No Improvement Without Acknowledgment: West Virginia Affirms Denial of Improvement Period and Child-Specific Dispositions in Domestic-Violence-Based Abuse and Neglect

Case: In re T.B., T.D., J.C.-1, and J.C.-2, No. 24-475

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Date: September 10, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed (Memorandum Decision under W. Va. R. App. P. 21)

Introduction

This memorandum decision from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirms the Circuit Court of Ohio County’s termination of the parental and custodial rights of Petitioner Mother M.J. to three of her children (T.D., J.C.-1, and J.C.-2) and the imposition of a non-termination disposition under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5) as to the fourth child, T.B. The case arises from repeated domestic violence between the mother and her partner (J.C.-3) occurring in the children’s presence, coupled with a documented history of prior abuse/neglect proceedings, allegations of the mother’s efforts to evade CPS regarding a newborn, and her ongoing minimization of the children’s disclosures about witnessing violence.

The key issues on appeal were: (1) whether the circuit court erred in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period under § 49-4-610; and (2) whether the circuit court erred in finding no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse/neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future and that termination was necessary. A subsidiary issue—raised but not preserved—concerned a post-dispositional improvement period.

The Supreme Court’s decision underscores two central principles in West Virginia child abuse and neglect law: first, a parent’s acknowledgment of the problem is a threshold requirement for an improvement period; second, dispositional outcomes may and should be child-specific, including using § 49-4-604(c)(5) for one child while terminating rights as to others when best interests diverge.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court affirmed the denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period, holding the mother failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that she was likely to fully participate. Her persistent minimization—specifically denying the children witnessed domestic violence despite forensic interviews—rendered an improvement period “an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.”
• The Court affirmed termination of parental and custodial rights to T.D., J.C.-1, and J.C.-2 under § 49-4-604(c)(6), concluding there was no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare.
• As to T.B., the Court left intact the circuit court’s use of § 49-4-604(c)(5), which allowed a non-termination placement (with the nonabusing father) suited to that child’s best interests and wishes, while preserving the mother’s legal status for that child.
• The Court rejected the mother’s argument for a post-dispositional improvement period because she had not filed the required written motion, reaffirming the written-motion prerequisite under State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson and noting her failure to cite to the record as required by Rule 10(c)(7).

Detailed Analysis

Procedural Timeline and Factual Context

• December 2023: DHS filed its third abuse/neglect petition against the mother (prior cases involved excessive corporal punishment and failure to supervise). Allegations centered on domestic violence between the mother and boyfriend (J.C.-3) witnessed by the children; threats to call CPS as discipline; extended confinement of children to bedrooms; instructing a child not to speak to CPS; and the children disputing the mother’s claim she had ended the relationship with J.C.-3.
• January 17, 2024 (Adjudication): The mother stipulated to domestic violence and to failures in supervision/protection, resulting in adjudication as to T.B., T.D., and J.C.-1. The circuit court denied a post-adjudicatory improvement period, emphasizing lack of likely participation and noting the mother’s high-risk pregnancy.
• March 2024 (Amended Petition): DHS added newborn J.C.-2. Allegations included the mother’s failure to sign medical authorizations, failure to report the birth, and evasion of CPS attempts to take custody (the record notes a filed criminal complaint for child concealment under § 61-2-14d(a), without any adjudication on that issue).
• May 2024 (Adjudication on amendment): The mother stipulated she had not remedied the conditions and was adjudicated as to J.C.-2.
• July 2024 (Disposition): Despite the mother’s testimony that she had obtained a protective order and her insistence that the children never witnessed violence, the court credited forensic interviews and CPS testimony regarding a pattern of minimizing and re-engagement with the abuser. It terminated rights to three children and ordered § 49-4-604(c)(5) disposition for T.B.
• September 10, 2025 (Appeal): The Supreme Court affirmed in a memorandum decision without oral argument.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
  Used for two propositions: (1) standard of review—clear error for factual findings and de novo for legal conclusions; and (2) courts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement when the child’s welfare would be seriously threatened. This framed the appellate deference to the circuit court’s credibility determinations and supported the decision to terminate without further delay.
• In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013), quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004)
  These cases articulate the “acknowledgment first” doctrine: an improvement period requires that the parent acknowledge the problem; otherwise it is futile. The Court directly invoked this principle to uphold denial of an improvement period where the mother denied that the children witnessed domestic violence.
• In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002)
  Confirms circuit courts have discretion to refuse improvement periods when no improvement is likely. This bolstered the circuit court’s refusal to extend services in light of persistent minimization and a history of recidivism.
• State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 878 S.E.2d 730 (2021)
  Reaffirms that a circuit court may not grant an improvement period unless the parent files a written motion. The mother’s failure to file, coupled with Rule 10(c)(7)’s record-citation requirement, rendered her post-dispositional improvement period argument meritless.
• State ex rel. Amy M. v. Kaufman, 196 W. Va. 251, 470 S.E.2d 205 (1996)
  Emphasizes the child’s right to permanency and reliable caretakers, supporting timely termination where parents cannot promptly address conditions of abuse/neglect.
• Statutes and Rules:
  • W. Va. Code § 49-4-610: Sets the improvement period framework and the parent’s burden to show likely full participation by clear and convincing evidence.
  • W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(5) and (c)(6): Provide dispositional alternatives, including non-termination placement (c)(5) and termination of parental rights (c)(6).
  • W. Va. Code § 61-2-14d(a): Child concealment statute referenced to explain DHS concerns and the mother’s alleged evasion (not adjudicated here).
  • W. Va. R. App. P. 21, 40(e), 10(c)(7): Respectively, memorandum decision procedure, confidentiality of parties via initials, and the requirement to cite the record in appellate briefs.

Legal Reasoning

1) Denial of the Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

The statute requires a parent to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they are likely to fully participate in services. The circuit court found—and the Supreme Court agreed—that the mother’s minimization and denial that the children witnessed violence, in the face of consistent forensic interviews, defeated any such showing. The Court leaned on Timber M./Charity H. to reiterate that acknowledgment is a threshold requirement; without it, services become a hollow formality that delays permanency. While the mother cited therapy and a protective order, the court weighed these against a demonstrated pattern of re-engagement with the abuser, inconsistent statements, and ongoing denial of the children’s lived experience.

2) No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction and Necessity of Termination

The record reflected multiple prior abuse/neglect cases, continuing association with the abuser, and efforts that undermined DHS oversight (such as failing to sign medical authorizations and not reporting the birth of J.C.-2). The circuit court concluded the mother was unable or unwilling to protect the children and was not candid with the court. Under § 49-4-604(c)(6), termination is authorized when (a) there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be corrected in the near future, and (b) termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. The Supreme Court upheld these findings, citing Cecil T. for the principle that courts need not “exhaust every speculative possibility” of parental improvement where children’s welfare is at stake.

3) Child-Specific Disposition for T.B. under § 49-4-604(c)(5)

The circuit court crafted a different outcome for T.B., consistent with the guardian ad litem’s recommendation and T.B.’s stated wishes. The non-termination disposition under § 49-4-604(c)(5) allowed placement with the nonabusing father, aligning with permanency planning while preserving the mother’s legal status for that child. The Supreme Court noted the mother did not challenge this aspect, and its acceptance underscores that dispositional decisions must be tailored to each child’s best interests—even within the same family.

4) Post-Dispositional Improvement Period Argument Forfeited

The mother raised a claim for a post-dispositional improvement period but had filed no written motion below. Under P.G.-1 v. Wilson, a written motion is a prerequisite to granting any improvement period. Additionally, Rule 10(c)(7) requires citation to the record; the failure to do so rendered the claim meritless. The Court’s treatment here doubles as a practice reminder: preservation and record support are essential on appeal.

5) Standards of Review and Deference to Credibility Findings

Applying Cecil T., the Supreme Court reviewed the circuit court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal rulings de novo. Crucially, the circuit court credited the children’s forensic disclosures and the CPS worker’s testimony regarding a pattern of minimization and recurrence, while discounting the mother’s denials. The Supreme Court deferred to those credibility determinations and the underlying factual inferences.

Impact and Implications

• Reaffirmation of the “Acknowledgment First” Rule: The decision confirms that courts will deny improvement periods when a parent denies or minimizes core facts of abuse or neglect. In domestic-violence contexts, rejecting children’s consistent reports is especially damaging to a parent’s prospects.
• Child-Specific Dispositions as Best-Interest Tools: The use of § 49-4-604(c)(5) for T.B. demonstrates that courts will vary dispositions among siblings to reflect individualized best interests, wishes, and permanency plans, even while terminating rights as to others.
• Procedural Rigor Matters: Failure to file a written motion for a post-dispositional improvement period—and to cite the record—will be fatal to that request on appeal. Counsel should paper improvement-period requests precisely and early.
• Domestic Violence as Abuse/Neglect: The case exemplifies how exposure to domestic violence, combined with parental minimization and relapse into violent relationships, supports findings of no reasonable likelihood of correction and termination—especially where prior CPS involvement has already attempted remediation.
• Practical Guidance for Parents and Counsel: Demonstrable separation from the abuser (compliance with protective orders), consistent acknowledgment of harm, full cooperation with DHS (including signing releases and promptly reporting births), and transparent candor with the court are indispensable. Any inconsistency will weigh heavily against improvement periods.
• Memorandum Decision with Persuasive Effect: While issued under Rule 21, the decision is part of a consistent line of cases emphasizing permanency and acknowledging domestic violence’s impact on children. Future litigants should expect similar outcomes on comparable facts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adjudication vs. Disposition: Adjudication is the court’s determination that abuse/neglect occurred. Disposition is the remedial order that follows (e.g., services, placement, termination), tailored to each child’s best interests.
• Improvement Period (Post-Adjudicatory vs. Post-Dispositional): A structured period of services meant to help a parent correct conditions. The parent must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, likely full participation. A post-dispositional improvement period may be sought after disposition begins—but only via a written motion, and it is discretionary.
• “Acknowledgment” Requirement: Courts generally require the parent to accept responsibility for the conduct or conditions that led to adjudication. Without acknowledgment, services tend to fail because the parent does not internalize the behavioral change needed.
• “No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction in the Near Future”: A statutory threshold for termination. The court assesses whether, given the parent’s past and present conduct, the root conditions are likely to be remedied promptly enough to meet the child’s need for safety and permanency.
• § 49-4-604(c)(5) vs. § 49-4-604(c)(6): Subsection (c)(5) allows non-termination dispositions such as placing the child with a nonabusing parent or other suitable person while parental rights remain intact. Subsection (c)(6) authorizes termination of parental rights when statutory criteria are met.
• Guardian ad Litem (GAL): A lawyer appointed to represent the child’s best interests, often relaying the child’s wishes and assessing the impact of abuse/neglect and proposed dispositions.
• Memorandum Decision (Rule 21): A streamlined appellate disposition used when a full opinion and oral argument are unnecessary. It applies settled law to the case’s facts.

Key Takeaways

• A parent’s denial that children witnessed domestic violence—contrary to forensic interviews—will almost certainly defeat the “likely to fully participate” showing required for an improvement period.
• Courts may craft different dispositions for different siblings to honor individual best interests and permanency plans.
• Written motions for improvement periods are mandatory; failure to file or to cite the record will doom the request.
• When repeated CPS involvement and minimization persist, the “no reasonable likelihood” standard is readily met, supporting termination.
• Protective steps (like obtaining a protective order) matter, but they are insufficient if undermined by ongoing minimization, lack of candor, or re-engagement with the abuser.

Conclusion

In re T.B., T.D., J.C.-1, and J.C.-2 reinforces settled West Virginia child welfare doctrine: improvement periods are not entitlements and hinge on genuine acknowledgment of the underlying harm; courts prioritize permanency and need not indulge speculative chances of improvement; and dispositional outcomes are individualized to each child’s best interests. The Court’s decision—grounded in Timber M., Charity H., Tonjia M., Cecil T., Amy M., and P.G.-1—offers a clear roadmap to practitioners: to secure services, establish candid acknowledgment and full cooperation; to defend against termination, demonstrate verifiable and sustained separation from violence and timely behavioral change; and to preserve appellate issues, file precise written motions and build a record. The mixed disposition here (termination for three children; § 49-4-604(c)(5) for one) exemplifies the system’s child-centric flexibility within a framework that refuses to compromise safety and permanency.