No Implied Municipal Power to Exclude Supplemental Waste Providers Under the Arkansas Solid Waste Management Act

I. Introduction

In Steven Hedrick and X-Dumpsters v. City of Holiday Island, 2025 Ark. 194, the Supreme Court of Arkansas confronted a focused but significant question: can a municipality, relying on the Arkansas Solid Waste Management Act, exclude all other providers from offering supplemental solid-waste services within its borders, once it has contracted with a single provider?

The City of Holiday Island argued that the statutory duty to provide a “solid waste management system” authorized it both to select an exclusive provider and to bar all competitors. Hedrick and X-Dumpsters—operators of a roll-off dumpster service—argued that the City had exceeded its statutory powers and, in addition, created an unconstitutional monopoly under article 2, section 19 of the Arkansas Constitution.

The circuit court accepted the City’s statutory argument and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court’s holding is narrow but important:

In doing so, the Court reaffirmed a classic principle of Arkansas municipal law: cities have only those powers expressly conferred by statute or necessarily implied, and the power to contract with a waste provider is not the same as the power to outlaw competitors.

The Court deliberately declined to decide the constitutional monopoly question, resting instead on statutory grounds. A vigorous dissent by Justice Hudson, joined by Chief Justice Baker, would have upheld the City’s authority to create an exclusive waste-service structure, reading the Act and prior Arkansas monopoly precedents much more broadly.

II. Background of the Case

A. Parties and Factual Setting

• Appellants: Steven Hedrick and X-Dumpsters.
• Nature of business: X-Dumpsters provides roll-off dumpster services—large movable dumpsters commonly used for construction, remodeling, or large clean-outs. These services are characterized in the litigation as “supplemental” or “ad hoc” solid-waste removal, distinct from routine weekly household garbage collection.
• Appellee: City of Holiday Island, a municipality that has chosen to contract with another entity (the Carroll County Solid Waste District) for:
  • weekly trash collection; and
  • as-needed supplemental waste-removal services.

In April 2022, Holiday Island enacted an ordinance that broadly barred anyone other than the City’s chosen contractor from providing solid-waste-removal services within the city limits. As a result, X-Dumpsters was prohibited from serving its existing and prospective customers in Holiday Island.

B. Procedural History

1. X-Dumpsters (and Hedrick) filed suit in Carroll County Circuit Court, challenging the ordinance on several grounds, including:
   • that the City lacked statutory authority under the Arkansas Solid Waste Management Act to exclude other providers; and
   • that the ordinance violated the Arkansas Constitution’s prohibition on monopolies (art. 2, § 19).
2. The City responded that Arkansas Code Annotated § 8-6-211, part of the Solid Waste Management Act, implicitly authorized the municipality to:
   • select a single provider for all solid waste; and
   • exclude competitors, including any “supplemental” providers.
3. The circuit court agreed with the City’s statutory interpretation and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.
4. Hedrick and X-Dumpsters appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court.

C. Statutory Framework: The Arkansas Solid Waste Management Act

The dispute centers on two key provisions of the Arkansas Solid Waste Management Act:

• Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-211(a) (Repl. 2022):
  [Municipalities must] provide “a solid waste management system which will adequately provide for the collection and disposal of all solid wastes generated or existing within the [city limits].”
  The same section authorizes municipalities to:
  “enter into agreements with one (1) or more other municipalities, counties, a regional solid waste management district, private persons or trusts, or with any combination thereof, to provide a solid waste management system, or any part of a system, for the municipality.”
• Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-203(20) (Repl. 2022) – definition of “solid waste management system”:
  “the entire process of source reduction, storage, collection, transportation, processing, waste minimization, recycling, and disposal of solid wastes by any [entity].” (emphasis added by the dissent)

The majority opinion focuses on § 8-6-211 as the grant of municipal authority. The dissent emphasizes § 8-6-203(20), arguing that the statutory definition of “solid waste management system” as an “entire process” signals legislative approval of exclusive, competition-displacing municipal arrangements.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

A. Holding

The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded, holding:

• The Solid Waste Management Act—specifically § 8-6-211—does not authorize Holiday Island to bar supplemental solid-waste providers such as X-Dumpsters.
• Municipalities are “creatures of the legislature” and possess only those powers:
  • expressly conferred by statute or the constitution, or
  • necessarily implied to carry out their statutory duties.
  The power to contract with one provider is not the same as the power to exclude all others.
• Because the City lacked statutory authority to enact the exclusionary portion of its ordinance, that portion is invalid.
• Given this statutory conclusion, the Court did not reach:
  • whether the ordinance created an unconstitutional monopoly under Ark. Const. art. 2, § 19; or
  • any other constitutional claims, including the “right to pursue a lawful occupation” argument mentioned in the dissent.

  B. Disposition

  The Court:

  • Reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of the complaint; and
  • Remanded “for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”

  On remand, the ordinance—as applied to prohibit residents from contracting with X-Dumpsters for supplemental services— cannot stand under existing statutory authority. The case may proceed on remaining claims (e.g., for declaratory or injunctive relief, and potentially any damages or other remedies pleaded) under this legal framework.

  C. The Dissenting View

  Justice Hudson, joined by Chief Justice Baker, dissented. The dissent would have:

  • Read the Solid Waste Management Act to allow municipalities to select a single provider and, by necessary implication, bar all competitors from providing any solid-waste services within the city;
  • Relied on the statutory definition of “solid waste management system” as the “entire process” of handling waste to support the exclusivity power; and
  • Rejected the constitutional monopoly challenge in light of longstanding Arkansas precedent upholding exclusive sanitation contracts under the police power.

  IV. Detailed Analysis

  A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

  1. Municipal Powers: “Creatures of the Legislature”

  Several older Arkansas cases are central to the majority’s approach to municipal authority:

  • Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark. 497 (1878). Quoting the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court reaffirmed that municipalities are:
    “created by the authority of the Legislature; and they derive all their powers from the source of their creation, except where the Constitution of the State otherwise provides.”
  • Jones v. Am. Home Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 335, 738 S.W.2d 387, 389 (1987):
    “Municipalities are creatures of the legislature and as such have only the power bestowed upon them by statute or the Arkansas Constitution.”
  • Bain v. Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co., 116 Ark. 125, 172 S.W. 843 (1915):
    [Municipalities have] “no powers except those expressly conferred and those fairly implied for the attainment of declared purposes.”
  • Deaderick v. Parker, 211 Ark. 394, 398, 200 S.W.2d 787, 789 (1947):
    “Municipalities have no power except those granted expressly or by necessary implication by the legislature.”

  These cases embody a Dillon’s Rule–style approach: cities must point to a statute (or constitutional provision) that expressly grants a power or from which that power is necessarily implied. Any doubt is normally resolved against an enlargement of municipal authority. This doctrine is the backbone of the majority’s reasoning.

  2. Invalidating Local Enactments That Exceed Statutory Authority

  The majority also cites:

  • Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 2019 Ark. 30, 565 S.W.3d 477.
    There, the Court invalidated a local ordinance because it exceeded what state law authorized municipalities to enact. The case stands for the proposition that even if a city’s goals might be laudable, its ordinances must still stay within the boundaries set by state law.

  By invoking Protect Fayetteville, the Court underscores that it is willing to strike down municipal action where the city’s authority is not grounded in statute—even if the ordinance addresses a matter traditionally related to public health or welfare.

  3. Standard of Review

  On review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the Court applies a de novo standard:

  • Dollarway Patrons for Better Schs. v. Morehead, 2010 Ark. 133, 361 S.W.3d 274:
    • The Court accepts the factual allegations as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
    • But where the dismissal turns on a purely legal issue—such as statutory interpretation—the Court engages in its own independent (de novo) review.

  The majority emphasizes the de novo legal aspect; the dissent quotes the fuller standard, including the requirement that reasonable inferences be drawn in favor of the complaint. Practically, both opinions agree that the key issue, statutory interpretation, is one of law for the Court.

  4. The “All Wastes” Language and Bridges v. Yellow Cab Co.

  The City relied on the requirement in § 8-6-211 that the municipal system must “provide for the collection and disposal of all solid wastes.” The majority responds:

  [T]hat language merely requires the city to ensure a trash collection, and no one suggests that the existence of supplemental providers, like X-Dumpsters, prevents the city from doing that. Cf. Bridges v. Yellow Cab Co., 241 Ark. 204, 206, 406 S.W.2d 879, 880 (1966).

  Though the opinion does not expound on Bridges, the citation suggests a prior recognition that:

  • A statutory or municipal duty to assure adequate service (e.g., taxi or utility service) does not automatically include the power to prohibit all competing services, unless the law clearly says so.

  The analogy supports the majority’s narrow reading of the City’s “all wastes” obligation: the duty is to ensure coverage, not to suppress others who might lawfully provide additional services without undermining that coverage.

  5. Dissent’s Precedents: Monopolies and Sanitation

  Justice Hudson’s dissent relies on a line of Arkansas cases upholding exclusive contracts or arrangements for waste and sanitation services, even against constitutional monopoly challenges:

  • Dreyfus v. Boone, 88 Ark. 353, 114 S.W. 718 (1908):
    • Upheld an ordinance granting an individual the exclusive right to remove deposits from unsewered privies for ten years.
    • Held that an exclusive contract for waste removal can be a valid exercise of the police power if it is reasonable and designed to protect public health.
  • Geurin v. City of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 103, 155 S.W.2d 719 (1941):
    • Upheld a garbage collection ordinance, including fees and penalties, as a valid police-power exercise.
  • Smith v. City of Springdale, 291 Ark. 63, 65, 722 S.W.2d 569, 570 (1987):
    “Without question a city is authorized to enter into proper exclusive contracts for sanitation services.”
  • Massongill v. County of Scott, 329 Ark. 98, 105, 947 S.W.2d 749, 752 (1997):
    “[M]onopolies are upheld when deemed necessary in executing a duty incumbent on city authorities or the legislature for the preservation of public health.”

  The dissent also cites:

  • L&H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., 769 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1985):
    Quoting:
    “[T]he legislative intent to displace competition can be inferred from the statutory scheme because it is a ‘necessary and reasonable consequence of engaging in the authorized activity.’”
    This federal case involves the doctrine that when a state authorizes a regulatory activity that would naturally displace competition (e.g., exclusive waste franchises), courts can infer an intent to allow competition-restricting arrangements.
  • Arkansas Attorney General Opinion 2006-062 (referenced indirectly):
    Described by the dissent as explaining that:
    “the legislature has authorized any municipality exclusively to contract with a single private individual for the provision of recycling systems, foreclosing any other individual from engaging in the activity.”

  These authorities frame the dissent’s position: given the statutory scheme, prior Arkansas case law, and public health concerns, a municipality must be understood as having authority to exclude competitors once it selects a provider for the entire waste-management system.

  B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

  1. Framing the Question and Limiting the Scope

  The majority consciously narrows the case to a single, precise question:

  Does Defendant City of Holiday Island have the power to exclude Plaintiffs … from providing supplemental waste-management services within Holiday Island?

  This framing is important:

  • The Court does not decide whether a municipality may ever enter into an exclusive contract for core waste services.
  • It focuses on whether § 8-6-211 grants the additional power to criminalize or forbid residents’ use of supplemental services from otherwise lawful providers.
  • It does not reach the constitutionality of monopoly arrangements under art. 2, § 19, because it resolves the appeal on narrower statutory grounds.

  2. Reaffirming the Limits of Municipal Power

  Relying on Eagle, Jones, Bain, and Deaderick, the Court confirms that Arkansas municipalities:

  • possess only those powers:
    • expressly granted by the General Assembly or the constitution, or
    • necessarily implied to carry out their duties; and
  • may not exercise power merely because it would be convenient, efficient, or good policy from the city’s perspective.

  This is critical to the holding: the City cannot reverse-engineer power from what it wishes to accomplish (a single, fully controlled waste contractor); it must point to a statutory text that actually authorizes the means it chose (excluding all other providers).

  3. Reading § 8‑6‑211: Duty to Provide Service vs. Power to Exclude

  The heart of the dispute is the interpretation of § 8‑6‑211(a). The relevant points in the majority’s construction are:

  1. The statute imposes an obligation, not a monopoly power.
     The requirement that a city provide a solid waste management system that “adequately provide[s] for the collection and disposal of all solid wastes” is read as a coverage duty:
     • The city must ensure that no solid waste is left unaddressed within its boundaries.
     • But this does not imply that no one else may also offer services so long as the city’s coverage duty remains satisfied.
  2. Authority to contract is not authority to exclude.
     The statute explicitly permits municipalities to:
     “enter into agreements with one (1) or more … [entities] to provide a solid waste management system, or any part of a system, for the municipality.”
     From this, the majority infers:
     • Cities may contract with one or multiple entities to ensure all waste is handled.
     • But the power to select one contractor does not, by itself, include the power to forbid others from offering services to willing customers.
     • There is “a significant difference between the ability to contract with a single party—and only that party— and the power to bar all others from offering a service.”
  3. “All solid wastes” ≠ “only the selected provider may operate.”
     The City argued that because its chosen contractor must be capable of handling “all” solid waste, no “room” remained for discretionary supplemental providers. The Court rejects that reading:
     [T]hat language merely requires the city to ensure a trash collection, and no one suggests that the existence of supplemental providers, like X-Dumpsters, prevents the city from doing that.

  Put differently, the obligation to ensure “all” waste is dealt with does not equate to an entitlement to outlaw competition. It speaks to minimum adequacy, not to maximum exclusivity.

  4. Rejecting “Necessary Implication” as a Basis for Exclusivity

  The dissent contends that once a municipality is authorized to provide a “solid waste management system” defined as the “entire process,” it “necessarily” follows that the city may bar others from interfering with that system. The majority disagrees.

  In a pointed footnote, the majority addresses the dissent’s reliance on the definitional provision § 8‑6‑203(20):

  [N]othing in that provision gives Holiday Island the authority to bar other, otherwise lawful providers. It simply defines “[s]olid waste management system” as “the entire process of [disposing of trash].” … The question is whether it can exclude others from providing trash services, and the dissent does not point to anything that gives Holiday Island that authority.

  And more broadly:

  [T]he dissent’s argument ultimately amounts to little more than a bald assertion that because municipalities can contract with providers, “[they] necessarily have the related power to bar anyone else from providing these services.” (quoting the dissent)

  Thus, in the majority’s view:

  • A definition of what “solid waste management system” entails is not a grant of power to exclude others.
  • The power to contract with an entity capable of providing the “entire process” does not inevitably entail the suppression of “supplemental” services that might overlap with or duplicate some aspects of that process.
  • “Necessary implication” must be truly necessary to perform the statutory duty—not just helpful to implement the city’s preferred policy (such as operating a fully exclusive franchise).

  5. Constitutional Avoidance: Not Reaching the Monopoly Clause

  The Court’s structure reflects a classic principle of judicial restraint: if a case can be resolved on non-constitutional grounds, a court should do so and avoid issuing unnecessary constitutional rulings.

  Here:

  • The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance violated article 2, section 19 of the Arkansas Constitution, which provides that “monopolies are contrary to the genius of a republic, and shall not be allowed.”
  • The City defended both on statutory grounds and by implication on constitutional grounds, relying on precedent upholding certain exclusive sanitation arrangements.
  • The Court, however, concludes that:
    • Holiday Island lacks statutory authority to enact the exclusionary portion of its ordinance; and thus
    • It is unnecessary (and inappropriate) to render a constitutional judgment on the monopoly question.

  The majority therefore leaves the substantive scope of Arkansas’s antimonopoly clause in this context for another day. Yet the strong dissent, and the prior cases it marshals, suggest that litigation on that constitutional text is likely to continue in other contexts.

  C. The Dissent’s Reasoning and Its Contrast with the Majority

  1. Emphasis on the “Entire Process” Definition

  Justice Hudson’s dissent treats § 8-6-203(20)’s definition of “solid waste management system” as central. The statute defines the system as:

  “the entire process of source reduction, storage, collection, transportation, processing, waste minimization, recycling, and disposal of solid wastes by any [entity].” (emphasis added by the dissent).

  Drawing on Merriam-Webster’s definition of “entire” as “having no element or part left out: whole,” the dissent argues:

  • If a municipality contracts with one entity to provide the entire waste-management system, then no residual role remains for supplemental providers such as X-Dumpsters.
  • Because the Carroll County Solid Waste District “does it all,” there is no “void” for X-Dumpsters to “fill or supplement.”

  From this, the dissent moves from a definitional premise (“entire”) to a conclusion regarding municipal power:

  [T]he Act delegates to municipalities the power to select a single provider for all solid-waste collection and disposal. With that, municipalities necessarily have the related power to bar anyone else from providing these services.

  2. Public Health, Efficiency, and Legislative Intent

  The dissent stresses that exclusivity:

  • “protects public health and promotes efficiency” by simplifying oversight and ensuring accountability to a single provider;
  • is a reasonable and historically accepted mechanism for municipalities to fulfill their waste-management obligations.

  Citing L&H Sanitation, the dissent suggests that the legislature’s authorization of municipal waste systems naturally entails the displacement of private competition:

  “[T]he legislative intent to displace competition can be inferred from the statutory scheme because it is a ‘necessary and reasonable consequence of engaging in the authorized activity.’”

  In the dissent’s view, therefore, granting municipalities the authority to provide and oversee a “solid waste management system” necessarily implies that competing systems cannot simultaneously operate within the same jurisdiction.

  3. Treatment of “Supplemental” Services

  The dissent is particularly skeptical of the plaintiffs’ characterization of their services as “supplemental”:

  [T]he majority has been led astray by X-Dumpsters’ strategic framing of their solid-waste services as “supplemental” or “ad hoc” services that are somehow legally distinct from the services that the City is required to provide.

  To the dissent, “solid-waste disposal is solid-waste disposal—regardless of how creatively it is characterized.” Therefore:

  • If the municipality has chosen a provider to handle the “entire process,” then any additional provider (even if calling itself “supplemental”) is, in substance, doing the same regulated activity the statute assigns to the city’s system.

  4. The Monopoly Clause and Prior Arkansas Cases

  On the constitutional issue, the dissent points out:

  • Article 2, section 19 broadly condemns monopolies, but:
    • Arkansas courts have consistently upheld exclusive waste and sanitation arrangements when tied to public health obligations.
  • Dreyfus, Geurin, Smith, and Massongill all stand for the proposition that:
    • Exclusive franchises for waste collection and related health measures can be constitutionally permissible exercises of the police power.
  • The plaintiffs in this case did not seriously contest the City’s ability to enter an exclusive core contract; they objected only to the exclusion of supplemental providers.

  Thus, in the dissent’s view, the case falls squarely within the constitutional safe harbor created by prior Arkansas decisions sustaining such exclusive arrangements in the name of public health.

  5. Where the Majority and Dissent Diverge

  The fundamental divide between the majority and dissent lies in:

  • What counts as a “necessary implication” of a municipal power.
    • The majority: contracting with a provider capable of handling all waste does not require banning all competitors; the city can still meet its duty even if others also operate.
    • The dissent: to fulfill the statutory vision of a single “entire” system, exclusivity and competition displacement are “necessary and reasonable consequences” of the authorized activity.
  • Whether a definitional section can quietly carry major structural consequences.
    • The majority: definitions explain terminology but do not enlarge power absent explicit operative language.
    • The dissent: the definition of “entire process” reflects a legislative commitment to integrated, exclusive systems.
  • How heavily to weigh historical practice and prior monopoly-friendly rulings.
    • The majority largely brackets those cases by deciding the matter entirely on statutory grounds.
    • The dissent relies on them as strong evidence that the legislature and courts have long understood municipal waste management to support exclusive arrangements.

  D. Doctrinal and Practical Impact

  1. Immediate Effect on Arkansas Municipal Waste Ordinances

  The decision directly affects any Arkansas municipality that, like Holiday Island:

  • contracts with a primary waste-services provider, and
  • seeks, under current law, to categorically bar other businesses from offering supplemental or overlapping waste services (such as roll-off dumpsters) to willing customers.

  Under Hedrick, unless another statute clearly grants such exclusionary authority, municipalities may not:

  • prohibit residents or businesses from contracting with otherwise lawful supplemental solid-waste providers; or
  • enforce ordinances that purport to criminalize or penalize such supplemental services solely on the ground that the city has chosen a primary provider.

  2. No Broad Ban on Exclusive Contracts—But Limits on “Locking Out” Competitors

  Crucially, the Court did not hold that municipalities are forbidden from awarding an exclusive contract to a single provider for:

  • routine household trash collection;
  • core, systemwide waste-management services; or
  • other aspects of the “entire process” as a matter of who the city pays or recognizes as its official contractor.

  The new rule is more surgical:

  • The Solid Waste Management Act does not, by itself, authorize municipalities to outlaw supplemental providers.
  • Any such exclusionary power must appear:
    • in a clear grant of authority from the General Assembly, or
    • be strictly necessary (not merely convenient) to carrying out an express statutory duty.

  3. Implications Beyond Waste Services

  Although the case arose in the waste-management context, the reasoning may reverberate in other areas where municipalities often structure exclusive or quasi-exclusive arrangements, for example:

  • taxi and ride-hailing ordinances;
  • tow-truck rotations or exclusive towing contracts;
  • cable television or broadband franchises;
  • ambulance or emergency medical services; and
  • municipal utilities or service concessions.

  For each of these sectors, Hedrick encourages the following question:

  • Is there an express or truly necessary implied statutory basis for the city to prohibit competitors, or does the statute merely authorize the city to select a provider (or providers) and ensure service is available?

  If a city’s ordinance tries to move from “we contract with Provider A” to “no one but Provider A may operate,” this case suggests Arkansas courts will scrutinize the statutory justification closely.

  4. Litigation Strategy: Statutory Before Constitutional

  For businesses and individuals challenging restrictive municipal regulations, Hedrick offers a roadmap:

  • Begin with statutory interpretation:
    • Identify the specific statutes the city relies on.
    • Ask whether those statutes truly confer the power to exclude competitors—or merely to regulate, license, or contract.
  • Use the “creatures of the legislature” doctrine:
    • Argue that any ambiguity must be resolved against enlarging municipal power, especially where competition or livelihoods are at stake.
  • Reserve constitutional challenges (e.g., monopolies clause, right to pursue an occupation) as backup issues if statutory grounds prove insufficient.

  The Court’s willingness to decide on statutory grounds reflects a preference for non-constitutional resolutions and signals that careful textual arguments can be decisive.

  5. Possible Legislative Response

  If the General Assembly disagrees with this interpretation, it could respond by:

  • Amending § 8‑6‑211 (or related provisions) to state explicitly that municipalities:
    • may grant exclusive franchises for some or all aspects of solid-waste management; and
    • may prohibit any unfranchised person or entity from engaging in designated waste activities within the city limits.
  • Clarifying whether and under what conditions municipalities may restrict “supplemental” or “ad hoc” waste-removal providers, such as roll-off dumpster businesses.

  Such amendments would raise in a more square way the constitutional question the Court avoided here: whether the Arkansas Constitution’s prohibition on monopolies allows the legislature to confer such broad, competition-suppressing powers in this field. For now, that question remains open at the Supreme Court level, though prior cases strongly suggest some constitutional tolerance for exclusive sanitation arrangements.

  V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

  A. “Creatures of the Legislature” and Dillon’s Rule

  In plain terms, the Court’s repeated statement that municipalities are “creatures of the legislature” means:

  • Cities and towns do not have inherent powers just because they are governments.
  • They can act only when:
    • a law expressly says they can; or
    • the power is so closely tied to a granted power that it is absolutely necessary to carry out that granted power.
  • “Helpful,” “efficient,” or “sensible” is not enough; the power must be rooted in statutory text.

  This is often called a Dillon’s Rule approach, and Arkansas continues to apply a strong version of it in construing municipal authority.

  B. Solid Waste Management System

  The term “solid waste management system” is statutorily defined to mean the entire chain of handling waste:

  • source reduction;
  • storage;
  • collection;
  • transportation;
  • processing;
  • waste minimization;
  • recycling; and
  • disposal.

  In everyday terms, it covers everything from putting your trash in a bin, to pickup, to hauling, recycling, and landfilling. The dispute in Hedrick is not over what the system is, but whether authorizing a city to ensure such a system exists also authorizes it to forbid any other business from performing parts of that system.

  C. Monopolies Clause (Ark. Const. art. 2, § 19)

  Arkansas’s constitution states that:

  “Monopolies are contrary to the genius of a republic, and shall not be allowed.”

  Despite this broad language, Arkansas courts have long recognized that:

  • In certain contexts—especially public health and safety—government may grant exclusive franchises (for example, sanitation services) without violating this clause.
  • The key justification is that a single accountable provider can be essential to effectively protecting public health.

  Hedrick does not change the body of case law interpreting article 2, section 19. Instead, the Court avoided the question and rested entirely on the lack of statutory authority for the City’s ordinance.

  D. Exclusive Contracts vs. Banning Competitors

  It is crucial to distinguish between two related but legally distinct actions:

  1. Exclusive contract (franchise) with a provider
     • The city chooses one company as its official provider and may pay that company to collect waste, set standards, and provide coverage.
     • Residents may still (depending on law) hire someone else at their own expense for extra services, so long as they comply with basic public-health rules.
  2. Barring competitors altogether
     • The city goes further and makes it unlawful for anyone else to offer similar or overlapping services—even if residents want and pay for them.
     • This second step is what the Court says the Solid Waste Management Act does not presently authorize.

  E. Standard of Review: De Novo on Legal Questions

  When a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, the Court:

  • Assumes all properly pleaded factual allegations are true, and
  • Independently interprets the law (statutes, constitutional provisions) without deference to the circuit court’s legal conclusions.

  That is what “de novo” means in this context.

  VI. Conclusion

  Steven Hedrick and X-Dumpsters v. City of Holiday Island, 2025 Ark. 194, establishes a clear and important rule in Arkansas municipal law:

  • The Arkansas Solid Waste Management Act does not, as currently written, give municipalities the power to exclude otherwise lawful supplemental waste providers from operating within city limits solely because the city has designated its own waste contractor.
  • Municipalities remain bound by the longstanding principle that they possess only those powers:
    • expressly conferred by statute or the constitution; or
    • truly necessary by implication to carry out those express powers.

  The Court’s decision does not categorically forbid exclusive municipal waste contracts, nor does it redefine the constitutional scope of Arkansas’s antimonopoly clause. Instead, it takes a disciplined, textual approach to municipal authority, emphasizing that the power to contract is not, without more, the power to outlaw competition.

  Going forward, Arkansas municipalities must carefully ground any attempt to create exclusive service monopolies in clear statutory language. Businesses challenging exclusionary ordinances have been handed a significant tool: a reaffirmed doctrine that cities may not assume the power to suppress competition unless the General Assembly has unmistakably authorized them to do so.