No Force Field: Seventh Circuit Upholds Indiana’s “Stop Approaching” 25‑Foot Police Buffer as a Content‑Neutral Time, Place, and Manner Rule

Introduction

In Donald Nicodemus v. City of South Bend, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of Indiana’s 2023 “buffer law,” Indiana Code § 35-44.1-2-14, against a facial First Amendment challenge. The statute makes it a misdemeanor to “knowingly or intentionally” approach within 25 feet of a law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in duties after the officer has ordered the person to stop approaching. The plaintiff, a citizen-journalist who records and livestreams police activity in public, argued the law violates the First Amendment right to record by giving officers unbridled discretion and by failing First Amendment time, place, and manner requirements.

After a bench trial, the district court upheld the statute, and the Seventh Circuit (Judge Pryor, joined by Judges Brennan and Jackson-Akiwumi) affirmed. Central to the appellate court’s analysis was a careful, narrowing construction of the statute: it is not a roving 25-foot “force field” allowing police to push all observers back. Rather, only those who continue to approach after being told to stop may be penalized; those already within 25 feet may remain in place and continue recording. With that construction, the court treated the law as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation that is narrowly tailored to significant governmental interests and leaves open ample alternative channels.

This decision simultaneously reaffirms the Seventh Circuit’s recognition of a First Amendment right to record police in public (ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez) and clarifies how proximity-based limits can constitutionally coexist with that right when pegged to a person’s “approach,” not to a categorical clearance radius.

Summary of the Opinion

Statutory construction: The court construes Indiana’s buffer law to prohibit only approaching within 25 feet after an officer orders a person to stop approaching. It is not a generalized authority to move anyone already within 25 feet. The statute “is not a force field.”
First Amendment applicability: Though the statute is silent about speech, it affects access to traditional public fora and impacts the First Amendment right to record police; therefore, First Amendment scrutiny applies.
Content-neutrality: The law regulates conduct (approach) without regard to message, and the State’s justifications (safety, witness-officer conversational privacy, efficiency) are content-neutral. The court rejects analogies to content-based frameworks (Holder v. HLP; City of Houston v. Hill) and to “unbridled discretion” permitting/licensing doctrine (City of Lakewood), distinguishing Ward v. Rock Against Racism as the governing standard.
Narrow tailoring: The law does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to advance significant interests in officer/bystander safety and investigative integrity. Its “stop approaching” design, combined with existing constraints from Alvarez (no dispersal merely for recording), supports narrow tailoring.
Alternative channels: Adequate alternatives remain because observers may stay put and continue recording; the statute does not impose a moving or “floating” no-speech zone. Schenck’s floating 15-foot clinic buffer is distinguishable.
Standing and posture: The court rejects the “clear misuse” bar from Schirmer and entertains the facial challenge; it reviews de novo because only legal issues remain.
Holding: Affirmed. Indiana’s buffer law is facially constitutional as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.

Background

Plaintiff-appellant Nicodemus operates a YouTube channel focused on filming and livestreaming police activity in South Bend. After a 2023 shooting, officers twice directed the public (including Nicodemus) to increase their distance at an active scene, invoking the buffer law. Nicodemus alleged that the law facially violates the First Amendment: it confers unbridled discretion, is not narrowly tailored, and fails to leave open ample alternatives.

Following consolidation of a preliminary injunction hearing with a merits trial, the district court found the law constitutional, emphasizing its incidental effect on recording and its safety-based aims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed only the facial constitutionality, reviewing de novo.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez (7th Cir. 2012): Recognizes a First Amendment right to record police in public. The panel relies on Alvarez as the foundational right, while clarifying that the right is not absolute; the state may impose content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions and may order dispersal for non-recording-related safety reasons.
Perry Education Ass’n; Brown v. Louisiana; McCullen v. Coakley: Establish that restrictions affecting access to traditional public fora trigger First Amendment scrutiny even if the law does not mention speech.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism: Provides the operative test for content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations: content-neutrality, narrow tailoring to significant interests, and ample alternatives. Ward also cabins the “unbridled discretion” line to licensing/prior restraint scenarios or those that deny speech altogether, which is not the case here.
Hill v. Colorado; Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network; McCullen v. Coakley: The court draws heavily on Hill’s reading of “approach,” emphasizing that a speaker may stand still and others may pass within the statutory distance without violating the law. Schenck’s floating buffer—requiring constant movement and posing a high risk of inadvertent violations—is inapposite because Indiana’s law merely commands “stop approaching,” not continuous motion or dynamic avoidance.
Turner Broadcasting; Reed v. Town of Gilbert; TikTok, Inc. v. Garland (2025): These authorities frame the content-based vs. content-neutral dichotomy and the strict scrutiny trigger for content-based laws. The court uses this framework to reject the claim that the statute is content-based.
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer; Smith v. Executive Director (7th Cir. 2014): The “unbridled discretion” doctrine in the prior-restraint/licensing context is not extended to a conduct rule that does not allow officials to deny speech altogether. The buffer law requires no permit and does not function as a licensing regime.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project; City of Houston v. Hill: The court rejects these analogies. Holder involved speech coordinated with foreign terrorist organizations, rendering the statute functionally content-based as applied. Hill involved vague terms giving police power to arrest for annoying or offensive speech. Indiana’s statute targets approach behavior, not content or amorphous “opposition.”
Brown v. Kemp (7th Cir. 2023): The panel notes its recent application of First Amendment scrutiny to physical proximity limits (there, around hunters), underscoring that proximity rules can be compatible with the First Amendment when properly tailored.
Riley v. California: A technological backdrop: modern smartphones mitigate the distance-related burden on collecting sound and images, undercutting the claim that a 25-foot constraint annihilates recording.
Schirmer v. Nagode; Bell v. Keating; Skilling v. United States; Kolender v. Lawson; O’Brien: The court distinguishes Schirmer’s “clear misuse” bar, finding it inapplicable given the statute’s novelty and the plausible dispute about its meaning. It notes that motivations do not invalidate otherwise constitutional statutes (O’Brien) and that vagueness arguments were disclaimed here.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Threshold: What the statute means

The Seventh Circuit begins with a textualist construction under Indiana law: “approach” retains its ordinary meaning—“to come nearer to” or “draw near.” The statute is triggered only when, after being told to stop approaching, a person knowingly or intentionally continues to approach within 25 feet. Critically, it does not authorize officers to clear an area or move those already inside the 25-foot radius. Nor does it say anything about recording. A person who halts their approach may remain and continue recording.

This construction is decisive. It narrows the law’s reach to a specific movement-based contingency and eliminates the “force field” premise that animated much of the facial challenge. Given that the key term is unambiguous and the U.S. Supreme Court construed “approach” similarly in Hill, certification to the Indiana Supreme Court is unnecessary.

b) First Amendment applicability

Although the statute is speech-neutral on its face, it affects access to sidewalks/streets—traditional public fora—and impinges the acknowledged right to record the police. Under McCullen and Perry, First Amendment scrutiny applies to such access restrictions.

c) Content-neutrality

The law is content-neutral because it regulates approach conduct regardless of message or viewpoint. The State’s proffered interests—officer and bystander safety, witness-officer conversational privacy, and efficient investigations—are unrelated to speech content. The court rejects:

The Holder analogy: Unlike coordinated instruction to foreign terrorist organizations, “approach” is not inherently expressive and does not target message-coordination.
The City of Houston analogy: Indiana’s statute does not criminalize generic “opposition” or “interruption” based on speech; it targets physical movement post-order.
The “unbridled discretion” licensing line: The buffer law does not operate as a prior restraint or permit scheme; it does not allow officials to deny speech outright. Ward, not City of Lakewood, supplies the standard.

The court also declines to infer illicit legislative motive; it applies the familiar principle that otherwise constitutional statutes are not invalidated by alleged subjective animus.

d) Narrow tailoring

The statute need not be the least restrictive means; the test asks whether it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to advance significant interests. The State’s interests are significant. The “stop approaching” model fills a gap: it provides a de-escalation tool at active, unfolding scenes distinct from more rigid perimeter laws or obstruction statutes. Because individuals can remain stationary and continue to record—even within 25 feet—only their continued approach is prohibited. This targeted movement rule, coupled with the constitutional constraint from Alvarez (officers cannot disperse people merely for recording), supports narrow tailoring.

Although overlapping Indiana statutes address obstruction and emergency incident areas, overlap is not fatal; the buffer law’s narrower, event-driven focus on approach provides a reasonably close fit between means and ends.

e) Ample alternative channels

The law leaves open realistic alternatives. It neither imposes a floating buffer that forces constant motion nor requires withdrawal beyond conversational range. Observers may stay in place and record; alternatively, they may reposition so long as they do not approach after an order to stop. The court declines to treat “conversational distance” as controlling in the recording context, especially given the power of modern audio-video devices. Schenck’s moving, floating no-go zone is thus inapt.

f) Standing and posture

The court allows the facial challenge to proceed despite evidence that officers may have over-read the new law on the street. Schirmer’s “clear misuse” exception is limited to cases where misuse is unmistakable. With a new statute and no authoritative construction at the time of enforcement, misuse was not “clear.” Nicodemus’s ongoing intent to record supports standing for pre-enforcement/prospective relief. The panel emphasizes that any claim of misuse is best vetted in an as-applied challenge; Nicodemus expressly abandoned that theory.

3) Impact and Significance

a) Right to record, clarified but intact

Alvarez remains good law: the public has a First Amendment right to record the police in public. This decision clarifies the space where governmental proximity rules may operate without violating that right. A “stop approaching” rule, rather than an all-encompassing clearance radius, is consonant with the First Amendment when applied as written.

b) Operational guidance for law enforcement

Officers may direct a person to stop approaching and may enforce that command up to 25 feet. They may not use this statute to evict, displace, or sweep everyone back within a 25-foot bubble.
Individuals already within 25 feet who halt their approach are not violating the law; they may remain and continue recording.
Orders to disperse based solely on the act of recording remain unconstitutional under Alvarez.
Policies and training should reflect the “no force field” construction to avoid as-applied liability.

C) Drafting lessons for legislatures

Proximity restrictions tied to approach conduct, rather than blanket exclusion zones, are more likely to survive content-neutral scrutiny.
Clear triggers and objective distances reduce vagueness and discretionary abuse concerns, though this decision did not resolve vagueness challenges (which were disclaimed).

d) Litigation landscape

Facial challenges to similar “approach”-based buffers will be more difficult; defendants can point to this case’s content-neutral, narrowly tailored characterization.
As-applied challenges remain viable where officers convert a “stop approaching” rule into a de facto force field, where orders are pretextual, or where enforcement targets speakers selectively.
The decision’s reliance on Hill and Ward may influence courts outside the Seventh Circuit assessing approach-based buffers in public fora.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Content-neutral vs. content-based: A law is content-based if it targets speech because of its message; it is content-neutral when it regulates features unrelated to content (like distance or movement). Content-based laws usually face strict scrutiny; content-neutral time, place, and manner laws face intermediate scrutiny (Ward).
Time, place, and manner test: The government may impose content-neutral limits on when, where, or how speech occurs if the limits are narrowly tailored to significant interests and leave open ample alternatives.
Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all (or most) applications; an as-applied challenge contests how the law operated in specific facts. Nicodemus brought only a facial challenge here.
“Unbridled discretion” and prior restraints: Permit/license regimes that allow officials to deny speech altogether without standards are suspect. Indiana’s law is not a permit system; it does not require prior approval to record and does not authorize categorical denial of speech.
“Approach” framing: By tying liability to continued approach after an order, the law targets a specific movement that can escalate danger; it does not prohibit remaining in place or moving elsewhere so long as one is not approaching the officer after the order.
Ample alternative channels: The law leaves realistic ways to speak/record—staying put, switching angles, zooming or using microphones—so it does not foreclose communication.

Key Takeaways

The Seventh Circuit sets a clear interpretive rule: Indiana’s buffer law is a “stop approaching” statute, not a 25-foot force field. Remaining within 25 feet after halting one’s approach is lawful.
As so construed, the law is a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation that survives intermediate scrutiny.
The decision preserves the right to record police while recognizing tailored proximity limits aimed at safety and investigative integrity.
Future disputes over misuse or pretextual enforcement should be pursued as as-applied challenges; facial invalidation is unwarranted on this record.
Agencies should update training to avoid treating the statute as an eviction tool; journalists and observers should understand that they may remain and record after ceasing to approach.

Conclusion

Donald Nicodemus v. City of South Bend offers a measured blueprint for reconciling the public’s right to record police with on-scene safety needs. By anchoring the statute to a person’s continued approach after a stop order—and expressly disclaiming any “force field” effect—the Seventh Circuit places Indiana’s buffer law within Ward’s content-neutral time, place, and manner framework. The court finds a reasonable fit between safety and investigative interests and the movement-only prohibition, while leaving intact the robust protection for recording recognized in Alvarez.

The opinion’s twin pillars—textual precision (“approach” means approach) and doctrinal restraint (no extension of licensing/prior-restraint cases)—will likely shape proximity regulation across the circuit. It cautions enforcers against conflating a “stop approaching” command with a wholesale clearing power and signals that the appropriate vehicle for contesting overreach is an as-applied challenge grounded in concrete facts. In short, the decision stabilizes the law in a sensitive, fast-evolving area: it affirms that transparency and safety are not mutually exclusive when statutes are drafted and enforced with care.