No Federal Liberty Interest in Tennessee Parole Release Dates Even After Grant of Parole: A Comprehensive Commentary on Hester v. Chester County, 24-5800 (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s published decision in Michael Hester v. Chester County, Tennessee squarely addresses an issue that arises with some frequency in corrections practice but has been doctrinally underdeveloped: whether a Tennessee inmate, once granted parole and issued a Certificate of Parole, holds a federal liberty interest in being released on the designated parole date before the expiration of his aggregate sentence.

Hester spent roughly four extra months in state custody after the Tennessee Board of Parole granted him parole with a specific effective date. A county detainer—alleged to be invalid and knowingly filed to keep him in custody—blocked his actual release. He brought a § 1983 action alleging that county officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights (and, to a lesser extent, the Fourth Amendment) by continuing to confine him without lawful authority.

The Sixth Circuit affirms dismissal of his federal claims. In doing so, it cements a clear and consequential rule: under Tennessee’s discretionary parole scheme, an inmate has no federal liberty interest in being released on a granted parole date before his sentence expires, and a Certificate of Parole does not itself create such an interest. Without a protected liberty interest, Hester’s procedural due process claim fails, the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity, and the county cannot be liable under Monell.

This commentary examines the opinion’s factual context, its core holdings, its treatment of federal and state parole jurisprudence, and its broader implications for over-detention, parole litigation, and municipal liability in the Sixth Circuit.

II. Background of the Case

A. Factual Background

Hester’s legal odyssey began with separate criminal matters in two Tennessee counties:

Madison County (2016): Hester pleaded guilty to unspecified criminal charges and received a ten-year sentence. He was later released on probation.
Chester County (2019): Hester was arrested on new charges in Chester County, which triggered revocation of his Madison County probation. The Chester County case led to:
- Three misdemeanor counts for driving on a revoked license (merged into one 11-month, 29-day sentence); and
- Two felony Schedule II drug offenses (possession with intent to sell and to deliver), for which he received 6 years.

The Chester County court ordered the five Chester sentences to run:

Concurrently with each other; but
Consecutively to the Madison County probation-revocation sentence.

That structure produced an aggregate sentence of sixteen years, set to expire on January 27, 2033. Hester was remanded to the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) and housed at Morgan County Correctional Complex (MCCX). In due course, he became eligible for parole.

On January 10, 2023, the Tennessee Board of Parole granted parole and issued a Certificate of Parole (COP), ordering that Hester “be, and hereby is paroled” effective February 15, 2023.

Yet shortly before that effective date, Chester County Jail Administrator Brian Stout informed Hester that he and Deputy Sheriff Mark Griffin had “taken it upon themselves” to lodge a detainer to prevent his release. On February 14, 2023, Stout filed the detainer warrant. Hester alleges that Stout, Griffin, and Sheriff Blair Weaver falsely asserted that he still owed an additional 11 months and 29 days in the Chester County jail.

As a result:

The February 15, 2023 parole effective date passed with no release.
Hester and his family attempted without success to get the matter resolved.
Hester claims the county officials ignored his complaints and failed to correct the issue.
After he retained counsel, the detainer was lifted on May 10, 2023—84 days past the parole date.
Additional “unknown delays” followed, and Hester was finally released on June 22, 2023—127 days after his supposed parole effective date.

B. Procedural Background

In February 2024, Hester filed a § 1983 action in the Western District of Tennessee against:

County defendants: Chester County, Sheriff Weaver, Deputy Griffin, and Jail Administrator Stout;
State defendants: three TDOC officials; and
John Doe defendants: unidentified individuals allegedly involved in his over-detention.

He alleged:

Federal claims: deprivation of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, based on continued custody after his parole date; and
State claims: violations of the Tennessee Constitution and state tort law.

The county defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), raising, among other arguments, qualified immunity for the individual officers and failure to state a Monell claim against the county. The state defendants filed their own motion to dismiss, and Hester voluntarily dismissed the claims against them.

The district court:

Held that Tennessee law does not create a protected liberty interest in parole, so Hester failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim;
Granted qualified immunity to the individual county defendants;
Found Hester’s allegations insufficient to sustain municipal liability under Monell; and
Declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Hester appealed only as to the county defendants and the federal claims and argued the district court erred in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Davis affirms the district court in full. The key holdings are:

No cognizable Fourth Amendment claim preserved. Hester referenced the Fourth Amendment but failed to develop any appellate argument distinct from his Fourteenth Amendment theory. The panel deems any such claim forfeited.
No federal liberty interest in parole release under Tennessee law. The court reiterates that under Tennessee’s discretionary parole scheme, inmates have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in being granted parole. Hester tries to recast his claim as a liberty interest in being released after parole is granted (via the COP) rather than in being granted parole. The court rejects this distinction and holds that no such liberty interest exists prior to expiration of the underlying sentence.
No liberty interest created by the Certificate of Parole or Tennessee regulations. The COP and the regulation governing its issuance (Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-01-01-.09) do not create a substantive federal liberty interest, especially where the Board retains authority to delay or adjust a parole date.
Over-detention doctrine inapplicable to pre-expiration parole delays. Over-detention precedents protect inmates from being confined beyond the expiration of a valid sentence. Hester’s sentence runs until 2033, and he challenges delay in parole release within that term. The panel holds that those over-detention cases are neither controlling nor analogous enough to establish the liberty interest Hester claims.
Qualified immunity for the individual county officers. Even if one assumed a liberty interest existed, there was no clearly established law in the Sixth Circuit (or beyond) that would have put reasonable officials on notice that delaying release after a COP, via a detainer, violated the Constitution. Thus, the sheriff, deputy, and jail administrator are entitled to qualified immunity.
No Monell liability for Chester County. Because there is no underlying constitutional violation, the county cannot be liable under § 1983 as a matter of law.
No abuse of discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction. Once federal claims were dismissed at an early stage, the district court acted within its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) by dismissing the state-law claims without prejudice.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

1. Federal Parole Liberty-Interest Doctrine: Greenholtz and its Progeny

The opinion is anchored in a well-established line of Supreme Court cases defining when an inmate has a protected liberty interest in parole:

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)
- Holding: There is no constitutional right to parole. However, state law can create a liberty interest if it uses mandatory language that gives inmates a legitimate claim of entitlement to parole under specified circumstances.
- Nebraska’s statute said the Board “shall” release eligible inmates unless certain exceptions applied. That mandatory “shall/unless” structure created an “expectancy of release” entitled to due process protection.
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) and Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011)
- Both affirm the principle that state statutes with mandatory language can create protected parole interests; the substantive scope and process remain modest.
Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981)
- The Ohio parole system was discretionary and did not create a liberty interest in parole.
- An inmate who had been approved for parole but whose parole was later rescinded without a hearing had no due process claim, because there was no state-created entitlement in the first place.
Inmates of Orient Correctional Inst. v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1991)
- Sixth Circuit case applying Greenholtz and Jago to Ohio law.
- The court held that because Ohio law did not create a legitimate entitlement to parole, inmates could not claim a protected liberty interest in their “on or after” parole dates.

Collectively, these cases establish two key principles:

The Constitution itself does not guarantee a right to parole; any liberty interest must be state-created.
A discretionary scheme without mandatory release language does not create a liberty interest in parole or in a particular parole release date.

2. Tennessee Parole Law: No Liberty Interest in Parole

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that Tennessee’s parole statutes do not create a federal liberty interest in the granting of parole:

Wright v. Trammell, 810 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) – concluded that Tennessee’s scheme is discretionary and does not confer a protected expectation of parole.
Seagroves v. Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole, 86 F. App’x 45 (6th Cir. 2003) – reaffirmed the same conclusion, citing Tennessee statutes.
Thomas v. Montgomery, 140 F.4th 335 (6th Cir. 2025) – more recently reiterated that Tennessee inmates have no “constitutionally recognized expectation of receiving parole because the statutory scheme does not sufficiently constrain the Board’s discretion to deny parole.”

Hester explicitly acknowledges this body of law and does not disturb it. Instead, the question becomes whether something different happens once parole has been granted and the Board has set a date.

3. Morrissey, Vitek, and Wolff: Where Liberty Interests Do Exist

Hester leaned on several Supreme Court cases recognizing other liberty interests:

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
- Held that a parolee living in the community has a protected liberty interest in continued freedom, requiring due process before parole revocation.
- The key is that the individual is already at liberty; revocation returns him to custody and inflicts a “grievous loss.”
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)
- Found a liberty interest where a state statute created specific conditions under which an inmate could be involuntarily transferred to a mental health facility.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)
- Held that state-created “good-time credits” could constitute a liberty interest because the statutory framework defined when they must be granted and revoked, subject to due process.

The Sixth Circuit in Hester correctly characterizes these cases as consistent with Greenholtz rather than exceptions to it: liberty interests arise when the state creates defined entitlements or uses mandatory language limiting official discretion. In Hester’s case, the Tennessee parole scheme remains discretionary throughout, and the COP does not function like good-time credits or the Vitek statute.

B. The Court’s Core Legal Reasoning

1. No Liberty Interest in “Parole Release” Before Sentence Expiration

Hester’s central move was to distinguish between:

a liberty interest in being granted parole (which he concedes does not exist in Tennessee); and
a liberty interest in being released once parole has been granted and a specific effective date set (which he claims does exist, at least once the COP issues).

The Sixth Circuit rejects that distinction for several reasons:

State law remains discretionary even post-grant.
Tennessee regulations permit the Board to delay a parole date if it receives significant new information (Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-01-01-.09). That contingency parallels the Ohio law in Jago and Inmates of Orient, where the parole authority could rescind or adjust release decisions before actual release.
The COP is not a substantive entitlement.
Hester argued the COP itself, issued under Tennessee regulations, created a legitimate entitlement to release on February 15, 2023. The court notes he identifies no mandatory language in the regulation that would convert the COP into a constitutional entitlement. Rather, the COP is issued within a discretionary system that retains authority to change release dates.
Morrissey applies only after actual release.
The liberty interest in Morrissey is the parolee’s interest in remaining free, not an inmate’s interest in becoming free. Hester was never actually released into the community, so he never occupied the status of a parolee under Morrissey. The court refuses to shift the vesting of that interest back to the signing of the COP.
No principled way to favor delayed release over rescinded parole.
The court points out a core inconsistency in Hester’s position: if even a rescission of parole or “on or after” dates (as in Jago and Inmates of Orient) does not violate due process because no liberty interest ever arose, it is difficult to justify special protection for a mere delay in release within the same discretionary system.

The opinion therefore concludes that Hester’s delayed release, occurring well before the expiration of his sentence in 2033, did not implicate any liberty interest cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

2. Over-Detention Theory Rejected: Sentence Not Expired

Anticipating the weakness of the parole-liberty-interest line, Hester tried to reframe his harm as “over-detention” — a recognized species of due process claim when a prisoner remains confined after his lawful sentence expires.

The court distinguishes that doctrine sharply:

Classic over-detention occurs when a valid sentence has ended, and the state nevertheless keeps the individual in custody. At that moment, the state has no remaining lawful authority to detain, and the liberty interest is at its zenith.
Hester’s case: his total sentence extends to 2033. He is not claiming his sentence expired in 2023. Rather, he argues he was entitled to be conditionally released within the sentence under parole.

The panel references:

McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institute, 407 U.S. 245 (1972) – illustrating that confinement beyond a lawful term violates due process.
Shorts v. Bartholomew, 255 F. App’x 46 (6th Cir. 2007) – an unpublished Sixth Circuit case where a prisoner was held for more than 200 days beyond the one-year incarceration component of his sentence before probation began. The court there treated the extra confinement as unconstitutional over-detention.

But the panel explains why Shorts does not help Hester:

Different sentence structure. Shorts had received a “split sentence” of incarceration followed by probation. Once the incarceration part ended, he had served the entire “imprisonment” component; the remainder was noncustodial probation. Hester, by contrast, was still serving a multi-year prison term that had not expired.
Parole is closer to imprisonment than probation. Citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and Morrissey, the court underscores that parole is a “variation on imprisonment,” not a substitute for it. It is fundamentally different from probation, which is imposed “in lieu of” incarceration.
Unpublished case cannot clearly establish law. Even if Shorts were factually on-point (which it is not), it is unpublished and thus incapable of clearly establishing a constitutional right for qualified immunity purposes.

The court also discusses several out-of-circuit cases (e.g., Berry v. Baca, Brass v. County of Los Angeles, Davis v. Hall) which hold that jailers may not unreasonably delay release after a court orders a detainee freed. But in each, the detainee’s lawful term had ended (via completion of sentence, payment of bail, or dismissal/acquittal). None involved an inmate with years left on his sentence whose parole release date was delayed by a detainer. Accordingly, these cases cannot clearly establish the rule Hester advocates, and they arise in materially different contexts.

3. Qualified Immunity: No Clearly Established Right

Qualified immunity shields government officials from personal liability unless:

The plaintiff shows a violation of a federal right; and
The right was “clearly established” at the time — meaning every reasonable official would have understood that the conduct was unlawful in the particular circumstances.

Here, the court chooses the straightforward path: because Hester fails to establish a constitutional liberty interest, there is no violation at step one. But the panel also makes clear that, even if such a right existed, it was not clearly established:

Hester conceded he could not “find a case directly on point” establishing that a Certificate of Parole alone creates a liberty interest in release.
The relevant analogues — over-detention cases and parole cases from other jurisdictions — either involve sentence-expiration scenarios or statutory schemes with mandatory release provisions absent in Tennessee.
Under Sixth Circuit precedent, unpublished opinions and most out-of-circuit decisions cannot, standing alone, clearly establish a right unless they “point unmistakably” to a rule that is already “clearly foreshadowed” by binding authority. That standard is not met here.

Therefore, Sheriff Weaver, Deputy Griffin, and Administrator Stout are entitled to qualified immunity: a reasonable Tennessee jail official in 2023 would not have had clear notice that causing a delay in parole release — even via an arguably invalid detainer — violated a federally protected liberty interest.

4. Monell Liability: No Underlying Violation, No County Liability

To hold a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show:

a constitutional violation; and
a municipal policy or custom that was the “moving force” behind that violation (Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).

The panel reiterates a critical threshold rule: a county “cannot be liable under § 1983 absent an underlying constitutional violation by its officers” (citing Roell v. Hamilton County and Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County). Because no federal liberty interest was violated, Hester’s municipal liability theories — whether grounded in an alleged single policymaker decision or ratification by Sheriff Weaver — fail as a matter of law.

5. Supplemental Jurisdiction over State-Law Claims

Once the federal claims were dismissed, the district court declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Hester’s Tennessee-law claims (state constitutional violations and torts). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a federal court may decline supplemental jurisdiction when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

In evaluating that decision, the Sixth Circuit applies the traditional factors of:

judicial economy,
convenience,
fairness, and
comity.

Because the case was at an early stage, the district court had not invested heavily in factual development, and state courts are better suited to interpret Tennessee constitutional and tort law, the panel finds no abuse of discretion in dismissing the state-law claims without prejudice.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is a “Liberty Interest”?

A liberty interest is a legal term for a kind of personal freedom or entitlement that the Constitution protects against arbitrary government interference. To bring a due process claim, a plaintiff must show:

The interest at stake (e.g., physical liberty, property, employment) is one the law recognizes as protected; and
Government deprived him of that interest without fair procedures (“due process”).

In the parole context:

The Constitution does not, by itself, create a right to early release on parole.
However, state law can create such a right by using mandatory language (e.g., “the Board shall grant parole when X and Y criteria are satisfied”).
Tennessee’s parole statutes are discretionary and omit this mandatory entitlement language, so there is no liberty interest in being granted parole.

Hester clarifies that this conclusion does not change simply because a parole board has given a favorable decision and set a release date; absent mandatory language stripping the Board (or the state) of residual discretion, there is still no liberty interest in being released early.

2. Parole vs. Probation vs. Sentence Expiration

Full sentence expiration: The inmate has completed the entire court-imposed term. At that moment, continued detention is almost per se unconstitutional unless some new lawful basis exists (e.g., civil commitment).
Probation: Often imposed “in lieu of” incarceration. The person may never go to prison at all if he complies with conditions. Once the incarceration component of a split sentence ends, holding the person in custody can be over-detention.
Parole: Release from prison before the sentence ends, subject to conditions. The sentence continues to run; the person remains under supervision and is conceptually still serving the sentence in a modified form. If the statutory scheme is discretionary, an inmate has no entitlement to be placed on parole in the first place.

The Sixth Circuit heavily emphasizes that parole is “more akin to imprisonment” than probation, which affects when liberty interests arise and whether over-detention doctrine applies.

3. Qualified Immunity in Practice

Qualified immunity protects individual officials from damages unless:

They violated a federal right; and
A reasonable official in their position would have known that the conduct was unlawful under clearly established precedent.

“Clearly established” typically requires:

Supreme Court or controlling circuit precedent with similar facts; or
A robust consensus of persuasive authority that makes the unlawfulness of the conduct obvious.

In Hester, the absence of any binding case recognizing a liberty interest in Tennessee parole release dates — combined with existing case law rejecting similar claims in other jurisdictions — makes it impossible for Hester to satisfy the clearly established prong.

4. Monell / Municipal Liability

A county is not vicariously liable for every constitutional wrong committed by its employees. To sue a county under § 1983, a plaintiff must show:

A municipal policy, custom, or decision by a final policymaker caused the violation; and
An actual underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Without the latter, a Monell claim fails automatically. Since the court found no violation of a protected liberty interest, there was nothing to attribute to Chester County as a matter of federal law.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

1. Firming Up the No-Liberty-Interest Rule for Tennessee Parole

Hester extends and solidifies existing Sixth Circuit law in an important way:

It was already clear that Tennessee inmates have no liberty interest in the grant of parole.
Hester now makes explicit that even after parole has been granted and a release date set, an inmate still lack a federal liberty interest in being paroled before his underlying sentence expires, at least under the current Tennessee statutory and regulatory framework.

This forecloses a class of constitutional claims by Tennessee prisoners who experience delayed release after a favorable parole decision, even when those delays are attributable to local detainers or administrative errors, unless some other constitutional theory (e.g., equal protection, First Amendment retaliation) is plausibly alleged.

2. Strategic Shift: State Law and State Courts

The opinion almost invites future plaintiffs in similar circumstances to look to state law:

If Tennessee statutes, regulations, or state constitutional provisions are interpreted by Tennessee courts to create rights or entitlements concerning parole release dates, then breaches might yield relief in state court.
Common-law torts — such as false imprisonment, negligence, or abuse of process — may provide remedies for wrongful or reckless use of detainers that delay release.

But federal courts applying § 1983 will generally be constrained by Hester when plaintiffs allege only that they were kept in custody beyond a parole effective date (but before sentence expiration) due to county action.

3. Guidance for Jailers and County Officials

For corrections and law enforcement officials within the Sixth Circuit, Hester offers both assurance and caution:

Assurance (federal side): Absent a clearly established federal right to parole release in Tennessee, officials will typically be protected by qualified immunity from damages suits premised solely on delayed parole release dates.
Caution (state side): The opinion expressly leaves state-law questions open. Officials remain potentially exposed to liability under Tennessee tort law and state constitutional doctrines for reckless or bad-faith detainer practices or for ignoring clear documentation of a prisoner’s entitlement to be transferred or released.

4. Limits of Over-Detention Claims in the Sixth Circuit

By rejecting Hester’s analogy to over-detention cases, the Sixth Circuit implicitly narrows the scope of that doctrine:

Over-detention remains viable after sentence expiration or where a court order mandating immediate release has issued.
But delays in transitional status (parole vs. probation vs. continued imprisonment) before sentence expiration will receive closer scrutiny, and courts will ask whether state law truly left officials without discretion to keep the person confined.

The court’s discussion of Shorts and more recent skepticism about over-detention’s “clearly established” status (as referenced in Jones v. Bottom) further underscores the need for plaintiffs to fit within the narrow, core fact patterns of that doctrine.

VII. Conclusion

Hester v. Chester County crystallizes a critical rule in parole and over-detention jurisprudence within the Sixth Circuit: under Tennessee’s current discretionary parole framework, a grant of parole and issuance of a Certificate of Parole do not create a federal liberty interest in being released on a specific parole date before the sentence’s expiration. Without such an interest, no Fourteenth Amendment due process claim lies against county officials for delaying a prisoner’s release via an allegedly invalid detainer, and those officials are entitled to qualified immunity.

This ruling:

Reinforces the Greenholtz/Jago paradigm that parole liberty interests are grounded in state-created mandatory entitlements, not in hopeful expectations or administrative decisions within a discretionary system;
Clarifies that over-detention doctrine is confined to post-sentence or post-release-order confinement;
Forecloses Monell liability for Tennessee counties in this specific class of parole-delay cases absent another constitutional violation; and
Shifts the primary battleground for such claims to state courts and state-law theories.

In practical terms, Hester sends a clear message: federal courts will not treat delayed parole release within a valid term of imprisonment in Tennessee as a federal due process problem, but rather as an issue for state law, state courts, and state policymakers to resolve.

No Federal Liberty Interest in Tennessee Parole Release Dates: Commentary on Hester v. Chester County