when a death is a foreseeable result of the dangerous felonious conduct that the defendant helped facilitate—in this case, a multi-person shooting at an occupied apartment complex—the accomplice’s intent under § 271 extends to that result.
Therefore, Henry could be convicted of first-degree murder as an accomplice:
Applying § 271(2) and the precedents in Hassan‑El and Claudio, the Court concluded that Henry’s repeated armed participation, from planning through escape, was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided, counseled, or agreed to aid in the killing of Mumford. He was thus properly convicted of first-degree murder under an accomplice theory, even though Latham‑Purnell was the actual shooter.

b. The “Foreseeable Consequence” Principle and the Unintended Victim

Henry argued that he could not be convicted of first-degree murder because the State failed to show that he specifically intended to kill this victim—Mumford, who was allegedly an unintended target.

The Delaware Supreme Court took an important tactical step: it chose not to resolve the case by squarely addressing whether § 636(a)(1) requires proof of an intent to kill the particular victim, or whether an intent to kill “someone” suffices when an unintended victim dies. That issue had been addressed by the Superior Court, which reasoned that culpability turns on the intent to kill, not on the identity of the person killed.

Instead, the Supreme Court resolved the appeal entirely on accomplice liability grounds:

The focus is not on whether Henry intended to kill Mumford specifically, but on whether he intended to promote or facilitate the conduct that led to Mumford’s death—a coordinated shooting at Wexford Village.
Under Claudio, once it is established that a homicide was a foreseeable consequence of the dangerous felonious conduct Henry intentionally promoted, the law imputes to him intent for that result for purposes of accomplice liability.

Functionally, the Court’s approach achieves a result similar to doctrines like “transferred intent” or the “kill zone” theory in other jurisdictions, but through the framework of accomplice liability and foreseeability:

If one joins a plan to carry out a group shooting in or around an occupied apartment complex, it is plainly foreseeable that someone will be shot and possibly killed.
Under Delaware law, that foreseeability, combined with intentional participation in the conduct, permits first-degree murder liability even where the victim is unintended or mistaken.

c. Termination of Complicity Under § 273: No Mid-Crime Withdrawal

Henry also argued that even if he was initially an accomplice, he terminated his complicity before the offense occurred by:

Standing in the parking lot “doing nothing” for a short time;
Firing shots in the opposite direction from where Mumford was shot; and
Not going directly to the backyard where the fatal shooting occurred.

The Court rejected this argument on both textual and factual grounds.

(i) Textual Reading of § 273

Section 273 requires that:

The accomplice terminates his complicity prior to commission of the offense; and
He must either:
- Wholly deprive his complicity of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or
- Give timely warning to law enforcement or otherwise make a proper effort to prevent the offense.

The Superior Court had held—and the Supreme Court agreed—that the statute’s plain language requires termination to occur before the offense is committed, not during its execution. Thus:

The relevant “offense” was the shooting that killed Mumford, not merely the preliminary conduct of driving to Wexford.
Once the coordinated shooting was underway, Henry could not claim that mid-crime hesitation, partial distancing, or firing in another direction retroactively terminated his complicity.

The Court’s insistence on a pre-offense cutoff for effective withdrawal aligns with the statutory text and the policy underlying accomplice liability: participants must convincingly and early-on sever their connection to the planned crime, not merely attempt to limit their individual blame while the group crime is in progress.

(ii) What Counts as “Termination” and “Wholly Depriving” Complicity of Effectiveness

Drawing on the 1973 Code Commentary and Lee v. State, the Court emphasized that:

Termination requires affirmative acts that meaningfully undo or neutralize the accomplice’s prior assistance.
Examples from the Commentary include:
- Taking back a weapon previously supplied to an intending killer.
- Urging reconsideration and abandonment of the plan.
Lee shows that merely expressing doubt or disapproval, while still participating and accepting the fruits of the crime, does not terminate complicity.

Applied to Henry:

He did not disarm anyone or attempt to physically prevent the shooting.
He did not warn law enforcement or make any attempt to prevent the crime.
He remained on scene, armed, firing shots, and moving in coordination with the shooters.
He fled the scene with the same group in the same caravan of cars.

The Court held these facts show continued participation, not withdrawal:

“Henry did not take actions to show he had abandoned his criminal purpose … Physically distancing himself from Latham‑Purnell in the parking lot, firing in the opposite direction, and walking ‘partway down the path’ to the back of building 105 does not demonstrate affirmative withdrawal or even an attempted withdrawal from the shooting.”

Thus, Henry remained an accomplice throughout the commission of the offense, and § 273 offered him no shield.

d. The Standard of Review and the Role of Circumstantial Evidence

The Court’s application of Hopkins underscores the deferential nature of sufficiency review:

The question is not whether the appellate court would have drawn the same inferences, but whether a rational trier of fact could have done so.
The evidence is to be viewed “in the light most favorable to the State,” including all reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence.

In this case, there was no direct evidence of a verbal agreement among the defendants to kill Mumford. But the Court held that:

The caravan formation, synchronized arrival, coordinated movements to different positions, mutual gunfire, and synchronized flight provided a powerful set of circumstantial facts supporting the existence of a joint plan to carry out a shooting.
The trial judge, as trier of fact in a bench trial, was entitled to infer from these facts that Henry and Latham‑Purnell shared a common criminal design in which a fatal shooting was a foreseeable outcome.

Under this standard, the Supreme Court concluded that a rational factfinder could find every element of accomplice liability beyond a reasonable doubt, and that Henry’s motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied.

3. Impact and Significance

a. Reinforcement of Broad Accomplice Liability in Homicide Cases

Henry v. State reinforces Delaware’s broad approach to accomplice liability, especially in the context of group violence and coordinated shootings:

A defendant who joins a coordinated armed venture—traveling together, arriving together, firing together, and fleeing together—faces full liability for a homicide that foreseeably results, even if he did not fire the fatal shot or specifically intend to kill the person who died.
This sends a clear message that willing participation in group shootings carries the same exposure as being the triggerman, so long as the death was a foreseeable consequence of the jointly undertaken conduct.

b. Clarification of the High Bar for Effective Withdrawal Under § 273

The opinion also clarifies, in concrete terms, what does not qualify as termination of complicity under § 273:

Standing in a different location at the crime scene;
Firing a gun in another direction;
Merely failing to go directly to the location of the fatal shooting; or
Remaining present and armed while the group crime is underway and then fleeing with the group,

are all insufficient.

The Court thereby:

Signals that defendants cannot carve out reduced responsibility by merely shaving down the extent of their participation at the margins once the crime has begun in earnest.
Emphasizes that termination must occur before the offense is committed and must be effective—meaning that the accomplice’s previous aid is neutralized or the crime is prevented or hindered.

C. Practical Implications for Prosecution, Defense, and Plea Negotiations

For prosecutors:

Henry provides strong appellate backing for charging non-shooting participants in group shootings with first-degree murder under an accomplice theory.
Evidence of coordinated travel, synchronized movements, and group flight can be pivotal in establishing shared intent and foreseeability.

For defense counsel:

It will be difficult to escape accomplice liability in similar group shooting cases by arguing lack of specific intent to kill the victim, or by pointing to partial disengagement during the offense.
The opinion underscores the importance of seeking to show either:
- No shared plan or coordinated action at all; or
- A truly effective pre-offense withdrawal (for example, leaving the scene entirely well before the attack, disarming co-participants, or warning authorities).

For plea negotiations:

The high exposure created by accomplice liability rules may drive earlier pleas by non-shooting participants when the State can demonstrate coordinated conduct.
Conversely, defense strategies will likely focus intensely on contesting the inference of a joint plan or coordinated attack where the factual record allows such an argument.

d. Doctrinal Coherence and Constraints

While Henry fortifies a robust regime of accomplice liability, it does so with built‑in constraints:

Liability still requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to promote or facilitate the underlying dangerous conduct.
The death must be a foreseeable consequence of that conduct.
Section 273 preserves a route for defendants who genuinely and effectively back out before the crime occurs and affirmatively attempt to prevent it.

Thus, the opinion does not impose strict liability for any bad outcome from group activity; it remains anchored in intent and foreseeability, constrained by the statutory text.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Accomplice vs. Principal

A principal is the person who directly commits the crime (here, the shooter who killed Mumford).
An accomplice is someone who helps, encourages, or facilitates the crime with the intent that it be committed (for example, by planning the attack, driving others to the scene, acting as a lookout, or firing in support).
Under Delaware law, the accomplice is usually punished as if he were a principal.

2. Specific Intent and Foreseeable Consequences

Specific intent to kill means the person consciously wants or aims to cause another’s death.
Under the “foreseeable consequence” approach, if you intentionally help carry out a very dangerous crime (like a group shooting), you can be held liable for a death that you did not specifically intend, so long as that death was a foreseeable outcome of the conduct you intentionally helped bring about.

3. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

This is a request to the trial judge to rule that the evidence is legally insufficient to support a conviction.
On appeal, the reviewing court asks whether a rational factfinder could have convicted based on the evidence presented, viewed in the State’s favor.

4. Termination of Complicity / Withdrawal

This is the legal process by which someone who initially joined a criminal plan can avoid liability if they effectively and early enough withdraw.
Under Delaware law, an accomplice must:
- Withdraw before the crime is committed; and
- Take meaningful steps to undo or neutralize their prior help, or alert the authorities or otherwise try to prevent the crime.
Simply having second thoughts or playing a somewhat smaller role during the crime is not enough.

5. Bench Trial vs. Jury Trial

In a bench trial, the judge acts as the factfinder, deciding both facts and law.
In a jury trial, the jury determines the facts, and the judge instructs on the law.
In Henry, both Henry and Holland waived their right to a jury, so the Superior Court judge served as the factfinder. On appeal, the same sufficiency standard applies as would apply to a jury verdict.

Conclusion

Henry v. State is a significant Delaware Supreme Court decision that both consolidates and clarifies the law of accomplice liability and the doctrine of termination of complicity.

Key takeaways include:

A defendant may be convicted of first-degree murder as an accomplice even if he did not fire the fatal shot, so long as he intentionally promoted or facilitated the dangerous armed conduct that foreseeably resulted in the victim’s death.
Under § 271, the crucial question is whether the accomplice intended to advance the principal’s conduct constituting the offense, not whether he personally harbored a specific intent to kill the particular victim.
Under § 273, termination of complicity requires an effective, affirmative withdrawal before the commission of the offense—mere presence, partial disengagement, or mid-crime hesitation is insufficient.
Circumstantial evidence of coordinated travel, synchronized actions, and collective flight can support a finding of a joint criminal plan and accomplice liability.

In reinforcing the principle that a person who is an “active participant from start to finish” in a group shooting bears full responsibility for a resulting death, and in articulating a demanding standard for termination of complicity, Henry v. State will likely shape the prosecution and defense of group violence cases in Delaware for years to come.