No Final Disclosures, No Set-Aside: Montana Supreme Court Clarifies § 40-4-253(5), MCA Requires Perjury in a Final Declaration and Sanctions Vexatious Appeals

Introduction

In In re the Marriage of Kelly & Camp, 2025 MT 263 (DA 24-0659), the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a Sixth Judicial District Court order denying Joseph S. Camp III’s motion to set aside a 2018 final decree of dissolution and to obtain a new trial. The Court held that § 40-4-253(5), MCA, authorizes post-judgment relief only when the court discovers perjury in a party’s final declaration of disclosure; where no final declarations were exchanged, the statute provides no basis to set aside the decree. The Court also awarded Appellee Bridget J. Kelly her attorney fees and costs on appeal under M. R. App. P. 19(5), concluding the appeal lacked substantial merit and appeared aimed at delay.

The case arises from protracted post-decree litigation over Joseph’s support obligations, repeated noncompliance, and serial motions. After years of enforcement actions and two prior appellate proceedings, Joseph moved in December 2023 to set aside the December 2018 decree on the ground that the parties never exchanged final disclosure statements as required by § 40-4-254, MCA. The District Court denied the motion as untimely and because Joseph had never timely objected to entry of the decree without final disclosures. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed on a different ground rooted in the plain text of § 40-4-253(5), MCA.

Summary of the Opinion

Narrow reading of § 40-4-253(5), MCA: The Court held that relief under § 40-4-253(5), MCA—authorizing courts to set aside a judgment “if the court discovers, within 5 years from the date of entry of judgment, that a party has committed perjury in the final declaration of disclosure”—requires the existence of a final declaration and perjury within it. Because both parties conceded that no final declarations were exchanged, the statute could not apply.
Waiver/acquiescence governs absent timely objection: Reaffirming In re Marriage of Caras and In re Marriage of Anderson, the Court endorsed the principle that a party who fails to timely object to entry of a decree without final financial disclosures cannot later undo the decree on that basis, especially after years of acquiescence and multiple adjudications.
Affirmance on any ground: Although the District Court denied the motion as untimely, the Supreme Court affirmed on the statutory inapplicability of § 40-4-253(5), MCA, without reaching timeliness—consistent with State v. Wilson’s rule that an appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
Sanctions under M. R. App. P. 19(5): The Court awarded Bridget reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal, citing Joseph’s pattern of multiplying proceedings and using meritless arguments to delay enforcement, and remanded for the District Court to determine the amount.

Factual and Procedural Background

Bridget Kelly and Joseph Camp lived together in Montana since 1995 and their relationship was recognized as a common law marriage. After separating in 2013, Bridget petitioned for divorce in 2014. The parties conducted extensive discovery but did not exchange final declarations of disclosure as required by § 40-4-253(1), MCA. Following a two-day bench trial in 2018, the District Court entered a Final Decree dissolving the marriage, equitably distributing the marital estate, awarding spousal and child support to Bridget, and requiring Joseph to pay the mortgage on the marital home awarded to Bridget. Neither party objected to the decree’s entry without final disclosures, nor did either appeal on that ground.

Post-decree litigation ensued. Joseph repeatedly sought to suspend or modify his support obligations, repeatedly ceased payments without court authorization, and repeatedly faced enforcement and contempt proceedings. In 2019–2020 the District Court limited Joseph’s post-decree discovery into Bridget’s finances, denied modification, and imposed fee awards. The Supreme Court affirmed those rulings in March 2022. In 2023, further contempt findings issued for nonpayment, along with additional fee awards.

On December 15, 2023—just over five years after the December 6, 2018 decree—Joseph moved to set aside the Final Decree under § 40-4-253(5), MCA, and for a new trial, arguing the court erred by entering the decree without final disclosures and that this omission led to an inequitable division. The District Court denied the motion as untimely and because Joseph had acquiesced for years without raising the disclosure issue in multiple proceedings and appeals. On November 13, 2025, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial and granted Bridget’s request for appellate attorney fees and costs under M. R. App. P. 19(5).

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

In re Marriage of Harms, 2022 MT 41, ¶ 23, 408 Mont. 15, 504 P.3d 1108: The Court invoked Harms to emphasize that Montana’s disclosure statutes are designed to protect finality and prevent relitigation when a party is fully informed. This articulates the legislative purpose against endless post-judgment skirmishes premised on disclosure grievances.
State v. Wilson, 2022 MT 11, ¶ 34, 407 Mont. 225, 502 P.3d 679: Supports affirmance on any ground in the record. The Supreme Court used Wilson to affirm the denial on statutory inapplicability rather than the District Court’s timeliness rationale.
In re Marriage of Taylor, 2016 MT 342, ¶ 9, 386 Mont. 44, 386 P.3d 599; In re N.A., 2021 MT 228, ¶ 11, 405 Mont. 277, 495 P.3d 45; In re J.J., 2018 MT 184, ¶ 13, 392 Mont. 192, 422 P.3d 699: These cases ground the Court’s plain-text approach to statutory interpretation: if legislative intent is ascertainable from the text, courts must apply the statute as written.
City of Missoula v. Fox, 2019 MT 250, ¶ 18, 397 Mont. 388, 450 P.3d 898 (quoting § 1-2-101, MCA): Reinforces that courts may not insert language into or omit language from a statute. The Court applied this canon to reject Joseph’s plea to craft a remedy “out of whole cloth” beyond § 40-4-253(5).
In re Marriage of Anderson, 2013 MT 238, 371 Mont. 321, 307 P.3d 313; In re Marriage of Caras, 2012 MT 25, 364 Mont. 32, 270 P.3d 48; In re Marriage of Stevens, 2011 MT 106, ¶ 28, 360 Mont. 344, 253 P.3d 877: These decisions underpin the waiver/acquiescence principle: where a party fails to timely object to the lack of required disclosures and proceeds to judgment, the court may enter the decree, and the party cannot later fault the court for a procedure to which they acquiesced. The Supreme Court found those cases directly applicable to Joseph’s belated disclosure complaint.
Standards of review: Martin v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2015 MT 167, ¶ 9, 379 Mont. 423, 352 P.3d 598; In re Marriage of Johnson, 2011 MT 255, ¶ 12, 362 Mont. 236, 262 P.3d 1105 (abuse of discretion for discretionary rulings and post-trial motions); Finn v. Dakota Fire Ins. Co., 2015 MT 253, ¶ 6, 380 Mont. 481, 356 P.3d 13 (de novo review for statutory interpretation). These framed the Court’s dual lens: discretion for the ultimate denial and correctness for the statutory reading.
Sanctions for frivolous/vexatious appeals: M. R. App. P. 19(5); Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll, 2018 MT 300, ¶ 22, 393 Mont. 435, 431 P.3d 342; Bi-Lo Foods, Inc. v. Alpine Bank, 1998 MT 40, ¶ 36, 287 Mont. 367, 955 P.2d 154; Jonas v. Jonas, 2013 MT 202, ¶¶ 24–25, 371 Mont. 113, 308 P.3d 33. The Court applied these authorities to sanction Joseph’s meritless appeal that multiplied litigation and impeded enforcement.

Legal Reasoning

Text controls the remedy under § 40-4-253(5), MCA. The statute authorizes setting aside a judgment “if the court discovers, within 5 years… that a party has committed perjury in the final declaration of disclosure.” The Court emphasized two gating conditions:
- There must be a final declaration of disclosure; and
- There must be perjury within that final declaration.
Because both parties agreed that no final declarations were exchanged, the statutory mechanism simply could not be invoked. Without a declaration, there can be no perjury in that document.
No judicial “gap-filling” beyond the statute’s terms. Invoking City of Missoula v. Fox and § 1-2-101, MCA, the Court declined Joseph’s invitation to craft a broader remedy for the lack of final disclosures. The judiciary may not insert omissions or carve out new grounds beyond those the Legislature specified. Section 40-4-253(5), MCA, is therefore a narrow post-judgment remedy.
Failure to timely object to missing disclosures waives the issue. Joseph’s reliance on § 40-4-254, MCA, was undone by his own conduct. He knew no final disclosures had been exchanged when the 2018 decree entered; he did not object; and he litigated and appealed multiple enforcement and modification matters for five years without raising the issue or alleging undisclosed assets. Under Caras, Anderson, and Stevens, a party may not later fault the court for a process the party accepted—particularly after extensive litigation on the merits.
Affirmance on alternative ground eliminates need to reach timeliness. The District Court denied the motion as untimely under the five-year window in § 40-4-253(5), MCA (notably, Joseph filed nine days after the five-year mark). The Supreme Court, citing Wilson, affirmed on the more fundamental ground that the statute was inapplicable at the threshold, and therefore did not decide the timeliness question.
Sanctions were warranted under M. R. App. P. 19(5). The Court found the appeal lacked substantial or reasonable grounds and appeared aimed at delay and burdening Bridget, given Joseph’s pattern of ceasing payments without leave of court, multiplying proceedings, and offering no substantive legal authority to support his § 40-4-253(5) theory. Consistent with Jonas and the Rule 19(5) standard, the Court awarded Bridget her reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal and remanded for the amount determination.

Impact and Practical Implications

Kelly & Camp provides clarifying guidance with immediate consequences for Montana family law practice and post-judgment litigation:

Bright-line prerequisite for § 40-4-253(5), MCA: Relief is available only if there is perjury in a “final declaration of disclosure.” If final declarations were not exchanged, § 40-4-253(5) is categorically unavailable. Litigants must identify a different statutory or procedural basis for post-judgment relief, if any.
Waiver/acquiescence is decisive: Parties who proceed to judgment without objecting to the absence of final disclosures—then litigate for years without complaint—cannot later unwind the decree on that omission. Timely objections are essential preservation tools.
Finality and judicial economy: The decision reinforces legislative and judicial commitments to finality in dissolution cases and curbing relitigation of settled issues absent statutory predicates (e.g., perjury in a final declaration).
Appellate risk for delay tactics: The fee award under M. R. App. P. 19(5) warns that appeals lacking substantial legal grounding—especially those that coincide with noncompliance and cause delay—risk sanctions, including attorney fees and costs.
Counseling clients and case management: Practitioners should ensure compliance with disclosure requirements pre-judgment and, critically, make timely objections if the record is incomplete. If contemplating post-judgment relief, counsel must match the relief sought to the statute’s predicates and deadlines, rather than rely on general equity arguments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Final declaration of disclosure: In Montana dissolution cases, each party must exchange a final, sworn financial disclosure before the decree is entered (§ 40-4-253, MCA). These documents are designed to provide full financial transparency and prevent later disputes.
Perjury in a final declaration: A knowingly false, material statement made under oath within the final declaration. Under § 40-4-253(5), MCA, discovery of such perjury within five years can justify setting aside all or part of a decree. Without a final declaration, this pathway is closed.
Waiver/acquiescence: When a party knowingly proceeds without objecting to a procedural irregularity (e.g., no final disclosures) and participates in or benefits from the process, they generally cannot later complain about that irregularity to undo the result.
Abuse of discretion vs. de novo review: Appellate courts defer to trial courts on discretionary rulings (abuse of discretion standard) but independently interpret statutes (de novo). Kelly & Camp blends both: a de novo reading of § 40-4-253(5) to determine applicability, supporting an affirmance of the denial.
M. R. App. P. 19(5) sanctions: Montana’s appellate rule authorizes sanctions, including attorney fees and costs, when an appeal is frivolous, vexatious, filed to harass or delay, or taken without substantial grounds. Courts apply this sparingly, typically when conduct amounts to an abuse of the judicial system.

Key Takeaways

Statutory gatekeeping: Section 40-4-253(5), MCA, is a narrow remedy tethered to perjury in a final declaration; no declaration means no § 40-4-253(5) relief.
Timely objection matters: If a party believes final disclosures were not exchanged as required by § 40-4-254, MCA, they must object before the decree or promptly after; prolonged silence and participation constitute waiver.
Appellate efficiency and deterrence: The Court validated sanctions to deter meritless appeals that serve primarily to stall enforcement of valid judgments.
Finality in family law: The decision fortifies the finality of dissolution decrees and limits post-judgment relitigation absent precisely satisfied statutory conditions.

Conclusion

Kelly & Camp crystallizes a straightforward but consequential rule: post-judgment relief under § 40-4-253(5), MCA, requires perjury in a final declaration of disclosure; absent such a declaration, the statute affords no avenue to set aside a decree. By reaffirming waiver and acquiescence principles from Caras and Anderson, the Court underscored that litigants must raise disclosure defects at the proper time, not years later after extensive litigation. The award of appellate attorney fees under M. R. App. P. 19(5) further signals that Montana’s high court will sanction appeals that lack substantive merit and appear designed to delay enforcement. For practitioners and parties alike, the opinion is a clear directive: adhere to disclosure requirements, preserve objections, and align post-judgment motions with the exact statutory predicates—or risk finality and sanctions.

Case: In re the Marriage of Kelly & Camp, 2025 MT 263 (Supreme Court of Montana, Nov. 13, 2025).
Disposition: Affirmed; remanded for calculation of Appellee’s reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs under M. R. App. P. 19(5).