No Hypothetical Presentments: New Jersey Supreme Court Bars Pre-emptive Suppression of Non-Existent Grand Jury Reports

1. Introduction

In In Re the Matter Concerning the State Grand Jury (A-15-24, decided 16 June 2025), the Supreme Court of New Jersey confronted an unprecedented procedural posture: a trial court had refused to empanel a special grand jury and, in advance, declared that any anticipated presentment regarding clergy sexual abuse within New Jersey’s Catholic dioceses would be unlawful. The State appealed, advocating for the continuation of its Clergy Abuse Task Force investigation, while the Diocese of Camden opposed the State’s efforts, arguing that grand jury presentments must be confined to “public officials” and “public entities.”

The central question was thus narrow but fundamental: May a court halt a grand-jury investigation and suppress a hypothetical report before the grand jury convenes or drafts a single word? The high court, per Chief Justice Rabner, answered with a unanimous and resounding “No,” thereby clarifying the scope of Rule 3:6-9 and reinforcing grand-jury independence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Reversal and Remand: The Court reversed both the trial court and the Appellate Division, instructing that the State is entitled to proceed with its investigation and to empanel a special state grand jury.
No Presentment, No Review: The Court held that judicial review under Rule 3:6-9 is triggered only when an actual presentment—voted upon by twelve or more grand jurors—exists. Courts lack authority to adjudicate the legality of an anticipated report.
Assignment Judge’s Future Role: If a presentment ultimately issues, the assignment judge must then apply the Rule’s standards—striking portions only when “clearly and unquestionably contrary to the public good,” and doing so “sparingly.”
Irrelevant Considerations: The supposed administrative hardships (time, juror bias screening, cost) that motivated the trial court are not legitimate bases to deny the grand jury’s convening.
Open Questions Reserved: The Court declined to decide (a) whether allegations against clergy satisfy “public affairs or conditions,” (b) whether a future report might implicate Establishment Clause or Free Exercise concerns, and (c) whether a censure-like section directed at non-public actors would be permissible—all issues postponed until, and unless, an actual report materializes.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury (1952) – “Camden I”
- Grand-jury presentments may address any matter “affecting the morals, health, sanitation or general welfare.”
- Established the assignment judge’s gatekeeping role and power to strike partisan or baseless reports.
In re Presentments by Monmouth County Grand Jury (1957) – “Monmouth”
- Added that presentments should speak to “matters imminent and pertinent” to public welfare.
- Held that suppression authority must be exercised “sparingly.”
In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury (1961) – “Camden II”
- Refined standards when a presentment censures a public official; required conclusive proof and allowed the official to challenge.
- Text from Camden II became the backbone of current Rule 3:6-9(c).
Rule 3:6-9 (historical evolution 1953–1994)
- Codifies the procedures for presentments, reinforcing that judicial intervention occurs after a presentment is returned.
Miscellaneous References
- Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) – reiterated prosecutorial independence.
- State v. Bell, 241 N.J. 552 (2020) – grand-jury autonomy.

By synthesizing these authorities, the Court reasoned that neither precedent nor rule contemplates judicial prognostication over a non-existent report. Camden I, Monmouth, and Camden II all involved completed presentments, underlining that the assignment judge’s supervisory power is triggered only after the grand jury’s work product is in hand.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

The opinion follows a straightforward syllogism:

Rule 3:6-9’s procedural steps—return, examination, striking—logically presuppose an existing presentment.
Without such a presentment, a court lacks the concrete record necessary to evaluate partisanship, falsity, or relation to public affairs.
Therefore, any judicial action to suppress, strike, or pre-emptively limit a hypothetical presentment exceeds judicial authority and trenches on grand-jury independence guaranteed by N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 8.

The Court also emphasized the institutional harms that would flow from allowing trial courts to speculate: it would chill grand-jury investigations, invite strategic litigation to derail probes, and confuse the separation between investigative and judicial roles.

3.3 Potential Impact

Grand-Jury Independence Strengthened: Prosecutors and grand juries are shielded from premature judicial interference, ensuring investigations can unfold without defensive litigation tactics.
Scope of Presentments Clarified: Future litigants now know that challenges to a presentment’s substantive legality must await the report’s completion, narrowing procedural avenues for delay.
Clergy-Abuse Investigations: The ruling permits New Jersey’s Clergy Abuse Task Force to proceed similarly to the Pennsylvania model, potentially yielding reform recommendations and victim vindication.
Assignment Judges’ Workload: Courts must still perform the Rule 3:6-9 analysis once a report issues, but the decision clarifies timing and avoids speculative disputes.
First-Amendment Litigation Deferred: Religious-liberty claims may yet arise, but only upon a concrete record—thus aligning with federal ripeness doctrine.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Presentment: A formal report adopted by at least twelve grand jurors that (a) may describe wrongdoing or conditions warranting public attention, and (b) may recommend reforms. It is not an indictment and does not itself charge crimes.
Indictment: A formal accusation voted by a grand jury charging a person with a criminal offense, triggering criminal proceedings.
Assignment Judge: The chief judge of a vicinage responsible for administrative oversight, including receiving and reviewing grand-jury presentments under Rule 3:6-9.
Striking a Presentment: The assignment judge’s power to suppress all or parts of a presentment if it is false, partisan, or contrary to public good.
Censure of Public Official: A portion of a presentment criticizing a named public official; subject to heightened procedural safeguards, including the right to examine grand-jury minutes and request a hearing.
Ripeness: A justiciability doctrine requiring an actual, developed dispute—not hypothetical possibilities—before courts may adjudicate.

5. Conclusion

In Re the Matter Concerning the State Grand Jury firmly establishes that courts may not short-circuit the grand-jury process by ruling on phantom presentments. The decision revitalizes long-standing principles of grand-jury independence, clarifies the sequence imposed by Rule 3:6-9, and signals that only concrete reports—complete with evidentiary foundations—are ripe for judicial scrutiny. Practitioners should note the Court’s insistence that suppression authority be “sparingly exercised,” ensuring that grand-jury presentments continue to serve their historic function as the “voice of the community” on matters of public concern.

For prosecutors, defense counsel, and public entities alike, the message is clear: litigate presentments on a fully developed record, not in the abstract. In the realm of clergy-abuse investigations—and any future probe of systemic, non-governmental wrongdoing—the Court’s ruling removes a significant procedural hurdle, paving the way for transparent, evidence-driven public reporting.