Introduction

In In the Matter of the Welfare of: C.T.B., 24 N.W.3d 651 (Minn. 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed and sharpened the constitutional boundaries on police pat-frisks during rapidly evolving encounters. The Court held that mere proximity to a suspect in an alleged crime—without more—is insufficient to supply the reasonable, articulable suspicion directed at the person to be frisked that Terry v. Ohio requires. The Court further refused to endorse any “expansion” of a Terry frisk from an original suspect to nearby individuals absent a particularized basis as to each person. It also corrected factual overreach by lower courts, emphasizing appellate scrutiny of record-based findings (including body-worn camera footage) and excluding facts that do not exist in the record.

The case arose from a police response to a report that a man in a yellow and black coat brandished a firearm at a Minneapolis light rail station and was later found in a nearby pizza restaurant. The 16-year-old appellant, C.T.B., stood near the original suspect when officers arrived. Officers frisked C.T.B. based on his proximity and an officer’s general experience that guns can be passed within groups, discovering a handgun in his sweater pocket. The district court denied a motion to suppress; the court of appeals affirmed, relying partly on an inference that the gun was not found on the original suspect. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record did not support such an inference and that proximity combined with generalized officer experience does not establish the individualized reasonable suspicion required to frisk.

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota
• Decision date: August 13, 2025
• Author: Justice Moore, III; Chief Justice Hudson concurring; Justice Gaïtas not participating
• Disposition: Reversed and remanded
• Core holding: Mere proximity to a suspect, even in a group setting and even when officers have general knowledge that weapons may be passed among group members, does not create reasonable, articulable suspicion to pat-frisk under Terry. Suspicion must be particularized and directed at the person frisked.

Summary of the Opinion

The Minnesota Supreme Court held that law enforcement lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a pat-frisk of juvenile appellant C.T.B. The Court emphasized that Terry’s limited weapons frisk must be supported by suspicion directed at the specific person frisked, not generalized concerns or mere association with a suspect. It rejected the court of appeals’ reliance on an unproven assumption that the original suspect’s gun was “unaccounted for,” finding no record support for that crucial inference. The Court also concluded that the district court clearly erred in finding that the original suspect was “huddled” and “conversing” with the nearby youths—including C.T.B.—based on the body-worn camera video and the officers’ testimony.

Because the remaining facts amounted to no more than physical proximity and an officer’s generalized knowledge that weapons can be passed within a group, the State failed to meet its burden to justify the frisk of C.T.B. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings.

In concurrence, Chief Justice Hudson agreed with reversal but wrote separately to provide practical guidance: the seizure of C.T.B. occurred when officers arrived with guns drawn and restricted his movement; under Minnesota precedent, courts cannot rely on facts that arose after the moment of seizure. As the search of the original suspect had only just begun, officers lacked a reasonable basis to suspect that the firearm had been passed to someone else at the time they seized—and later frisked—C.T.B.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): The bedrock for stop-and-frisk doctrine. Terry permits a “carefully limited search of the outer clothing” for weapons when an officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous and that criminal activity may be afoot. The Court applied Terry’s framework to insist on an individualized suspicion standard for any frisk.
• Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979): Central to the result. Ybarra squarely holds that Terry does not allow generalized cursory searches of persons present at the scene; suspicion must be “directed at the person to be frisked.” The Minnesota Supreme Court relied on Ybarra to reject the notion that officers can frisk nearby individuals simply because they are near a suspect in a place where a weapon was reported.
• State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 2004): Confirms that Minnesota applies Terry principles under its own Constitution. The Court situates its analysis within both federal and state constitutional protections.
• State v. Lemert, 843 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2014): The Court reaffirmed Minnesota’s rejection of the “automatic-companion rule,” under which some jurisdictions allow searches of companions of arrestees. Lemert treats companionship as one factor—not dispositive—within a totality analysis, a principle central to rejecting a “group frisk” approach here.
• State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 2011): Two influences. First, it underscores that although the threshold for reasonable suspicion is “not high,” it must exceed an unarticulated hunch. Second, as the concurrence stresses, Diede bars reliance on facts that “did not yet exist” at the time of seizure, a timing rule that informs how courts assess what belongs in the “totality of the circumstances.”
• State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1989): Requires officers to point to objective, articulable facts—not mere hunches—supporting suspicion. This principle undercuts reliance on generalized training insights in lieu of specific facts tied to the individual frisked.
• State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 2021) and United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981): Totality-of-the-circumstances analysis considers an officer’s training and experience, but those must still be tethered to specific factual observations about the person frisked. The Court holds that general knowledge that “weapons can be passed” is insufficient standing alone.
• State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. 2007): Describes the “Terry search exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements. The narrowness of this exception frames why the Court closely polices the scope of permissible frisks.
• State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992): Reiterates that searches are presumptively unreasonable without a warrant or exception. This background presumption places the burden on the State to justify a pat-frisk.
• State v. Molnau, 904 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. 2017): Articulates standards of review (clear error for facts; de novo for legal conclusions) and confirms the State’s burden at suppression. Both points drive the outcome: the Court corrects clearly erroneous factual findings and then, de novo, holds the frisk unconstitutional.
• State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998): Acknowledges officer safety as a paramount interest, but not a trump card. Safety concerns inform the analysis without displacing constitutional requirements.
• State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2020) and In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. 2021): Provide the clear-error framework and evidentiary support requirement for factual findings. The Court relies on these authorities to correct the district court’s “huddled” and “conversing” findings.
• State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388 (Minn. 1995): Defines seizure as restraint on liberty by force or show of authority. Cited in the concurrence to identify the seizure’s timing when officers approached with guns drawn and restricted movement.
• Johnson v. State, 956 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 2021): Cited for judicial restraint—avoiding resolution of unnecessary issues. The majority explains why it need not reach additional questions once it rejects the “missing gun” inference.
• Circuit split on the automatic-companion rule: The opinion catalogs federal circuit divergence (Fourth and Ninth adopt; Sixth and Eighth reject), aligning Minnesota with jurisdictions requiring individualized suspicion for companions (United States v. Poms; United States v. Berryhill; United States v. Bell; United States v. Flett).

Legal Reasoning

The Court structures its analysis around Terry’s narrow exception. A pat-frisk is permissible only when officers have reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person to be frisked is armed and dangerous and that criminal activity may be afoot. That suspicion must be particularized to the individual; generalized safety concerns or mere association with a suspected offender do not suffice.

1. Standards of review and the record: The Court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. It scrutinizes the record, including body-worn camera footage, and finds clear error in the district court’s characterization that the original suspect was “huddled” and “conversing” with the youths. The video shows only brief co-location near a window as officers approached—no conversation, coordination, or indicators of relationship. These corrections strip away the glue that the lower courts used to connect C.T.B. to the suspect.
2. Excluding unproven assumptions from the totality: The court of appeals’ inference that the original suspect’s gun was “unaccounted for,” and thus could have been handed off, lacked any evidentiary foundation. No officer testified to that fact, and the district court made no such finding. The Supreme Court holds that the “missing gun” inference cannot be part of the totality of circumstances.
3. No “expansion” of Terry frisks to nearby persons: The Court explicitly rejects the notion that a valid frisk of a suspect can be “expanded” to companions without an individualized basis. Citing Ybarra, the Court reiterates that the narrow scope of Terry does not permit generalized weapons searches of those in the vicinity. Minnesota, consistent with Lemert, rejects any automatic-companion rule.
4. Proximity plus generalized experience is not enough: After correcting the record and excluding the “missing gun” inference, the remaining facts—proximity to the suspect and the officer’s general training that guns can be passed among group members—do not amount to reasonable suspicion directed at C.T.B. The Court underscores that while officer experience informs the analysis, it cannot substitute for specific, articulable observations about the individual frisked.
5. Burden of proof: The State bears the burden at suppression to establish the constitutionality of the search. On this record, the State did not satisfy that burden.
6. Concurrence on seizure timing: Chief Justice Hudson’s concurrence provides pragmatic guidance: a seizure occurred when officers, with guns drawn, prevented movement of individuals inside the restaurant, including C.T.B. Under Diede, courts cannot consider facts that “did not yet exist” at the moment of seizure. Because the search of the original suspect was just beginning then, officers could not have reasonably believed that the firearm had already been passed off to others at the point they seized and later frisked C.T.B.

Impact and Practical Implications

This opinion will reverberate across street-level policing, suppression litigation, and judicial fact-finding in Minnesota:

• Law enforcement: Officers confronting armed-suspect calls may not frisk all nearby individuals as a matter of course. Individualized suspicion is required for each person. General training that “guns get passed” is relevant but insufficient without specific, articulable indicators tied to the person (e.g., observed hand-to-hand transfer, furtive movements suggestive of concealment, a visible bulge consistent with a firearm, clutching a waistband, flight tied to evasive conduct, or reliable tips identifying a specific person).
• Officer safety balanced by constitutional limits: The Court acknowledges the paramount importance of officer safety but reinforces that it cannot override Terry’s constraints. Departments should emphasize articulation training: officers must describe with specificity what they saw about the person frisked, not just the scene generally.
• Suppression practice: Defense counsel should attack group or companion frisks lacking individualized facts, challenge reliance on post-seizure developments (per Diede), and use body-worn camera footage to contest embellished findings. Prosecutors must build a record with precise, person-specific observations, avoiding broad generalizations and ungrounded inferences.
• Trial courts and appellate review: Fact-finding must be tightly tethered to the record; courts should avoid loaded descriptors (“huddled,” “conversing”) unless the evidence supports them. Body-worn camera footage can be dispositive in determining whether findings have evidentiary support. Appellate courts will correct clear error where descriptors outpace the evidence.
• Continued rejection of the automatic-companion rule: Minnesota remains aligned with jurisdictions demanding particularized suspicion for each frisked person. This bears on searches at bars, group gatherings, vehicles with multiple occupants, and similar contexts.
• Juvenile proceedings: The same Terry standards apply to juveniles. Where suppression eliminates the key evidence (here, the handgun), adjudications may be unsustainable on remand.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Terry stop and frisk: A brief detention and a limited pat-down of outer clothing for weapons, permitted without a warrant or probable cause when an officer reasonably suspects that the person is engaged in criminal activity and is armed and dangerous.
• Reasonable, articulable suspicion: A low but real threshold requiring specific, objective facts—plus reasonable inferences from training and experience—suggesting criminal activity and danger. It cannot be a mere hunch and must be directed at the particular person frisked.
• Totality of the circumstances: A holistic assessment of all facts known to the officer at the time of the seizure or frisk. Training and experience matter, but generalized knowledge does not replace individualized facts.
• Automatic-companion rule: A rule (rejected in Minnesota) that would allow automatic searches of companions of an arrestee. Minnesota treats companionship as one factor, not a license to frisk without specific suspicion as to each individual.
• Seizure timing: A person is seized when their liberty is restrained by force or a show of authority (e.g., officers with guns drawn preventing exit). Courts may not consider facts that arise after that moment to justify the initial seizure or frisk.
• Clear error: An appellate standard under which a factual finding is set aside if it lacks evidentiary support in the record. Video evidence can be decisive in this assessment.
• Burden at suppression: The State must prove that a warrantless search fits a recognized exception and was constitutional. Ambiguities in the record cut against the State.

Conclusion

In re Welfare of C.T.B. clarifies a critical constitutional boundary: officers may not transform a specific weapons report into a group frisk based on proximity and generalized experience. Terry’s narrow exception requires suspicion “directed at the person to be frisked,” and Minnesota courts will police that requirement by insisting on record-supported findings and by excluding unproven assumptions from the totality analysis. The concurrence’s timing guidance further grounds the doctrine in practical realities of police-citizen encounters: facts that arise after a seizure cannot retroactively justify it.

As a result, Minnesota law now emphatically instructs: no “expansion” of a frisk from one person to many without particularized facts as to each; no reliance on evocative descriptors not borne out by video or testimony; and no backfilling the totality with post-seizure developments. Officer safety remains paramount, but it must be achieved within Terry’s constitutional limits. This decision will shape training, on-the-ground tactics, and courtroom advocacy in cases involving weapons reports and group encounters for years to come.