No Immunity Without Compliance: Vermont Affirms Tow-Company Duty of Care and Sufficiency of Owner Testimony for Missing Vehicle Contents

Grey Barreda v. Handy's Service Center, Vermont Supreme Court, Case No. 24-AP-305 (Entry Order, Sept. 5, 2025)

Note on precedential value: The Court issues this as a three-justice panel Entry Order, which the opinion itself cautions is “not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.” That said, the decision provides persuasive guidance on statutory compliance for abandoned vehicles, duties of care for tow/storage operators, evidentiary sufficiency, and appellate preservation.

Introduction

This case arises from a dispute over missing personal property from a vehicle stored in a tow company’s lot for nine months. Plaintiff Grey Barreda alleged that defendant Handy’s Service Center (a towing and storage operator) negligently failed to safeguard the vehicle and its contents after removing it from a repair garage as an “abandoned” car. The Superior Court (Chittenden Unit, Civil Division) conducted a bench trial and entered judgment for the plaintiff, awarding $2,380 for missing tools and equipment. Handy’s appealed, arguing primarily that the evidence was insufficient to establish that its negligence caused the loss and that plaintiff needed to prove the tow company or its employees actually took the property. Handy’s also raised additional arguments on appeal about bailment notice and valuation methodology.

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the trial court’s factual findings were sufficiently supported by credible evidence—including the owner’s testimony alone—and that the trial court properly analyzed the case under a negligence framework rather than requiring proof of intentional theft. Two other defense arguments (that the tow company had no notice of contents and that valuation was improperly based on replacement cost) were deemed unpreserved and not considered. The Court did not disturb the trial court’s conclusion that, because the statutory abandoned-vehicle procedures were not followed (23 V.S.A. §§ 2152(b)(2), 2153), the tow operator retained a duty of care.

Summary of the Opinion

Affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment awarding $2,380 in damages for missing personal property from the vehicle.
Sufficiency of evidence. Owner testimony that the items were in the vehicle and went missing while in defendant’s custody was enough; corroboration was not required.
Negligence, not intentional tort. Because the claim sounded in negligence, plaintiff did not need to prove defendant’s employees intentionally took the items.
Statutory framework in the background. The trial court found defendant failed to follow the abandoned-vehicle procedures under 23 V.S.A. §§ 2152(b)(2), 2153; as a result, it concluded the vehicle was not “abandoned” for immunity purposes and defendant owed a duty of care. Defendant did not challenge that conclusion on appeal, and the Supreme Court left it undisturbed.
Unpreserved arguments waived. The tow company’s arguments that (a) a bailment duty for interior contents requires prior notice from the vehicle owner, and (b) valuation improperly used replacement cost, were not preserved below and were not reviewed.

Factual and Procedural Background

Barreda owned a vehicle in which he sometimes lived. In early 2023 he had it towed to a garage for repairs. He did not authorize work, communication broke down, and the garage asked Handy’s to remove what it viewed as an abandoned vehicle. Handy’s towed the car to its secured lot. According to the trial court’s findings, Handy’s did not observe identifying information and did not notify the plaintiff. The vehicle remained in Handy’s lot for nine months. The lot was locked and gated, and two men lived in a trailer “as security,” but there was no evidence of proactive patrols, monitoring, or other security protocols.

Barreda periodically checked the car and noticed, beginning April 2023, that items were missing. He also received some items back from someone who claimed to work for Handy’s. Although defendant’s driver testified that photos were taken when the car was originally towed and again when later moved to a salvage yard (at which point a rear window was broken), Handy’s did not introduce the second set of photos at trial. The trial court held that defendant failed to comply with 23 V.S.A. §§ 2152(b)(2) and 2153 and was therefore not shielded from liability as if the vehicle were abandoned. It found negligence in the failure to exercise appropriate supervision over the lot and awarded $2,380 for specified tools and items proven to have been in the vehicle.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Soon Kwon v. Edson, 2019 VT 59, 210 Vt. 557. Cited for the deferential standard of review after a bench trial: the Supreme Court views factual findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and affirms if supported by any credible evidence, even if contradicted by substantial evidence.
Moyers v. Poon, 2021 VT 46, 215 Vt. 118. Reinforces that credibility determinations and weighing of evidence are the trial court’s province; appellate courts do not second-guess those assessments.
State v. Ben-Mont Corp., 163 Vt. 53 (1994). Cited on preservation: an issue must be presented with specificity and clarity to give the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on it.
In re White, 172 Vt. 335 (2001). Explains the purpose of preservation—to ensure the original forum can rule on an issue before appellate review.
Tufford v. Layman, 911 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table decision). Invoked by defendant for the proposition that a bailor must notify the bailee of contents of a vehicle to recover for their loss. The Vermont Supreme Court did not reach this argument because it was not preserved, and it did not adopt any such rule.
23 V.S.A. § 2152(b)(2). Authorizes landowners to remove “abandoned” vehicles and conditions a liability shield on immediate notice to local police with certain vehicle identifiers.
23 V.S.A. § 2153. Requires an application to the DMV for an abandoned-motor-vehicle certification within ninety days of discovery or relocation, initiating formal administrative processes for notice and disposition.

Legal Reasoning

1) Evidentiary sufficiency and deference to the trial court. The appeal centered on whether there was sufficient evidence that Handy’s negligence caused the loss. The Supreme Court reiterated the highly deferential standard governing bench trials. Plaintiff testified that:

He had specific items in the car when defendant took possession;
The items went missing while the car remained in defendant’s custody;
He provided descriptions and values for the enumerated items.

The tow driver corroborated that items were visible inside when the car was first towed. Although defendant attacked plaintiff’s credibility and emphasized the lack of corroborating documentation, the trial court credited plaintiff’s testimony. Under Soon Kwon and Moyers, that was dispositive on appeal: plaintiff’s testimony alone constituted “credible evidence” sufficient to sustain the findings.

2) Negligence versus intentional theft. Defendant argued that plaintiff had to show defendant’s employees actually took the items. The Court rejected this as a misstatement of the governing legal theory. Because plaintiff’s claim sounded in negligence, he needed to establish that defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding the vehicle and its contents, and that this failure resulted in the loss. Proof of an intentional act (e.g., theft by an employee) was not required.

3) Statutory context: abandoned-vehicle procedures and duty of care. The trial court concluded that Handy’s (or the garage, acting as landowner) did not follow 23 V.S.A. § 2152(b)(2) (immediate police notification with identifiers) and § 2153 (DMV certification within ninety days). It therefore treated the vehicle as not “abandoned” for purposes of the statutory liability shield and held that defendant owed an ongoing duty of care. On appeal, defendant did not challenge this statutory conclusion, so the Supreme Court left it undisturbed. The practical upshot is clear: where the statutory procedures for handling abandoned vehicles are not followed, a tow or storage operator should expect to remain subject to ordinary negligence duties regarding the vehicle and its contents.

4) Unpreserved issues not reached. Two appellate arguments were deemed waived for lack of preservation:

Bailment and notice of contents: Defendant argued that a vehicle owner must notify the bailee of interior contents to recover for their loss. The Supreme Court noted that defendant never presented this legal theory to the trial court; indeed, at trial defendant argued instead that its duty diminished over time as the vehicle appeared abandoned. The Court therefore declined to address the bailment-notice theory.
Valuation standard: Defendant’s claim that the trial court used replacement cost instead of a proper value measure was also not preserved, so the Court did not consider it.

Impact and Practical Significance

For tow and storage operators (and repair garages):

Compliance is critical. The civil-liability shield for removing “abandoned” vehicles under 23 V.S.A. § 2152(b)(2) presumes strict compliance with immediate police notification and provision of identifiers (plate, VIN if available, make/model/color). Failure to comply—and to seek DMV abandoned-vehicle certification under § 2153 within 90 days—can forfeit the immunity and leave the operator subject to negligence liability.
Security measures matter. A locked gate and passive “on-site presence” can be inadequate if there are no proactive steps (patrols, monitoring, access controls, documentation) to safeguard vehicles and their contents. Lax practices, especially over prolonged storage, increase exposure.
Document everything. Thorough, timestamped photos on intake and at every move, inventory practices when legally permissible, custody logs, and incident reports can be decisive. Failure to introduce available documentation (e.g., second-transfer photos) may undercut defenses.

For vehicle owners:

Owner testimony can be enough. In Vermont, in a bench trial, the owner’s credible testimony identifying items present and later missing can support a negligence judgment without further corroboration, especially where the custodian had control of the vehicle.
Keep records if possible. Although not strictly required, inventory lists, photos, and receipts strengthen valuation and causation.

For litigators:

Preserve issues. Arguments about bailment doctrines (notice of contents) and valuation metrics must be squarely raised below. The Supreme Court will not reach unpreserved theories.
Frame the claim correctly. If alleging negligence, proof of intentional misconduct is not required; focus on duty, breach (security measures), causation, and damages.

On precedential scope: Because this is a three-justice Entry Order, it is not precedential. Nonetheless, it signals how the Court is likely to analyze similar disputes: deference to trial factfinding; readiness to accept owner testimony as “credible evidence”; strict view of statutory compliance for “abandoned” vehicle handling; and insistence on preservation before considering new legal theories on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Negligence vs. intentional tort: Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care, resulting in harm. It does not require proof that the defendant intended the harm or took the property. Intentional torts (like conversion) require proof of deliberate interference with property.
Standard of review after a bench trial: On appeal, factual findings are upheld if any credible evidence supports them. The trial judge decides which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give the evidence. Appellate courts rarely disturb those determinations.
Preservation of issues: To argue a legal point on appeal, you must have presented it to the trial court with enough clarity to allow a ruling. New theories raised for the first time on appeal are typically waived.
Abandoned-vehicle statutes (23 V.S.A. §§ 2152, 2153): Vermont permits landowners to remove abandoned vehicles without civil liability if they immediately notify local police with identifying information and, within 90 days, pursue DMV certification for abandoned vehicles. Skipping these steps risks loss of the liability shield.
Bailment (general concept): When property is delivered to another for custody, a bailment may arise, imposing a duty of reasonable care on the custodian. Some jurisdictions require special notice to the bailee for unusual or valuable contents; Vermont did not decide that question here because the argument was not preserved.
Valuation measures: Courts may consider fair market value, replacement cost, or other measures depending on context. The Supreme Court did not decide the correct valuation standard here because the issue was not preserved.

Deeper Dive: How the Statutes Framed the Duty

Although the Supreme Court’s affirmance turned on evidentiary sufficiency and preservation, the trial court’s analysis was anchored in Vermont’s abandoned-vehicle scheme:

23 V.S.A. § 2152(b)(2): A landowner may remove an abandoned motor vehicle (directly or via a towing service) but must “immediately notify” the local police and provide available identifiers (plate, VIN, make, model, color). Compliance is tied to a statutory assurance of no civil liability to the vehicle owner for the act of removal.
23 V.S.A. § 2153: Within 90 days of discovery/relocation, the possessor (often the garage or towing service) must apply to the DMV for an abandoned-vehicle certification that triggers notice to owners and a regulated path to disposition.

The trial court concluded that noncompliance meant the defendant could not claim the “abandoned vehicle” status for immunity and thus owed a duty of care for reasonable safeguarding. On appeal, defendant did not contest that statutory conclusion. Practically, the opinion underscores that the statutory liability protection is conditional and procedural; operators who bypass the steps do so at their own risk.

Key Takeaways and Guidance

Owner testimony can carry the day. In negligence claims over missing vehicle contents, a plaintiff’s credible testimony can be sufficient to prove both presence and loss of items during the defendant’s custody.
Negligence duty persists absent statutory compliance. If the abandoned-vehicle protocols are not followed, tow/storage operators should assume they owe an ordinary duty of care to protect vehicles and their contents.
Don’t rely on new theories on appeal. Arguments about bailment notice requirements and valuation methods must be raised at trial, not saved for appeal.
Security must be proactive, not merely passive. Gates and on-site occupants, without patrols, monitoring, or documented controls, may be inadequate to discharge a duty of care—especially over months-long storage.
Document transfers and conditions meticulously. Intake and release photos, chain-of-custody logs, and incident records are essential to rebut claims of loss or damage; failure to produce known documentation can be damaging.

Unresolved and Open Questions

Scope of the bailment notice rule (if any) in Vermont. The Supreme Court did not adopt or reject a requirement that vehicle owners provide notice of interior contents to hold a custodian liable for their loss. That question remains open for a future, preserved case.
Valuation standard for lost contents. Whether Vermont courts should prefer fair market value over replacement cost (or some other measure) for personal property lost from vehicles under a custodian’s care remains undecided here.
Allocation of statutory duties between landowner and towing service. The trial court stated that either the garage or the towing service needed to pursue DMV certification within 90 days. The opinion does not explore the precise allocation of responsibility, which may depend on possession, contracts, and regulatory practice.

Conclusion

Although non-precedential, Grey Barreda v. Handy’s Service Center offers clear, practical direction. The Court reaffirms core appellate principles: deference to trial-level factfinding in bench trials; the sufficiency of credible owner testimony to establish loss; and strict enforcement of preservation rules. Substantively, the decision underscores that towing and storage operators who do not adhere to Vermont’s abandoned-vehicle procedures cannot rely on statutory immunity and remain subject to negligence duties to secure both the vehicle and its contents. For practitioners and industry actors alike, the message is straightforward: comply with the statutes, adopt proactive security measures, document condition and custody meticulously, and preserve legal arguments early—or be prepared to answer for losses under a standard negligence framework.