Introduction

In Matter of Caruso (Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist.–Commissioner of Labor), 2025 NY Slip Op 05132 (3d Dept Sept. 25, 2025), the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (UIAB) and clarified the contours of “reasonable assurance” under Labor Law § 590(10) as it applies to per diem substitute teachers. The court held that a school district’s letter promising continued substitute opportunities “under substantially the same economic terms and conditions” and expected earnings “no less than 90%” of the prior year constitutes reasonable assurance—even absent any guarantee of a specific number of days, priority in assignment, or granular statistical forecasts.

The case arises at the intersection of unemployment insurance eligibility and the cyclical nature of K–12 employment. The claimant, Charlene M. Caruso, a long-serving per diem substitute teacher, received a Letter of Assurance in June 2023 for the 2023–2024 school year. Although she acknowledged the letter and remained on the substitute list, she sought benefits for the summer break. The Department of Labor initially denied benefits, but an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the UIAB found the letter insufficient. On the district’s appeal, the Third Department reversed, emphasizing that reasonable assurance is not a guarantee and that the Board’s contrary approach lacked substantial evidentiary support.

Parties: - Appellant: Shenendehowa Central School District - Respondent Claimant: Charlene M. Caruso - Respondent: Commissioner of Labor - Amicus: New York State School Boards Association, Inc.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department, per Ceresia, J., held that the UIAB’s determination granting Caruso benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. The court found:

• Labor Law § 590(10) precludes benefits between successive academic years if the claimant—here, a per diem substitute teacher—has received “reasonable assurance” of continued employment.
• “Reasonable assurance” does not require a guarantee of employment or a promise of a specific number of days; the established benchmark is whether substantially the same economic terms will apply such that expected earnings will be at least 90% of the prior year.
• The district’s June 1, 2023 Letter of Assurance, stating continued opportunities in the “same capacity,” under “substantially the same” economic terms, and expected earnings “no less than 90%” of the prior year, satisfied the standard.
• Record evidence (unchanged budgetary/enrollment conditions, daily need for substitutes, consistent assignment system) provided a good-faith basis for the assurance; the Board misread testimony and improperly discounted competent witness evidence.
• The Board erred by effectively demanding guarantees, by treating claimant’s lack of assignment priority as disqualifying (when it was unchanged from the prior year), and by insisting on unknowable specifics such as the exact number of openings.

Disposition: Decision reversed, without costs, and matter remitted to the UIAB for proceedings consistent with the court’s ruling (i.e., applying the reasonable-assurance finding).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Matter of Jensen (Commissioner of Labor), 233 AD3d 1211 (3d Dept 2024): The court quotes Jensen for two key propositions: (1) professional employees of educational institutions are precluded from between-terms benefits when they have reasonable assurance, and (2) the Board’s reasonable-assurance findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Jensen also contributes the “not illusory” framing—if the record provides no reason to believe the employer’s assurances were illusory, the assurance stands. Caruso leans on Jensen to conclude the district’s assurance was real and supported by the record.
• Matter of Felipe (New York City Sch. Dist.–Commissioner of Labor), 175 AD3d 1698 (3d Dept 2019): Felipe articulates the now-settled 90% earnings benchmark: reasonable assurance exists when substantially the same economic terms will apply such that the claimant will receive at least 90% of prior earnings. Caruso reiterates and applies this benchmark to a per diem substitute with a letter explicitly invoking the 90% threshold.
• Matter of Ficalora (Commissioner of Labor), 233 AD3d 1215 (3d Dept 2024): Confirms that whether reasonable assurance was received is a factual question for the Board, but subject to substantial evidence review. Caruso applies this standard to scrutinize and ultimately reject the Board’s determination as lacking substantial evidence.
• Matter of Enman (New York City Dept. of Educ.–Commissioner of Labor), 161 AD3d 1368 (3d Dept 2018), lv denied 32 NY3d 902: A linchpin case: a reasonable assurance is not a guarantee. Caruso quotes Enman to fault the Board for effectively imposing a guarantee requirement inconsistent with statute and case law. This principle is central to the reversal.
• Matter of Alongi (City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y.–Commissioner of Labor), 227 AD3d 1341 (3d Dept 2024): Aligns with Enman in rejecting a guarantee requirement and supports the sufficiency of a 90% earnings assurance under substantially similar conditions. Caruso uses Alongi to reinforce that letters promising comparable terms meet the standard without quantified day-counts.
• Matter of Gracy (Commissioner of Labor), 182 AD3d 871 (3d Dept 2020); Matter of Barnett (Broome County Community Coll.–Commissioner of Labor), 182 AD3d 763 (3d Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 1077; Matter of Cieszkowska (Commissioner of Labor), 155 AD3d 1502 (3d Dept 2017): These decisions collectively affirm that reasonable assurance rests on comparability of economic terms and the employer’s good-faith, evidence-based projection of continued need. Caruso places itself squarely within this line, emphasizing that variables inherent to substitute teaching do not undermine a valid assurance.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning turns on three interlocking elements: (1) the statutory standard and settled 90% benchmark; (2) the evidentiary sufficiency under substantial-evidence review; and (3) rejection of the Board’s legal errors in demanding guarantees and misreading the record.

1) The governing standard: reasonable assurance without guarantees

Labor Law § 590(10) reflects the Legislature’s policy that professional employees of educational institutions, including per diem substitutes, are not eligible for unemployment insurance during breaks between academic years if they have received a “reasonable assurance” of continued employment. Decisional law translates “reasonable assurance” into a forward-looking comparison: the employer must represent that the claimant can expect continued work under substantially the same economic terms and conditions, measured by whether expected earnings will be at least 90% of the prior period’s earnings, assuming comparable availability. The Third Department confirms that this is not a promise of a specific workload or earnings; it is a reasonable, good-faith projection—not a guarantee.

2) The letter and the record met the standard

The district’s Letter of Assurance did the heavy lifting. It:

• Re-placed Caruso on the same automated assignment registry and confirmed the same assignment process;
• Expressly stated continued opportunities “in the same capacity” and “under substantially the same economic terms and conditions”; and
• Committed that expected earnings would be “no less than 90%” of the prior year if availability remained the same.

The district bolstered the letter with testimony: the 2023–2024 year had a similar budget, no teacher layoffs, no significant enrollment changes, 186 school days (slightly more than the prior 184), and an ongoing daily need for substitutes. The witness estimated one or two elementary openings a day that Caruso—given her availability and interest—could expect to fill. This evidence provided a good-faith basis for the assurance.

The fact that the letter did not mention a pay increase implemented at the start of 2023–2024 did not undermine assurance; if anything, it made the economic comparability more favorable to the claimant than represented.

3) The Board’s errors and the court’s correction

• Improper “guarantee” requirement: The Board treated the absence of a promise of a specific number of days or guaranteed work as fatal. The court, invoking Enman and Alongi, held this was legal error: reasonable assurance does not contemplate guarantees, especially given the inherently variable nature of substitute demand (absences, assignments, coverage patterns).
• Misreading and discounting competent testimony: The Board said the human resources specialist lacked specific knowledge of budget/enrollment and was incompetent to testify about the registry without detailed training credentials. The record contradicted this: she had overseen the registry since January 2022, had training and operational familiarity, and provided concrete data and demonstrations of system use. The court expressly rejected the Board’s competency finding as unsupported.
• Overemphasis on unknowable specifics and priority status: The Board viewed as “significant” that the number of openings “is not known” and that Caruso, being uncertified, lacked priority in automated assignment. The court explained that those circumstances were the same as the prior year—yet Caruso completed 169 assignments—and therefore did not undermine comparability. Moreover, demanding precise counts of future openings or individualized guarantees misconceives the assurance standard.
• Data granularity not required: The absence of proof about whether multiple registry calls occurred on a single day or whether prior assignments were full or half days does not defeat reasonable assurance where the aggregate expectation—same capacity, same assignment method, same economic terms, 90% earnings—has a good-faith evidentiary basis.

4) Substantial evidence review

Applying substantial evidence review, the court concluded that the UIAB’s determination lacked adequate support. The letter’s plain assurances, the district’s systemic continuity, and the unrefuted testimony about ongoing need and stable conditions collectively established reasonable assurance. The record, as in Jensen, gave “no reason to believe” the employer’s assurances were illusory. Consequently, reversal and remittal were required.

Impact

Caruso does not announce a brand-new doctrine; rather, it meaningfully clarifies and strengthens the practical application of the existing reasonable-assurance standard to per diem substitute teachers.

• For school districts and educational employers:
  • Standardized Letters of Assurance that explicitly reference “same capacity,” “substantially the same economic terms and conditions,” and “no less than 90% of prior earnings” are legally robust.
  • No obligation to guarantee days, quantify precise openings, or provide priority status to substitutes to establish reasonable assurance.
  • Employers should be prepared to show a good-faith basis: stable budgets/enrollment, no systemic reductions, historical demand, and assignment practices unchanged.
  • Witness competency: A knowledgeable HR professional overseeing the assignment system can provide competent testimony without exhaustive training histories; operational familiarity and data-backed testimony suffice.
• For claimants (per diem substitutes):
  • Receipt of a properly framed assurance letter will generally preclude between-terms benefits absent a contrary showing.
  • To rebut reasonable assurance, claimants must present evidence that assurances are not made in good faith or are illusory—e.g., documented budget cuts, layoffs, program closures, significant enrollment declines, material changes to assignment systems, or removed access to the registry.
  • Arguments based solely on the employer’s inability to guarantee specific days or the inherent variability of substitute work are unlikely to succeed.
• For the UIAB and DOL adjudicators:
  • Caruso cautions against imposing a de facto guarantee requirement or demanding impracticable forecasts of substitute demand.
  • When letters state the 90% benchmark and the record reflects stable institutional conditions, a reasonable-assurance finding will likely be compelled.
• Drafting implications:
  • Unqualified assurances are best. The court noted the district’s assurance “without qualification.” While non-committal caveats may not automatically defeat reasonable assurance, they invite litigation risk.
  • Explicitly tie the 90% expectation to unchanged availability; that is a recognized comparator in the case law.
  • Deliver assurances before the break between terms (here, June 1 for a June end-of-year), aligning with statutory timing expectations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Reasonable assurance (Labor Law § 590(10)): A forward-looking promise by an educational employer that the employee will have an opportunity to work in the next academic period on substantially the same economic terms—commonly operationalized as an expectation of at least 90% of the prior year’s earnings if the employee’s availability is comparable. It is not a guarantee of specific days or assignments.
• Between successive academic years: The summer or inter-term break separating school years or terms. Benefits are barred during this period if reasonable assurance exists.
• Professional employed by an educational institution: Includes per diem substitute teachers. The statute’s exclusion is not limited to full-time, salaried teachers.
• Substantial evidence: A deferential review standard: whether there is relevant proof that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. Courts do not re-weigh evidence but will reverse when the Board’s determination lacks such support or is based on legal error.
• Good-faith basis: The employer must have a reasonable, evidence-grounded basis for its assurance (e.g., stable budgets, enrollment, historical need). The showing is practical, not exact.
• Automated assignment registry: Systems used by districts (often vendor platforms) to fill substitute openings. Continuity of registry access and process is evidence of “same capacity” and conditions.

Key Takeaways

• A letter promising continued substitute opportunities “in the same capacity,” under “substantially the same economic terms,” with expected earnings “no less than 90%” of the prior year, generally satisfies reasonable assurance.
• Reasonable assurance is not a guarantee. Employers need not promise specific day counts, nor show priority status for substitutes.
• Stable budgets, enrollment, and assignment practices, plus a documented ongoing need for substitutes, supply the good-faith evidentiary foundation.
• The UIAB may not disregard competent operational testimony based on hyper-technical training inquiries where the record shows knowledge and oversight.
• For claimants, successful challenges require concrete evidence that the assurance is illusory (e.g., cuts, layoffs, program closures, loss of registry access), not mere variability inherent in substitute work.

Open Questions and Cautionary Notes

• Qualified assurances: Caruso favorably notes that the district’s letter was “without qualification.” While some qualifiers may be acceptable, heavy caveats (e.g., “subject to funding approval, may be rescinded at any time”) could jeopardize the finding of reasonable assurance in future cases.
• Measurement period and availability: The 90% benchmark assumes comparable availability by the claimant. Significant self-imposed restrictions in availability relative to the prior year may complicate the analysis.
• Remittal scope: The case is remitted for proceedings consistent with the court’s holding. Practically, that will mean finding the claimant ineligible for the between-terms period, but the UIAB retains jurisdiction over any peripheral issues that may remain (e.g., weeks outside the break, if any were at issue).

Conclusion

Matter of Caruso reinforces and sharpens New York’s reasonable-assurance jurisprudence for educational employees, especially per diem substitutes. The Third Department confirms that a clear 90% earnings assurance—paired with stable operational conditions and continued registry access—satisfies Labor Law § 590(10) without requiring guarantees of days or preferential assignment. The decision instructs adjudicators to evaluate assurances based on practical, good-faith projections grounded in institutional continuity, not on speculative demands for precision ill-suited to the substitute-teaching context. For school districts, Caruso validates the use of carefully drafted assurance letters and provides a roadmap for evidentiary showings. For claimants, it underscores that overcoming such assurances requires concrete proof that the prospects for continued work are illusory, not merely uncertain. In the broader legal landscape, Caruso harmonizes recent Third Department precedents and offers administrable guidance that is likely to reduce litigation over between-terms unemployment claims by per diem substitutes.