No Inventory Search Without Lawful Impoundment: Third Department Suppresses Firearm and Reaffirms Good‑Faith Discovery Readiness in People v. Grandoit

Case: People v. Grandoit, 2025 NY Slip Op 05720 (3d Dept Oct. 16, 2025)

Court: Appellate Division, Third Department

Panel: Clark, J.P., Aarons, Lynch, Ceresia and Fisher, JJ. (Opinion by Clark, J.P.)

Disposition: Judgment reversed; handgun suppressed; plea vacated; matter remitted.

Introduction

People v. Grandoit addresses two recurring fault lines in New York criminal procedure: the scope of “good faith” discovery compliance that supports a valid statement of readiness under CPL 30.30 and Article 245, and the constitutional limits on warrantless “inventory” searches of vehicles. The case arises from a Christmas Day 2020 traffic stop that culminated in the discovery of a handgun under the driver’s seat and a subsequent guilty plea to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. On appeal, the defendant challenged both the People’s asserted trial readiness (arguing that discovery lapses rendered their Certificate of Compliance illusory) and the denial of suppression (arguing that the warrantless search of his car did not qualify as a lawful inventory search).

The Third Department rejected the speedy trial argument—clarifying that a single, promptly cured discovery omission does not vitiate a Certificate of Compliance where the People exercised due diligence and acted in good faith. But the court agreed the gun must be suppressed, holding that the sheriff’s “tow” practice did not satisfy the constitutional prerequisites for an inventory search: the vehicle was not lawfully impounded, and the department’s policy lacked standardized, discretion‑limiting procedures for towed vehicles. The decision underscores a bright‑line rule: no inventory search without a lawful impoundment, and no constitutionally valid “tow inventory” based on a vague, one‑sentence policy.

Summary of the Opinion

Discovery/Readiness: The People turned over substantial discovery between December 2020 and May 24, 2021, then filed a Certificate of Compliance (COC) on May 24, 2021 and declared readiness on August 9, 2021. Although the second deputy’s body‑worn camera (BWC) footage was not disclosed pre‑readiness, the court deemed the COC valid. The omission was singular; the People acted diligently upon learning of the missing footage, and defense counsel had failed to notify the prosecution despite hinting at “missing videos” on the record. Under the due diligence standards articulated by the Court of Appeals and the Third Department, the COC was not illusory, and the People’s speedy trial readiness was timely.
Suppression: The People defended the search solely as an “inventory” search preparatory to a tow. The court held that justification invalid. The deputy’s conduct and contemporaneous statements reflected a plain‑view rationale and investigative purpose, not a standardized inventory. Critically, the vehicle was not lawfully impounded, and the sheriff’s policy provided only a single sentence about “towed” vehicles—insufficient to constitute a standardized, discretion‑limiting procedure. Because the constitutional requirements for an inventory search were not met, the handgun was suppressed. The defendant’s plea was vacated and the case remitted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023): The Court of Appeals set out flexible, multi‑factor guideposts for assessing prosecutorial “due diligence” under CPL Article 245, including the efforts made to comply, the volume and complexity of discovery, how obvious missing items would be to a diligent prosecutor, explanations for lapses, and the speed and good faith of remedial disclosures. Grandoit applies Bay’s framework to conclude that a single missed BWC—promptly cured when identified—does not undo readiness.
People v. McCarty, 221 AD3d 1360 (3d Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 1093 (2024): Reaffirmed that “actual readiness” requires a good‑faith COC with CPL 245.20 disclosures and an on‑the‑record judicial inquiry into readiness. Grandoit cites McCarty both for this procedural requirement and for the proposition that subsequent diligent disclosures do not retroactively invalidate an otherwise valid COC.
People v. Contompasis, 236 AD3d 138 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1007 (2025): Emphasized that Article 245 does not demand “a perfect prosecutor,” and that good‑faith compliance is assessed pragmatically. Grandoit uses Contompasis to reject the defense’s “illusory COC” argument where a single missing item was later disclosed diligently.
People v. James, 229 AD3d 1008 (3d Dept 2024): Cited for readiness principles and the People’s duty to exercise due diligence in discovery; supports Grandoit’s conclusion that the People’s methodology and cure were adequate.
People v. Reynolds, 239 AD3d 1098 (3d Dept 2025): Stands for the proposition that a solitary outstanding item, particularly where defense counsel did not timely alert the prosecution, does not automatically render the COC illusory. Grandoit applies Reynolds directly.
People v. Graham, 233 AD3d 1361 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 43 NY3d 944 (2025): Recognizes the People’s continuing duty to disclose newly discovered materials expeditiously after readiness. Grandoit relies on this to uphold the COC once the BWC was produced promptly after its existence became known.
People v. Williams, 224 AD3d 998 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 41 NY3d 1021 (2024): Supports the conclusion that reasonable pre‑COC disclosures, followed by good‑faith supplementation, can sustain readiness.
People v. Padilla, 21 NY3d 268 (2013), cert denied 571 US 889 (2013): The foundational standard for inventory searches: departments must have established procedures that “clearly limit” officer discretion and assure consistent, reasonable inventories tied to legitimate objectives (safeguarding property, protecting against claims), not investigatory aims. Grandoit uses Padilla to deem the sheriff’s one‑sentence tow clause inadequate.
People v. Kabia, 197 AD3d 788 (3d Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 1162 (2022); People v. Jones, 185 AD3d 1159 (3d Dept 2020); People v. Espinoza, 174 AD3d 1062 (3d Dept 2019): These cases reinforce that inventory searches must be conducted pursuant to standardized routine procedures, limited in discretion, serving legitimate inventory goals—not as a pretext for criminal investigations. Grandoit draws heavily on this line to invalidate the search.
People v. Gray, 234 AD3d 1130 (3d Dept 2025); People v. Mortel, 197 AD3d 196 (2d Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 1097 (2021): Establish the prerequisite that inventory searches are valid only if the vehicle was “lawfully impounded” at the time. Grandoit adopts this requirement and stresses that a mere “tow” does not satisfy it; indeed, the sheriff’s own testimony that the vehicle was not impounded undercut the People’s theory.

Legal Reasoning

1) Discovery Compliance and Speedy Trial Readiness

Grandoit fortifies a pragmatic, good‑faith approach to Article 245. The court acknowledged the omission of the second deputy’s BWC footage from the People’s pre‑COC disclosures. But several factors supported the COC’s validity:

Substantial compliance: The People produced voluminous materials—dashcam and one deputy’s BWC—over multiple productions, culminating in a COC filing by May 24, 2021.
Singular omission and plausible explanation: The sheriff’s office had a limited body‑cam pilot program; whether the second deputy even had a camera at the time was uncertain.
Defense counsel’s role: Although counsel vaguely referenced missing “videos” at arraignment, he conceded he did not notify the prosecution. The court recognized defense counsel’s corresponding duty to confer about apparent discovery gaps (CPL 245.35[1]) before litigating noncompliance.
Prompt cure: Upon being specifically apprised by the defense’s motion, the People quickly obtained and produced the second deputy’s BWC.

Applying Bay and related Third Department cases, the court reiterated that Article 245 does not require a “perfect prosecutor.” A good‑faith, diligent effort—particularly where a single item is later disclosed expeditiously—suffices to support readiness. Because the COC stood, the People’s statement of readiness was valid and timely within the applicable six‑month 30.30 period for felony prosecutions.

2) The Search: Inventory vs. Investigation

The core of the suppression ruling is structural: inventory searches must be administrative, not investigatory, and they must be conducted under standard protocols that meaningfully limit officer discretion and are triggered by a lawful impoundment of the vehicle.

Several features of the record—most vividly captured on the second deputy’s BWC—revealed that this was not a standardized inventory:

On‑scene justification and conduct: The deputy circled the car with a flashlight (more consistent with a “plain view” scan) and then re‑approached to probe the contents of a soda can after commenting that it is “never just snacks.” The deputy cited the driver’s “nervous” demeanor and desire to “check it out.” These are investigatory cues, not inventory steps.
Policy deviations: The department policy required supervisor approval prior to an inventory; none was obtained. The deputy also admitted he did not contemporaneously complete the inventory form while “inventorying.”
No impoundment: The supervisor testified that the car was not “impounded,” only “towed.” Grandoit, citing Gray and Mortel, reaffirms that a valid inventory search presupposes a lawful impoundment. Labeling a tow as distinct from impoundment undermined the People’s position.
Inadequate “tow” policy: The sheriff’s policy contained only a single sentence about towed vehicles, requiring completion of an inventory report before release “from the scene.” The court held that this is not the “established procedure clearly limiting the conduct of individual officers” demanded by Padilla. A one‑line directive cannot transform a discretionary, investigative rummage into a constitutionally valid administrative inventory.
Pretext and purpose: As Padilla, Espinoza, and Gray teach, incriminating evidence may result from an inventory, but it cannot be the purpose. The deputy’s commentary and course of conduct suggested an investigatory motive, confirming that the inventory rationale was pretextual.

Importantly, the People chose to defend the search solely on the “inventory” theory; they did not advance a plain‑view or probable cause justification for the entry. The appellate court therefore evaluated the search on the theory presented and found the inventory justification constitutionally insufficient. Suppression followed.

Impact

Grandoit has immediate, practical implications across two domains.

A) Discovery Readiness Under CPL 245 and CPL 30.30

Good‑faith, not perfection: Prosecutors remain protected when they substantially comply, document reasonable efforts, and promptly cure discrete lapses upon learning of them. A single missing item will rarely be fatal if remedied diligently.
Defense duties matter: Defense counsel’s obligation to raise perceived gaps promptly and confer (CPL 245.35[1]) is real; silence can weigh against an “illusory COC” claim.
Continuing obligations continue: Post‑readiness, the People must expeditiously disclose newly discovered materials; doing so will not retroactively invalidate a valid COC.
Amendments caution: Although Article 245 was amended effective August 7, 2025, Grandoit did not apply those changes. The decision nevertheless signals that the Bay good‑faith/due‑diligence framework remains central unless and until the Legislature or Court of Appeals says otherwise.

B) Vehicle Inventories and Warrantless Searches

Impoundment is a threshold requirement: A vehicle must be lawfully impounded before an inventory search may occur. A mere tow—especially to “a safer location”—does not create inventory authority.
Policies must be robust and specific: Agencies must adopt standardized, written procedures that meaningfully limit officer discretion, including for towed vehicles if inventories are contemplated. One‑sentence references are inadequate.
Supervisory checks and contemporaneous documentation: Policies should require supervisor approval where appropriate and contemporaneous inventory forms. Deviations jeopardize admissibility.
Pretext will doom inventories: Statements or conduct reflecting investigatory motives (e.g., rummaging based on hunches) can convert an ostensible “inventory” into an unconstitutional search.
Litigation strategy matters: If the People choose to justify a search only as an inventory, they risk suppression where the record supports an investigatory or plain‑view theory that is not argued or preserved. Comprehensive, consistent justification is critical.
Body‑cam transparency cuts both ways: Expanding BWC usage can validate officer conduct—or, as here, reveal pretext and policy deviations. Agencies should align training and policy with BWC realities.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Certificate of Compliance (COC): A formal filing by the prosecution certifying good‑faith compliance with automatic discovery obligations under CPL 245.20. A valid COC is a prerequisite to declaring trial readiness.
Statement of Readiness (SoR): The People’s assertion that they are ready to proceed to trial under CPL 30.30. It must be accompanied or preceded by a valid COC and confirmed by the court after an on‑the‑record inquiry.
Due Diligence (Discovery): Reasonable efforts, under the circumstances, to identify, obtain, and disclose discoverable material. Assessed holistically using factors set forth in People v. Bay.
Illusory COC: A claim that the COC is invalid because the People did not actually comply with discovery obligations. Not every omission makes a COC illusory; singular, promptly cured lapses often do not.
Inventory Search: An administrative cataloging of a lawfully impounded vehicle’s contents, conducted under standardized, discretion‑limiting policies to protect property and insulate police from claims—not to search for evidence.
Impound vs. Tow: “Impoundment” means police custody of the vehicle (seized and held), which can justify a standardized inventory. A “tow” to move a car from a scene is not necessarily an impoundment and does not itself authorize an inventory search.
Plain View Doctrine: Officers may seize an item without a warrant if they are lawfully present, its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and they have lawful access to it. Observing from outside is different from entering the vehicle to manipulate or inspect containers, which generally requires a warrant or another exception.
Pretext: When an asserted administrative justification conceals an investigatory purpose. Pretext undermines the legitimacy of an “inventory” search.

Conclusion

People v. Grandoit creates a clear, practical checkpoint for New York practitioners and law enforcement. On discovery, it reaffirms that CPL 245 demands good‑faith, reasonable diligence—not flawless omniscience—and that a single, cured omission ordinarily will not vitiate readiness, particularly where defense counsel fails to timely flag perceived gaps. On suppression, the decision insists on constitutional rigor: an inventory search requires lawful impoundment and execution under standardized, discretion‑limiting procedures tailored to the situation at hand. A perfunctory “tow” clause and investigatory rummaging cannot substitute for the administrative safeguards Padilla and its progeny require.

The ruling will encourage agencies to tighten vehicle inventory policies—especially for towed, non‑impounded cars—by incorporating clear supervisory approvals, contemporaneous documentation, and explicit limits on officer discretion. It also cautions prosecutors to align their suppression theories with the record and to maintain robust discovery workflows that document due diligence and prompt cures. In the broader legal landscape, Grandoit harmonizes Article 245’s good‑faith compliance regime with longstanding Fourth Amendment and New York constitutional constraints on vehicle inventories, providing a detailed roadmap for future litigation and policy reform.