No Live Controversy, No Stay: Justice D’Auria’s Mootness Framework and Appellate Restraint in Connecticut Child‑Protection Cases

Introduction

This commentary examines the first dissenting opinion by Justice D’Auria, joined by Justice Elgo, in In re Jewelyette M. (Supreme Court of Connecticut, April 1, 2025). The dissent confronts a central appellate question in Connecticut’s child-protection system: what should appellate courts do when an intervening event—here, the sudden death of a rehabilitated parent who had just regained custody—alters the case so profoundly that the previously live issues no longer permit practical relief?

The parties include the foster parents, John N. and Diana N.; the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families; the respondent father, John M. (now deceased); the child, Jewelyette M.; and the child’s paternal aunt. The procedural posture is unusual: while the foster parents’ appeal and a consolidated writ of error were pending, the Supreme Court majority stayed an imminent trial court guardianship hearing following the father’s death and denied the Commissioner’s motions to dismiss the appellate matters as moot. Justice D’Auria’s dissent contends those actions were incorrect and harmful to the child’s interests.

The dissent urges a clear rule rooted in Connecticut’s long-standing mootness doctrine: when intervening events make it impossible for an appellate court to grant practical, tangible relief, the appeal must be dismissed and trial-level decision-making—especially in juvenile matters—must proceed without appellate interference.

Summary of the Dissent

Justice D’Auria would have denied the foster parents’ motion to stay trial court proceedings and would have granted the Commissioner’s motions to dismiss the pending appeal and writ of error as moot. The dissent emphasizes:

Intervening events—the respondent father’s death on January 21, 2025—nullified the trial court’s November 4, 2024 orders premised on the father’s fitness and presence (revocation of commitment to reunify with the father, with a period of protective supervision).
The trial court promptly transferred guardianship to the paternal aunt on January 23, 2025 pending a full hearing set for January 27, 2025; however, the Supreme Court stayed that hearing and later, by a 4–3 vote on February 6, 2025, continued the stay and declined to dismiss the appellate matters.
Given the changed landscape, the appellate court can no longer provide practical relief the foster parents sought (restoration of intervenor status in the prior neglect proceeding; reversal of the November 4 revocation and related orders), because those orders hinged on the now-deceased parent’s custodial role.
Child-protection cases demand urgency driven by the child’s best interests; appellate stays that interrupt trial court problem-solving at a critical moment risk real, not hypothetical, harm—especially to a grieving child.
The well-worn mootness exception for issues “capable of repetition, yet evading review” does not apply because the same intervention issue is already scheduled for full review in In re Andrew C.—demonstrating it does not evade review.

In short, the dissent posits that the Supreme Court should have prioritized the trial court’s capacity to act swiftly in the child’s best interests and should have declined to reach legally interesting but now academic disputes. The remedy: deny the stay; dismiss the appeal and writ of error as moot.

Factual and Procedural Background

Jewelyette was born in 2015 and remained in the Commissioner’s care from infancy. The Commissioner filed to terminate parental rights (TPR) in 2016; the mother’s rights were terminated in 2017. Jewelyette began living with the foster parents in October 2017. The Commissioner withdrew the TPR petition against the father in 2019 as circumstances changed and supported reunification.

In March 2021, despite the father’s rehabilitative progress, the trial court concluded the Commissioner had not proven that reunification then served the child’s best interest. In November 2021, the foster parents obtained an injunction prohibiting removal from their home. In December 2023, after In re Ryan C., 220 Conn. App. 507, 299 A.3d 308, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023), the trial court removed the foster parents as intervenors, and they appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

In July 2024, the trial court placed Jewelyette with her paternal aunt, citing deterioration in the foster placement and the difficulty the Department had implementing permanency planning under the 2021 injunction. In August 2024, she was placed with her father for reunification. On November 4, 2024, the trial court revoked the Commissioner’s commitment, transferred guardianship to the father, and ordered six months of protective supervision to help the father access services. The foster parents filed a writ of error challenging their exclusion and the scope of their “right to be heard” under General Statutes § 46b‑129(p).

Oral argument was held on December 19, 2024. On January 21, 2025, the father passed away. The next day, the foster parents sought a stay of the November 4 order. On January 23, the trial court issued an interim order transferring guardianship to the paternal aunt pending a full January 27 hearing. On January 24, the Commissioner moved to dismiss the appeal and writ as moot. The Supreme Court stayed the January 27 guardianship hearing and, on February 6, 2025, continued the stay (4–3) and denied the motions to dismiss. Justice D’Auria dissented.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Ayala v. Smith, 236 Conn. 89, 93, 671 A.2d 345 (1996): Reaffirms that appellate jurisdiction requires an ongoing, live controversy; courts do not decide “moot questions” or those from which “no practical relief” can follow. The dissent relies on this foundational rule to argue dismissal.
In re Allison G., 276 Conn. 146, 165, 883 A.2d 1226 (2005): If events during an appeal preclude the court from granting practical relief, the case becomes moot. The father’s death is precisely such an event; it erases the factual predicate of the contested November 4 orders.
CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education, 346 Conn. 1, 28–29, 287 A.3d 557 (2023): Courts resolve only live disputes, no matter how interesting the issues once were. The dissent employs this to caution against advisory decisions.
J.Y. v. M.R., 215 Conn. App. 648, 283 A.3d 520 (2022): An interim custody order became inoperative upon issuance of a final order; the proper vehicle to seek relief is to challenge the final orders. The dissent uses J.Y. to explain that mootness turns on whether subsequent developments “supersede” the earlier decision, not simply on whether a hearing is labeled “interim.”
State v. Santiago, 219 Conn. App. 44, 56, 293 A.3d 977 (2023), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1028, 295 A.3d 944: A decision is superseded when later action replaces or nullifies it, mooting the challenge. The dissent analogizes: the father’s death nullifies the prior guardianship order to him and the protective supervision premised on his participation.
Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 458, 493 A.2d 229 (1985): Sets the equitable test for stays—likelihood of success and irreparable harm among other factors. The dissent argues both factors cut against the stay here, especially given the changed facts and the child’s need for stability.
In re Ryan C., 220 Conn. App. 507 (2023): Held that § 46b‑129(p) does not authorize intervention in neglect proceedings by unrelated persons (such as foster parents). This was the basis for removing the foster parents as intervenors in December 2023, a ruling they appealed.
In re Andrew C., 350 Conn. 931–32, 326 A.3d 1107 (2024): The Supreme Court has already granted review to revisit whether Ryan C. should be overruled. The dissent underscores this to show the intervention issue will not evade review and therefore does not fit the mootness exception.
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.1: Addressing how courts sometimes anticipate imminent mootness. The dissent views the majority’s reliance on this secondary authority as misplaced and, in any event, insufficient to justify a stay that delays trial-level best-interest determinations.

Legal Reasoning

The dissent’s legal reasoning rests on three linked propositions: jurisdictional mootness, the unavailability of practical relief, and the impropriety of an appellate stay that impedes trial court action in juvenile matters.

Mootness is jurisdictional and requires a live, remediable controversy at all times. The death of the father—on whom the November 4, 2024 orders were premised—extinguished the factual premise for revocation of commitment to him and for protective supervision as a vehicle to provide him parenting services. Because the foundation for those orders no longer exists, there is no practical appellate relief to grant: one cannot “reverse” a placement to a parent who has died. Nor does “restoring” intervenor status in a now-transformed proceeding provide meaningful redress.
The majority’s two non-mootness rationales fail.
- “Interim” nature of the January 23, 2025 guardianship order: The dissent stresses that mootness turns on the effect of extraneous events, not on whether a later hearing is labeled “interim.” The father’s death superseded the November 4 orders; the timing and label of the January proceeding do not resuscitate the old controversy. Indeed, the only reason the hearing remained “interim” was because the Supreme Court stayed it.
- Availability of relief: The foster parents sought reversal of the November 4 orders and restoration of intervenor status. The dissent explains that, post‑death, those remedies are either illusory or advisory: the revocation decision to the father cannot be meaningfully undone; protective supervision targeted at assisting the father is moot; and intervention in a fundamentally altered proceeding is not a practical remedy for the original controversy.
Stays are equitable; granting one here was an abuse of discretion. Applying Griffin Hospital, Justice D’Auria notes the foster parents’ diminished likelihood of success after the father’s death and the heightened risk of harm to the child from delay. The stay blocked the trial court—best positioned to respond rapidly in a dynamic, sensitive juvenile context—from conducting the January 27 hearing and crafting an updated best-interest plan for a now-bereaved child. The dissent views this as precisely the kind of appellate intervention the mootness doctrine is designed to avoid.

Application to the Case: Why the Foster Parents’ Requested Relief Became Impractical

Reversing revocation and guardianship to the father: The respondent father is no longer a legal actor in the case. Relief premised on his custody cannot be granted, and any order “reverting custody” now involves the paternal aunt (an arrangement created after his death), not the prior posture.
Restoring intervenor status: The neglect proceeding the foster parents sought to influence was tethered to a reunification trajectory with the father. After his death, the proceeding’s core question fundamentally changed. Reinstalling the foster parents as intervenors in that prior posture would not provide meaningful relief, and the trial court could, in any event, afford them a robust right to be heard in the post‑death posture without party intervention.
Protective supervision: The record shows protective supervision existed largely to facilitate the father’s access to services. With his passing, that purpose evaporated, undercutting any argument that appellate intervention could restore a configuration that meaningfully advances the child’s welfare.
Alternative path for review: The dissent stresses that if the foster parents take issue with the January 23, 2025 interim guardianship order or any subsequent final order, they can challenge those directly—without freezing the juvenile court’s ability to act when a child most needs timely decisions.

Section 46b‑129(p): The “Right to be Heard” vs. Intervenor Status

A thread running through the case is whether the foster parents are entitled to party status (intervention) in neglect proceedings or, alternatively, to a meaningful “right to be heard” as nonparties under § 46b‑129(p). According to the dissent, the majority defines the “right to be heard” as the right to be present throughout the relevant proceeding and to argue at the appropriate time about the child’s best interest, subject to the trial court’s discretion for good cause.

The dissent neither disputes that trial courts can provide robust opportunities for foster parents to be heard nor endorses intervention in the now‑changed proceeding. Instead, it underscores that defining the contours of the right to be heard in this case—especially after the father’s death—risks producing an advisory ruling and preempting full consideration of intervention in the live controversy already pending in In re Andrew C.

Why the “Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review” Exception Does Not Apply

The dissent points out that the majority did not rely on the classic mootness exception. And for good reason: the question of foster-parent intervention under § 46b‑129(p) is already before the Supreme Court in In re Andrew C., demonstrating the issue is capable of review in a live case. Thus, even if the issue is important and recurring, it is not the type that systematically evades appellate consideration.

Institutional Concerns and Policy

Justice D’Auria’s dissent highlights the institutional costs of appellate courts reaching beyond live controversies in juvenile matters:

Trial courts, aided by lawyers, guardians ad litem, and social workers, are best positioned to make immediate best-interest determinations, especially upon sudden changes like a parent’s death.
Appellate stays that halt those determinations for months can destabilize a child’s life, compounding trauma in already difficult circumstances.
Issuing decisions that read like advisory opinions risks “making bad law” detached from the realities of child protection practice and the dynamic nature of family circumstances.
Staying a live trial court hearing to issue a broad appellate pronouncement can also preempt parties’ arguments and the Court’s deliberation in other live cases—here, the looming review in In re Andrew C.

Impact

Although a dissent has no binding effect, Justice D’Auria’s opinion is likely to influence future litigation and appellate case management in several ways:

Reinforcement of strict mootness in juvenile appeals: Practitioners may invoke this dissent to argue for dismissal when intervening events eliminate the availability of practical relief, urging the Court to avoid advisory rulings and to prioritize the child’s immediate needs.
Restraint in granting appellate stays: The dissent provides a pointed template for challenging stays that postpone trial courts’ ability to make urgent best-interest decisions, emphasizing the Griffin factors and the child-centered harm of delay.
Procedural pathway clarity: Counsel may be more likely to challenge new, post‑event trial court orders directly (e.g., interim and final guardianship orders) rather than trying to revive disputes premised on superseded factual circumstances.
Separation of “right to be heard” from intervention: The dissent underscores that meaningful participation can be afforded without party status and cautions against conflating these doctrines—particularly in contexts where the underlying premise of the proceeding has changed.
Comity toward pending cases: The opinion urges against resolving contested legal questions (like foster-parent intervention) in quasi-moot settings when a straightforward, live vehicle is already queued (here, In re Andrew C.).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: Courts only decide live disputes. If something happens during an appeal that makes it impossible for the court to offer real, useful relief (for example, a party whose status is at the heart of the case dies), the case is “moot” and must be dismissed.
Practical Relief: A remedy that changes the parties’ legal position in a meaningful way. If the court’s decision cannot produce a tangible, real-world change, it is not “practical relief.”
Stay: An order that pauses a case or stops a lower court from acting. Stays are discretionary and require weighing factors like the likelihood of success on appeal and whether delay will cause irreparable harm.
Protective Supervision: A period during which the court keeps a case open after a child leaves state custody to monitor and support the family, often to ensure services are provided and safety is maintained.
Revocation of Commitment: The process by which a child is returned from the Commissioner’s custody to a parent or guardian, ending the state’s legal “commitment” of the child.
Transfer of Guardianship: A court order assigning legal responsibility for a child to a specified adult, such as a parent or relative like an aunt.
Writ of Error (Connecticut practice): A procedural device to obtain appellate review of certain trial-level actions not otherwise immediately appealable.
Right to Be Heard (General Statutes § 46b‑129(p)): A statutory opportunity for foster parents and others to be present and address the court about the child’s best interest during relevant proceedings, even if they are not parties. It is distinct from intervenor (party) status.
Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review: A narrow exception allowing courts to decide otherwise-moot cases if the issue will recur but, by its nature, always ends before appellate review is possible.

Conclusion

Justice D’Auria’s dissent advances a disciplined and child-centered approach to appellate jurisdiction in juvenile matters: when intervening events extinguish a live controversy and no practical relief remains, appellate courts should decline to decide and allow the trial court to proceed. The opinion critiques the majority’s stay and refusal to dismiss on mootness grounds, warning against advisory rulings and emphasizing the acute costs of delay for a nine-year-old child in a moment of crisis.

The dissent supplies a clear framework:

Apply mootness rigorously to ensure appellate courts decide only live disputes.
Do not let labels like “interim” obscure whether events have truly superseded earlier orders.
Measure stays against real-world harm to the child and the diminished likelihood of success after facts change.
Distinguish between a meaningful right to be heard and the separate question of intervention.
Respect institutional comity where a fully live vehicle (like In re Andrew C.) is poised to resolve systemic questions.

While not binding, this dissent offers a compelling roadmap for balancing appellate doctrine with on‑the‑ground child welfare realities: prioritize timely trial court action in the child’s best interest, avoid advisory pronouncements, and dismiss appeals that no longer present a practical controversy to resolve.