No Forced Trade-Off Between Speedy Trial and Confrontation Rights:
A Commentary on Boykin v. State (Delaware Supreme Court, Dec. 17, 2025)

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I. Introduction

The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Boykin v. State, No. 442, 2024 (Dec. 17, 2025), addresses a recurring but under-theorized tension in criminal procedure: what happens when a defendant’s insistence on one constitutional right (face-to-face confrontation of witnesses) contributes to delay that implicates another (the right to a speedy trial)?

Appellant Isaiah Boykin remained incarcerated for nearly two years between his arrest and trial on serious felony charges including first-degree home invasion-burglary, attempted robbery, conspiracy, assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and terroristic threatening. His trial was continued three times, twice to accommodate the family leave of a key State witness, Detective Christopher Skrobot. In each instance, Boykin refused proposed alternatives (substituting a different detective or permitting remote testimony) but did not formally object to the continuances until very late in the process.

On appeal, Boykin argued that the Superior Court’s grant of the State’s second and third continuance requests violated his state and federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this claim, affirming the convictions. The case is most significant for its clear statement that:

• A defendant cannot be penalized under the speedy-trial analysis merely for insisting on in-person, face-to-face confrontation of a key witness; and
• No defendant should be forced to trade away one constitutional right in order to preserve another.

Within the established framework of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Court classifies the reason-for-delay factor as neutral where delay is attributable both to a legitimate State need (witness family leave) and to the defendant’s legitimate exercise of the Confrontation Clause right. At the same time, the Court reinforces two longstanding themes in speedy-trial doctrine: the importance of timely asserting the right and the need to demonstrate actual, not merely presumed, prejudice.

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II. Factual and Procedural Background

The key chronology is as follows:

• April 7, 2022 – Boykin is arrested.
• August 15, 2022 – A grand jury indicts Boykin on multiple felony counts, including home invasion-burglary, attempted robbery, conspiracy, assault, a firearm offense, terroristic threatening, and other counts that were later severed or dropped.
• Initial trial setting – The Superior Court schedules trial for March 20, 2023.

A. First Continuance (Co-defendant’s Counsel Conflict)

• March 2023 – Boykin’s co-defendant’s attorney has a scheduling conflict and needs a continuance.
• The State, “on behalf of all the parties (including Boykin),” submits a continuance request.
• The Superior Court grants the request and postpones the trial to late May 2023.
• Boykin does not challenge this first delay on appeal.

B. Second Continuance (Detective’s Anticipated Family Leave)

• Approaching the late May 2023 date, the State seeks another continuance.
• Detective Christopher Skrobot, a key State witness, reports that his wife is due to give birth in late May and that he will likely be on family leave during trial.
• The State offers an alternative: substitute Detective Daniel Vucci, who is familiar with the case but lacks personal knowledge of the underlying facts.
• Boykin rejects this substitution but does not object to the continuance itself.
• The Superior Court grants the continuance and sets trial for September 11, 2023.

C. Third Continuance (Extended Family Leave; Remote Testimony Proposal)

• August 29, 2023 – The State seeks a third continuance: Detective Skrobot is still on family leave and unavailable for the September 11 date.
• To avoid delay, the State proposes that the detective testify remotely.
• Boykin rejects remote testimony but again does not object to the continuance request itself.
• The court takes the matter under advisement; no new trial date is set immediately.

D. Assertion of Speedy-Trial Right and Motion Practice

• October 19, 2023 – At a scheduling conference, approximately 18 months after arrest, Boykin for the first time asserts his right to a speedy trial and demands dismissal of the charges.
• The Superior Court does not rule on the request because it was not presented in a written motion; instead, it sets a new trial date of March 4, 2024.
• January 18, 2024 – Boykin files a formal speedy-trial motion.
• February 26, 2024 – The Superior Court issues a written decision (State v. Boykin, 2024 WL 772557 (Del. Super.)) denying the motion, emphasizing Boykin’s acquiescence in the prior continuances and lack of demonstrated prejudice.
• March 4, 2024 – Trial begins as scheduled and lasts seven days. The jury acquits Boykin of terroristic threatening but convicts him on all remaining charges.
• Boykin is sentenced to 14 years’ incarceration followed by probation.

On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Boykin challenges only the State-initiated second and third continuances as violating his speedy-trial right.

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III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Court, applying de novo review to the alleged constitutional violation, analyzes Boykin’s claim under the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo:

1. Length of delay: Almost two years elapsed between arrest (April 7, 2022) and trial (March 4, 2024). The State concedes that this factor favors Boykin and triggers full Barker analysis.
2. Reason for the delay: The second and third continuances were due to the unavailability of a State witness on family leave. The Court holds that this is a valid reason for delay that does not weigh against the State. At the same time, Boykin’s insistence on in-person confrontation of that witness is a legitimate constitutional choice that cannot be held against him. The reason-for-delay factor is deemed neutral.
3. Defendant’s assertion of the right: Boykin remained silent for approximately 18 months and did not object when the continuances were requested. He first asserted his speedy-trial right in October 2023, well after the delays had already occurred. This factor weighs in favor of the State.
4. Prejudice: Boykin claims only generalized or “presumptive” anxiety from pretrial incarceration, offering no specific evidence of particularized harm. The Court acknowledges the serious general harms of prolonged pretrial detention but holds that, on this record, Boykin has not shown legal prejudice. This factor also weighs in favor of the State.

Balancing the factors, the Court concludes that:

• Although the length of delay favors Boykin,
• His failure to timely assert the right and his failure to show prejudice “significantly outweigh” that factor.

Accordingly, the Court holds that Boykin’s state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated and affirms his convictions.

The key doctrinal development is the Court’s express refusal to attribute delay to a defendant who insists on face-to-face confrontation, and its rejection of a contrary approach taken by a Superior Court decision, State v. Malachi. The Court emphasizes that “no individual should feel pressured to surrender one constitutional right in fear of losing another.”

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IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Constitutional Framework

• Delaware Constitution, art. I, § 7 – Protects the right to a speedy trial under state law.
• U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI – Guarantees the rights to a speedy trial and to confront the witnesses against the accused. These protections apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Barker v. Wingo and Its Delaware Adoption

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court established the now-standard four-factor balancing test for speedy-trial claims: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. No single factor is necessary or sufficient; courts must perform a “difficult and sensitive balancing process.”

• Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622 (Del. 1973) – Delaware’s early adoption of the Barker test. The Court in Boykin cites Johnson to reaffirm that Delaware follows Barker and weighs the four factors rather than applying bright-line time limits.
• Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1990) – Reiterates that there is no fixed time period that automatically constitutes a violation, but a sufficiently long delay triggers the need for full Barker analysis.
• Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613 (Del. Dec. 5, 2011) – Recognizes that a delay exceeding one year between arrest/indictment and trial generally warrants application of the Barker factors. Boykin follows this approach: a nearly two-year delay plainly triggers the analysis.

C. Delaware Speedy-Trial Cases on Reasons, Assertion, and Prejudice

• Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268 (Del. 2002) – Clarifies how reasons for delay are weighted and underscores the harmful consequences of pretrial incarceration. Middlebrook recognizes that time in jail, loss of employment, and disruption of family life are serious, but still requires a concrete showing of prejudice in the Barker sense. Boykin mirrors this reasoning: it acknowledges the seriousness of pretrial detention but finds no specific prejudice shown on the record.
• Key v. State, 463 A.2d 633 (Del. 1983) – Emphasizes a defendant’s “responsibility to call attention to what he views as an unfair postponement,” quoting Barker. A defendant cannot remain silent through multiple continuances and then, much later, assert that “time is essential.” Boykin draws directly on Key to weigh the assertion factor against Boykin.
• Butler v. State, 2009 WL 1387640 (Del. May 19, 2009) – States that a defendant “cannot complain about the result of his exercise of [a procedural] right.” The State invoked this logic to argue that Boykin’s insistence on in-person testimony should make him responsible for the delay. The Supreme Court in Boykin recognizes this principle but confines it: it will not use that reasoning to penalize the exercise of a core constitutional right such as confrontation.

D. Confrontation Clause Authorities

• Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) – Holds that while the Sixth Amendment strongly prefers face-to-face confrontation, such face-to-face contact is not an indispensable element of the Confrontation Clause in every circumstance. Under carefully controlled conditions (e.g., to protect child victims), certain forms of remote testimony may be constitutional. Boykin relies on Craig to acknowledge that face-to-face confrontation is not absolutely mandatory, while still emphasizing its importance.
• McGriff v. State, 781 A.2d 534 (Del. 2001) – Recognizes that the Sixth Amendment “has been interpreted to express a preference for the in-court testimony of witnesses,” citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Boykin invokes McGriff to underline the strong preference for in-person testimony when assessing whether Boykin’s insistence on face-to-face confrontation was legitimate.
• Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) – Historically articulated the former reliability framework for hearsay under the Confrontation Clause (subsequently superseded by later cases such as Crawford v. Washington). In Boykin, it is cited only for the general proposition that there is a strong preference for live, in-court testimony.
• Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) – Holds that the State may not coerce an individual into forfeiting one constitutional right as the price for exercising another. Boykin uses Lefkowitz to frame a key principle: the State and courts cannot structure proceedings so that a defendant must yield his confrontation right to avoid incurring speedy-trial delay.

E. State v. Malachi and Its (Implicit) Rejection

The State relied heavily on State v. Malachi, 2021 WL 4805515 (Del. Super. Oct. 14, 2021), where the Superior Court reasoned that when the State seeks to cure a witness’s unavailability by offering Zoom testimony, and the defendant refuses remote testimony, the “true impetus” for the delay is attributable to the defendant. Malachi held that the reason-for-delay factor then weighs in the State’s favor because the defendant “cannot prolong the matter then claim infringement on her right to a speedy trial.”

The Delaware Supreme Court in Boykin expressly declines to follow this logic. It concludes that refusing remote testimony or an inadequate substitute is an exercise of core confrontation rights, and that such an exercise cannot be used to saddle the defendant with responsibility for delay under Barker. In this way, Boykin significantly curtails Malachi’s reasoning and clarifies the law in favor of protecting confrontation rights in scheduling disputes.

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V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Boykin

A. Barker Factor 1 – Length of Delay

The Court first considers whether the delay is sufficient to trigger full Barker analysis. While there is no fixed period that automatically violates the speedy-trial right, Delaware precedent recognizes that a delay exceeding one year generally warrants an in-depth analysis.

• Boykin was arrested on April 7, 2022; his trial began March 4, 2024.
• Thus, nearly two years elapsed between arrest and trial.
• The State concedes that this delay is long enough to weigh in Boykin’s favor and to require full consideration of the remaining Barker factors.

The Court therefore treats the first factor as solidly favoring Boykin. However, consistent with Barker, this factor is not dispositive; it simply opens the door to a balancing of all four factors.

B. Barker Factor 2 – Reason for the Delay

The second factor is often the most intricate, because it requires assigning weight to various causes of delay:

• Deliberate delay by the State to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the State.
• Negligence and institutional delays (e.g., overcrowded dockets) weigh against the State, but less heavily.
• Valid reasons (such as a missing or unavailable witness) may justify delay and typically do not weigh against the State.
• Delays caused by the defendant weigh against the defendant.

Here, the relevant delays (second and third continuances) stemmed from the unavailability of Detective Skrobot due to family leave. The State, seeking to avoid postponement, twice offered alternatives:

1. Substituting another detective who lacked personal knowledge but was familiar with the case file; and
2. Arranging for Skrobot to testify remotely.

Boykin refused both alternatives but did not directly oppose the State’s continuance requests at the time. The core analytical questions are:

• Is the witness’s family leave a valid reason for delay?
• Does Boykin’s refusal of the offered alternatives shift responsibility for the delay to him?

The Court answers as follows:

1. Witness’s family leave is a valid reason. The Court treats a “missing witness” as a recognized, legitimate justification for delay. That Skrobot’s unavailability was due to family leave rather than, for example, illness or relocation does not undermine the validity of the reason. Consequently, the delay is not weighed against the State.
2. Boykin’s exercise of confrontation rights is also valid. Boykin’s insistence on:
   • Excluding a witness with no personal knowledge of the underlying facts, and
   • Requiring in-person testimony from the key detective
   are both grounded in the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The Court recognizes that:

   “Although the right to meet a witness face-to-face is not an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment, it remains important, and no individual should feel pressured to surrender one constitutional right in fear of losing another.”

Thus, even though Maryland v. Craig allows remote testimony in some circumstances, the Court stresses the “strong preference” for face-to-face confrontation and refuses to treat Boykin’s insistence on that preference as blameworthy. Invoking Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, the Court warns against any procedural design that effectively forces defendants to surrender confrontation rights as the price for a faster trial.

Result: The Court finds the second factor neutral—it does not weigh against either party. The State’s reason is valid; the defendant’s insistence on constitutional confrontation is also valid. This balance is the doctrinal core of the opinion.

C. Barker Factor 3 – Defendant’s Assertion of the Right

The third factor examines whether and when the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial. The rationale is straightforward: a defendant who genuinely values a speedy trial is expected to say so, especially when delays are proposed. As Key v. State (quoting Barker) holds, a defendant bears “some responsibility to call attention to what he views as an unfair postponement.”

Applying this principle, the Court notes:

• Boykin remained silent about speedy-trial concerns for roughly 18 months after his arrest.
• He did not object to the State’s first, second, or third continuance requests at the time they were made.
• He first raised the speedy-trial right in October 2023 at a scheduling conference, long after the problematic delays had occurred.
• He conceded on appeal that he “may not have asserted his right as early as one would have hoped.”

The Court treats this late assertion as weighing in favor of the State. This is not because a defendant’s silence constitutes a waiver of the speedy-trial right—it does not—but because late assertion undercuts the claim that the defendant experienced the intervening delay as unfair or oppressive in the Barker sense.

D. Barker Factor 4 – Prejudice to the Defendant

The fourth factor considers actual prejudice to the defendant, measured against the interests that the speedy-trial right is designed to protect. Barker identifies three such interests:

1. Preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration;
2. Minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and
3. Limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired (e.g., lost evidence, faded memories, unavailable defense witnesses).

Boykin’s prejudice argument focuses only on generalized “anxiety and concern” resulting from his prolonged incarceration. He does not:

• Claim specific loss of evidence or impairment of his defense;
• Offer concrete examples of mental health decline, lost employment opportunities, or family-related consequences beyond what any detained defendant might experience; or
• Provide affidavits, medical records, or other evidence of particularized prejudice.

The Court candidly acknowledges, echoing Middlebrook, that time spent in jail awaiting trial is often devastating:

“[T]ime spent in jail awaiting trial by one presumed innocent until proven guilty often means loss of a job, disrupts family life, and enforces idleness. Imposing these consequences on anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious.”

Yet the Court distinguishes between:

• General harms that “might be generally experienced by all criminal defendants,” and
• The kind of concrete, case-specific prejudice that justifies relief under the speedy-trial right.

Because Boykin shows only generic, “presumptive” anxiety with no evidence of particularized harm or trial prejudice, the Court finds that the prejudice factor weighs in favor of the State.

E. Overall Balancing of the Barker Factors

With the four factors assessed as:

• Length of delay – Favors Boykin;
• Reason for delay – Neutral;
• Assertion of right – Favors the State;
• Prejudice – Favors the State;

the Court concludes that there was no speedy-trial violation. Two key elements drive the outcome:

1. Boykin’s long silence and delayed assertion of his right; and
2. His failure to demonstrate actual prejudice beyond generalized anxiety.

The Court explicitly states that these failures “significantly outweigh” the length-of-delay factor, the only factor in Boykin’s favor. Because Barker is a balancing test, not a checklist where the defendant can prevail merely by showing a lengthy delay, Boykin’s claim fails.

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VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a “Continuance”?

A “continuance” is a court’s decision to delay or reschedule a hearing or trial to a later date. Parties (the State or the defense) may request continuances for various reasons—witness unavailability, attorney conflicts, need for more preparation time, etc. How those reasons are treated under the speedy-trial analysis depends on who requested the continuance and why.

B. The Right to a Speedy Trial

The Sixth Amendment and the Delaware Constitution guarantee that criminal defendants will not face unjustified, excessive delays before trial. This protects:

• Defendants from languishing in jail;
• The integrity of evidence (memories fade, witnesses move or die); and
• The emotional and psychological well-being of the accused.

However, because criminal cases vary widely in complexity and circumstance, courts do not use a fixed calendar deadline. Instead, they weigh the four Barker factors in context.

C. The Right to Confrontation and Face-to-Face Testimony

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses who testify against them. Traditionally, this has meant:

• Witnesses appear live in the courtroom;
• The defendant and jury can observe their demeanor; and
• The defense can cross-examine them in real time.

The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed limited exceptions (for example, closed-circuit testimony by child victims in certain cases). But there remains a powerful preference for in-person, face-to-face confrontation. In Boykin, the Court treats the defendant’s insistence on this preference as fully legitimate.

D. “Prejudice” in Speedy-Trial Claims

In everyday language, “prejudice” might mean any harm or unfairness. In the Barker context, however, it is more specific. Courts look for:

• Unusually harsh or oppressive pretrial incarceration;
• Severe and particularized anxiety or mental health harm; and/or
• Impairment of the defense (lost witnesses, faded memories, missing evidence).

Merely being in jail and experiencing the stress that almost any defendant would feel, without more, usually does not establish legal prejudice sufficient to overturn a conviction or dismiss charges.

E. “De Novo” Review

The Court states that it reviews claims of constitutional violations “de novo.” This means the appellate court decides the issue anew, without deferring to the lower court’s legal conclusions, although it still respects the trial court’s factual findings where appropriate. In Boykin, the Supreme Court independently applies the Barker factors to the undisputed facts.

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VII. Doctrinal and Practical Impact

A. No Penalty for Exercising the Confrontation Right

The most important doctrinal contribution of Boykin is the explicit holding that a defendant’s refusal to:

• Accept a substitute witness who lacks personal knowledge; or
• Agree to remote testimony by a key prosecution witness

cannot be counted against the defendant in the speedy-trial analysis. The Court’s reasoning has several implications:

• Defendants may insist on in-person testimony from critical witnesses without fear that doing so will later be used to defeat a speedy-trial claim.
• Prosecutors and courts must recognize that offering a remote or substitute witness is not a cure-all that shifts responsibility for delay to the defense.
• Trial courts should be cautious in relying on Malachi-style reasoning; Boykin strongly signals that attributing delay to a defendant solely because they insisted on core confrontation rights is doctrinally unsound.

B. Strengthening the Principle Against Trading Rights

By invoking Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, the Court reaffirms a broader constitutional principle: the State may not condition the exercise of one right on the forfeiture of another. Applied here:

• A defendant should not be told, in effect: “If you want a speedy trial, you must accept remote testimony or a lesser form of confrontation.”
• Nor should a defendant be penalized in the Barker analysis for insisting on robust confrontation protections.

This has particular salience in an era of increasingly normalized remote proceedings and video testimony. Boykin suggests courts must take care that technological conveniences do not erode fundamental trial rights.

C. The Ongoing Importance of Timely Assertion

At the same time, Boykin is a cautionary tale for defendants and defense counsel:

• Silence in the face of repeated continuances will weigh against the defendant under Barker factor three.
• Even if the defendant ultimately asserts the right, late assertions are less persuasive.
• Defense counsel should make a record—through objections, letters, or motions—whenever delay is perceived as unfair or excessive.

Practically, this means that defense attorneys who wish to preserve speedy-trial claims should:

• Object on the record when they believe a continuance is unnecessary or excessive;
• File a written speedy-trial demand or motion rather than relying on informal complaints; and
• Do so as early as reasonable under the circumstances.

D. Evidentiary Burden on Prejudice

Boykin also signals that, in Delaware, claims of prejudice based solely on “presumptive anxiety” are unlikely to succeed. To strengthen a prejudice argument, defendants should:

• Document specific harms from delay—such as the unavailability of a key defense witness, loss of surveillance footage, or faded memories of particular events;
• Provide evidence of psychological or medical impacts of detention, where appropriate; and
• Show how the delay concretely affected trial strategy or outcome.

For the State, Boykin underlines the value of:

• Articulating clear, legitimate reasons for each requested continuance;
• Creating a record that demonstrates the absence of prejudice (e.g., that evidence remains intact, witnesses remain available); and
• Being prepared to show that delays were not tactical or negligent but grounded in unavoidable circumstances such as witness unavailability.

E. Treatment of Witness Unavailability and Family-Leave Conflicts

The Court’s acceptance of family leave as a valid reason for delay reflects an important practical reality: key law-enforcement witnesses may have personal and family obligations. Boykin indicates that:

• Reasonable, documented family-leave-related unavailability can justify continuances.
• Such justifications generally do not weigh against the State in the Barker balance.
• But they also do not excuse all delay indefinitely; the Court’s neutral treatment in this case is tied to the fact that both sides had legitimate constitutional interests at stake.

Future cases may explore the outer limits of how long such family-leave-based delay remains justifiable and how far a court must go to accommodate both the witness’s needs and the defendant’s rights.

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VIII. Conclusion

Boykin v. State reaffirms Delaware’s adherence to the Barker v. Wingo balancing test for speedy-trial claims while offering important clarifications at the intersection of the speedy-trial right and the Confrontation Clause. The decision makes three principal contributions:

1. It holds that when delay results from a combination of:
   • a valid State justification (witness unavailability due to family leave), and
   • a defendant’s legitimate insistence on face-to-face confrontation,
   the reason-for-delay factor is neutral and cannot be weighed against the defendant.
2. It firmly rejects the notion, advanced in State v. Malachi, that a defendant “causes” delay by refusing remote testimony and therefore cannot complain of a speedy-trial violation. The Court underscores that no person should be pressured to forfeit one constitutional right to preserve another.
3. It underscores the continuing importance of timely assertion of the speedy-trial right and concrete proof of prejudice. A long delay alone, without early assertion or a showing of specific harm, will rarely suffice to establish a constitutional violation.

In the broader legal context, Boykin offers a principled template for handling scheduling conflicts in an era of remote technology and evolving trial practices. It instructs courts to protect the core of both the speedy-trial and confrontation rights, resisting pressures—whether technological, administrative, or doctrinal—to make defendants choose between them. At the same time, it reminds defendants and counsel that constitutional protections, to be fully effective, must be timely asserted and concretely supported in the record.