No Eighth Amendment or ADA Violation Where Restrictive Housing of a Mentally Ill Inmate Is Tied to Specific Security Risks, Regular Review, Step‑Down Programming, and Ongoing Mental‑Health Care

Introduction

In David Rosario v. John Wetzel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of current and former Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) officials. The case, though designated “not precedential,” offers a detailed, practical application of Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) standards in the context of a mentally ill inmate’s prolonged placement in restrictive housing.

David Rosario, an inmate diagnosed with schizophrenia and other mental health disorders, challenged his placement on the DOC’s Restricted Release List (RRL) and in the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) following multiple serious assaults on correctional staff and a persistent pattern of disciplinary misconduct. He alleged: (1) Eighth Amendment violations based on deliberate indifference to risks inherent in prolonged solitary confinement for a mentally ill prisoner and inadequate mental-health treatment; (2) Fourteenth Amendment due process violations tied to allegedly perfunctory or meaningless review of his restricted placement; and (3) violations of the ADA predicated on disability discrimination.

The Third Circuit, reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, concluded that the undisputed record demonstrated legitimate penological justification for Rosario’s restrictive placement, ongoing periodic review with a step‑down program toward reintegration, and continuous access to psychiatric and psychological care. It further held that no evidence supported an inference that the placement and conditions were imposed “by reason of” disability, as required by Title II of the ADA.

Summary of the Judgment

Eighth Amendment (conditions of confinement/deliberate indifference): The court held that Rosario’s placement and retention in segregated housing were justified by his specific risk profile—repeated, serious assaults on staff and other misconduct—and that the DOC’s regular reviews, step‑down programming, and ongoing mental‑health services defeated claims of deliberate indifference. Segregation is not per se unconstitutional so long as conditions are not inhumane and are reasonably related to legitimate security goals.
Eighth Amendment (medical care): The court found no triable issue on inadequate mental‑health care. The record showed frequent psychiatric rounds, periodic direct contacts, availability on request, multiple evaluations, medication adjustments, and counseling access—even when Rosario sometimes refused care or medication.
Fourteenth Amendment (due process): The court concluded that periodic Program Review Committee (PRC) assessments and Rosario’s participation in a structured six‑phase Intensive Management Unit (IMU) program provided constitutionally adequate process, even when Rosario declined to attend some reviews, and even over an extended period preceding his release from RHU in January 2025.
ADA (Title II): Summary judgment for the defendants was proper because there was no evidence that Rosario’s placement on the RRL or in the RHU was “because of” his disability. Rather, the undisputed rationale was his “long assaultive history” and “unpredictable patterns of violence.” The district court had also recognized that damages are unavailable against individual defendants under Title II.
Procedural posture and disposition: Exercising plenary review under Rule 56 and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Third Circuit concluded the appeal presented no substantial question and summarily affirmed; the motion for appointment of counsel was denied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994): The bedrock Eighth Amendment framework: a plaintiff must show (1) an objectively serious deprivation and (2) officials’ subjective deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. The court applied Farmer’s two‑prong test through Third Circuit refinements.
Porter v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 974 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2020): Clarified that restrictive housing can be justified by “the risk that the prisoner specifically poses.” The panel leaned on Porter to emphasize individualized security justifications—highly salient given Rosario’s repeat assaults and serious disciplinary history.
Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded on other grounds: Segregation is not cruel and unusual punishment per se if not “foul, inhuman or totally without penological justification.” The panel’s reasoning tracked this principle, finding ample justification tied to safety and order.
Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997): Endorsed PRC procedures and administrative custody over substantial periods when grounded in legitimate penological concerns. The court cited Griffin to conclude the DOC’s regular reviews and phased programming satisfied due process.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999): Established the “serious medical need” and “deliberate indifference” standards for prison medical care claims. The panel found the record of psychiatric access and treatment defeated deliberate indifference.
Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991): Recognized the seriousness of mental‑health vulnerabilities. The panel accepted Rosario’s mental illness as a serious medical need but determined the response was constitutionally adequate.
Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167 (3d Cir. 2022) and Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017): Both decisions caution courts to account for the special risks solitary confinement poses to seriously mentally ill prisoners. Importantly, the panel distinguished them as pleading‑stage rulings; by contrast, Rosario’s case was at summary judgment with a developed record showing regular review, step‑down opportunities, and ongoing clinical care.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): Set the summary judgment standard—whether evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant. The panel found no genuine dispute of material fact.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis unfolded along three principal axes: conditions of confinement (Eighth Amendment), medical care (Eighth Amendment), and procedural due process (Fourteenth Amendment), with a separate ADA inquiry.

1) Eighth Amendment: Conditions of Confinement for a Mentally Ill Inmate

The panel accepted that solitary confinement can carry heightened risks for mentally ill inmates (as recognized in Palakovic and Clark), but emphasized that those cases were at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage, where allegations are credited as true. On the developed summary judgment record here, the undisputed facts demonstrated:

Multiple violent assaults on correctional officers (including two aggravated assault convictions and a new 10–20 year sentence arising from a July 2021 attack), as well as repeated post‑RHU misconducts (fighting, threats, refusal of orders, property destruction).
Placement on the Restricted Release List in June 2021 due to specific, individualized security concerns.
Regular classification reviews by the PRC, a six‑phase IMU program designed to incentivize positive behavior and gradually restore privileges, advancement to Phase 3 by spring 2024, and eventual release from RHU in January 2025.

Under Young and Porter, segregation is permissible when grounded in legitimate security needs, including the specific risk posed by the inmate. The court found the DOC’s measures were not “totally without penological justification” and, indeed, were calibrated to both manage risk and promote reintegration through structured incentives.

2) Eighth Amendment: Mental‑Health Treatment in Restrictive Housing

Applying Estelle/Rouse/Colburn, the court recognized Rosario’s serious mental illness but concluded there was no triable issue of deliberate indifference. The evidentiary record showed:

Psychiatric rounds in the RHU six days a week.
Monthly direct outreach to Rosario and on‑request availability at any time.
At least a dozen mental‑health evaluations between February 2020 and March 2024 with medication adjustments as needed.
Daily supportive counseling when placed in a psychiatric observation cell.
Occasional refusal of care and non‑adherence to prescribed medications by Rosario himself.

Disagreement with clinical decisions or dissatisfaction with the level of care does not equate to constitutional deliberate indifference. The record of sustained access and adaptive treatment defeated the claim.

3) Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process in Long‑Term Administrative Custody

Drawing on Griffin, the court held that PRC periodic reviews and the structured, behavior‑contingent IMU pathway furnished adequate process. That Rosario sometimes refused to participate in reviews did not transform the process into a constitutional deficiency. The court signaled continuity between historical DOC procedures upheld in Griffin and the modern iteration used here, even across a substantial custody period.

4) ADA (Title II): No Disability‑Based Motive

The ADA requires proof that the plaintiff was excluded from services, denied benefits, or otherwise discriminated against “by reason of” a disability. The court affirmed summary judgment because the uncontroverted evidence showed Rosario’s placement was driven by violence and security risk—not disability animus. The district court had also correctly recognized that Title II does not provide a damages remedy against individual defendants; and any equitable relief would fail absent proof of discrimination.

Impact

While non‑precedential, this decision has meaningful practical guidance for correctional systems, litigants, and lower courts within the Third Circuit:

Record‑building matters at summary judgment: Palakovic and Clark underscore the special risks solitary confinement poses to mentally ill inmates at the pleading stage. Rosario illustrates that, on a full evidentiary record, officials can prevail by documenting individualized security rationales, regular reviews, a step‑down/IMU framework, and continuous mental‑health access.
Security justification + procedural rigor: When restrictive housing is tied to specific, ongoing risk (e.g., repeated assaults) and is paired with periodic PRC review and meaningful opportunities to earn reduced restrictions, courts are likely to find no Eighth Amendment or due process violation.
Clinical engagement in RHU is pivotal: Evidence of frequent psychiatric rounds, proactive outreach, medication management, and counseling opportunities is a strong defense to deliberate indifference claims—even when the inmate sometimes refuses care.
ADA claims require disability-based causation: Security‑based decisions, even if they impact a disabled inmate, do not violate Title II absent proof that disability motivated the adverse action. Additionally, damages against individual defendants under Title II are unavailable, narrowing the viable scope of ADA claims in this context.
Inmate nonparticipation does not defeat due process: Declining to attend PRC reviews does not render those reviews meaningless if the process is otherwise regularly conducted and documented.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Restricted Housing Unit (RHU): A high‑security setting—often “segregation” or “solitary”—used to separate inmates for safety, discipline, or administrative reasons.
Restricted Release List (RRL): A DOC classification for inmates considered especially dangerous or disruptive; release from restrictions typically requires high‑level approval and demonstrable behavioral stability.
Program Review Committee (PRC): A panel that periodically reviews an inmate’s status, security classification, and progress, and determines whether continued restrictions are necessary or can be eased.
Intensive Management Unit (IMU)/Step‑Down Program: A structured, phased program that rewards positive behavior with incremental restoration of privileges, serving as a pathway from restrictive housing back to general population.
Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference”: Not mere negligence or disagreement with care; officials must know of and disregard a substantial risk to inmate health or safety.
Due process in administrative segregation: The Constitution requires periodic, meaningful review of the necessity for continued segregation. It does not mandate release at any particular time; it requires a real, documented assessment.
ADA Title II causation: The central question is whether adverse action occurred “by reason of” disability, not merely whether a disabled person experienced adverse action. Legitimate, non‑discriminatory security reasons defeat ADA claims.
Summary judgment standard: The moving party wins if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the law entitles them to judgment; the nonmovant must point to evidence that could convince a reasonable jury to rule in their favor.
Non‑precedential opinion: Not binding on future panels but can be cited for persuasive value; nonetheless, it reflects how the court applies established doctrine to particular records.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in Rosario reaffirms core principles governing restrictive housing of mentally ill inmates: segregation is not unconstitutional per se; it must be grounded in legitimate security needs, implemented with periodic, meaningful review, and accompanied by access to appropriate mental‑health care. On this robust record—marked by serious, repeated assaults, documented PRC reviews, a structured step‑down program, and continuous psychiatric access—the court found no triable issues under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.

The decision also confirms the ADA’s demanding causation requirement in prison classification cases: where actions are attributable to a well‑documented assaultive history and ongoing security risks, an ADA claim fails absent evidence of disability‑based motive. And to the extent damages are sought, Title II does not authorize suits against individual officials.

In sum, Rosario offers a clear roadmap for correctional administrators and litigants: individualized risk assessments; rigorous, periodic reviews; behavior‑based step‑down pathways; and demonstrable, continuous mental‑health care together form a strong constitutional and statutory defense to challenges brought by inmates with serious mental illness in restrictive housing. While not binding precedent, the opinion is a persuasive, record‑driven application of established doctrine within the Third Circuit.