No Individualized Dangerousness Inquiry for Drug‑Trafficking Felons under § 922(g)(1): The Fifth Circuit’s Per Se Rule Reaffirmed in United States v. Mancilla

No Individualized Dangerousness Inquiry for Drug‑Trafficking Felons under § 922(g)(1): The Fifth Circuit’s Per Se Rule Reaffirmed in United States v. Mancilla

Introduction

In United States v. Mancilla (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 2025), the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed a categorical rule that individuals with felony drug‑trafficking convictions may constitutionally be disarmed under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) without an individualized inquiry into their current dangerousness. Anchoring its disposition in the court’s recent decision United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025), the panel held that drug trafficking is “inherently dangerous,” placing those convicted of such offenses within a historically disarmable class under the Supreme Court’s framework in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).

The case spotlights an active intra‑circuit debate. Chief Judge Elrod concurred, agreeing that Kimble controls but advocating—if free to do so—for a more individualized dangerousness assessment in as‑applied challenges. Judge Graves dissented, invoking the Fifth Circuit’s rule of orderliness and arguing that an earlier panel decision, United States v. Reyes, 141 F.4th 682 (5th Cir. 2025), requires a fact‑specific, person‑focused inquiry that Kimble could not displace.

Summary of the Opinion

Facts and posture: In 2022, Alvaro Alejandro Mancilla was arrested at a Fort Worth gun show with five firearms and $27,072. He had a 2010 felony conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. He pleaded guilty to violating § 922(g)(1) and brought a preserved, as‑applied Second Amendment challenge on appeal under Bruen and Rahimi. The panel reviewed de novo. See United States v. Giglio, 126 F.4th 1039, 1042 (5th Cir. 2025).

Framework: Following Bruen, the panel accepted that the Second Amendment’s text covers firearm possession by individuals, including felons, shifting the burden to the government to show consistency with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24; United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 2025 WL 1727419 (2025).

Holding: The panel held that the government met its burden under Kimble. Drug trafficking convictions establish membership in a historically disarmable, “dangerous” class. Congress may categorically disarm such individuals, and courts need not perform an individualized dangerousness inquiry in this class of cases. Mancilla’s 2010 drug‑trafficking felony thus forecloses his as‑applied challenge, and the conviction is affirmed.

Scope and record limits: Echoing Kimble and Diaz, the panel emphasized that the relevant consideration is qualifying prior convictions—crimes punishable by more than one year—not contemporaneous unproven conduct or misdemeanors. The court therefore did not weigh Mancilla’s other criminal history beyond his qualifying felony predicate.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Establishes the two‑step framework: if the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct, the government must show a historical tradition supporting the regulation. Mancilla proceeds at step two because possession is covered by the Amendment’s text.
  • Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Confirms that disarmament statutes survive if they align with historically supported regulations disarming individuals who pose a credible danger. Mancilla invokes Rahimi; the government and the Fifth Circuit utilize Rahimi’s dangerousness rationale to defend categorical disqualification for drug‑trafficking felons.
  • Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024): Recognizes that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers possession by felons and articulates that the government must justify § 922(g)(1) via historical tradition. Diaz’s approach frames Mancilla’s burden‑shifting analysis and underscores that qualifying convictions (not misdemeanors or unproven conduct) ground the inquiry.
  • Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025): The centerpiece precedent. While Kimble rejected a specific analogy to some Founding‑era capital felonies, it held that drug trafficking is “inherently dangerous,” and that the historical tradition of disarming dangerous persons supports categorical disarmament of individuals with drug‑trafficking felonies. Kimble thus forecloses as‑applied relief for such defendants without an individualized dangerousness assessment.
  • Reyes, 141 F.4th 682 (5th Cir. 2025): Employed a more individualized appraisal, considering the defendant’s entire record, to sustain § 922(g)(1). The Mancilla majority distinguishes Reyes as not setting a universal standard for all § 922(g)(1) cases and as not involving a drug‑trafficking predicate. The dissent contends Reyes’s individualized approach remains controlling under the rule of orderliness.
  • Additional Fifth Circuit cases delineating offense‑class approaches:
    • Schnur, 132 F.4th 863 (5th Cir. 2025): “Crimes of violence,” like aggravated battery, justify disarmament.
    • Clark, --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2417117 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2025): Aggravated assault with a firearm qualifies as a dangerous, violent crime supporting disarmament.
    • Contreras, 125 F.4th 725 (5th Cir. 2025); Betancourt, 139 F.4th 480 (5th Cir. 2025); Reyes, 141 F.4th 682 (2025); Morgan, 147 F.4th 522 (5th Cir. 2025); Alaniz, 146 F.4th 1240 (5th Cir. 2025): Various degrees of fact‑specific analysis, with Morgan and Alaniz endorsing consideration of broader criminal records in some contexts.
    • Connelly, 117 F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024): Rejected the government’s dangerousness rationale under § 922(g)(3) (unlawful users of controlled substances) based on lack of historical comparators and insufficient link to violence.
    • Quiroz, 125 F.4th 713 (5th Cir. 2025) and Giglio, 126 F.4th 1039 (5th Cir. 2025): Uphold disarmament during certain criminal‑process phases and for those serving sentences (e.g., supervised release), respectively.
    • Allam, 140 F.4th 289 (5th Cir. 2025): Illustrates the court’s appetite for fact‑sensitive as‑applied adjudication in other Second Amendment contexts.
  • Circuit split context (summarized in the concurrence):
    • Broadly upholding § 922(g)(1) as applied to all felons (some relying on pre‑Bruen precedent and/or historical analysis): 2d (Zherka), 4th (Hunt), 8th (Jackson), 9th en banc (Duarte); 10th (Vincent) and 11th (Dubois) on precedent.
    • Allowing as‑applied challenges with individualized dangerousness determinations: 3d (Pitsilides) and 6th (Williams), considering entire criminal histories.
    • 7th Circuit has assumed arguendo limited room for as‑applied challenges but has thus far rejected them (Gay); the 1st Circuit has not yet reached an as‑applied challenge de novo (Langston).
  • Relief mechanisms mentioned: 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (expungement, pardons, restoration of civil rights) and § 925(c) (administrative relief on dangerousness/public interest), with the concurrence noting recent executive steps to revive § 925(c) processing after a long funding hiatus. See Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1 (2007); 90 Fed. Reg. 34394 (proposed July 22, 2025).

Legal Reasoning

The court follows Bruen’s textual and historical model. It accepts that the Second Amendment’s “plain text” covers Mancilla’s conduct (possession), placing the onus on the government to justify § 922(g)(1) by demonstrating a historical tradition of analogous regulation. Rather than analogizing drug trafficking to specific Founding‑era capital felonies (an argument Kimble declined), the panel adopts Kimble’s broader, historically rooted dangerousness principle. It reasons that:

  • The tradition of disarming “dangerous” individuals is well‑established and recognized by Rahimi.
  • Drug trafficking is “inherently dangerous” due to the intrinsic violence of the drug trade; thus, those convicted of drug‑trafficking felonies fall within a class legislatures have long disarmed.
  • Because dangerousness operates at the level of class‑based disarmament here, Congress may impose a categorical prohibition without an individualized determination in each drug‑trafficking case.
  • Record scope is limited to qualifying convictions punishable by more than one year; courts do not consider unproven contemporaneous conduct or misdemeanors when adjudicating such as‑applied challenges.

The concurrence’s cautionary notes draw attention to the temporal remoteness and nonviolent facts of Mancilla’s 2010 offense (age 19, no weapon or violence), and to historical analogues that provided mechanisms for restoration—suggesting that permanent, lifetime bans may diverge from the historical pattern of temporary, conditional disarmament. Nevertheless, bound by Kimble, the concurrence agrees the panel’s outcome is correct.

The dissent emphasizes intra‑circuit methodology. It argues that Reyes first endorsed an individualized approach considering a defendant’s entire history (including juvenile offenses) to evaluate “credible threat” and that, under the Fifth Circuit’s rule of orderliness, Kimble could not jettison that approach. It points to post‑Reyes decisions (Alaniz, Morgan) that expressly consider broader records, and it rejects a one‑way ratchet in which individualized review is used only when it favors upholding § 922(g)(1).

Impact

Within the Fifth Circuit, Mancilla cements a clear, administrable rule for a specific predicate class:

  • For defendants with qualifying drug‑trafficking felony convictions, as‑applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by a per se “dangerousness” determination under Kimble. No individualized dangerousness assessment is required, even when the predicate is old or nonviolent in its particulars.
  • District courts benefit from a predictable, category‑based screening rule in drug‑trafficking predicate cases, reducing evidentiary disputes over individualized risk.
  • The opinion carefully limits the evidentiary universe to qualifying felony convictions, excluding unproven conduct and misdemeanors, which simplifies litigation and aligns with Diaz and Kimble.

At the same time, the split opinions foreshadow continued litigation on two fronts:

  • Offense classes outside drug trafficking: Mancilla expressly relies on Kimble’s drug‑trafficking holding. In other predicate categories (e.g., certain property or regulatory offenses), litigants will continue to contest whether the Fifth Circuit applies categorical rules or requires a more individualized assessment.
  • Intra‑circuit method and the rule of orderliness: The disagreement between the majority and dissent over Reyes’s scope and precedential effect suggests potential en banc clarification about whether and when individualized assessments are mandated across § 922(g)(1) challenges.
  • Nationally, the concurrence catalogs a robust split: some circuits uphold § 922(g)(1) across the board; others allow individual assessments. Mancilla reinforces the Fifth Circuit’s hybrid approach—category rules for certain predicates (drug trafficking; crimes of violence) and fact‑specific analysis in select contexts.
  • Relief pathways: The concurrence’s discussion of § 921(a)(20) and § 925(c) underscores that, even within a categorical regime, individualized relief may exist outside litigation—through expungement, pardons, restoration of civil rights, or revived administrative relief assessing current dangerousness and public interest.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • As‑applied vs. facial challenge:
    • As‑applied: The law is challenged as unconstitutional in the particular circumstances of the challenger (here, a drug‑trafficking felon possessing a firearm).
    • Facial: The law is challenged as unconstitutional in all or most applications.
  • Bruen’s two‑step test:
    • Step 1: Does the Second Amendment’s text cover the conduct? If yes, the conduct is presumptively protected.
    • Step 2: The government must show that the regulation is consistent with historical tradition (e.g., longstanding practice of disarming dangerous persons).
  • “Dangerousness” as a limiting principle:
    • After Rahimi, governments can justify disarmament by showing a tradition of disarming people who pose a credible danger to others or to public safety.
    • Kimble and Mancilla treat drug‑trafficking felons as categorically “dangerous,” eliminating the need for individualized risk findings in that class.
  • Qualifying predicate offenses vs. other conduct:
    • For § 922(g)(1), courts look to prior convictions punishable by more than one year. Misdemeanors or unproven allegations are not part of the core analysis in this line of cases.
  • Rule of orderliness:
    • Within the Fifth Circuit, one panel cannot overrule another absent an intervening change in law (Supreme Court, en banc, or legislative). The dissent argues this keeps Reyes’s individualized approach in play.
  • Restoration and relief:
    • Section 921(a)(20) excludes certain convictions (e.g., expunged, pardoned, or where civil rights are restored) from counting as § 922(g)(1) predicates.
    • Section 925(c) allows administrative relief upon a showing of no likely dangerousness and consistency with the public interest; the concurrence notes recent steps to revive this process.

Conclusion

United States v. Mancilla reinforces, and operationalizes, a bright‑line rule within the Fifth Circuit: under Bruen and Rahimi, Congress may categorically disarm individuals convicted of drug‑trafficking felonies under § 922(g)(1), and courts need not conduct individualized dangerousness assessments in such cases. The decision deepens the circuit’s developing taxonomy of predicate offenses—some treated as per se dangerous (drug trafficking; defined crimes of violence), others potentially inviting fact‑intensive review.

The concurrence and dissent illuminate the policy and methodological tensions that will likely continue to shape Second Amendment litigation: how to reconcile historical traditions that often permitted restoration with modern lifetime bans; whether individualized dangerousness must be considered across all § 922(g)(1) challenges; and how to harmonize intra‑circuit precedent under the rule of orderliness. While Mancilla leaves those broader debates for another day, it firmly answers one question now controlling in the Fifth Circuit: drug‑trafficking felons are a historically disarmable class, and § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to them without a case‑by‑case dangerousness inquiry.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

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