Introduction

This appeal arises from two police encounters between the Toledo Police Department (TPD) and plaintiff-appellant Corvin English, a local musician who operated “Money Getta Records,” a registered music studio in Toledo, Ohio. English alleged a pattern of police harassment culminating in two arrests—one in November 2017 at his studio and another in January 2020 at a different venue. He brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unreasonable seizure and excessive force, as well as related state-law claims, and a municipal failure-to-train claim against Chief George Kral in his official capacity. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on qualified-immunity grounds and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

The Sixth Circuit affirms in part and reverses in part. The panel holds that (1) English’s January 2020 excessive-force claim fails because he did not tie any named defendant to the alleged force and, on appeal, he waived challenge to the district court’s alternative ground; (2) the district court erred in relying on a grand jury indictment to presume probable cause for the November 2017 warrantless arrest; (3) fact disputes preclude qualified immunity on English’s November 2017 excessive-force claim, where the record (including video) could support a finding that officers used substantial force on a subdued suspect; (4) English has created a triable issue as to the involvement of certain officers under the Sixth Circuit’s “small-group” identification doctrine; (5) the Monell failure-to-train claim was properly dismissed for lack of supporting evidence; and (6) the state-law claims must be reconsidered on remand because the predicate federal claims survive.

Summary of the Opinion

• January 2020 arrest (excessive force): Affirmed dismissal. The court did not reach the enforceability of the diversion-related release under Town of Newton v. Rumery because the district court had an alternative, independent ground: English failed to present evidence linking any named defendant to the alleged force. On appeal, English did not challenge that alternative ground, thereby waiving it.
• November 2017 arrest (probable cause and excessive force): Reversed summary judgment. The district court erred in relying on the later grand jury indictment to presume probable cause for the earlier warrantless arrest (Radvansky). Disputes of material fact about the second predicate offense (noise) under Toledo’s chronic-nuisance ordinance preclude a probable-cause determination. On excessive force, viewing the record in English’s favor, a jury could find the force (including body-weight pressure on a prone suspect and head-straddling) was excessive and in violation of clearly established law.
• Identification of specific officers (Poskarbiewicz, Sutphin, Thomas): The court allows claims to proceed under the Sixth Circuit’s “small-group” doctrine (Pineda/Fazica), given evidence that English was face down and unable to observe which specific officers did what, yet placed the defendants among the small set of directly involved officers.
• Monell failure-to-train: Affirmed dismissal. English provided only conclusory assertions and no specific evidence of policy, pattern, inadequate training, or causal linkage.
• State-law claims: Reversed the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction because the premise for declining (dismissal of all federal claims) no longer exists; remanded to reconsider in light of surviving federal claims.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Probable cause and warrants:
  • United States v. Watson (warrantless arrests allowed with probable cause)
  • Maryland v. Pringle; Ornelas v. United States; Illinois v. Gates; District of Columbia v. Wesby (probable cause as a practical, totality-based, “not high” standard)
  • Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls: a subsequent indictment cannot retroactively validate a prior warrantless arrest—central to reversing the district court’s presumption of probable cause
• Excessive force:
  • Graham v. Connor (objective reasonableness; severity of crime, immediate threat, and resistance)
  • Grawey v. Drury (collecting Sixth Circuit cases on force against subdued suspects)
  • Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc. (pressure on a prone, restrained person creates asphyxiating conditions and violates clearly established law)
  • Morrison v. Board of Trustees of Green Township (obvious unlawfulness of gratuitous force such as driving a restrained suspect’s face into the ground absent a safety threat)
  • Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court; Norton v. Stille; Williams v. Morgan (gratuitous force, including breaking limbs of passively resisting arrestees, is unconstitutional)
  • Martin v. City of Broadview Heights; Saalim v. Walmart, Inc.; Jackson v. Washtenaw County; Caie v. West Bloomfield Township (active resistance standards; anger/profanity alone is not enough absent overtly threatening conduct)
  • Adams v. Metiva; Schreiber v. Moe (credibility disputes go to the jury at summary judgment)
  • Barnes v. Felix (totality of circumstances inquiry reiterated)
• Officer identification and personal participation:
  • Fazica v. Jordan (personal participation requirement)
  • Pineda v. Hamilton County (plaintiff can proceed where, due to practical limitations, he cannot assign each discrete act to a specific officer, if the defendants are placed within a small, directly involved group)
• Release agreements and waiver:
  • Town of Newton v. Rumery; Coughlen v. Coots (enforceability of release-dismissal agreements)
  • White Oak Property Development v. Washington Township; United States v. Thornton (failure to challenge an independent alternative ground on appeal waives it)
• Monell and official-capacity claims:
  • Monell v. Department of Social Services (municipal liability requires a policy/custom causing the violation)
  • Peatross v. City of Memphis; Wright v. City of Euclid (paths to municipal liability)
  • Miller v. Calhoun County (official-capacity suits equate to suits against the municipality)
• Summary judgment standards:
  • Celotex v. Catrett; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby; Matsushita (burdens and inferences at summary judgment)

Legal Reasoning

1) January 2020 Arrest: Identification Failure and Appellate Waiver

Although English challenged the district court’s enforcement of a diversion-related release under Rumery, the Sixth Circuit avoided that question. The district court had granted summary judgment on an independent, alternative ground: English failed to adduce evidence tying any named defendant to the alleged force during the January 2020 incident—a bedrock requirement under Fazica. On appeal, English did not confront that alternative holding, triggering waiver under White Oak and Thornton. The court further noted that English’s affidavit identified three officers who allegedly used force—but none were the defendants in this suit. Because English neither placed the named defendants within a small group of direct actors (Pineda) nor otherwise linked them personally, summary judgment was proper and is affirmed.

2) November 2017 Arrest: Probable Cause and the Chronic Nuisance Ordinance

The district court treated a later grand jury indictment as creating a presumption of probable cause for the earlier warrantless arrest. The panel rejected that approach as inconsistent with Radvansky: “after-the-fact grand jury involvement cannot serve to validate a prior arrest.” The correct inquiry, conducted de novo, looks to the historical facts as known to the officers and asks whether, under the totality, an objectively reasonable officer would believe a crime had been committed.

TPD relied on Toledo Municipal Code § 541.18 (public nuisance) which requires two qualifying predicate offenses arising from a party/social gathering. Parking violations were undisputed. But the second predicate—excessive noise—was sharply contested: officers described bass that could be felt from outside; English swore there was no loud music and that no noise complaint prompted the visit. The court held this evidentiary conflict created a genuine dispute material to probable cause and could not be resolved at summary judgment.

Notably, English briefly suggested the warrantless entry into his studio was unjustified for a misdemeanor, but he did not develop that argument (e.g., property interest, exigency). Applying McPherson v. Kelsey, the court deemed that issue waived.

3) November 2017 Arrest: Excessive Force Under Graham

Applying Graham’s factors and the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry (Barnes), the court found disputes precluding qualified immunity:

• Severity of the crime: Defendants conceded the suspected crimes were “relatively minor,” disfavoring significant force.
• Immediate threat: The district court found no clear indication of an immediate threat. While officers claimed English slammed a door on an officer’s hand, later bit an officer’s leg, and retreated into a crowded venue after being told he was under arrest, English disputed each (except the presence of a crowd). At summary judgment, such credibility determinations are for the jury (Adams; Schreiber).
• Active resistance: The court rejected the district court’s characterization of English’s conduct as an “admission” of evasion. English swore he was not told he was under arrest and reentered only to avoid an escalation. Angry words alone, without overtly threatening statements or actions, do not constitute active resistance under Sixth Circuit precedent (Shumate; Eldridge; Jackson; Caie). The brief “turtling” of arms was, according to English, a reaction to inflicted force. The 90‑second video clip shows English prone, with multiple officers on top of him, and no apparent active resistance.

The evidence, viewed favorably to English, supports a finding that officers applied substantial force—forcing his face into the floor with crushing pressure, straddling and squeezing his head between an officer’s legs, kneeling on his back and ankles, and twisting an ankle hard enough to “snap”—at a time when he was already on the ground and effectively restrained.

4) Clearly Established Law (as of November 24, 2017)

The court emphasized long-settled Sixth Circuit law that officers may not use gratuitous force against restrained or non-threatening individuals. Applying body-weight pressure to a prone, restrained suspect risks asphyxiation and violates the Fourth Amendment under Champion. Driving a detainee’s face into the ground or inflicting unnecessary injury when control has already been achieved is similarly unconstitutional (Morrison; Shreve; Norton; Williams). These authorities were clearly established by 2017. Given the video and English’s account, a jury could find that defendants violated clearly established rights, defeating qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.

5) Identifying Individual Officers: The “Small-Group” Doctrine

The district court granted qualified immunity to all defendants without parsing the roles of officers Poskarbiewicz, Sutphin, and Thomas. The Sixth Circuit clarified that English’s sworn statements and the video permit a reasonable inference that these defendants were part of the small set of officers who directly applied force—even if English cannot assign each discrete act to a particular officer—because he was face down and physically unable to observe them. Under Pineda and Fazica, this evidentiary posture suffices to survive summary judgment, and the question of each officer’s involvement goes to the jury.

6) Monell: Failure-to-Train

The court affirmed dismissal of the municipal liability claim against Chief Kral in his official capacity (i.e., against the City of Toledo) because English offered only conclusory assertions. He identified no policy, pattern of similar constitutional violations, training deficiency, or deliberate indifference, as required by Monell and its progeny (Wright, Peatross). At summary judgment, absent specific evidence, the claim cannot proceed.

7) State-Law Claims and Supplemental Jurisdiction

The district court declined supplemental jurisdiction because it had dismissed all federal claims. With some federal claims now revived, the predicate rationale falls away. The panel remands for the district court to reassess whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under the familiar considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Impact and Practical Implications

• No “indictment presumption” for prior warrantless arrests: The opinion forcefully reiterates Radvansky: later indictments do not backfill probable cause for earlier arrests. District courts must independently evaluate probable cause from the facts known at the time.
• Excessive force on subdued suspects remains a bright line: Body-weight pressure on a prone, restrained person; facial pressure; head-straddling that impedes breathing; and limb manipulation causing injury are all within the realm of clearly established prohibitions when control has been achieved and no immediate threat exists.
• Active resistance requires more than anger or profanity: The decision continues the Sixth Circuit’s line that hostile words or noncompliance without overtly threatening conduct do not, by themselves, justify escalated force.
• “Small-group” identification doctrine is robust at summary judgment: Plaintiffs who, for practical reasons (e.g., being face down; officers surrounding; short, chaotic events), cannot allocate each act to a specific officer may still proceed if they can place defendants within a small, directly involved group.
• Appellate waiver of alternative grounds is decisive: When a district court offers independent reasons for dismissal, an appellant must challenge each. Failure to address the alternative ground forfeits review, as happened with the January 2020 claim.
• Develop warrant/entry arguments or risk waiver: The court expressly deemed the separate warrantless-entry claim waived due to skeletal presentation. Practitioners must substantiate the Fourth Amendment entry analysis, especially in misdemeanor contexts.
• Monell remains evidence-driven: Conclusory references to targeting or inadequate training will not survive summary judgment absent proof of policy/custom, pattern, deficiency, and causation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified immunity: Shields officers from civil damages unless they violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. Courts ask (1) Was there a constitutional violation? (2) Was the right clearly established?
• Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party on the evidence presented. All reasonable inferences go to the non-movant.
• Probable cause: A practical, common-sense standard—whether, based on the facts known at the time, there was a fair probability that the suspect committed a crime.
• Chronic nuisance (Toledo Muni. Code § 541.18): Deems a location a public nuisance when two or more qualifying offenses (e.g., obstructive parking, excessive noise) occur in connection with a party or gathering. Here, parking violations were undisputed; noise was hotly disputed.
• Active resistance: Requires outward, volitional defiance—physical or verbal—and more than mere anger or profanity. Threatening gestures/statements or physical attempts to defeat arrest are paradigmatic examples.
• “Small-group” officer identification: Where a plaintiff cannot, for reasons beyond his control, attribute specific acts to specific officers, claims may proceed if the plaintiff places each defendant within a small cohort directly involved in the incident.
• Release-dismissal (Rumery): A release of civil claims in exchange for prosecutorial concessions must be voluntary, free of misconduct, and consistent with the public interest; the enforcing party bears the burden. The court here did not resolve enforceability because an independent ground disposed of the claim.
• Monell liability: Municipal liability under § 1983 attaches only when an official policy or custom causes the constitutional injury. Proof of pattern, policy, inadequate training, and deliberate indifference is often required.
• Supplemental jurisdiction: Federal courts may hear related state-law claims, but often decline if federal claims drop out. When federal claims survive, courts reassess whether to keep the state claims.

Conclusion

English v. Kral delivers several important clarifications in Fourth Amendment litigation within the Sixth Circuit. First, a later indictment does not sanitize an earlier warrantless arrest; probable cause must be judged on the facts known at the time. Second, a robust line of cases still clearly forbids gratuitous force—including body‑weight pressure on a prone, restrained suspect and similar tactics—once a subject is subdued and not posing an immediate threat. Third, plaintiffs need not lose claims at summary judgment solely because they cannot match every act to a specific officer when the evidence shows the defendants were part of a small group of direct actors and the plaintiff was practically unable to observe who did what. At the same time, the decision underscores the importance of linking each named defendant to the alleged misconduct where possible, of challenging all alternative grounds on appeal, and of supporting municipal-liability theories with concrete proof.

Although not precedential, the opinion is a thorough, practical guide to the interaction of qualified immunity, summary judgment standards, and evidentiary burdens in excessive-force and unlawful-seizure cases. On remand, a jury will resolve disputed facts surrounding the November 2017 arrest, and the district court will reassess the related state-law claims. The case stands as a reminder that careful factual development and precise legal framing are decisive in police-misconduct litigation.