No Interlocutory Appeals Under Rule 103.03(b) for Trust Code Orders Restoring Property or Removing a Trustee

Introduction

In this precedential decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarifies a recurring appellate-jurisdiction problem at the intersection of trust administration and interlocutory review. The case arises from the administration of two family trusts created by Carroll A. Johnson and Janet E. Johnson in 1998 for the benefit of their three children: Paul Johnson (the successor trustee), and his sisters, Nancy Patock and Susan Gerhardt (beneficiaries).

After the last settlor (Carroll) died in March 2016, Paul became sole trustee. The trusts’ principal asset was a parcel of agricultural land in Sacred Heart, Minnesota. The trust instruments gave Paul an option to purchase that land within 60 days after a “written offer by the Trustee” following the death of the last surviving parent. Years later—only months before the trusts’ scheduled termination in March 2023—Paul, acting as trustee, gave notice to himself in his individual capacity and consummated a purchase of the land for $2,384,649, financing the purchase with mortgages.

In early 2023, Nancy and Susan petitioned under the Minnesota Trust Code (Minn. Stat. ch. 501C), alleging breach of trust, seeking removal of the trustee, restoration of the real property to the trusts, and other relief. The district court first declared that Paul’s purchase option had lapsed in 2016 and that he breached his fiduciary duties by causing a self-interested sale. In a later order (July 17, 2024), the court: (1) removed Paul as trustee and appointed Nancy as successor trustee; (2) ordered Paul to restore the real property, unencumbered, to the trusts within 14 days; (3) ordered turnover of other assets and an accounting; (4) directed the successor trustee to investigate reimbursement issues; (5) recognized beneficiaries’ entitlement to reasonable fees and costs subject to submission and approval; and (6) set ongoing review hearings and retained in rem jurisdiction until trust termination.

Paul attempted an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals dismissed as premature, holding the order was not an appealable “injunction” under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b). The Supreme Court granted review and now affirms: orders restoring trust property and removing a trustee—granted as statutory remedies under the Trust Code—are not injunctions or their functional equivalent, and thus are not immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b).

Summary of the Opinion

The Minnesota Supreme Court (Justice Gaïtas) affirms the dismissal of Paul Johnson’s interlocutory appeal. The key holdings are:

A district court’s order compelling a former trustee to restore real property to a trust is not an order “which grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an injunction” within the meaning of Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b). It is a statutory remedy for breach under Minn. Stat. § 501C.1001(b)(3), granted on the merits, not an equitable or statutory injunction preserving the status quo.
A district court’s order removing a trustee and appointing a successor trustee is likewise not an “injunction” under Rule 103.03(b). Permanent removal under Minn. Stat. § 501C.0706(b) is merits relief; it is neither an injunction in name nor the functional equivalent of one.
The court declines to extend Rule 103.03(b) to reach these Trust Code remedies and, even if the federal Forgay v. Conrad doctrine were assumed to apply, it would not support jurisdiction here because Forgay expressly excludes orders directing delivery of trust property to a newly appointed trustee.

Because the July 2024 order was not an injunction, and because other issues (reimbursements and fees) remained pending, the appeal was properly dismissed as premature. The Supreme Court therefore affirms the court of appeals.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re Estate of Figliuzzi, 979 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. 2022). The court relied heavily on Figliuzzi to underscore that not every judicial command to “act” constitutes an injunction. There, a constructive trust—though it directs a conveyance—was not an injunction because it does not preserve or restore the status quo, a “key feature” of injunctions. The same reasoning applies here: ordering restoration of property under § 501C.1001(b)(3) redresses a breach; it does not preserve interim conditions pending adjudication.
Howard v. Svoboda, 890 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. 2017). Cited for the principle that Rule 103.03(b) covers orders that are injunctions “in effect but not in name.” The court nevertheless emphasized that to qualify as a functional injunction, the order should bear the hallmarks of injunctive analysis (e.g., irreparable harm, adequacy of legal remedies, Dahlberg factors). Those hallmarks were absent here.
City of Rochester v. Kottschade, 896 N.W.2d 541 (Minn. 2017). The court referenced the approach of examining what the district court actually analyzed (injunctive factors or not) to decide whether an order functions as an injunction for Rule 103.03(b) purposes.
State v. Minnesota School of Business, 899 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 2017). Differentiated equitable injunctions (governed by traditional equitable factors) from statutory injunctions (authorized and conditioned by statute). The Trust Code expressly authorizes injunctive relief in certain circumstances (§ 501C.1001(b)(2)), but the district court did not issue that remedy here. Instead, it granted other statutory remedies (restoration and removal).
Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979); Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 137 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 1965). These define core equitable standards for injunctions (irreparable harm, inadequacy of legal remedies; the Dahlberg factors). Their absence in the district court’s analysis weighed against characterizing the orders as injunctions in effect.
Bellows v. Ericson, 46 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1951). While Bellows describes a “mandatory injunction” as commanding affirmative action, the Supreme Court cautioned that mere compulsion does not suffice. Figliuzzi clarifies this point for modern doctrine; otherwise, Rule 103.03(b) would invite a flood of interlocutory appeals for any order compelling action.
Reichel v. Wendland Utz, LTD, 11 N.W.3d 602 (Minn. 2024); Emme v. C.O.M.B., Inc., 418 N.W.2d 176 (Minn. 1988). These articulate the strong policy against piecemeal appeals and the general rule limiting appeals to final judgments. The court anchored its Rule 103.03(b) analysis within this policy framework.
City of Waconia v. Dock, 961 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2021). Recognizes that permanent injunctions are appealable under Rule 103.03(b). The court distinguished this line: there was no injunction here—permanent or temporary—so Waconia does not confer interlocutory jurisdiction.
Int’l Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963). Quoted for the notion that appealable injunctions provide substantive relief sought by the complaint, as opposed to orders governing conduct pending trial unrelated to the merits. Here, the district court had already decided breach and then awarded statutory merits relief—again distinguishing the order from an injunction meant to preserve the status quo.
In re Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711 (Minn. 2024). Cited for textualism in legislative design: when the Legislature wants an injunction remedy, it says so. The Trust Code does exactly that in § 501C.1001(b)(2), yet the court did not issue that form of relief in this case.
Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848), and HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2015). The court addressed Forgay’s “immediate appeal” doctrine for orders requiring conveyance of property, noting Minnesota has never adopted it and, in any event, Forgay itself excludes orders directing property held in trust to be delivered to a new, court-appointed trustee—a precise fit here.

Legal Reasoning

The court approached the question by interpreting Rule 103.03(b) de novo and applying its established methodology for identifying injunctions “in effect.” The analysis turned on the “key features” of injunctions, as crystallized by recent Minnesota jurisprudence:

Status quo focus. Preventative injunctions prohibit action to preserve the status quo; mandatory injunctions may compel action but typically to restore the original status quo pending adjudication. The district court’s orders did neither. The court had already adjudicated breach in March 2024, and the July 2024 directive to restore property and remove the trustee implemented statutory remedies on the merits, not interim measures to maintain or return to a prelitigation equilibrium.
Absence of injunctive analysis. The beneficiaries did not request injunctive relief. The district court did not consider irreparable harm, adequacy of legal remedies, or the Dahlberg factors. Nor did it invoke or apply a statutory injunction framework. This signaled that the orders were not equitable or statutory injunctions.
Trust Code remedial structure. The Trust Code expressly lists injunction as one available remedy (§ 501C.1001(b)(2)) but also provides other distinct remedies, including restoration of property (§ 501C.1001(b)(3)) and removal of a trustee (§ 501C.0706(b); § 501C.1001(b)(7)). The district court selected and applied the latter remedies, not an injunction. The court underscored that the Legislature “knows how” to authorize an injunction and did so in § 501C.1001(b)(2)—which was not invoked here.
Figliuzzi analogy. Just as a constructive trust ordering conveyance is not an injunction, a § 501C.1001(b)(3) order restoring trust property is not an injunction; both “right a wrong” rather than preserve or restore an interim status quo.
Policy harmony. Expanding Rule 103.03(b) to reach any order “commanding” an act would invite piecemeal appeals—contrary to the Rules’ “thrust” against such fragmentation and the strong policy articulated in Emme and Reichel.
Forgay’s inapplicability. Even assuming arguendo Minnesota embraced Forgay, it excludes cases ordering trust property to be delivered to a new trustee. Thus, Forgay offers no path to interlocutory review here.

In sum, the district court’s orders were merits-based statutory relief under the Trust Code, not injunctions, and therefore not immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b).

Impact

The ruling draws a bright, practical line for trust litigation and, more broadly, for “special proceedings” governed by detailed statutory remedial schemes:

Trust Code practice. Parties should not expect immediate appeals under Rule 103.03(b) from orders that: (a) restore trust property (§ 501C.1001(b)(3)); or (b) remove and replace a trustee (§ 501C.0706(b); § 501C.1001(b)(7)). Those orders are merits-based remedies, even if they compel affirmative acts, and do not qualify as injunctions in name or effect.
Strategic pleading and orders. If a party truly needs interlocutory review under Rule 103.03(b), it must seek an injunction—equitable or statutory (§ 501C.1001(b)(2))—and the district court must conduct a recognizable injunctive analysis (e.g., irreparable harm, adequacy of legal remedies, Dahlberg factors, or statutory prerequisites). Absent that, appellate jurisdiction will likely be denied until final judgment or other authorized endpoints.
Discretionary review remains. The court noted Paul also sought, and was denied, discretionary review under Rule 105.01. That vehicle remains available in appropriate cases but is exceptional and not entitlement-based.
Limiting Forgay in Minnesota. The decision signals skepticism toward importing Forgay; even if considered, Forgay’s own exceptions render it largely inapplicable in trust-remedy contexts. This narrows arguments for immediate appeal of property-transfer orders in probate and trust cases.
Systemic efficiency. By constraining Rule 103.03(b) to true injunctions, the court minimizes piecemeal appeals, reduces delay and expense, and ensures appellate review follows a complete record after final resolution of all intertwined remedial issues (e.g., reimbursements and attorneys’ fees).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Injunction vs. other court orders: An injunction is a specialized order used to prevent harm before a case is finally decided. It typically preserves or restores the status quo. Not every order directing someone to “do something” is an injunction. Orders that grant final remedies (like restoring trust property because a breach has already been found) are not injunctions.
Functional equivalent of an injunction: Courts sometimes treat an order as an injunction even if it isn’t labeled as such—if it walks and talks like an injunction (i.e., considers irreparable harm, adequacy of legal remedies, and other injunctive factors; preserves status quo pending final resolution). That was not the case here.
Final vs. interlocutory orders: An appeal generally must wait until the district court has decided all issues (a final judgment). Interlocutory (mid-case) appeals are rare and permitted only in narrow circumstances—like true injunctions under Rule 103.03(b).
Trust Code remedies: Minnesota’s Trust Code allows courts to fix breaches in several ways, including compelling a trustee to restore property (§ 501C.1001(b)(3)), removing a trustee (§ 501C.0706(b)), and, where appropriate, entering an injunction to prevent future breaches (§ 501C.1001(b)(2)). Each remedy has a different purpose and procedural posture.
Dahlberg factors: When considering a temporary equitable injunction, Minnesota courts weigh: (1) the relationship and history between the parties; (2) the balance of harms; (3) likelihood of success on the merits; (4) public policy; and (5) administrative burdens. No such analysis occurred here.
Forgay doctrine: An old federal rule allowing immediate appeal from certain orders compelling immediate property transfer. Minnesota has not adopted it, and in any event it contains an exception for orders directing trust property to be delivered to a new court-appointed trustee—exactly this scenario.

Conclusion

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion provides clear guidance: Trust Code orders that restore property to a trust or remove and replace a trustee are not “injunctions” under Rule 103.03(b) and are therefore not immediately appealable as of right. The court reinforces the doctrinal divide between interim injunctive relief that preserves the status quo and merits-based statutory remedies that redress breaches. It also signals that the Forgay doctrine neither governs Minnesota practice nor, by its own terms, would apply to orders directing trust property to a newly appointed trustee.

Key takeaways:

To obtain interlocutory appellate review under Rule 103.03(b), parties must secure true injunctive relief or its functional equivalent, supported by traditional injunctive analysis or an authorizing statute.
When the district court has already determined breach and is granting statutory remedies under the Trust Code (such as restoration or removal), those orders are merits relief—not injunctions—and are not immediately appealable.
Discretionary review under Rule 105.01 remains available but is exceptional.
Counsel in trust litigation should plead and present requests with careful attention to the relief sought and the corresponding appellate pathways. If interim, status-quo-preserving relief is needed, seek an express injunction and develop the record for injunctive factors.

By affirming dismissal of the interlocutory appeal, the court advances coherent appellate procedure in trust cases, curbs piecemeal review, and confirms that the Trust Code’s remedial orders—without more—do not qualify as injunctive orders for Rule 103.03(b) appealability.