No Interlocutory Appeal Without Accepted Plaintiff-Favorable Facts: Second Circuit Reaffirms Limits on Collateral-Order Review of Qualified Immunity in Vann v. City of Rochester

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Date: November 4, 2025

Panel: Circuit Judges Denny Chin, Richard J. Sullivan, and Beth Robinson

Disposition: Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (Summary Order; nonprecedential)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s summary order in Vann v. City of Rochester, No. 24-3186 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2025), dismissing an interlocutory appeal by the City of Rochester and two police officers from a district court order that granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff David Vann on certain Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims. Appellants argued that the district court failed to address qualified immunity and misapplied the Supreme Court’s excessive-force framework under Graham v. Connor. The Second Circuit declined to reach those issues, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the order was nonfinal, no Rule 54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) certification was obtained, and the collateral-order doctrine did not permit review given appellants’ refusal to accept plaintiff-favorable facts in the face of disputed evidence—including a surveillance video the district court deemed “incontrovertible.”

Although issued as a summary order and therefore nonprecedential under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision provides a clear, practice-focused reaffirmation of settled limits on appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory qualified-immunity disputes: defendants seeking immediate review must present a purely legal question or accept plaintiff-friendly factual assumptions (or stipulations). Where disputed facts remain—and particularly where video evidence contradicts the defendants’ narrative—interlocutory appellate jurisdiction is unavailable.

Summary of the Opinion

Holding: The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Reason 1 — Finality: The district court’s order granting partial summary judgment did not resolve all claims against all parties. Appellants did not obtain entry of partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291’s final-judgment rule, the order was nonappealable.
Reason 2 — Collateral-Order Doctrine: Interlocutory review of qualified-immunity rulings is available only to the extent an appeal raises a pure legal issue or the appellant accepts plaintiff-favorable facts. Here, appellants contested the district court’s factual findings and did not accept plaintiff’s version of events or any stipulated facts. The court therefore lacked jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine.
Video Evidence: The panel noted that “incontrovertible” surveillance footage contradicted appellants’ characterization of the incident—specifically, the claim that Vann reached for his waistband before an officer’s “distractionary jab.” Under Scott v. Harris, appellate courts view the facts as depicted by the video when it clearly contradicts one side’s account.
Unreached Issues: Because jurisdiction was lacking, the court did not address the City’s standing to participate or the merits of the qualified-immunity or Graham arguments.

Factual and Procedural Background

David Vann sued the City of Rochester and multiple officers for excessive force arising from a September 2015 arrest. The district court (Chief Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford, W.D.N.Y.) granted partial summary judgment to Vann on several discrete uses of force—finding, for example, that Officer Steven Mitchell used excessive force on four occasions—but left other excessive-force allegations and claims against additional defendants for trial. Appellants (the City and Officers Matthew Drake and Steven Mitchell) took an interlocutory appeal, contending that the district court failed to address qualified immunity and misapplied Graham v. Connor.

The Second Circuit emphasized that the district court explicitly identified unresolved factual disputes on several excessive-force episodes and with respect to other defendants (e.g., Officer Jeffrey Kester), underscoring the nonfinal nature of the order. Appellants neither sought Rule 54(b) entry of judgment nor § 1292(b) certification. They instead pursued an interlocutory appeal and, in their briefing, disputed the district court’s factual determinations—insisting that a jury should resolve what happened during Vann’s arrest.

Key Issues

Whether the Second Circuit had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review a partial summary-judgment order that left multiple claims and parties unresolved.
Whether the collateral-order doctrine permitted an interlocutory appeal from a qualified-immunity dispute when appellants challenged the district court’s view of the facts rather than presenting a pure legal question or accepting plaintiff-favorable facts.
Whether video evidence that contradicts a party’s version of events narrows or eliminates factual disputes for the purpose of interlocutory review.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

28 U.S.C. § 1291; Final Judgment Rule: The court cited Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 475 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 2007), and Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978), to reaffirm that appellate jurisdiction ordinarily extends only to “final decisions”—those that end the litigation on the merits, leaving nothing but execution of the judgment. LaTrieste Restaurant & Cabaret, Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 96 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1996), reinforced that granting partial summary judgment is nonfinal and not independently appealable.
Rule 54(b) and § 1292(b) Gateways: The panel underscored that appellants did not use available mechanisms to create appealability: Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (entry of partial final judgment where “no just reason for delay” exists) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (permitting certification of controlling legal questions). Absent those steps, the partial disposition could not be appealed.
Collateral-Order Doctrine: Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2001), and Grune v. Rodriguez, 176 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1999), frame the narrow exception allowing immediate appeal of certain nonfinal orders that conclusively resolve important issues separate from the merits and that would be effectively unreviewable later. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), limits interlocutory review of qualified-immunity denials to pure legal questions and forbids appeals that turn on disputed facts.
Qualified-Immunity Interlocutory Appeals in the Second Circuit: Franco v. Gunsalus, 972 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2020), and Jok v. City of Burlington, 96 F.4th 291 (2d Cir. 2024), cabin such appeals to legal issues and, where factual disputes exist, require appellants to proceed on facts favorable to the plaintiff. Jok articulates three permissible avenues: (1) stipulated facts; (2) acceptance of plaintiff’s alleged facts; or (3) acceptance of facts favorable to plaintiff that the jury could find. Appellants satisfied none of these.
Video Evidence and Fact Framing: Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), instructs courts to adopt the video’s depiction where it “blatantly contradicts” a party’s account. The Second Circuit relied on the district court’s assessment of surveillance footage to reject the officers’ version of a “distractionary jab,” thereby reinforcing that certain facts were not genuinely disputable for interlocutory purposes.
Nature of the Right at Stake: Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), recognizes qualified immunity as an immunity from suit (a right not to stand trial), but only where the appeal raises a legal question resolved adversely to the official. Where factual disputes predominate, the “right not to stand trial” does not open the collateral-order door.
Finality Reaffirmed: Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008), reiterates that a final judgment conclusively resolves all claims of all parties. In re State Police Litigation, 88 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1996), supports dismissing interlocutory appeals for want of jurisdiction where the collateral-order criteria are unmet.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning tracks a two-step jurisdictional analysis.

Final Judgment Rule: The district court’s order adjudicated only some excessive-force episodes against some defendants. Other uses of force and claims against additional officers remained for trial. Because appellants did not obtain Rule 54(b) entry of judgment or § 1292(b) certification, the partial grant of summary judgment was nonfinal and therefore nonappealable under § 1291.
Collateral-Order Doctrine and Qualified Immunity: Although qualified-immunity denials can sometimes be appealed interlocutorily, the appeal must present an “issue of law” separable from the merits. Here, appellants challenged the district court’s factual view of the record—arguing, for example, that Vann posed a threat and reached for his waistband. The district court found the surveillance video refuted that account, and the Second Circuit was clear that appellants did not accept the plaintiff-favorable facts, did not stipulate to facts, and did not frame a purely legal question. Under Johnson and Jok, the court therefore lacked collateral-order jurisdiction.

Because the panel resolved the case on jurisdictional grounds, it did not reach appellants’ substantive complaints (e.g., whether the district court correctly applied Graham v. Connor, or whether qualified immunity should shield the officers on particular episodes). A brief footnote confirms that the court likewise did not address the City’s standing to participate in the appeal, given the jurisdictional disposition.

Impact and Practical Significance

While nonprecedential, the decision provides several important, practice-oriented signals for litigants and district courts in the Second Circuit:

Rigid Adherence to Finality: Parties appealing partial dispositions must use Rule 54(b) or § 1292(b) if they want appellate review before final judgment. Skipping those steps will almost certainly foreclose immediate review.
Narrow Path for Qualified-Immunity Interlocutory Appeals: Defendants seeking interlocutory review must present a pure legal issue or accept plaintiff-favorable facts. Inviting the court of appeals to resolve factual disputes or to credit the defendants’ narrative is a nonstarter.
Video Evidence Can Be Dispositive for Interlocutory Framing: When video footage clearly contradicts an officer’s account, Scott v. Harris requires courts to adopt the video’s depiction. That can narrow the facts for qualified-immunity analysis—but, as here, it does not convert a fact-bound dispute into a legal question fit for interlocutory review if other factual disputes persist and the appellants refuse to accept the plaintiff-favorable view.
Excessive-Force Standards Will Often Await Final Judgment: Disagreements over how to apply Graham v. Connor in a multi-episode encounter frequently turn on granular facts (e.g., degree of resistance, threat level, sequence and timing of force). Appellate courts will defer issues entwined with those factual disputes until after trial.
Strategic Guidance for Municipal and Officer Defendants:
- If seeking interlocutory review of a qualified-immunity ruling, consider stipulating to a set of facts or expressly accepting the plaintiff’s version for purposes of the appeal.
- Narrow the issues to a pure legal question (e.g., whether the right was clearly established on facts the district court deemed undisputed).
- Where multiple claims and parties remain, evaluate Rule 54(b) or § 1292(b) certification strategies early.
Preservation of Arguments: Appellants’ challenges to the district court’s treatment of qualified immunity and Graham are preserved for post-judgment appeal. But interlocutory review will not be available simply because the defendants disagree with the district court’s factual assessments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Final Judgment Rule (28 U.S.C. § 1291): Appellate courts generally hear only “final” decisions—those that end a case for all claims and all parties. Partial wins or losses usually cannot be appealed immediately.
Rule 54(b): A procedural tool allowing a district court, in a multi-claim or multi-party case, to enter a final judgment on fewer than all claims or parties if there’s “no just reason for delay,” making that portion appealable.
Section 1292(b): Allows a district court to certify an interlocutory order for appeal when it presents a controlling legal question, there’s substantial ground for disagreement, and immediate appeal may materially advance the case.
Collateral-Order Doctrine: A narrow exception that permits immediate appeal of certain nonfinal orders that (1) conclusively resolve an issue, (2) are separate from the merits, and (3) would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment.
Qualified Immunity (QI): Shields officials from suit and liability unless they violated a clearly established constitutional right. Interlocutory appeals of QI are allowed only on pure legal questions, not when facts are disputed.
“Issue of Law” vs. “Issue of Fact”: Legal issues ask “What rule applies to these facts?” Fact issues ask “What actually happened?” Interlocutory QI appeals must present the former, not the latter.
Scott v. Harris Rule (Video Evidence): When a video clearly contradicts one side’s version, courts adopt the video’s version for summary-judgment purposes.
Jok’s Three Pathways for QI Appeals: To take an interlocutory QI appeal amid factual disputes, the appellant must proceed on (1) stipulated facts, (2) the plaintiff’s alleged facts, or (3) plaintiff-favorable facts a jury could find.
“Right Not to Stand Trial” (Mitchell v. Forsyth): QI can protect officials from the burdens of trial, but this protects only against being tried on claims that fail as a matter of law—even when the plaintiff’s version of the facts is assumed true.
Summary Orders and Citation: In the Second Circuit, summary orders issued since 2007 may be cited under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, but they do not have precedential effect.

Additional Observations

City’s Standing: The panel expressly declined to address the City’s standing to participate because the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. This leaves for another day questions about when municipalities, which do not enjoy qualified immunity, may piggyback on officers’ interlocutory QI appeals.
Case Management Implications: District courts may wish to make explicit, when denying or granting in part summary judgment in QI cases, the factual assumptions adopted, the existence of any pure legal issues, and whether certification under § 1292(b) is appropriate. This can streamline interlocutory review when it is truly warranted.

Conclusion

Vann v. City of Rochester is a clear reminder that the road to interlocutory review in qualified-immunity cases is narrow and carefully policed. The Second Circuit enforced the final-judgment rule, declined to treat a partial summary-judgment order as appealable absent Rule 54(b) or § 1292(b) certification, and applied Johnson, Jok, and Scott to hold that where appellants dispute the facts and refuse to accept plaintiff-favorable assumptions—particularly in the face of dispositive video evidence—no collateral-order jurisdiction exists.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores three central takeaways: (1) do not bypass Rule 54(b) or § 1292(b) when appealing partial dispositions; (2) frame any interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal as a pure legal question and accept plaintiff-favorable facts (or stipulate to facts); and (3) recognize that video evidence can fix the factual terrain for summary judgment—but will not convert a fact-bound dispute into an appealable legal question. Although nonprecedential, the decision offers a disciplined application of settled jurisdictional principles and a practical guide for structuring, or deciding against, interlocutory appeals in excessive-force litigation.