No Intensive-Services Duty Absent Intellectual Incapacity: Failure to Comply with Improvement Period and Continued Exposure to Known Sex Offenders Justifies Termination Without Lesser Alternatives

Introduction

This memorandum decision affirms the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children, D.T. and G.T., under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). The case centers on the mother’s repeated failure to protect her children from known sexual offenders and domestic violence, her dishonesty with the child welfare agency, and her inability to comply with conditions of a lengthy improvement period—culminating in what the circuit court deemed “eleventh-hour” attempts to cure persistent deficiencies.

The Department of Human Services (DHS) filed the abuse and neglect petition in February 2023, alleging that the petitioner mother, W.T., failed to protect G.T. from sexual abuse by the petitioner’s then-boyfriend, L.P., and exposed the children to domestic violence. Following separation from L.P., the mother moved the children in with a new boyfriend, R.S., who turned out to be a registered sex offender. Even after learning of R.S.’s registration status, she allowed him to stay with her and the children at a hotel and later concealed her continued contact with him from the multidisciplinary team (MDT) and DHS. The mother had previously relinquished rights to two other children after proceedings tied to physical and sexual abuse in the home.

The circuit court ordered a psychological and parental fitness evaluation to probe competency and capacity. While the evaluator diagnosed borderline intellectual functioning, the mother was found competent and capable of self-care and child care, albeit with a guarded prognosis for parenting improvement. The mother stipulated at adjudication that she exposed the children to sex offenders and violent persons and received an improvement period, later extended. Despite completing some classes and ultimately procuring a lease a week before the final hearing, she failed to secure appropriate housing for months, did not progress beyond supervised visitation, did not consistently pursue therapy, and continued involvement with R.S.

On appeal, the mother urged a less restrictive alternative to termination, emphasizing that she was not incarcerated, did not abuse drugs, and was participating in services. The Supreme Court affirmed termination, holding that the unchallenged factual findings of the circuit court supported the statutory determinations that there was no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and that termination was necessary for the child’s welfare. Crucially, the Court rejected reliance on In re Maranda T.—the seminal decision requiring intensive long-term services when parental neglect is based on intellectual incapacity—because the psychologist’s testimony established that the mother’s intellectual functioning was adequate for parenting; thus, no heightened, long-term assistance obligation attached on that basis.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Supreme Court applied the standard of review from In re Cecil T.: factual findings are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions de novo.
• Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), termination is authorized upon findings that (a) there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect or abuse can be corrected in the near future and (b) termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.
• The mother did not challenge the circuit court’s critical factual findings: longstanding unstable/inadequate housing; repeated exposure of the children to known sex offenders; dishonesty with DHS; and failure to satisfy improvement period terms.
• Consistent with In re K.L., noncompliance with an improvement period is a recognized and regular basis for affirming termination.
• Consistent with Syl. Pt. 5 of In re Kristen Y. (reiterating In re R.J.M.), courts need not deploy less restrictive alternatives when “no reasonable likelihood” exists for correction.
• The Court declined to invoke In re Maranda T.’s duty to provide intensive long-term assistance where neglect is based on intellectual incapacity, because the evidence showed the mother had adequate intellectual capacity to parent.
• Result: The July 15, 2024 order terminating parental rights was affirmed. Permanency for G.T. is adoption in her current placement; D.T. had reached majority. The father’s rights were also terminated (not at issue on appeal).

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

• In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
  The Court reiterated two core points from Cecil T.:
  • Standard of Review (Syllabus Point 1): circuit court fact-finding is reviewed for clear error, legal conclusions de novo. This constrained appellate re-weighing of evidence and amplified the significance of the mother’s failure to challenge factual findings.
  • Deference to Child Welfare Concerns (Syllabus Point 4, in part): courts “are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement… where it appears that the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened.” This principle supported rejecting further delays or speculative alternatives given the ongoing risk of exposure to sex offenders.
• In re K.L., 247 W. Va. 657, 885 S.E.2d 595 (2022)
  The Court quoted K.L. to emphasize that failure to comply with an improvement period is a statutorily recognized basis for termination under § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d)(1)-(3). K.L. thus supplied doctrinal footing for the circuit court’s conclusion that continued noncompliance—particularly in housing, therapy, honesty, and visitation progression—established “no reasonable likelihood” of correction.
• In re Kristen Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (Syl. Pt. 5, in part), and In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)
  Together, these cases hold that termination may be employed without intervening less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be substantially corrected. The Court leaned on this bedrock rule to reject the mother’s plea for less restrictive options such as additional services, extended supervision, or guardianship arrangements.
• In re Maranda T., 223 W. Va. 512, 678 S.E.2d 18 (2009) (Syl. Pt. 4)
  Maranda T. requires a “thorough effort” to determine whether parents can adequately care for children with intensive long-term assistance when neglect allegations are based on intellectual incapacity. The Court explained why Maranda T. does not control: the undisputed psychological evidence established the mother’s adequate intellectual capacity to parent; therefore the specific Maranda T. obligation for intensive, long-term assistance was not triggered by the kind of incapacity addressed in that case.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court framed the appeal within the familiar two-step termination analysis of § 49-4-604(c)(6): whether the parent’s conditions are likely correctable in the near future and whether termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. The linchpin of its affirmance was the mother’s failure to contest the circuit court’s key factual findings. Those findings—unstable and inadequate housing; recurrent exposure of the children to known sex offenders; deception of DHS; and a risk of further exposure if reunified—were supported by the record and, as unchallenged, stood as the operative facts on appeal.

Applying K.L., the Court characterized the mother’s noncompliance with the improvement period as a recognized statutory basis for termination. The record showed she:

• Failed for months to obtain suitable housing and only produced a lease more than a year into the case and a week before the final hearing (“11th hour”);
• Did not progress beyond supervised visitation;
• Did not participate in required therapy as expected;
• Maintained involvement with a registered sex offender and concealed that involvement despite DHS warnings and offers of alternative placement.

Balancing these facts against the governing standards, the Court cited Kristen Y. and R.J.M. to emphasize that less restrictive alternatives need not be attempted when “no reasonable likelihood” of correction exists. Reinforcing Cecil T., the Court concluded that it need not “exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement,” particularly where ongoing risk to the child’s welfare—here, the substantial risk of continued exposure to sex offenders—persists.

Finally, the Court addressed the mother’s reliance on Maranda T. It distinguished that decision, noting that the psychologist’s testimony established she had sufficient intellectual functioning to care for herself and the children. Because the neglect here was not based on intellectual incapacity, Maranda T.’s requirement of intensive long-term assistance did not apply. The Court therefore found no error in the circuit court’s termination order.

3) Statutory Framework and Application

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) authorizes termination of parental rights upon a finding that:

• There is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
• Termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

The Court’s analysis tethered the circuit court’s findings to this standard. The persistence of unsafe relationships (with known sex offenders), the mother’s dishonesty with DHS, the failure to secure appropriate housing for an extended period, and the lack of progress beyond supervised visitation justified the “no reasonable likelihood” finding. Given the documented risk of future exposure to sex offenders, the “necessary for the welfare” prong was also satisfied. The mother’s generalized assertions (e.g., that she was not incarcerated or a drug user) were beside the point; what mattered was whether she remedied the specific dangers alleged and adjudicated.

4) Impact and Implications

Although issued as a Rule 21 memorandum decision, the Court’s reasoning carries practical significance across several dimensions of West Virginia abuse-and-neglect practice:

• Clarifying the reach of Maranda T. Borderline intellectual functioning, without more, does not trigger the Maranda T. duty to provide intensive long-term services. Where a qualified evaluator finds adequate intellectual capacity for parenting, a parent cannot avoid termination by reframing neglect as “capacity-based.” This will likely streamline litigation over services when the core issues are protective decision-making and honesty, not cognitive incapacity.
• Improvement periods are not open-ended. The decision reinforces that noncompliance with an improvement period remains a powerful statutory ground for termination. “Last-minute” efforts—such as belatedly securing housing after prolonged instability—carry limited weight when they do not overcome a documented, sustained failure to mitigate risk.
• Risk-centered analysis for sexual abuse exposure. The Court’s acceptance of a risk of future exposure to sex offenders (not merely prior harm) as satisfying the “necessary for the welfare” and “no reasonable likelihood” findings confirms that courts may act decisively when a parent’s pattern of choosing unsafe partners persists.
• Honesty and cooperation matter. The mother’s concealment of continued contact with a registered sex offender and refusal of DHS-offered alternative housing materially undermined her case. Practitioners should advise parents that candor with the MDT and DHS is not optional; deception can be dispositive.
• Appellate preservation is critical. The Court emphasized that the mother did not challenge the underlying factual findings. On appeal, unchallenged findings will be decisive, especially under the deferential clear-error review on facts. Counsel must directly attack adverse findings with record citations or risk near-certain affirmance.
• Permanency planning and sibling divergence. The case demonstrates that outcomes can diverge: D.T. aged out while G.T.’s permanency plan is adoption. The Court’s approach underscores timely permanency for minors without delay for speculative parental improvement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Improvement Period: A court-ordered timeframe during which parents must complete services (therapy, classes, safe housing, etc.) to remedy the conditions that led to abuse/neglect. Failure to substantially comply can itself justify termination.
• No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction (Near Future): A legal conclusion that, based on the parent’s track record and current circumstances, the problems (e.g., unsafe partners, housing instability) are unlikely to be fixed soon enough to meet the child’s needs for safety and permanency.
• Less Restrictive Alternatives: Options short of terminating parental rights, such as continued services, legal guardianship, or placement with relatives while maintaining parental rights. Courts do not need to use these if there is no reasonable likelihood of correction.
• Maranda T. Services: When neglect is based on a parent’s intellectual incapacity, child welfare agencies must thoroughly explore whether the parent can safely parent with intensive, long-term assistance. This duty arises only if intellectual incapacity is the basis of the neglect; it does not apply when the parent is found intellectually capable.
• Standard of Review (Clear Error): Appellate courts defer to the circuit court’s factual findings unless the record leaves them with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Legal issues are reviewed anew (de novo).
• Multidisciplinary Team (MDT): A collaborative group (DHS, service providers, guardian ad litem, etc.) that coordinates services and case plans. Transparency with the MDT is essential; misrepresentation can jeopardize reunification.

Conclusion

In re D.T. and G.T. reaffirms core tenets of West Virginia child welfare law: termination is proper without lesser alternatives where there is no reasonable likelihood of correction and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare; noncompliance with an improvement period is a regular and statutory ground for termination; courts need not entertain speculative possibilities of parental improvement at the expense of child safety; and Maranda T.’s heightened services obligation is limited to cases where neglect is actually predicated on intellectual incapacity. The Court’s emphasis on the mother’s unchallenged factual findings—repeated exposure of the children to known sex offenders, dishonesty with DHS, and chronic housing instability—underscores that protecting children from foreseeable harm is paramount.

Practically, the decision guides litigants and courts in distinguishing capacity-based neglect from unsafe decision-making, reinforces the evidentiary importance of consistent service participation and genuine behavioral change, and highlights the procedural necessity of preserving and contesting adverse factual findings on appeal. For future cases, the opinion signals that late-breaking efforts will rarely overcome a prolonged pattern of noncompliance and risk, especially where sexual safety in the home remains unresolved.