No Individual Right to Directly Petition an Investigative Grand Jury: Commentary on Thomas Garber v. Superior Court

Introduction

In Thomas Garber v. Superior Court, Third Judicial District, No. S-18611 (Nov. 28, 2025), the Alaska Supreme Court addressed a fundamental structural question about the grand jury’s role in Alaska’s constitutional system: does Article I, section 8’s command that “the power of grand juries to investigate and make recommendations concerning the public welfare or safety shall never be suspended” give private citizens a constitutional right to present matters directly to a grand jury, free from screening by prosecutors or judges?

The court’s answer is unequivocal: no. Article I, section 8 protects the institutional power of grand juries, not an individual right of citizens to bypass established procedures. Accordingly, the court holds that Alaska Criminal Rule 6.1(c)—which requires citizen requests for investigative grand jury action to be directed first to the Attorney General—falls squarely within the court’s constitutional rule-making authority and does not “suspend” the grand jury’s power.

This decision is significant for at least three reasons:

• It confirms the Alaska Supreme Court’s broad authority under Article IV, section 15 to regulate procedures governing grand jury practice.
• It clarifies that Alaska’s “anti-suspension clause” does not create a citizen right to direct access to an investigative grand jury.
• It institutionalizes the Attorney General as the primary “gatekeeper” for citizen-initiated investigative grand jury matters, while preserving a conflict-of-interest “safety valve” through Rule 6.1(c)(2).

The case arises from a citizen’s effort to enlist a grand jury to investigate alleged systemic problems in the Office of Children’s Services (OCS). The court uses that dispute to articulate a comprehensive, historically grounded reading of Article I, section 8 and to situate Alaska’s practice within national grand jury doctrine—particularly New York, whose constitution provided the model for Alaska’s anti-suspension clause.

Summary of the Opinion

In 2022, Thomas Garber, a private citizen and not a member of any grand jury, approached a superior court judge in Anchorage seeking to present documents and information about alleged failures within OCS to a grand jury. He was not asking for criminal indictments; he wanted a grand jury to investigate patterns of conduct and “identify deficiencies” in statutes and policies relating to child protection.

The superior court opened a case and held a hearing to understand his request. Before a second hearing could occur, the Alaska Supreme Court issued Supreme Court Order (SCO) 1993 (Dec. 1, 2022), amending Criminal Rules 6 and 6.1. The key change for this appeal was the addition of Rule 6.1(c), which provides that private citizens wishing to have the grand jury investigate public welfare or safety matters must:

• First direct their concerns to the Attorney General for review and possible presentation to a grand jury, and
• If the alleged misconduct involves the Department of Law itself, follow a special process in Rule 6.1(c)(2) allowing for superior court involvement to avoid conflicts of interest or appearances of impropriety.

In light of this new rule, the superior court vacated Garber’s continued hearing and instructed him to submit his request to the Attorney General. Garber did so, asking the Attorney General to “investigate OCS failures,” but he also appealed, arguing primarily that:

1. The Alaska Supreme Court lacked constitutional authority to adopt Rule 6.1(c), or exceeded that authority.
2. Requiring citizen requests to pass through the Attorney General violates Article I, section 8 by effectively “suspending” the grand jury’s investigative power.

The Supreme Court:

• Rejected any exhaustion requirement: Garber was challenging a judicial decision (the superior court’s denial of his request), not an administrative agency decision; thus ordinary administrative exhaustion rules did not apply.
• Affirmed its broad rule-making power under Article IV, section 15, and reiterated that grand juries are “an arm of the court system” whose procedures fall under court-promulgated rules.
• Held that Rule 6.1(c) does not “suspend” the grand jury’s constitutional power to investigate and recommend, because:
  • Article I, section 8 protects the grand jury’s institutional authority, not a personal right of citizens to direct access;
  • Nothing in Rule 6.1(c) prevents a grand jury from investigating or reporting; the rule only structures how citizen proposals reach the grand jury; and
  • There is no textual, historical, or precedential basis for an individual right to petition an investigative grand jury directly.
• Rejected Garber’s additional arguments (due process, crime victims’ rights, legislative powers, statutory conflicts), finding none demonstrated a constitutional violation.

The court thus affirmed the superior court’s decision to deny Garber’s 2022 request to bypass Rule 6.1(c) and go directly through the court to the grand jury.

Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Garber’s initiative illustrates the type of citizen-driven systemic complaint the new Criminal Rule 6.1(c) is designed to canalize. He described several child protection matters that he believed reflected broader problems within OCS and the foster care system. His focus was not on prosecuting any particular individual, but on:

• Alleged unwarranted removals of children from their parents,
• Alleged abuse of at least one child in foster care, and
• Perceived failures by OCS, guardians ad litem, and the courts to respond adequately to reports of these issues.

Garber explicitly disclaimed any interest in obtaining formal criminal indictments. He instead sought to use the grand jury’s investigative/reporting function (rather than its accusatory function) to surface and correct systemic problems within OCS.

While the superior court was still exploring how, if at all, it could facilitate such a request, the Supreme Court finalized SCO 1993. The new Rule 6.1(c) responded to growing inconsistency among superior courts in handling citizen petitions for investigative grand juries. Some judges had entertained direct citizen presentations; others had rejected them. The Supreme Court concluded that a uniform statewide process was necessary.

After the rule change, the superior court told Garber it could no longer act as a direct conduit to the grand jury and that he had to proceed under Rule 6.1(c) via the Attorney General. Garber then:

• Submitted his request to the Attorney General, and
• Simultaneously appealed, arguing that the court’s promulgation and application of Rule 6.1(c) was unconstitutional.

On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court treated the superior court’s dismissal of his petition effectively as a summary judgment in favor of the court’s interpretation of the rule and constitution, and reviewed the legal questions de novo.

B. No Requirement to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The superior court (represented by counsel on appeal) argued that Garber should have been required to “exhaust” administrative remedies before advancing his constitutional claim. In classic administrative law settings, a litigant must typically pursue available agency procedures before asking the courts to intervene. The Alaska Supreme Court has long explained that this allows agencies to:

• Correct their own errors, and
• Develop a factual record and apply specialized expertise before judicial review occurs.

Here, however, the Supreme Court emphasized that:

• The decision under review was judicial—the superior court’s denial of Garber’s request—not an executive-branch administrative decision.
• Therefore, the doctrinal rationale for exhaustion (deference to administrative processes) did not apply.

This portion of the opinion is doctrinally straightforward but important: it preserves citizens’ ability to directly challenge judicial rule-application and rule-validity without first having to complete any newly-created internal executive review processes.

C. Rule-Making Authority and the Status of the Grand Jury

1. Article IV, Section 15 and Broad Judicial Rule-Making Power

Article IV, section 15 of the Alaska Constitution provides that:

“the supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts” and “rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all courts.”

The court relies on this provision to reaffirm that it enjoys broad constitutional authority to structure how judicial institutions—including grand juries—function procedurally. The opinion stresses that:

• Although prosecutors lead most grand jury sessions,
• It is the judiciary that calls and convenes grand juries,
• And grand juries are, in this institutional sense, an “arm of the court system.”

This characterization comes from O’Leary v. Superior Court, where the court held that grand jury operations fall within the “rules of administration, practice and procedure” authorized by Article IV, section 15.

Garber did not directly challenge O’Leary or argue that the court should overrule it. Instead, he argued that this particular rule—Rule 6.1(c)—went too far by infringing on grand jury independence. The court rejects that contention, explaining that setting an orderly, standardized process for citizen-initiated investigations is a classic procedural/regulatory act, not a substantive restriction on the grand jury’s powers.

2. Federal–State Distinction and United States v. Williams

Garber relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992), in which the Court described the federal grand jury as “an institution separate from the courts” and held that federal courts may not impose certain judicially-created obligations on prosecutors in grand jury proceedings.

The Alaska Supreme Court explains why Williams does not control:

• The federal judiciary’s powers are defined by the U.S. Constitution, which does not explicitly grant rule-making authority over grand jury procedures.
• By contrast, Alaska’s judiciary derives its powers from Article IV of the Alaska Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to regulate practice and procedure in criminal cases in all courts.

Therefore, whatever may be true for federal grand juries, Alaska’s grand juries are constitutionally subject to procedural rules promulgated by the state’s highest court.

3. Relationship with Statutes and the Legislature

Garber also argued that Rule 6.1(c) impermissibly usurps legislative authority, allegedly conflicting with two statutes:

• AS 12.40.030, requiring grand juries to inquire into crimes within the court’s jurisdiction.
• AS 12.40.040, obligating any grand juror who knows or believes a triable crime has been committed to disclose it to fellow jurors for investigation.

The court resolves this in two steps:

1. Inapplicability to Garber’s situation. Garber:
   • Sought no indictment, and
   • Was not himself a grand juror.
   Therefore, statutes about grand juries’ duties to investigate crimes and jurors’ disclosure obligations do not govern his situation.
2. Supremacy of Court Rules under AS 12.85.010 and Article IV, Section 15.

   AS 12.85.010 explicitly recognizes that Title 12’s statutory criminal procedure applies “except where … the Rules of Criminal Procedure adopted by the supreme court under its constitutional authority apply.” Thus, the legislature itself has acknowledged that court-promulgated rules can override otherwise applicable statutory procedural provisions in criminal matters.

The opinion further notes that, under well-established doctrine, when a statute or court rule is enacted to govern an area once treated as common law, the statute or rule supersedes the prior common law. The legislature retains the power to alter court rules by a two-thirds vote (Article IV, section 15), preserving democratic oversight. But short of such legislative action, Criminal Rule 6.1(c) governs.

4. The Court’s Rule-Making Process and Consultation with the Department of Law

Garber criticized the process by which the court adopted SCO 1993—particularly consultation with the Department of Law—suggesting this undermined grand jury independence.

The court responds by:

• Explaining that proposed amendments to grand jury-related Criminal Rules had been under consideration with the Criminal Rules Committee since as early as 2016, so the rule change was not a sudden reaction to Garber specifically.
• Describing how inconsistent superior court practices regarding citizen grand jury petitions made a uniform procedural rule increasingly necessary.
• Invoking Alaska Administrative Rule 44, under which the court may:
  • Refer suggested rules to committees, but also
  • Expedite rule changes when immediate promulgation is necessary.
• Highlighting that, in practice:
  • Courts convene grand juries and provide logistical support, but
  • Grand jury sessions are led and conducted by the Department of Law.
  Given that reality, consulting the Department of Law on a rule it must implement is rational and consistent with Criminal Rule 2’s goals of simplicity, fairness, and efficiency.

Far from undermining grand jury independence, the court casts this consultation as ensuring workable procedures that respect the distinct roles of the judiciary and executive branches.

D. The Anti-Suspension Clause and Rule 6.1(c)

The central constitutional issue is whether requiring citizen petitions to go through the Attorney General “suspends” the grand jury’s power to investigate and recommend.

1. Textual Analysis: Powers vs. Individual Rights

Article I, section 8 contains both the indictment clause and the anti-suspension clause. The indictment clause provides:

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury.”

By contrast, the anti-suspension clause states:

“the power of grand juries to investigate and make recommendations concerning the public welfare or safety shall never be suspended.”

The court draws a sharp and important distinction:

• The indictment clause expressly references “No person,” making it clear that it confers an individual right (to be prosecuted for serious crimes only upon grand jury indictment).
• The anti-suspension clause, by contrast:
  • Speaks only of the “power of grand juries,”
  • Contains no reference to a “person” or individual claimant, and
  • Therefore protects the institutional authority of the grand jury, not an individual procedural entitlement.

While some Alaska decisions recognize unenumerated individual rights by implication, the court emphasizes that this is not a context in which to infer one. The text here is naturally read as safeguarding what grand juries as bodies may do—investigate and make recommendations—not as guaranteeing how individual citizens may access them.

On this reading, a rule that tells citizens how to present issues (through the Attorney General, or under certain circumstances through a judge) does not suspend the grand jury’s power. The grand jury remains fully able to:

• Investigate matters presented to it,
• Request further information, and
• Make reports and recommendations concerning public welfare or safety.

What Rule 6.1(c) regulates is the front-end channel by which citizen complaints arrive—not the back-end power of the grand jury itself.

2. Territorial Practice and Historical Backdrop

To confirm this reading, the court turns to the legal environment in which Alaska’s framers were operating.

During the territorial era:

• The federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (especially Rule 6) governed grand jury practice.
• The territorial criminal code and local district court rules contained no provision for private citizens to petition grand juries directly.

Territorial statutes did grant grand juries some specific investigatory authority—for example, to investigate:

• Public prisons, and
• The condition and management of court-related offices.

But there is no evidence that any court recognized a citizen’s legal right to force a grand jury to consider his or her complaint, or to appear directly before it. Territorial grand jury investigations into public corruption or misconduct were typically:

• Initiated by judges (e.g., judicial charging instructions to a newly empaneled grand jury), or
• Facilitated by the executive (prosecutors), rather than by direct citizen request.

The absence of any codified right of direct citizen petition at the time of the Constitutional Convention strongly suggests that the framers did not intend to constitutionalize such a right sub silentio in Article I, section 8.

3. Constitutional Convention Debates

Garber relied heavily on one statement by Delegate Yule Kilcher, who said during the Convention debates:

“The grand jury can be appealed to directly, which is an invaluable right to the citizen.”

The Supreme Court places this remark in proper context. The Convention’s debates on grand juries primarily concerned the accusatory function—whether felony prosecutions must proceed by indictment or could proceed by information filed by a prosecutor.

Initially, the Preamble and Bill of Rights Committee proposed allowing felony prosecutions to begin “by indictment or information,” without making indictment a right. Delegate Edward Davis, drawing on his experience as both prosecutor and defense attorney, proposed an amendment to enshrine a right to indictment that only the accused could waive. Delegates debated:

• Whether mandatory grand jury indictments in all felony cases would:
  • Unduly delay prosecutions in a large, sparsely populated state, and
  • Impose heavy administrative and financial burdens on the nascent state government.

It was in this charged debate about the accused’s protection against unfounded charges that Delegate Kilcher made his “appealed to directly” comment. In context, his remark:

• Supports the idea that a person accused of a crime can obtain grand jury review of the prosecution’s case, and
• Does not clearly establish a general right for any citizen to place any matter (criminal or systemic) before a grand jury on demand.

Moreover, later brief discussions of the grand jury’s investigative function during the Convention did not mention any such citizen access right. When read against the textual focus on grand jury powers and the absence of any language about citizen-initiated proceedings, the debates do not support Garber’s position.

4. Precedent: O’Leary and New York’s Anti-Suspension Clause

In O’Leary v. Superior Court, 816 P.2d 163 (Alaska 1991), the Alaska Supreme Court examined the very anti-suspension language at issue here. It concluded that this clause was intended “to prevent legislation which deprived the grand jury of authority to act.” It traced the provision to:

• Article I, section 16 of the Missouri Constitution, itself modeled on
• Article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution, which likewise contains an anti-suspension clause.

New York’s courts have long held that, despite their anti-suspension clause, there is no individual right for private persons to present information to, or appear before, a grand jury. Cases such as Morgan v. Null, 117 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), echo earlier New York decisions in holding that permitting such direct access would:

• Impose intolerable administrative burdens, and
• Create serious risks of prejudice to potential defendants and abuse of the process.

Because Alaska’s anti-suspension clause was consciously modeled on New York’s, New York’s interpretation is especially instructive and persuasive. It supports Alaska’s conclusion that the clause:

• Prevents the legislature from abolishing or disabling the grand jury’s investigatory/reporting authority, but
• Does not guarantee any particular procedural avenue for citizens to access that body.

5. Application to Rule 6.1(c)

With this textual, historical, and precedential foundation, the court assesses Rule 6.1(c) directly.

Rule 6.1(c):

• Requires private citizens to direct requests for investigative grand jury action to the Attorney General for consideration.
• Provides a mechanism in Rule 6.1(c)(2) for:
  • Notifying the superior court if the subject of the proposed investigation is the Department of Law itself, and
  • Addressing potential conflicts of interest or appearances of impropriety.

This procedure:

• Does not prohibit grand juries from investigating any matter the Constitution allows them to investigate.
• Does not prevent grand juries from making reports and recommendations about public welfare and safety.
• Merely defines an orderly, uniform process for filtering and evaluating citizen proposals before they reach a grand jury.

Thus, Rule 6.1(c) falls within the court’s procedural rule-making authority and does not “suspend” anything that Article I, section 8 guarantees.

E. Evaluation of Garber’s Remaining Arguments

1. Procedural Due Process

Garber argued that routing his request through the Attorney General violated his procedural due process

• A deprivation of a protected life, liberty, or property interest, and
• An absence of adequate procedures surrounding that deprivation.

The court holds that the ability of a non-grand-juror citizen to demand direct access to an investigative grand jury is not a life, liberty, or property interest recognized in law. Garber himself implicitly acknowledged this by repeatedly suggesting that citizens should be allowed to access an investigative grand jury via a judge (rather than by direct personal appearance)—that is, he assumed some mediated process.

Without a cognizable protected interest in direct grand jury access, there can be no procedural due process violation from altering the routing of citizen complaints.

2. Crime Victims’ Rights and Criminal Justice Provisions

Garber invoked:

• Article I, section 24 (crime victims’ rights), and
• Article I, section 12 (provisions concerning criminal administration and punishments).

The court quickly disposes of these arguments because:

• Garber was not seeking criminal indictments or alleging his rights as a victim in a particular criminal case.
• Rather, he sought a systemic investigation and recommendations about OCS practices.

Those constitutional provisions are geared toward protecting:

• Individuals who are victims of crimes, and
• Defendants and the integrity of criminal punishment.

They do not grant a general right to control or initiate investigative grand jury proceedings.

3. Legislative Amendment and Executive Order Provisions

Garber also cited:

• AS 24.08.200, dealing with how the Alaska Constitution may be amended, and
• AS 24.08.210, concerning how the legislature can disapprove of executive orders.

He appears to suggest that the Supreme Court, by adopting Rule 6.1(c), effectively amended the Constitution or exercised powers reserved to the legislature. The court rejects this, clarifying that:

• Criminal Rule 6.1(c) is a court rule adopted under Article IV, section 15—not a constitutional amendment.
• Provisions about legislative handling of executive orders have no bearing on the judiciary’s inherent and constitutional rule-making powers.

4. Legislative Investigations vs. Grand Jury Investigations

Finally, Garber claimed that the grand jury is the vehicle through which the legislature investigates matters concerning public welfare and safety. The court points out that this misapprehends Alaska’s separation-of-powers structure:

• The legislature has its own constitutionally recognized power to conduct investigations (e.g., Article I, section 7), including usage of hearings, subpoenas, and committees.
• The grand jury’s investigative authority operates independently of that legislative power and is not the exclusive mechanism for legislative inquiry.

Thus, Rule 6.1(c) has no bearing on the legislature’s ability to investigate executive or private wrongdoing through its own tools.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Several precedents and authorities significantly shaped the court’s reasoning.

1. O’Leary v. Superior Court, 816 P.2d 163 (Alaska 1991)

O’Leary is the cornerstone for understanding Alaska’s grand jury as:

• An “arm of the court system,” and
• A body whose operations fall within the judiciary’s rule-making powers under Article IV, section 15.

O’Leary also interpreted the anti-suspension clause as being aimed at preventing legislation that would rob the grand jury of its power to act, not at freezing procedural mechanisms in place or creating direct citizen petition rights.

2. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992)

Garber cited Williams to claim that grand juries are wholly “separate” from courts and therefore not subject to court rule-making. The Alaska Supreme Court distinguishes Williams on constitutional-structural grounds, emphasizing that:

• Federal courts operate under a different constitutional arrangement,
• The Alaska Constitution explicitly grants rule-making powers over criminal procedure to the state Supreme Court, and
• Therefore, the “institutional separateness” language in Williams does not transpose directly to Alaska’s system.

3. New York Case Law, including Morgan v. Null, 117 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)

Because Alaska’s anti-suspension clause was modeled on New York’s, New York’s understanding of what that clause does—and does not—guarantee is highly influential. New York cases, as summarized in Morgan, hold that:

• There is no personal right to submit evidence to a grand jury or be heard by one.
• Grand jury administration may be structured to prevent abuse and protect the rights of potential defendants and the public.

This supports Alaska’s conclusion that Article I, section 8 does not guarantee direct citizen access to investigative grand juries.

4. General Constitutional Interpretation Cases

The court also relies on a line of Alaska decisions (e.g., Dunleavy v. Alaska Legislative Council, Wielechowski v. State, State v. Alaska Legislative Council) to reaffirm its approach to state constitutional interpretation:

• Begin with the text of the provision,
• Give words their ordinary meaning unless context suggests otherwise,
• Consider framers’ intent and historical context, and
• Take into account precedent, reason, and policy.

This methodology frames the entire analysis of Article I, section 8 in Garber.

Impact and Future Implications

Garber will have significant practical and doctrinal consequences.

1. Institutionalizing the Attorney General as Gatekeeper

The decision effectively cements the Attorney General as the primary gatekeeper for citizen-initiated investigative grand jury matters in Alaska. Going forward:

• Citizens cannot demand to appear before a grand jury, submit materials directly to it, or insist that a judge act as a direct conduit.
• Instead, they must submit their concerns to the Department of Law, which will:
  • Review the submissions,
  • Possibly employ advisory panels (as the Department told Garber it was planning), and
  • Decide whether and how to seek a grand jury investigation.

In cases where the Department of Law or Attorney General are the subject of the alleged misconduct, Rule 6.1(c)(2) provides a judicially supervised alternative path. That “safety valve” is critical to preserving public confidence that the executive will not be judge in its own cause.

2. Clarifying the Scope of the Anti-Suspension Clause

Doctrinally, Garber draws a clear boundary around Article I, section 8:

• It preserves the grand jury’s broad investigative and recommendation power, including systemic investigations into public welfare and safety issues.
• But it holds that that power is institutional, not individually enforceable in the form of direct citizen access to grand juries.

Future litigants seeking to claim a constitutional entitlement to shape grand jury procedures—whether as citizens, victims, or defendants—will have to navigate this clear textual and historical boundary.

3. Separation of Powers and Judicial Rule-Making

The case also reinforces the Alaska Supreme Court’s view of its own role:

• The court is the primary architect of procedural rules governing the criminal justice system, including the grand jury.
• The legislature may override court rules, but only via the constitutionally prescribed two-thirds vote mechanism, preserving judicial primacy in procedural design by default.

This may shape future separation-of-powers disputes over criminal procedure, including issues like discovery, indictment protocols, and grand jury secrecy.

4. Citizen Oversight vs. Institutional Controls

From a policy perspective, Garber reflects a balancing of competing values:

• Citizen oversight and transparency, which may be advanced by making investigative grand jury processes accessible and responsive to public concerns; and
• Institutional stability and fairness, which caution against:
  • Opening grand juries to potentially limitless citizen petitions,
  • Risking reputational harms from untested accusations, and
  • Overwhelming grand juries with matters beyond their capacity.

By upholding Rule 6.1(c), the court favors institutional mediation of citizen complaints via the executive branch (with judicial oversight in conflict cases), rather than a direct-democratic model of grand jury access.

5. Space for Legislative Response

Although Garber validates Rule 6.1(c), it also implicitly invites legislative engagement:

• If the legislature believes that citizens should have broader or clearer access to investigative grand juries, it can attempt to alter Criminal Rule 6.1 under Article IV, section 15’s two-thirds override mechanism.
• The legislature might also create statutory frameworks for how the Attorney General must handle citizen grand jury requests (e.g., timelines, written explanations of denials, appeal-like review procedures), so long as they do not conflict with governing court rules.

Thus, Garber settles the current constitutional minimum but does not foreclose further structural or procedural refinement through ordinary lawmaking.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Grand Jury (Indicting vs. Investigative Functions)
  A grand jury traditionally has two related roles:
  • Indicting function: deciding whether there is probable cause to charge someone with a serious crime (in Alaska, required for capital or “infamous” crimes).
  • Investigative/reporting function: investigating broader issues of public welfare or safety and making non-binding recommendations (e.g., about prisons, public corruption, systemic agency failures).
• Anti-Suspension Clause
  Article I, section 8’s anti-suspension clause says the “power of grand juries to investigate and make recommendations concerning the public welfare or safety shall never be suspended.” This means the legislature (or others) cannot abolish or disable that power. It does not mean that citizens have a right to personally or directly present matters to grand juries.
• Judicial Rule-Making Power
  Under Article IV, section 15, the Alaska Supreme Court can create rules about:
  • How courts are administered, and
  • The practices and procedures used in civil and criminal cases.
  Grand jury procedures are part of “criminal practice and procedure,” so the court can regulate them via Criminal Rules like Rule 6.1.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
  Usually, if a government agency makes a decision, a person must first use that agency’s internal review processes before going to court. That is “exhausting administrative remedies.” In Garber, the challenged action was a court’s decision, not an agency’s, so that rule did not apply.
• Procedural Due Process
  Procedural due process is about the fairness of procedures used when the government takes away someone’s life, liberty, or property. To claim a violation, you must:
  • Have a recognized life/liberty/property interest, and
  • Show that the procedures used were unfair.
  The court held that direct access to a grand jury is not a recognized life, liberty, or property interest.

Conclusion

Thomas Garber v. Superior Court is a landmark clarification of Alaska’s grand jury system and the meaning of Article I, section 8’s anti-suspension clause. The Alaska Supreme Court holds that:

• There is no individual constitutional right for citizens to directly petition an investigative grand jury.
• The anti-suspension clause protects the grand jury’s institutional power to investigate and recommend, not a specific method of citizen access.
• Criminal Rule 6.1(c), which requires citizen proposals to go through the Attorney General (with a conflict-of-interest exception), is a valid exercise of the court’s rule-making authority and does not “suspend” grand jury powers.
• Other constitutional and statutory arguments (due process, crime victims’ rights, legislative provisions) do not undermine the rule’s validity.

As a result, the superior court’s denial of Garber’s attempt to bypass Rule 6.1(c) and directly engage the grand jury was properly affirmed. The decision brings much-needed clarity and uniformity to citizen-initiated grand jury practice in Alaska, while leaving room for future legislative or administrative refinement within the contours of the Constitution.