No Guesswork Under Rule 1006 and “Why” Matters in Concealment Laundering: The Fifth Circuit’s Multifaceted Ruling in United States v. McGuire

Introduction

In United States v. McGuire (consolidated with appeals by Lala, Ragle, Sargent, and Roberts), the Fifth Circuit delivered a sweeping opinion that touches nearly every stage of a complex, multi-state marijuana-trafficking prosecution—from evidentiary admissibility and standards of review, to sentencing methodology, money-laundering theories, indictment sufficiency for a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE), Alleyne jury-fact requirements for firearm enhancements, and even clerical corrections under Rule 36.

The case arises from a large marijuana distribution network that purchased cannabis (and THC cartridges/edibles) from legal markets in California and Oregon and transported it in vans to customers across twenty-one states, using encrypted Signal messages and cash transactions outside the banking system. The five appellants (Eric Roberts, Ronald McGuire, Lowell Sargent, Christopher Ragle, and Philip Lala) were tried jointly; eight co-defendants testified. All five were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to commit money laundering, among individual counts. On appeal, they mounted nine principal challenges.

The Court affirmed most convictions but vacated portions of sentencing and ordered corrections to the judgments and presentence reports (PSRs). The opinion’s core contributions are twofold:

• A bright-line warning against Rule 1006 “summary” charts that fill evidentiary gaps with assumptions and averages to prove drug quantity elements; and
• A clarification that concealment money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) turns on why—not merely how—funds are moved, reaffirming Cuellar’s purpose-based test, while sustaining promotional money laundering conspiracy under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).

Summary of the Judgment

The Court’s holdings, distilled:

• Rule 1006 Summary Chart Error:
  • The government’s Rule 1006 spreadsheet (Exhibit 190) was admitted in error under plain-error review. It used a single “average” trip weight (506 pounds) to fill in unknown quantities and thereby “manufactured” proof of drug quantity. While the error did not undermine the drug-conspiracy convictions themselves, it affected sentencing exposure tied to quantity findings.
  • Remedy: The Court remanded for resentencing under the default marijuana penalty provision, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), where applicable. It specifically vacated McGuire’s drug sentence for a full drug-quantity reassessment and default-penalty resentencing; the opinion’s body strongly indicates the same default-penalty resentencing for Sargent (see analysis below on an apparent tension in the conclusion).
• Drug Quantity at Sentencing:
  • McGuire: PSR reliance on the flawed Exhibit 190 lacked sufficient indicia of reliability; sentence vacated and remanded for fresh drug-quantity findings.
  • Sargent: The district court’s drug-quantity reliance was affirmed in light of counsel’s concessions about foreseeability; however, the panel elsewhere directs resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(D) after the Rule 1006 error—an internal tension discussed below.
  • Lala: Any error was harmless; the district court announced it would impose the same sentence regardless of quantity.
• Money Laundering:
  • Concealment theory (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)): Insufficient as a matter of law on this record under Cuellar—using cash and secrecy to avoid detection shows “how,” not the “why” required for concealment laundering.
  • Promotional theory (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)): Sufficient; payments to drivers and reinvestment in drug purchases supported conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering.
  • Clerical errors: The judgments and PSRs erroneously referenced international money laundering (§ 1956(a)(2)) theories that were not submitted to the jury; remanded for Rule 36 corrections to reflect only domestic promotional money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (with concealment insufficient on this record).
• CCE (21 U.S.C. § 848):
  • The indictment was deficient because it did not specify three predicate CSA violations for the “continuing series.” The error was deemed harmless, however, given trial evidence and grand-jury probable cause considerations.
• Firearm Sentencing (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)):
  • Alleyne error: The short-barreled-rifle fact that increased the mandatory minimum was not submitted to the jury. Roberts’s § 924(c) sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing.
• Venue:
  • Affirmed; conspiracy venue is broad and may be premised on a co-conspirator’s acts in the district.

Case disposition (as summarized by the Court):

• McGuire: Convictions affirmed; drug sentence vacated; remanded for resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(D) and for clerical corrections.
• Lala: Money-laundering conviction and sentence affirmed.
• Ragle: Money-laundering conviction affirmed; remanded for clerical corrections.
• Sargent: Convictions affirmed; sentence affirmed; remanded for clerical corrections.
• Roberts: Money-laundering and CCE convictions and venue affirmed; § 924(c) sentence vacated; remanded for firearm resentencing and clerical corrections.

Notably, the body of the opinion indicates that Sargent, like McGuire, should be resentenced under the default penalty provision because the Rule 1006 error affected the drug-quantity finding that triggered the higher statutory range, whereas the concluding paragraph states Sargent’s drug sentence is affirmed. This apparent inconsistency is addressed in the Analysis and Impact sections.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

The Court anchored its evidentiary ruling on Rule 1006 in a line of Fifth Circuit decisions requiring accuracy and non-argumentative presentation for summary charts:

• United States v. Spalding; United States v. Bishop; United States v. Smyth; United States v. Ocampo‑Vergara; United States v. Hart; United States v. Taylor. These cases collectively caution that Rule 1006 charts cannot be used to prove elements that the government has not established by independent evidence; charts may not assume what must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
• United States v. Scales (6th Cir.) emphasized the need for accuracy, authenticity, and proper introduction of Rule 1006 summaries.
• On preservation and plain-error review, the Court drew on United States v. Portillo; Fed. R. Evid. 103; Puckett v. United States; and United States v. Olano, insisting that a party must state the specific ground for objection and that plain error requires a clear, outcome-affecting mistake that undermines the fairness and integrity of proceedings.

On money laundering:

• Cuellar v. United States: The Supreme Court’s seminal “why, not how” directive on § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) concealment laundering controlled. Merely transporting cash secretly to avoid detection is insufficient; concealment must be the purpose of the transaction.
• United States v. Brown (5th Cir. 2008): Concealment laundering exists when steps make it harder to trace funds—e.g., structured deposits below thresholds that trigger CTRs. The government had no comparable proof here.
• United States v. Stanford; United States v. Trejo; United States v. Wilson; United States v. Lozano; United States v. Puig‑Infante; United States v. Cano‑Guel: These decisions established the elements of promotional money laundering, defined “financial transaction” and “disposition,” permitted proof of specific intent through awareness of the operation’s workings, and recognized that paying co-conspirators and re‑upping inventory promote the unlawful activity.

On sentencing and PSR reliability:

• United States v. Alford; United States v. Rudolph; United States v. Melendez; United States v. Harris: A PSR must rest on facts with “sufficient indicia of reliability”; “mere inclusion” in a PSR does not bootstrap unreliable facts into reliable ones, especially when objections alert the court to reliability concerns.
• United States v. Dinh; United States v. Gentry; U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5: Extrapolations can be permissible at sentencing under a preponderance standard when tied to reliable data (e.g., lab samples), a contrast that underscored why the government’s average-based extrapolation without method was unacceptable here.
• U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 and related Fifth Circuit authority confirm that in conspiracy cases a defendant’s base offense level includes relevant conduct that was within the scope of jointly undertaken activity, in furtherance of it, and reasonably foreseeable.

On the CCE count:

• Richardson v. United States: The “continuing series of violations” are elements, and a jury must unanimously agree on which violations comprise the series.
• Russell v. United States; United States v. Davis; Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c): Indictments must “fully, directly, and expressly” set forth all elements, with enough factual specificity to give notice and allow double-jeopardy protection.
• United States v. Dentler; United States v. Robinson; United States v. Suarez; United States v. Adams: These cases inform the harmless error framework for indictment defects—assessing notice and loss of grand jury rights, and whether a rational grand jury would have indicted on the missing element.

On firearm sentencing:

• Alleyne v. United States: Any fact that increases a mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to the jury; failure to do so requires resentencing.

On venue:

• United States v. Romans; United States v. Thomas; 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a): Conspiracy venue is broad; acts by any co-conspirator in the district suffice.

Legal Reasoning

1) Rule 1006 Summary Chart: Accuracy Is Non‑Negotiable

The government’s Exhibit 190 purported to summarize voluminous Signal messages by deriving an “average trip weight” of 506 pounds and applying it across numerous “unknown” trips to compute drug quantities by driver. The Court found multiple defects:

• No explanation of how “trips” were formed or attributed to specific drivers.
• Mathematical errors in sub-calculations and exclusion of known data from the average.
• Duplication risks (counting both pickups and deliveries) inflating totals.
• High variance in delivery weights (the Court even calculated a standard deviation near 1,000 pounds), making a single average a hazardous basis for individualized extrapolation.
• Critically, “unknown” quantities were not just summarized—they were replaced with an average and treated as proof. The Court characterized these as “guesstimates” and “manufactured evidence.”

Under Rule 1006, summaries may “prove the content” of voluminous records only if they accurately reflect competent underlying evidence. They cannot assume facts that the government is required to prove. Elevating guesswork to “evidence” was plain error that affected substantial rights—most acutely at sentencing, where statutory ranges depend on jury-verified quantities.

Remedy: The Court preserved the convictions but remanded for resentencing under the default marijuana penalty (§ 841(b)(1)(D)) where the quantity finding was tainted, and separately vacated McGuire’s Guidelines-based sentence because the PSR’s adoption of the flawed chart lacked reliability.

2) Money Laundering: Concealment Requires Purpose; Promotional Requires Intent

On concealment (§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)), the Court followed Cuellar: secretive means of transporting cash (avoiding banks; using cash; stashing funds) show how the money was moved, not that the transactions were designed to conceal the nature, source, location, ownership, or control of the funds. Unlike Brown, where structured deposits and routing through accounts obscured origins, here the government’s theory stopped at secrecy in transportation. That is insufficient as a matter of law for concealment.

On promotional (§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)), the proof was sufficient: drivers delivered cash proceeds “to the care or possession of” Roberts (a “financial transaction” via disposition), were paid from drug proceeds, and profits were used to continue purchasing marijuana. Knowledge of the operation’s workings and the repeat-reinvest cycle supported specific intent to promote.

3) Sentencing: Reliability of the PSR and the Default Penalty Rule

The Court reaffirmed that while PSRs generally carry indicia of reliability, sentencing findings must rest on accurate facts. Where the PSR simply recites the Rule 1006 chart’s speculative extrapolations, and the defense lodges reliability objections, blind adoption is clear error. The Court vacated McGuire’s sentence and remanded for a new, reliable drug-quantity calculation. For Sargent, counsel’s concessions on foreseeability supported the district court’s quantity findings for Guidelines purposes; for Lala, any error was harmless because the court would have imposed the same sentence.

Separately, because the jury’s 1,000‑kg finding rested in part on the tainted chart, the statutory range linked to that quantity could not stand for those who preserved the Rule 1006 error. The Court therefore directed resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(D) (the default penalty when no jury-proven quantity governs).

4) CCE Indictment: Elements Must Be Charged—But Harmless Here

A CCE requires a “continuing series” of three drug felonies. Under Richardson, those violations are elements. The indictment here cited the conspiracy in Count 1 and vaguely referenced a “continuing series,” but it did not specify the additional predicate violations. That is an elemental omission.

Applying Dentler/Robinson/Suarez, the Court deemed the error harmless: given the trial record, a rational grand jury would have found probable cause on the missing element. Although notice was not ideal (the government identified additional predicates only late in the process), Roberts was not “blindsided” in a way that would have altered his defense, and the trial record substantially overlapped with the proof of potential predicate offenses (e.g., substantive § 841 and § 843(b) violations).

5) Alleyne Error on Firearm Sentencing

Because the short-barrel fact that raised Roberts’s § 924(c) mandatory minimum was not submitted to the jury, Alleyne required vacatur of that sentence and remand.

6) Clerical Errors: Domestic, Not International Money Laundering

The jury was instructed only on domestic promotional and domestic concealment theories; yet the judgments and PSRs referenced international money laundering. The Court remanded for Rule 36 corrections to reflect only § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (domestic promotional) as the underlying substantive theory for the § 1956(h) conspiracy.

Impact

The opinion has immediate and practical implications across several areas.

• Rule 1006 in Criminal Trials:
  • Summary charts must summarize—accurately. They cannot be used as a backdoor to prove an element (such as drug quantity) by assumptions, averages, or extrapolation untethered to explained, reliable methodology. Expect heightened district court gatekeeping and more robust Daubert-like scrutiny where charts embed analytic steps.
  • Prosecutors should avoid filling “unknown” values with group averages; if extrapolation is used at sentencing, spell out the method, justify with reliable data, and consider medians or driver-specific distributions where variance is high.
• Drug-Quantity Findings and Statutory Ranges:
  • Where jury quantity findings are materially influenced by inadmissible charts, defendants may be resentenced under § 841(b)(1)(D) absent a valid, jury-proven quantity. This curtails exposure to 10‑year mandatory minimums (and higher ranges) in marijuana cases.
• Money Laundering Charging Strategy:
  • Cuellar is alive and well: the government must prove that concealment was an intended purpose of the transaction—secrecy in transport is not enough. By contrast, promotional conspiracy remains comparatively easier to sustain: paying participants and using proceeds to re-up inventory satisfies intent to promote.
  • Clerical precision matters. When counts include multiple theories, judgments and PSRs must mirror what was actually submitted to and found by the jury.
• Indictment Drafting for CCE:
  • List or incorporate the three predicate drug felonies; do not rely on a generic “continuing series” clause. Even if a conviction survives on harmless error now, future panels may apply Dentler/Robinson more rigorously on notice or grand-jury grounds.
• Sentencing Practice:
  • PSR reliability is not pro forma. When defense objections flag reliability issues—particularly with government-created analytic exhibits—district courts should articulate why the data and method are reliable before adopting them.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 1006 Summary Chart:
  • A tool to present the gist of voluminous records. It is “evidence,” but only if it accurately reflects the underlying materials. It cannot plug evidentiary holes with assumptions or averages.
• Plain Error:
  • On appeal, a party who did not specifically preserve an argument must show a clear, obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness and integrity of proceedings.
• Default Penalty (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D)):
  • If no drug quantity is validly found by a jury, sentencing defaults to this lower range for marijuana, rather than higher quantity-driven ranges.
• PSR Reliability:
  • PSRs are influential but must be based on reliable facts. Courts cannot adopt PSR conclusions that rest on unvetted or speculative calculations.
• Concealment vs. Promotional Money Laundering:
  • Concealment asks whether the transaction’s purpose was to hide attributes of the money (source, owner, etc.). Promotional asks whether the transaction was intended to further the criminal enterprise (e.g., paying couriers, buying more drugs).
• CCE Predicates:
  • A CCE requires three separate CSA felonies. They are elements, must be specified or incorporated, and the jury must unanimously agree on them.
• Standard Deviation and Median:
  • When data vary widely, a single average can mislead. The median (the middle value) is less skewed by outliers, and large standard deviations warn against applying one-size-fits-all averages to individuals.
• Rule 36 Clerical Corrections:
  • A mechanism to correct judgment/PSR mismatches and similar record errors that reflect oversight rather than judicial intent.
• Alleyne Rule:
  • Any fact that increases a mandatory minimum (e.g., a short barrel) is an element that must go to the jury and be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

An Apparent Tension in the Disposition for Sargent

The opinion’s reasoning states that the Rule 1006 error warranted resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(D) where the jury’s quantity finding was tainted. In footnote 24, the Court explains that “there is no statutory minimum to the default penalty provision,” and implies Sargent’s sentence would be unaffected by a safety-valve dispute because the default penalty would apply. Yet, the concluding paragraph list affirms Sargent’s sentence.

How to read this:

• The body of the opinion supports remand for resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(D) for Sargent (consistent with McGuire), because the higher statutory range hinged on the flawed chart and plain-error analysis.
• The conclusion’s summary appears to conflict with that remedial logic. In practice, the mandate or subsequent district court proceedings may clarify whether Sargent’s sentence must be conformed to the default penalty. Practitioners should treat the Rule 1006 analysis as controlling on the substantive point and be prepared to seek resentencing relief consistent with the body of the opinion.

Conclusion

United States v. McGuire is a significant Fifth Circuit decision that reshapes how prosecutors and district courts may use Rule 1006 summaries in criminal trials, especially to prove drug quantities that drive statutory penalties. The Court’s message is unmistakable: summaries must summarize; they cannot supply proof by averages, “guesstimates,” or undisclosed methodologies. On money laundering, the opinion reinforces Cuellar’s distinction between how and why funds are moved—tightening the confines of concealment laundering—while confirming that routine payments and reinvestment can readily establish promotional money laundering conspiracy.

The ruling also sharpens best practices for CCE indictments (charge or incorporate the three predicates explicitly), for PSR reliability (do not adopt unexamined, error-ridden analytics), for Alleyne compliance (submit mandatory-minimum facts to the jury), and for record accuracy (fix judgment/PSR misreferences via Rule 36).

Key takeaways:

• Rule 1006 charts must be accurate and non-argumentative; they cannot fill evidentiary gaps with conjecture.
• When flawed charts infect jury quantity findings, resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(D) may be required.
• Concealment laundering requires concealment as the purpose of the transaction; secrecy alone is not enough. Promotional laundering remains robust where proceeds pay participants or finance more crime.
• CCE counts should enumerate or incorporate the three predicate felonies to satisfy Richardson and give fair notice.
• PSRs need reliable underpinnings; courts should not adopt speculative math.
• Mandatory-minimum-enhancing facts must go to the jury under Alleyne.
• Judgments and PSRs must match the theories submitted and found by the jury; Rule 36 is the tool to correct misalignments.

In sum, the Fifth Circuit has drawn crisp lines around evidentiary summaries and money-laundering theories, favoring methodological rigor, transparent charging, and reliable sentencing foundations. The opinion will influence how complex narcotics cases are tried, proved, and sentenced throughout the Circuit—and likely beyond.