No Interlocutory Appeal of Qualified Immunity Denials When Genuine Fact Disputes Persist: Cornelius v. Luna (2d Cir. 2025)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order, non-precedential)
Panel: Circuit Judges Richard C. Wesley, Joseph F. Bianco, and Beth Robinson
Date: September 29, 2025
Docket: 24-1859-cv

Introduction

This appeal arises from a § 1983 excessive force action brought by plaintiff-appellee Kijana Cornelius against New Haven Police Officers Jose Luna, Ronald Pressley, Clayton Howze, and Nikki Curry (collectively, the Officers). The dispute centers on a 2018 intake-room encounter at the New Haven Police Department during which officers took Cornelius to the floor, restrained him prone, and allegedly lifted him by his handcuffs. The district court (Hall, J.) granted summary judgment on some claims but denied it on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, concluding the Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage given genuine disputes of material fact. The court later denied reconsideration.

On interlocutory appeal, the Officers argued that even taking the facts in the light most favorable to Cornelius, their force was objectively reasonable and, in any event, did not violate clearly established law. The Second Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the denial of qualified immunity turned on genuine factual disputes that cannot be resolved on interlocutory review. The decision underscores a settled but critical point: the collateral order doctrine does not permit immediate appeals of qualified immunity denials that hinge on disputed facts rather than purely legal questions.

Summary of the Opinion

Disposition: Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; case remanded.
Rationale: Under the collateral order doctrine, interlocutory review of qualified immunity denials is available only to the extent the ruling turns on an issue of law. Where the district court’s denial rests on genuine disputes of material fact, appellate jurisdiction is absent.
Key factual disputes identified:
- The takedown: Whether Cornelius was resisting (or even noncompliant) at the moment officers took him to the ground. The video, which lacks audio, shows Cornelius initially placing only his left hand on the wall, then placing his right hand within about ten seconds, briefly lifting it to gesture, and continuing to stand on the line with his left hand on the wall. Whether officers gave verbal commands immediately before the takedown is unclear.
- The alleged handcuff lift: Whether, while prone, Cornelius was resisting or merely moving to breathe more easily when officers allegedly lifted him by his handcuffs. The video does not conclusively resolve this, and the Officers dispute whether the lift occurred at all (though they assumed it did for purposes of appeal).
Qualified immunity analysis:
- Step one (constitutional violation): Objective reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment turns on the totality of the circumstances, including threat, resistance, and crime severity. The district court found a reasonable jury could conclude the force was excessive.
- Step two (clearly established law): By 2018, it was clearly established in the Second Circuit that significant force against a non-resisting arrestee who poses no threat is unconstitutional and that gratuitous force is unlawful. These questions also turn on disputed facts, defeating interlocutory review.
Video evidence: Scott v. Harris permits courts to grant summary judgment when video “blatantly contradicts” a party’s account. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that this was not such a case—the silent video did not conclusively resolve key disputes.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985): Establishes that qualified immunity denials are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine when they turn on pure issues of law. The court invoked Mitchell to acknowledge the narrow window for interlocutory review.
Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1996): Clarifies that interlocutory review is appropriate only on stipulated facts, the plaintiff’s version, or the facts the jury could find in plaintiff’s favor. The court signaled that this appeal did not fit those categories due to unresolved factual disputes.
State Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2007): If facts necessary to resolve qualified immunity are disputed, appellate review must await final judgment. The court relied on Rowland to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011): The Supreme Court confirmed that interlocutory appeals are unavailable when a district court’s denial rests on the existence of genuine factual disputes. Ortiz anchors the jurisdictional holding here.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) and Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012): Frame the two-pronged qualified immunity analysis: constitutional violation and clearly established law. The panel applied this framework to show why disputed facts at both steps defeat appellate jurisdiction.
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014): Reinforces that summary judgment must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant in excessive force cases. The panel’s approach to the video and witness testimony follows Tolan’s instruction.
Rogoz v. City of Hartford, 796 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2015) and Cugini v. City of New York, 941 F.3d 604 (2d Cir. 2019): Restate that force must be objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances, prohibiting force beyond what is warranted by the objective situation.
Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19 (2d Cir. 2025): Articulates the familiar Graham v. Connor factors—crime severity, immediate threat, and active resistance/flight—used to assess reasonableness. The panel used Linton to structure the reasonableness inquiry.
Lennox v. Miller, 968 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020) and Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2006): Emphasize that excessive force claims are fact-intensive; summary judgment is appropriate only when no reasonable factfinder could deem the force unreasonable. The panel referenced these to affirm the centrality of the unresolved facts.
Jok v. City of Burlington, 96 F.4th 291 (2d Cir. 2024): Dismissed an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal where factual disputes existed over whether the plaintiff was resisting while being handcuffed. Jok is closely analogous and supports dismissal here.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Permits courts to reject a party’s account when contradicted by clear video evidence. The panel distinguished Scott because the silent video here did not “blatantly” contradict Cornelius’s account.
Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2010) and Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2020): Establish that gratuitous or significant force against a non-resisting, non-threatening arrestee violates clearly established law in this Circuit—central to the step-two analysis.
Sullivan v. Gagnier, 225 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam): Even some resistance justifies only some degree of force; it does not license unlimited force. This undercuts the Officers’ argument that any “passive noncompliance” made the takedown objectively reasonable as a matter of law.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011): Confirms lack of appellate jurisdiction when the denial of qualified immunity rests on evidentiary sufficiency and factual disputes. The court invoked Doninger in concluding dismissal was required.

Legal Reasoning

The panel proceeded in three steps: (1) identifying the controlling jurisdictional rule; (2) examining the record to determine whether the district court’s ruling turned on factual disputes; and (3) confirming that the same disputes infected both steps of the qualified immunity analysis.

1) Jurisdictional gatekeeping under the collateral order doctrine:
- Interlocutory review lies only for pure legal questions in qualified immunity denials (Mitchell; Salim). If a fact determination is a necessary predicate, review must await final judgment (Rowland; Ortiz).
- The applicable standard of review would be de novo, but only if jurisdiction exists; here, the threshold defect is that the issues are fact-bound.
2) The takedown and the ambiguity of the video evidence:
- The district court carefully parsed a silent video. It observed that Cornelius initially placed his left hand on the wall, placed his right hand within about ten seconds, briefly lifted it to gesture, and kept standing on the marked line with his left hand on the wall.
- Critically, the court found it unclear whether any command preceded Officer Curry’s grabbing Cornelius’s right hand, a point the silent video cannot resolve.
- Given these uncertainties, a jury could rationally find Cornelius was not resisting when officers executed the takedown, making the force potentially excessive. The panel agreed this was not a Scott v. Harris scenario and that factfinding is necessary.
3) The alleged “handcuff lift” and the nature of Cornelius’s movements while prone:
- The Officers assumed for appeal that Cornelius was lifted by his handcuffs but claimed he had been resisting (kicking, squirming, flailing; using a slur).
- The district court noted the video does not clearly show resistance in the moments before the lift, and Cornelius testified his movements were to reposition himself to breathe—again a factual dispute bearing on reasonableness.
- On this record, a jury could “easily” find the force excessive if it credits Cornelius’s version.
4) Step two (clearly established law) likewise depends on disputed facts:
- By 2018, in the Second Circuit it was clearly established that significant or gratuitous force against a non-resisting, non-threatening arrestee violates the Fourth Amendment (Tracy; Jones).
- Whether the Officers could reasonably believe their force was lawful depends on whether Cornelius presented a threat or resisted—precisely the facts in dispute. Because step two cannot be resolved without choosing among competing factual narratives, interlocutory review is improper.
5) “Active” versus “passive” resistance is not dispositive on this record:
- The panel rejected the notion that the district court’s denial turned on a formalistic active/passive dichotomy. The threshold question is whether there was any resistance at all at the key moments, which remains contested.
- Even some resistance permits only proportionate force; it does not immunize all force (Sullivan).

Impact

Although issued as a non-precedential summary order, the decision is an instructive application of settled law with practical consequences:

For appellate practice: The Second Circuit will dismiss interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials that hinge on factual disputes. Defendants seeking immediate review must frame a pure legal question or identify conclusive, contradiction-free record evidence (e.g., clear video) that eliminates factual disputes. Silent or ambiguous videos will seldom suffice.
For district courts: Careful identification of specific, material factual disputes—especially when parsing video—effectively forecloses interlocutory review and channels the case to trial. Explicit findings about what the video does and does not conclusively show are pivotal.
For police defendants and municipalities: The order reiterates that force used during custodial intake is subject to the same objective reasonableness analysis as field arrests. Allegations like “lifting by handcuffs” while a detainee is prone and not resisting expose officers to trial where facts are disputed, with no immediate appellate shield.
For plaintiffs: Testimony explaining movements as breathing-related or non-resistive, coupled with non-conclusive video, can defeat summary judgment and block interlocutory immunity appeals, preserving the right to a jury trial on excessive force claims.
On video evidence: The court’s discussion limits Scott v. Harris to genuinely dispositive recordings. Lack of audio and ambiguous angles can be outcome-determinative at the jurisdictional stage. Agencies may draw operational lessons about audio capture and camera placement.
On clearly established law: The opinion reinforces that by 2018 it was clearly established in this Circuit that significant, gratuitous force on a non-resisting, non-threatening person is unconstitutional. Where facts could support that scenario, qualified immunity cannot be resolved on interlocutory appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A defense shielding officials from damages unless they violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. Two-step inquiry: (1) Was there a constitutional violation? (2) Was the law clearly established so that a reasonable officer would know the conduct was unlawful? Courts may address either step first.
Collateral order doctrine: A narrow exception allowing immediate appeal of some non-final orders. In qualified immunity cases, it allows appeals only when the denial turns on a pure question of law—not when factual disputes must be resolved.
Interlocutory appeal: An appeal of a non-final order. Generally barred, except in limited circumstances like those under the collateral order doctrine.
Objectively reasonable force: Assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, considering factors such as the severity of the suspected crime, immediate threat to safety, and whether the suspect is actively resisting or attempting to flee.
Gratuitous force: Force that serves no legitimate law enforcement purpose—for example, significant force against someone who is restrained, not resisting, and poses no threat. In this Circuit, using such force has long been clearly unlawful.
Scott v. Harris rule on video: Courts can reject a party’s version of events if a video record blatantly contradicts it so no reasonable jury could believe it. If video is ambiguous or lacks key context (such as audio), courts must still credit the nonmovant’s evidence.
Standard of review vs. jurisdiction: Even though denials of summary judgment on immunity are reviewed de novo, the appellate court must first have jurisdiction. If unresolved factual disputes underpin the denial, the court cannot reach the merits.

Conclusion

Cornelius v. Luna underscores a foundational limit on interlocutory review in qualified immunity cases: when the district court’s denial hinges on genuine disputes of material fact, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to intervene. The Second Circuit’s analysis tracks Supreme Court and Circuit precedent, distinguishing cases with conclusive video evidence and recognizing that a silent, ambiguous recording cannot resolve contested issues such as resistance or threat. The panel further reiterates that, well before 2018, it was clearly established in this Circuit that significant or gratuitous force against a non-resisting, non-threatening arrestee violates the Fourth Amendment.

As a practical matter, defendants seeking immediate qualified immunity review must present purely legal questions or undisputed facts; otherwise, they must proceed to trial and, if necessary, seek review after final judgment. For litigants and courts alike, the opinion provides a clear roadmap: fact disputes about resistance, threat, and proportionality foreclose interlocutory resolution and reserve the reasonableness determination for the jury.