No Habeas-by-Compassionate-Release: Second Circuit Affirms Denial Based on § 3553(a) and Individualized Circumstances in United States v. Andrews

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (summary order, nonprecedential)

Date: October 16, 2025

Case: United States v. Andrews, No. 23-8046

Panel: Cabranes, Menashi, Circuit Judges; Liman, District Judge (sitting by designation)

Introduction

This appeal arose from the denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (commonly known as “compassionate release”). Defendant-Appellant Lemrey (Lemrey) Andrews—convicted in 2003 on racketeering, murder-conspiracy in aid of racketeering, prostitution-related offenses, firearm possession in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and felon-in-possession—sought a reduced sentence based primarily on two developments:

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), which invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause (§ 924(c)(3)(B)), allegedly undermining the validity of his § 924(c) conviction; and
Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (including § 4B1.1 and § 4A1.3), which he argued would lower his criminal history category today and support relief under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), the 2023 “change in law” provision.

The district court denied the motion, concluding that (i) § 3582 is not a vehicle for challenging the validity of a conviction (that must be pursued under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), (ii) the cited Guidelines amendments did not create an extraordinary and compelling reason, and (iii) the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed strongly against release given the seriousness of the offenses and Andrews’s extensive disciplinary record. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial on multiple, independent grounds:

Guidelines amendments are not an extraordinary and compelling reason here. The panel agreed the amendments either did not change Andrews’s range or were not retroactive—and in any event did not establish an extraordinary and compelling reason under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).
Attacks on conviction validity are not cognizable in § 3582 motions. Relying on United States v. Fernandez, 104 F.4th 420 (2d Cir.), the Court held that a § 3582 motion cannot be used to collaterally attack a conviction (e.g., via Davis); such challenges must proceed under § 2255.
Independent, sufficient bases for denial: § 3553(a) and individualized circumstances. Even if the Davis-based argument could be considered, the Court affirmed because the district court permissibly denied relief based solely on (a) the § 3553(a) factors and (b) individualized circumstances required by § 1B1.13(b)(6).
Harmlessness. Any error regarding what counts as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” would be harmless because the record makes clear the district court would have denied relief in any event.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

United States v. Fernandez, 104 F.4th 420 (2d Cir.). The Second Circuit’s leading decision that “attacks on the validity of the defendant’s conviction [are] not cognizable on a section 3582 motion for compassionate release—either under the section 3553(a) prong or the extraordinary-and-compelling reasons prong.” The panel emphasized that “compassionate release is not a channel to habeas relief or an end run around the limitations of section 2255.” Notably, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Fernandez, 145 S. Ct. 2731 (2025), but the panel declined to wait for that outcome because independent grounds sufficed to affirm.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (2023 amendments). This provision permits courts, in some circumstances, to consider certain “change in the law” arguments as extraordinary and compelling reasons—except that nonretroactive Guidelines amendments are expressly excluded from qualifying as “change in the law” for this purpose. It also adds a requirement of “full consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.”
United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2021). District courts may deny compassionate release motions based solely on § 3553(a) considerations; no separate “extraordinary and compelling reason” analysis is required if § 3553(a) defeats the motion.
United States v. Roney, 833 F. App’x 850 (2d Cir. 2020). Emphasizes that an individualized determination addressing the § 3553(a) factors suffices.
United States v. Amato, 48 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2022). Abuse-of-discretion standard governs review of § 3582(c)(1)(A) denials.
United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2021). Questions of statutory interpretation embedded in the § 3582 analysis receive de novo review within the abuse-of-discretion framework.
Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2016); Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2009). Canonical articulation of abuse-of-discretion review.
United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008). Harmless error in sentencing appeals where the record shows the same result would follow.
United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2008). Addresses co-defendant sentencing disparity arguments under § 3553(a)(6), acknowledging that differential outcomes can be warranted by material differences in culpability/procedural posture.
United States v. Booker, 540 U.S. 220 (2005); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005). Historical backdrop to Andrews’s earlier post-Booker review and re-sentencing posture.
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019). Invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, spawning later disputes over whether convictions rest on the elements clause or the invalidated residual clause—and how to litigate such claims.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in three principal steps.

1) Guidelines amendments do not carry the day. Andrews argued that changes to the Guidelines—including to § 4B1.1 and § 4A1.3—would reduce his criminal history calculation today and that such “change in law” supports relief under § 1B1.13(b)(6). The panel noted two problems:

Nonretroactivity and text. Section 1B1.13(b)(6) allows courts to consider changes in law as extraordinary and compelling reasons, but it expressly excludes nonretroactive Guidelines amendments from that category. The district court therefore did not err in rejecting reliance on such amendments as extraordinary and compelling.
No consequential range change. The district court found the cited amendments either did not affect Andrews’s range or were not retroactive—so even assuming arguendo they could be considered, they were not extraordinary and compelling in this case.

2) Fernandez forecloses using § 3582 to attack conviction validity. Andrews’s principal claim was that Davis rendered his § 924(c) conviction invalid, and that this invalidity should be treated as an extraordinary and compelling reason. The panel held that such “validity” attacks are not cognizable in compassionate release proceedings. Those arguments belong in a § 2255 motion. The Court’s language is categorical: “all claims cognizable under section 2255 must be brought under section 2255,” and “compassionate release is not a channel to habeas relief.”

3) Independent bases: § 3553(a) and individualized circumstances warrant denial regardless. The panel emphasized that it could affirm on grounds independent of Fernandez:

§ 3553(a) factors. District courts may deny relief based solely on § 3553(a). Here, the district court reasonably weighed the nature and circumstances of the offenses (including conspiracy to murder, a violent and coercive interstate prostitution enterprise, and other racketeering conduct), the need to protect the public, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities. It also noted Andrews’s 352-month sentence was originally below the Guidelines and remains within the applicable range even without the § 924(c) count—undercutting claims of “gross disparity.”
Individualized circumstances under § 1B1.13(b)(6). Even where a “change in the law” could establish an extraordinary and compelling reason (especially where it creates a “gross disparity”), § 1B1.13(b)(6) requires full consideration of individualized circumstances. The district court did that—recounting Andrews’s very serious post-conviction disciplinary record: approximately 108 infractions, including 39 involving physical aggression or sexual misconduct, five incidents of indecent exposure to female staff, and three involving dangerous weapons. This history strongly supported denial.
Co-defendant disparity argument rejected. Andrews invoked § 3553(a)(6), pointing to co-defendant Gary Jackson’s successful § 2255 resentencing. The district court reasonably found the situations materially different: Jackson filed a timely § 2255 to vacate his § 924(c) conviction, had a less troubling disciplinary record, was convicted of less serious crimes, and—unlike Andrews—was not convicted of a substantive RICO count or involvement in the Bloods’ prostitution business. The resulting disparity was not “unwarranted.”

Harmless error. The panel added that even if there were any error in the extraordinary-and-compelling analysis (e.g., whether to consider the Davis point), the denial would stand because the district court clearly would have reached the same result under § 3553(a) and the individualized circumstances requirement. That makes any error harmless under Jass/Cavera.

Impact and Practical Implications

Within the Second Circuit (pending Supreme Court review in Fernandez):

No collateral attacks via § 3582. Defendants cannot use compassionate release to challenge the legality of their convictions (including via Davis). Such claims must be pursued under § 2255, with its gatekeeping and timeliness requirements.
§ 3553(a) can be dispositive. District courts may deny relief solely by weighing § 3553(a) factors. Robust evidence of rehabilitation and a clean disciplinary record are critically important; without them, § 3553(a) will often dominate.
Change-in-law claims under § 1B1.13(b)(6) are cabined. The provision allows some nonretroactive changes in law (not nonretroactive Guidelines amendments) to be considered as extraordinary reasons, but only after full individualized assessment and typically where a “gross disparity” exists.
Guidelines amendments are limited as extraordinary reasons. Nonretroactive Guidelines changes do not qualify as “change in the law” under § 1B1.13(b)(6). And even arguendo, courts retain broad discretion to say they are not extraordinary in a given case.
Co-defendant disparity arguments require apples-to-apples comparisons. Material differences in convictions, procedural posture (e.g., timely § 2255 relief), and prison conduct can justify different outcomes without creating “unwarranted” disparity.
Harmless error safety valve. Appellate courts may affirm where the record shows a denial would have issued regardless of any mistake about “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”

Looking ahead to the Supreme Court’s review in Fernandez: If the Supreme Court narrows the Fernandez bar, some “validity” arguments may become cognizable under § 3582 in limited ways. Even then, this summary order underscores that defendants would still face the independent hurdle of § 3553(a) and individualized circumstances. In other words, demonstrating a change in law is rarely sufficient; courts will deny where public-safety, deterrence, seriousness-of-offense, and prison conduct weigh against release.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate release (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)): Lets a court reduce a sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” subject to consideration of § 3553(a) factors.
§ 3553(a) factors: Statutory sentencing considerations such as offense seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, defendant’s history and characteristics, and avoidance of unwarranted disparities.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6): A 2023 Guideline policy statement recognizing that certain “changes in the law” (excluding nonretroactive Guidelines amendments) may constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons, but only after fully considering individualized circumstances, and especially where there is a “gross disparity” between the sentence imposed and what would be imposed today.
Nonretroactive Guideline amendments: Changes to the Guidelines that do not apply to past sentences. Under § 1B1.13(b)(6), such amendments generally cannot be used as the “change in the law” to justify compassionate release.
§ 924(c) and Davis: § 924(c) penalizes using or carrying a firearm during a “crime of violence.” Davis struck down the statute’s “residual clause,” leading some defendants to argue their § 924(c) convictions are invalid if only that clause supported the predicate; the vehicle to litigate such claims is generally § 2255, not § 3582.
§ 2255 vs. § 3582: Section 2255 is the primary vehicle to attack the legality of a conviction or sentence (e.g., constitutional error). Section 3582 is for sentence modifications based on extraordinary and compelling reasons and does not authorize collateral attacks on convictions.
Harmless error in sentencing appeals: If the record shows the same result would have occurred, appellate courts may affirm despite a possible error.

Conclusion

Although issued as a nonprecedential summary order, United States v. Andrews offers clear guidance on current Second Circuit practice. The Court reaffirmed three practical constraints on compassionate release: (1) defendants cannot use § 3582 as a substitute for habeas (§ 2255) to challenge conviction validity; (2) nonretroactive Guidelines amendments are not “changes in the law” that can, by themselves, supply extraordinary and compelling reasons under § 1B1.13(b)(6); and (3) district courts may deny relief based solely on § 3553(a) and individualized circumstances, which will often be decisive when the original crimes are serious and the post-sentencing conduct reflects poor institutional behavior. The panel further signaled that even if ongoing Supreme Court review in Fernandez changes the cognizability of some “validity” arguments under § 3582, many motions will still fail on independent § 3553(a) and individualized grounds. For practitioners, Andrews underscores the premium on developing robust rehabilitation records, carefully distinguishing any co-defendant comparisons, and selecting the correct procedural vehicle for conviction-based challenges.