No Maranda T. Enhanced-Efforts Duty Where Parent Is Cognitively Competent; Noncompliance with an Improvement Period and Exposure to Sex Offenders Support Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

Introduction

In re D.T. and G.T., No. 24-457 (W. Va. Sept. 30, 2025), is a memorandum decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirming the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The case centers on the mother’s failure to protect her children from known sex offenders and domestic violence, her dishonesty with the Department of Human Services (DHS), and her incapacity to remedy these conditions during an improvement period, despite extensive services. Notably, the Court addresses and narrows the applicability of In re Maranda T.—a decision requiring especially robust agency efforts when termination is predicated on a parent’s intellectual incapacity—by holding that the duty is not triggered where a psychological evaluation establishes the parent’s competence and the neglect is not based on cognitive deficits.

The petitioner mother, W.T., challenged the circuit court’s July 15, 2024 dispositional order terminating her parental rights to D.T. and G.T. The Court, applying the familiar Cecil T. standard of review, concluded that the record supported the circuit court’s findings that there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions could be substantially corrected in the near future and that termination, without resort to less restrictive alternatives, was necessary for the children’s welfare.

Summary of the Opinion

DHS filed a petition in February 2023 alleging abuse and neglect based on the mother’s failure to protect G.T. from sexual abuse by her boyfriend, L.P., and on the children’s exposure to domestic violence. After separating from L.P., the mother moved the children in with a new boyfriend, R.S., who was later identified as a registered sex offender. Although the mother initially moved the children to a hotel upon learning that fact, she allowed R.S. to stay there with them and lied to DHS about his presence. The mother had previously relinquished rights to two other children following similar failure-to-protect allegations.

Following a psychological evaluation, the mother was diagnosed with borderline intellectual functioning but found competent. At adjudication, she stipulated to exposing the children to sex offenders and violent persons, resulting in an adjudication of abuse and neglect. The court granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period, later extended, during which the mother engaged in some services but failed to obtain suitable housing, did not progress beyond supervised visitation, and continued contact with R.S., concealing it from DHS.

At disposition in April and May 2024, the court heard expert testimony that the mother’s intellectual functioning did not prevent her from caring for herself or the children, though her prognosis for improved parenting was “guarded.” The mother produced a new lease and photographs of an apartment only shortly before the final dispositional hearing. The circuit court found a history of unstable housing, repeated exposure of the children to sex offenders, and dishonesty with DHS; it concluded there was no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and that termination was necessary. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Importantly, the Court rejected the mother’s reliance on Syllabus Point 4 of In re Maranda T., holding that the enhanced obligation to explore long-term assistance when termination is based on a parent’s intellectual incapacity did not apply because the expert testimony established her competence and DHS’s allegations were not rooted in cognitive incapacity.

Key Holdings and Takeaways

When competent expert evidence shows a parent is cognitively competent and neglect is not predicated on intellectual incapacity, the enhanced efforts contemplated by In re Maranda T. do not apply.
Noncompliance with an improvement period is a statutorily recognized basis supporting termination when there is no reasonable likelihood conditions can be corrected in the near future. See In re K.L.
Courts may terminate parental rights without employing less restrictive alternatives when returning custody would seriously threaten a child’s welfare and remediation is unlikely. See In re Kristen Y.; In re R.J.M.
Exposing children to known sex offenders, coupled with dishonesty toward DHS and last-minute, “eleventh-hour” steps, supports findings of ongoing risk and unlikelihood of timely correction.
On appeal, failure to specifically challenge the circuit court’s factual findings undermines claims that termination was erroneous.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court anchored its analysis in four principal authorities:

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011): Provides the standard of review—clear error for factual findings and de novo for legal conclusions. The Court also repeated Cecil T.’s recognition (via R.J.M.) that courts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement where the child’s welfare would be seriously threatened, reinforcing that the circuit court acted within its discretion in not prolonging the case for further speculative prospects.
In re K.L., 247 W. Va. 657, 885 S.E.2d 595 (2022): Emphasizes that a parent’s failure to comply with the improvement period is a statutorily recognized basis on which termination may be affirmed under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d). The Supreme Court relied on K.L. to underscore that the mother’s documented noncompliance—unsuitable housing, failure to progress beyond supervised visits, continued association with a sex offender, and dishonesty—supported the “no reasonable likelihood” finding.
In re Kristen Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), and In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980): Together, these decisions authorize termination without resorting to less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future. The Court applied these holdings directly to reject the mother’s argument for less restrictive alternatives.
In re Maranda T., 223 W. Va. 512, 678 S.E.2d 18 (2009): Syllabus Point 4 calls for a “thorough effort” to determine whether a parent can adequately care for children with intensive, long-term assistance when allegations of neglect are based on a parent’s intellectual incapacity. The mother invoked this principle, but the Court found it inapplicable because the psychological evaluation established competence and the neglect here turned on failure to protect, exposure to sex offenders, and dishonesty—not on cognitive incapacity.

The precedents collectively framed a straightforward path to affirmance: defer to the circuit court’s factual determinations (Cecil T.), recognize noncompliance with an improvement period as a statutory basis for termination (K.L.), apply the established rule permitting termination without less restrictive alternatives when remediation is unlikely (Kristen Y.; R.J.M.), and limit Maranda T. to cases where cognitive incapacity is the basis of the neglect finding.

Legal Reasoning Applied

The Supreme Court’s reasoning proceeded in four steps:

Standard of Review: The Court reiterated the clear-error standard for factual findings and de novo review for legal conclusions (Cecil T.). This set the posture for deference to the circuit court’s credibility determinations and risk assessments.
Statutory Framework: Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), a court may terminate parental rights upon findings that (a) there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect or abuse can be corrected in the near future and (b) termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. Subsection (d) informs what constitutes “no reasonable likelihood,” including failure to follow through with a family case plan and rehabilitative efforts.
Application to the Facts: The circuit court made specific findings that the mother:
- Had a history of unstable and inadequate housing, including a last-minute lease offered “in the 11th hour.”
- Repeatedly exposed the children to known sex offenders (L.P. and R.S.).
- Was dishonest with DHS about R.S.’s presence and refused alternative placements offered by DHS.
- Failed to progress beyond supervised visitation and did not fulfill therapy obligations during her improvement period.
The Supreme Court observed that the mother did not challenge these core factual findings on appeal. That omission left the statutory findings intact and fatally undermined her arguments for reversal or lesser dispositions.
Disposition: The Court held that the circuit court did not err in finding no reasonable likelihood of correction and that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare. Citing Kristen Y. and R.J.M., it reaffirmed that courts are not required to implement less restrictive alternatives before terminating rights where returning the children would seriously threaten their welfare and rehabilitation is unlikely. The Court also cited K.L. to emphasize that noncompliance with the improvement period strongly supports termination.

Clarification of Maranda T. and Its Limits

The petitioner invoked Syllabus Point 4 of In re Maranda T., arguing DHS owed a heightened duty to explore whether she could parent with intensive long-term support. The Court rejected this, explaining that Maranda T. applies where allegations are “based on intellectual incapacity.” Here, the mother underwent a psychological evaluation that diagnosed borderline intellectual functioning but concluded she was competent to care for herself and the children. The neglect adjudication and dispositional findings were grounded not in cognitive impairment but in failure to protect, exposure to sex offenders, and dishonesty. Consequently, the enhanced efforts framework of Maranda T. did not apply.

This clarification is significant: it limits the Maranda T. duty to those cases where the state’s allegations, and the adjudicatory basis for neglect, substantially rest on intellectual incapacity. Competent parents, even those with borderline intellectual functioning, cannot rely on Maranda T. to demand extraordinary long-term assistance when the neglect stems from protective decision-making failures and risk-laden conduct unrelated to cognitive incapacity.

Impact and Prospective Significance

The decision—though a memorandum disposition—has several practical implications:

Scope of Reasonable Efforts: It reaffirms that DHS’s enhanced obligations under Maranda T. are not universal; they are triggered by neglect predicated on intellectual incapacity. Where competence is established, standard reasonable efforts suffice.
Weight of Noncompliance: The Court underscores that failing to comply with an improvement period is independently probative of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction, especially when paired with a sustained risk profile (e.g., association with sex offenders, unstable housing, and dishonesty).
Less Restrictive Alternatives: The Court continues to authorize termination without intermediate dispositions when the record supports both prongs of § 49-4-604(c)(6). Practically, last-minute compliance—such as an “11th hour” lease—will rarely overcome a sustained record of instability and unmitigated risk.
Appellate Preservation: By noting that the petitioner did not challenge the circuit court’s critical factual findings, the Court highlights the importance of specifically assigning error to the facts underpinning the statutory determinations. Absent such challenges, reversal is unlikely.
Protective Decision-Making and Paramours: The Court’s reasoning signals that exposing children to known sex offenders and violent partners is a paradigmatic basis for finding ongoing risk and supports termination when persistent, unremedied, or concealed from DHS.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Improvement Period: A court-ordered timeframe during which a parent is given services and opportunities to correct the conditions of abuse or neglect. Progress is measured against case-plan goals (housing stability, therapy, parenting skills, visitation progress). Failure to comply can support termination.
No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction: A statutory conclusion under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), informed by factors in subsection (d), that the parent cannot substantially correct the conditions in the near future despite services (e.g., failure to follow through with case plan; continued risky associations; lack of progress).
Necessary for the Welfare of the Child: Even when remediation is unlikely, termination must also be shown to be necessary to protect the child’s well-being, safety, and permanency interests.
Less Restrictive Alternatives: Dispositions short of termination (e.g., guardianship, continued improvement period, custodial transfer). Under Kristen Y. and R.J.M., these are not required when the statutory termination criteria are met and the child’s welfare would be seriously threatened by delay.
Maranda T. Enhanced Efforts: A requirement that, when neglect is based on intellectual incapacity, the social services system must make a thorough effort to evaluate whether the parent can adequately parent with intensive, long-term assistance. The duty is limited to cases where intellectual incapacity is a basis for the neglect finding.
Standard of Review (Cecil T.): Appellate courts accept the circuit court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous and review legal conclusions de novo. This gives deference to trial-level credibility and risk assessments.
Memorandum Decision (Rule 21): A streamlined appellate disposition without oral argument, used when no substantial question of law is presented and the record supports the judgment. It applies settled law to the case’s facts.

Additional Case-Specific Notes

Housing: The mother’s new lease produced shortly before the final hearing was deemed too late to overcome a long history of instability—illustrating that “eleventh-hour” compliance typically carries limited weight against sustained noncompliance.
Services: The mother completed anger management and made progress in parenting and life skills; however, she did not progress beyond supervised visitation, did not complete therapy as required, and maintained risky associations—all of which outweighed partial service compliance.
Permanency: The circuit court also terminated the father’s rights. The plan for G.T. is adoption; D.T. reached the age of majority.

Conclusion

In re D.T. and G.T. reinforces core West Virginia abuse-and-neglect principles: (1) termination is appropriate when there is no reasonable likelihood of timely correction and the child’s welfare requires it; (2) courts need not employ less restrictive alternatives in such circumstances; and (3) noncompliance with an improvement period is a powerful, statutorily grounded basis for termination. The decision also clarifies the reach of Maranda T.: the enhanced, long-term assistance inquiry for intellectually impaired parents is not triggered where a qualified expert finds the parent competent and the neglect does not rest on cognitive incapacity.

For practitioners, the case underscores the necessity of candid engagement with DHS, sustained progress across case-plan objectives (particularly safe housing and protective decision-making), and precise appellate challenges to the circuit court’s factual findings. For courts and agencies, it affirms that the safety risks inherent in exposing children to known sex offenders and violent partners, combined with deception and late-breaking compliance, justify termination to secure timely permanency and protection.