No Exhaustion, No Case: Third Circuit Reaffirms Strict PLRA Compliance and Permits Dismissal of Unidentified Defendants under Rule 21

No Exhaustion, No Case: Third Circuit Reaffirms Strict PLRA Compliance and Permits Dismissal of Unidentified Defendants under Rule 21

Introduction

In Armoni Johnson v. Bienkoski, Nos. 24-1049 & 24-1276 (3d Cir. Sept. 2, 2025) (non-precedential, per curiam), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment rulings entered by the Middle District of Pennsylvania in a pro se prison civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case centers on the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion mandate, Pennsylvania’s inmate grievance system (DC-ADM 804), the continuing vitality of sovereign immunity for state prisons and official-capacity claims, pleading and proof rules for supervisory liability, and the dismissal of an unidentified “Doe”-type defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 after prolonged inability to identify that party.

Johnson alleged that while incarcerated at SCI Dallas, multiple officials retaliated against him for exercising First Amendment rights and interfered with his legal access and religious practice. The allegations included a striking factual wrinkle: a prison vocational instructor (Richard Devers) sat on the jury in Johnson’s state criminal trial. After Johnson’s return to SCI Dallas in March 2016, he contended that various officers confiscated his items (deodorant, toothpaste, legal materials, and religious beads), issued a misconduct, and later placed him in Administrative Custody (AC) when the prison realized Devers’s jury service. He sued the individual officers, a “Teacher aide” identified only as “Ada,” four supervisory officials, and SCI Dallas itself.

The key issues on appeal were:

  • Whether Johnson exhausted “available” administrative remedies as required by the PLRA for claims against Sergeant Edmund Bienkowski (spelled “Bienkoski” in the caption), Officer David Cuba (spelled “Chuba” in the caption), and instructor Devers;
  • Whether sovereign immunity and pleading defects doomed claims against SCI Dallas and alleged supervisory officials;
  • Whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the unidentified “Ada (Teacher aide)” defendant under Rule 21 after years of litigation; and
  • Whether the district court erred in denying post-judgment motions under Rules 59(e) and 60(b).

The Third Circuit affirmed across the board, emphasizing strict compliance with DC-ADM 804, the limited scope of “unavailability” exceptions under Ross v. Blake, and the importance of coherent appellate briefing even by pro se litigants.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in full:

  • Sovereign immunity and supervisory liability: The district court properly dismissed with prejudice Johnson’s § 1983 claims against SCI Dallas and four supervisory defendants at screening. State prisons (and official-capacity claims against state employees) are protected by sovereign immunity, and Johnson did not plausibly allege any recognized theory of supervisory liability.
  • Unidentified “Ada” defendant: The district court correctly dismissed the claim against “Ada (Teacher aide)” under Rule 21 because Johnson failed to identify and serve her after five years and despite discovery opportunities.
  • PLRA exhaustion: Summary judgment for Devers and Bienkowski was proper because Johnson admitted he never filed grievances against them. Summary judgment for Officer Cuba was proper because the expanded record showed Johnson failed to complete a final appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA) on the religious-beads grievance.
  • Unavailability arguments forfeited or unpersuasive: Although the Court noted a possible carve-out in DC-ADM 804 for grievances concerning misconduct citations or AC status (citing Prater v. DOC), Johnson forfeited the point by inadequate briefing and otherwise failed to show the grievance process was “unavailable” under Ross v. Blake.
  • Post-judgment motions: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s Rule 59(e)/60(b) motions.

The panel also admonished Johnson that future defective appellate briefs may result in summary affirmance without further analysis, reiterating concerns it had previously expressed in Johnson v. McGinley (3d Cir. 2023).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006): The PLRA mandates “proper exhaustion,” requiring prisoners to follow all procedural rules of the prison’s grievance system, including deadlines and appeal steps. This provided the doctrinal backbone for affirming summary judgment where Johnson never grieved two defendants (Devers and Bienkowski) and did not complete the final SOIGA appeal for the grievance involving Officer Cuba.
  • Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016): Ross carved out three narrow situations where administrative remedies are deemed “unavailable”: dead ends, opacity, or thwarting by officials (machination/misrepresentation/intimidation). The Court found none applied here and emphasized that Johnson’s briefing did not effectively develop any Ross-based argument.
  • DC-ADM 804 (Pennsylvania DOC “Inmate Grievance System”): Pennsylvania’s three-stage process (initial grievance, appeal to Facility Manager, and final SOIGA appeal) controlled whether Johnson properly exhausted. An affidavit from SOIGA established there was no final appeal on the beads grievance, and Johnson admitted no grievance against two defendants. The panel also noted (but did not decide) a potential exception for misconduct/AC matters referenced in § 1(A)(7), aligning with Prater v. Dep’t of Corr., 76 F.4th 184, 204 (3d Cir. 2023), but held that Johnson forfeited the issue.
  • Prater v. Dep’t of Corr., 76 F.4th 184 (3d Cir. 2023): Cited to suggest that certain matters (e.g., disciplinary or AC decisions) may be channeled through specialized procedures other than DC-ADM 804, potentially rendering 804 “unavailable” for those specific claims. But because Johnson did not properly raise or develop that argument, it could not help him on appeal.
  • Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2020): Reaffirmed Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity for state prisons and suits against state employees in their official capacities under § 1983. This supported dismissal of claims against SCI Dallas and any official-capacity claims.
  • Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2010): Clarified the narrow avenues for supervisory liability (e.g., personal involvement, policy with deliberate indifference). Johnson pleaded none of them, warranting dismissal of supervisory claims.
  • Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2020): Cited for the standard of review—plenary review of sua sponte dismissals under § 1915(e). It framed the appellate posture for reviewing the district court’s screening rulings.
  • Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184 (3d Cir. 2024): Confirmed plenary review for summary judgment decisions, guiding the Court’s de novo assessment of the exhaustion record.
  • Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2003) and Max’s Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669 (3d Cir. 1999): Provided the abuse-of-discretion standard and substantive parameters for reviewing denials of Rule 59(e) and 60(b) motions. Johnson’s post-judgment challenges failed under these demanding standards.
  • Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017); Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 2018); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2013): These authorities underscore that even pro se litigants must present clear, developed arguments on appeal; ill-developed or inadequately briefed issues are typically forfeited. The Court invoked these to explain why it would not reconstruct Johnson’s arguments and warned that future defective briefs could be summarily rejected.
  • Johnson v. McGinley, No. 22-3288, 2023 WL 5670700 (3d Cir. 2023) (per curiam): The panel referenced its prior admonition to Johnson about deficient briefing, repeating the concern here and signaling that continued noncompliance could lead to affirmance without further explanation.

Legal Reasoning

The decision rests on four interlocking strands of doctrine:

  1. PLRA exhaustion must be completed and proved; unavailability is narrow.
    The Court held that Johnson’s claims against Devers and Sergeant Bienkowski were barred outright because he never filed grievances against them. For Officer Cuba, although Johnson filed an initial grievance about the seizure of religious beads (a First Amendment Free Exercise claim), the undisputed record showed he did not perfect a final appeal to SOIGA. Under Woodford, exhaustion requires strict compliance with all procedural steps; partial or defective use of the grievance process is insufficient. Johnson’s generalized assertions that the process was unavailable did not satisfy Ross’s tight exceptions. The Court noted a possible carve-out in DC-ADM 804 for misconduct or AC challenges (as discussed in Prater), but Johnson forfeited that line of argument through inadequate briefing.
  2. Sovereign immunity forecloses § 1983 suits against state prisons and official-capacity defendants.
    Relying on Downey, the Court affirmed dismissal of claims against SCI Dallas and any claims that amounted to official-capacity suits. Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity bars such claims, and state prisons are not “persons” suable under § 1983 for damages. Johnson’s “municipal liability” theory was inapposite because SCI Dallas is an arm of the state, not a municipality.
  3. Supervisory liability requires specific, plausible allegations of personal involvement or culpable policies.
    The Court agreed that Johnson’s supervisory claims failed under Santiago’s framework. Conclusory or vicarious-liability allegations against supervisory officials—without facts showing personal participation, knowledge and acquiescence, or a policy maintained with deliberate indifference—do not state a claim.
  4. Unidentified parties can be dismissed when the plaintiff fails to identify them despite ample time and discovery.
    The Court upheld dismissal of the “Ada (Teacher aide)” claim under Rule 21 after five years without identification or service, noting Johnson’s vague assertions that defendants “hid” or “withheld” her identity were unsupported. Where discovery opportunities are provided yet the plaintiff cannot identify a Doe defendant, dismissal is within the court’s discretion to manage its docket and enforce service rules.

On standards of review, the Court applied plenary review to the § 1915(e) screening dismissals and to the summary judgment orders; it reviewed the denial of post-judgment motions for abuse of discretion. Finding no legal error and no abuse of discretion, it affirmed.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although designated “not precedential,” this decision carries practical guidance for prison litigation within the Third Circuit:

  • Exhaustion remains a powerful, often case-dispositive defense. Defendants prevailed entirely on exhaustion for the individual-capacity claims that reached summary judgment. Prisoners must:
    • File a grievance naming the specific actor(s) tied to each incident;
    • Appeal to the Facility Manager; and
    • Complete the final appeal to SOIGA.
    Records from SOIGA (or the Facility Manager) can be decisive.
  • Unavailability exceptions are narrow and must be supported with specific evidence. Ross’s exceptions demand concrete proof of dead ends, opacity, or thwarting. General allegations or vague references to confusion will not suffice.
  • Know the carve-outs in DC-ADM 804. As suggested by Prater and the Court’s footnote, some issues (e.g., disciplinary or AC matters) may be channeled outside 804. But litigants must argue and document those carve-outs; failure to develop the point can result in forfeiture.
  • Sovereign immunity and supervisory screens are formidable gatekeepers. Claims against state prisons and bare supervisory claims will be culled at screening unless plaintiffs plead facts fitting recognized doctrines.
  • Doe defendants require diligence. Courts may dismiss unidentified defendants under Rule 21 when plaintiffs, even pro se, cannot identify them after ample time and discovery. Early, targeted discovery to learn identities is crucial.
  • Appellate briefing matters—pro se status is not a shield against forfeiture. The panel reiterated that ill-developed arguments are forfeited and warned that continued briefing deficiencies could prompt summary affirmance. Clarity and focus are essential on appeal.

Taken together, the decision underscores that meritorious-sounding constitutional claims can be lost entirely on process grounds. It also illustrates the strategic value of developing a complete administrative record and of preserving nuanced “unavailability” arguments where DC-ADM 804 overlaps with other DOC procedures.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • PLRA Exhaustion (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)): Before suing in federal court, incarcerated people must use the prison’s grievance system exactly as written—filing the grievance on time, naming the responsible staff, and taking all required appeals. Missing the final appeal (to SOIGA in Pennsylvania) usually means the federal claim cannot proceed.
  • “Unavailable” Remedies (Ross v. Blake): You don’t have to exhaust if the system is (1) a dead end, (2) so confusing you can’t use it, or (3) if staff sabotage your efforts. But you must show real, specific facts proving one of these situations.
  • DC-ADM 804 (Pennsylvania): This is the DOC’s general grievance policy with three steps. Some issues (like disciplinary or AC decisions) may be addressed under different DOC policies, which can affect what “exhaustion” requires for those particular claims.
  • Sovereign Immunity: States and their agencies (like SCI Dallas) are generally immune from damages suits under § 1983. Suing prison staff “in their official capacities” is effectively suing the state, and is typically barred for damages claims.
  • Supervisory Liability: Supervisors aren’t automatically responsible for subordinates’ actions. A plaintiff must allege facts showing the supervisor’s personal involvement, knowledge and acquiescence, or a policy/custom that caused the violation with deliberate indifference.
  • Rule 21 Dismissal of Unidentified Defendants: If a plaintiff sues a “John/Jane Doe” but cannot identify and serve that person despite reasonable time and discovery, the court can drop that party from the case.
  • Summary Judgment: A case can be decided without trial if there’s no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In exhaustion disputes, grievance records and affidavits are often decisive.
  • Forfeiture on Appeal: Appellate courts will not fix or invent arguments for the appellant. If an issue is not clearly argued and supported in the brief, it is usually considered forfeited.

Conclusion

Johnson v. Bienkoski is a textbook reaffirmation of key constraints in prison civil-rights litigation: strict PLRA exhaustion, the narrowness of “unavailability,” the resilience of sovereign immunity, the exacting nature of supervisory liability, and the court’s authority to dismiss unidentified defendants after prolonged delay. While the case’s underlying facts—especially a prison instructor’s jury service—are unusual, the Third Circuit never reached the merits because the claims faltered on procedural prerequisites.

The broader lesson is practical rather than doctrinally novel: success in prison § 1983 cases turns not only on constitutional substance but also on diligent compliance with grievance processes, careful pleading, prompt identification and service of defendants, and clear, focused appellate briefing. Non-precedential though it is, the decision sends a clear signal: no exhaustion, no case—and no indulgence for opaque appellate strategies, even from pro se litigants.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

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