No Final Opinion Yet: The Disciplinary Case Against Mark E. Anderson Signals Strict Enforcement of MRPC 3.1, 3.5, and 8.4 for Abusive Litigation Conduct

Introduction

This commentary examines the filing titled “In the Matter of Mark E. Anderson,” dated October 24, 2025, before the Commission on Practice of the Supreme Court of the State of Montana. The document is not a judicial opinion; it is a formal disciplinary complaint by the Montana Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC), signed by Chief Disciplinary Counsel Pamela D. Bucy, alleging professional misconduct by attorney Mark E. Anderson under the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC).

The proceeding arises out of contentious litigation involving the estate planning, guardianship, and probate of Anderson’s mother’s estate. The complaint alleges that Anderson, an attorney admitted in 1997, engaged in a pattern of abusive filings and statements toward a presiding judge, opposing counsel, and family members, and separately engaged in threatening behavior at his mother’s nursing home culminating in a disorderly conduct conviction. The charges invoke MRPC Rules 3.1 (frivolous claims and harassment), 3.5 (conduct disruptive to a tribunal), and 8.4(b) and (d) (criminal acts reflecting adversely on fitness; conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Key issues framed by the filing include:

Whether an attorney’s repeated use of derogatory, abusive, and unsupported accusations in court filings and proceedings violates MRPC Rules 3.1 and 3.5.
Whether a misdemeanor disorderly conduct conviction arising from threatening and disruptive conduct at a third-party facility (a nursing home) reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to practice and is sanctionable under MRPC Rule 8.4(b).
Whether conduct within litigation that causes delay, expense, and disruption of proceedings is “prejudicial to the administration of justice” under MRPC Rule 8.4(d).
How and to what extent the MRPC apply when a lawyer is a party to personal, highly charged family litigation and appears self-represented.

Procedurally, the Commission on Practice granted leave to file on October 15, 2025. ODC filed the complaint on October 24, 2025, requested issuance of a citation requiring an answer within 21 days, and sought a formal hearing before an Adjudicatory Panel with eventual findings and recommendations to the Montana Supreme Court, including an award of costs.

Because this is a charging document, no new precedent has been announced and no discipline has been imposed. Nonetheless, the allegations and legal theories, if sustained, would reinforce the principle that attorneys remain bound by professional conduct rules in all litigation, including when acting as self-represented parties in personal family disputes, and that abusive litigation conduct and related criminal behavior can trigger professional discipline.

Summary of the Filing

The complaint alleges the following:

Anderson allegedly quitclaimed his mother’s property to himself for no consideration, sparking a series of disputes regarding her estate planning, guardianship, and probate.
In court filings, Anderson purportedly referred to the presiding judge with profane insults and repeatedly accused the court of bias without evidence. He allegedly used similarly profane and disparaging language for opposing counsel and family members and made serious accusations (e.g., theft, assault) against opposing counsel without supporting evidence.
Outside the courtroom, he allegedly engaged in threatening and disruptive behavior at his mother’s nursing home, was barred from the facility (“trespassed”), was charged with disorderly conduct, and pled guilty in March 2024.

The complaint pleads two counts:

Count One (MRPC 3.1 and 3.5): Alleging filings and conduct primarily consisting of derogatory statements—even after court warnings—amounted to harassment and disruption in violation of Rule 3.1 (prohibiting proceedings or issues asserted for harassment, delay, or leverage, or that are non-meritorious) and Rule 3.5 (prohibiting conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal).
Count Two (MRPC 8.4(b) and (d)): Alleging the disorderly conduct conviction reflects adversely on fitness as a lawyer and that the litigation conduct caused delay, expense, and interference with judicial administration, thereby violating Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(d).

Relief sought includes: issuance of a citation requiring an answer within 21 days, a formal hearing before an Adjudicatory Panel, and a report to the Montana Supreme Court with recommended discipline and costs.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The complaint does not cite prior cases. It grounds the charges in:

The Montana Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), specifically Rules 3.1, 3.5, and 8.4(b) and (d), which the Montana Supreme Court has adopted.
General reference to the oath of admission and statutory obligations connected with attorney discipline (notably parts 3 and 4 of Chapter 61, Title 37, Montana Code Annotated).

In the absence of cited precedent, the analysis is framed around the text of these rules and the factual allegations as pleaded by ODC. Any eventual adjudication by the Commission on Practice and the Montana Supreme Court could, of course, invoke case law concerning attorney speech in filings, the intent element of disruption under Rule 3.5, and the scope of Rule 8.4(b) and (d). At this stage, however, the official record provided is limited to the complaint.

Legal Reasoning (as pleaded by ODC)

Although no court has yet ruled, the complaint reveals ODC’s theory of liability under each rule.

1) Rule 3.1: Frivolous or Harassing Litigation Conduct

Rule 3.1 bars lawyers from advancing proceedings or issues for the purpose of harassment, delay, or leverage, or where claims are non-meritorious. The complaint acknowledges Anderson “may have had legitimate legal issues” regarding his mother’s matters, but asserts that his “defense consisted primarily” of derogatory attacks against the judge, opposing counsel, and family members, repeated even after warnings. ODC’s implicit argument is that:

Content and pattern matter: A repeated focus on ad hominem attacks and unsupported accusations suggests a purpose to harass or disrupt rather than to advance meritorious issues.
Warnings intensify culpability: Continuing after court warnings supports an inference of purposefulness or, at minimum, a knowing disregard of Rule 3.1.
Lack of evidentiary support: Accusations against opposing counsel (e.g., theft, assault) without evidence can demonstrate a lack of good-faith basis, undermining the legitimacy of the filings.

2) Rule 3.5: Conduct Intended to Disrupt a Tribunal

Rule 3.5 prohibits conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. The complaint points to “consistent practice of making derogatory statements in court documents and proceedings in nearly every filing and appearance.” Even in the absence of overt physical disruption, ODC appears to argue that:

Systematic, inflammatory rhetoric in pleadings and proceedings is incompatible with the decorum necessary for judicial function and can constitute disruption.
Intent may be inferred from the persistence of such conduct, particularly post-warning, and from the nature of the language used (e.g., repeated profanities directed at the presiding judge and counsel).

3) Rule 8.4(b): Criminal Acts Reflecting on Fitness

Rule 8.4(b) deems it professional misconduct to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. The complaint alleges Anderson was trespassed from the nursing home, charged with disorderly conduct, and pled guilty in March 2024. ODC’s argument is not that disorderly conduct is a crime of dishonesty, but that it reflects adversely on “fitness” by demonstrating an inability to control emotions and temperament—traits antithetical to the professional obligations of a lawyer. On this theory:

A conviction—especially in the context of an ongoing legal conflict—can serve as evidence of impaired judgment and self-control relevant to the practice of law.
The nexus between the criminal behavior and the lawyer’s role (even if outside the courtroom) may heighten the concern when the behavior relates to the same underlying family dispute fueling the litigation.

4) Rule 8.4(d): Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice

Rule 8.4(d) proscribes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. ODC ties this to both the tone and content of Anderson’s filings and the practical consequences: delay, added expense, and hampered proceedings. The core claim is that:

Abusive filings and unsupported accusations consume judicial and party resources, inflame conflicts, and impede efficient adjudication.
Persisting in such tactics after warnings indicates disregard for orderly process and the court’s authority—classic predicates for 8.4(d) violations.

Role of Attorney Status in Personal Litigation

A notable feature is that the alleged misconduct occurred in a family dispute in which Anderson appears to have been personally involved. The MRPC apply to “lawyers,” not solely when representing paying clients. The complaint proceeds on the premise that a lawyer cannot shed professional obligations by acting as a pro se litigant or by invoking personal stakes. If the adjudicators adopt this view, it would reinforce that lawyer-ethics norms apply in any tribunal participation by a licensed attorney.

Potential Defenses and Counterpoints (not adjudicated)

Protected Speech: An attorney might argue that sharp criticism of judicial actors is protected speech. However, lawyer speech in and around court proceedings is subject to professional regulation designed to preserve the integrity and functioning of the justice system. The complaint’s emphasis on repeated, profane personal attacks and baseless accusations tends to push the conduct beyond protected critique into sanctionable disruption and harassment.
Zealous Advocacy: Zealousness does not license ad hominem attacks or unsupported allegations in filings. The rules target purpose, intent, and impact on judicial processes.
Isolated Criminal Conduct: A single misdemeanor may be framed as an aberration. ODC’s theory connects the disorderly conduct to a broader pattern of intemperance within the same familial dispute, thereby tying it to fitness concerns.

Impact

Although there is no decision yet, the complaint signals several potential impacts if the Commission and Supreme Court ultimately find violations:

Reaffirmation of Civility Norms: Professional discipline can rest not only on false statements or dishonesty, but also on abusive rhetoric and conduct that undermines decorum and function of courts.
Application to Self-Represented Lawyers: Lawyers engaged in personal matters remain fully bound by MRPC. Pro se status will not shield misconduct in filings or proceedings.
Fitness Beyond Honesty: 8.4(b) continues to operate as a fitness clause, capturing criminal behavior indicative of emotional dysregulation or poor judgment even when unrelated to client funds or truthfulness.
Administrative Efficiency as a Protected Interest: 8.4(d) protects the system’s ability to administer justice efficiently. Conduct that increases cost, delay, and conflict can be sanctionable even if not independently unlawful.
Sanction Considerations: If violations are found, likely factors will include the persistence after warnings (aggravation), the breadth of the misconduct (in and out of court), and the context (family dispute). Mitigating factors, if any, would depend on the record developed at hearing (e.g., remorse, corrective action, health issues, absence of prior discipline), which are not addressed in the complaint.

Complex Concepts Simplified

MRPC Rule 3.1: Prohibits lawyers from bringing or defending proceedings, or raising issues, primarily to harass, delay, or gain leverage, or where claims lack a good-faith basis in law and fact.
MRPC Rule 3.5: Bars conduct intended to disrupt court proceedings. This covers more than physical disruption; filings or statements that undercut tribunal decorum and function can qualify.
MRPC Rule 8.4(b): Makes it misconduct to commit a criminal act reflecting adversely on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or general fitness as a lawyer. Fitness includes judgment, self-control, and respect for legal processes.
MRPC Rule 8.4(d): Prohibits conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice—behavior that impairs courts’ ability to decide cases efficiently and fairly.
Commission on Practice: A body before which ODC prosecutes disciplinary complaints. An Adjudicatory Panel holds hearings and reports findings and recommendations to the Montana Supreme Court, which imposes discipline.
Citation and Answer: After a complaint is filed, the respondent lawyer is typically served with a citation requiring a written answer within a specified time (here, 21 days).
Trespassed from a Facility: A facility formally bars an individual from its premises; returning can result in legal consequences.
Constructive Fraud: A legal doctrine that can arise from a breach of duty or a relationship of trust where a person gains an advantage without an open, fair, and honest disclosure of facts—even absent intent to defraud. The complaint references an accusation of constructive fraud as background to the family disputes; the disciplinary counts focus on professional conduct, not adjudicating the fraud accusation itself.
Guardianship and Probate: Court-supervised processes to manage personal and financial affairs of an incapacitated person (guardianship) and to administer a decedent’s estate (probate). These often involve sensitive family dynamics and can become contentious.

Conclusion

The filing in the Matter of Mark E. Anderson is a formal disciplinary complaint, not an opinion or final decision. It alleges that a Montana lawyer, during personal family litigation and related interactions with a nursing home, engaged in abusive and unsupported accusations in court filings and disruptive conduct culminating in a disorderly conduct conviction. Based on these facts, ODC charges violations of MRPC Rules 3.1, 3.5, and 8.4(b) and (d), and seeks a hearing and disciplinary sanctions.

If sustained, the case would underscore that:

Attorneys remain bound by professional norms of civility, good-faith pleading, and respect for the judicial process even when litigating personal disputes or appearing pro se.
Persistent, profane, and unsupported attacks in court filings can amount to harassment and disruption under Rules 3.1 and 3.5.
Criminal acts reflecting emotional dysregulation or disrespect for lawful authority may implicate Rule 8.4(b), and conduct that increases delay and expense in litigation can violate Rule 8.4(d).

The next steps will include Anderson’s answer, a possible hearing before an Adjudicatory Panel of the Commission on Practice, and eventual recommendations to the Montana Supreme Court. Only after those proceedings will there be an authoritative decision and, potentially, a precedential opinion. For now, the complaint itself signals the enforcement posture and the ethical baselines the disciplinary authorities intend to vindicate.