No Duty to Maximize Dedicated Districts: Legislative Policy Preferences Suffice as a Rational Basis Under Part II, Article 11

Introduction

In City of Dover & a. v. Secretary of State & a. (N.H. June 4, 2025), the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the State, rejecting a state-constitutional challenge to the 2020-cycle redistricting of the New Hampshire House of Representatives, codified at RSA 662:5 via House Bill 50 (HB 50). The plaintiffs—the Cities of Dover and Rochester and several individual voters—argued that the plan violated the “dedicated district” requirement in Part II, Article 11 of the New Hampshire Constitution because it did not maximize the number of qualifying towns and wards afforded their own House districts.

The Court held that where full compliance with Article 11 is impossible in light of other constitutional imperatives, the Legislature need not adopt the plan that maximizes dedicated districts. Instead, legislative policy preferences may provide a rational and legitimate basis for choosing among imperfect, noncompliant options. The decision reinforces substantial judicial deference in the redistricting arena and clarifies that the Constitution imposes no “maximization” mandate for dedicated districts.

The dispute focused on three counties—Strafford, Merrimack, and Hillsborough—where plaintiffs had standing. A nonpartisan “Map-a-Thon” alternative plan would have created a net gain of six dedicated districts in these counties but, notably, would have eliminated the Town of Durham’s dedicated district and, by pairing Durham with Madbury, would have diluted the latter’s voting strength. The plaintiffs did not ask the court to adopt the Map-a-Thon plan outright; rather, they contended that any lawful plan must create at least as many dedicated districts as the Map-a-Thon plan.

Summary of the Opinion

Proceeding under Supreme Court Rule 20(3), the Court resolved the appeal by order, affirming the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to the State and denial of the plaintiffs’ cross-motion. The Court:

Reaffirmed the presumption of constitutionality for redistricting statutes and the requirement of “inescapable grounds” or a “clear and substantial conflict” to declare a statute invalid.
Applied a review standard “akin to rational basis” for state constitutional challenges to legislative redistricting plans under Part II, Article 11.
Held that plaintiffs failed to show the Legislature lacked a rational or legitimate basis in adopting RSA 662:5, particularly where both the enacted plan and the plaintiffs’ comparative example (Map-a-Thon) were noncompliant with Article 11.
Rejected the plaintiffs’ central theory that Article 11 requires maximizing the number of qualifying towns and wards with dedicated districts; legislative policy preferences may justify choosing a different, still-imperfect plan—especially when the difference in dedicated districts is de minimis and adoption of the alternative would produce countervailing harms (e.g., loss of Durham’s dedicated district and dilution of Madbury’s voting power when paired with Durham).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s reasoning is anchored in its 2012 decision in City of Manchester v. Secretary of State, 163 N.H. 689 (2012). There, challengers similarly argued that the Legislature violated Part II, Article 11 by failing to maximize dedicated districts. The Court recognized the impossibility of achieving perfect compliance with Article 11 while also satisfying other state and federal constitutional constraints, such as equal population. It adopted a deferential approach: redistricting plans are reviewed under a standard akin to rational basis, and courts will not substitute their policy judgments for the Legislature’s when the Legislature’s choice is rational and legitimate.

City of Manchester thus established three pillars of review that the Court reiterated here:

A strong presumption of constitutionality and a requirement that challengers demonstrate a “clear and substantial conflict” between statute and constitution.
Deference to the Legislature’s institutional competence in reconciling competing policy and constitutional aims in redistricting.
Rejection of a judicial “maximization” rule for Article 11 when other constitutional constraints render perfection unattainable.

The Court also cited Brown v. Secretary of State, 176 N.H. 319 (2023), to underscore that the New Hampshire Constitution commits redistricting authority to the Legislature, reinforcing separation-of-powers deference. Guare v. State of N.H., 167 N.H. 658 (2015), supplied the general summary-judgment framework (viewing facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and reviewing legal application de novo). Finally, Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321 (1993), was cited to dispose of remaining arguments without extended discussion.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds in several steps:

Presumption and Standard of Review. The Court began with the presumption that RSA 662:5 is constitutional and clarified that it would not invalidate the plan absent “inescapable grounds” or a “clear and substantial conflict” with the Constitution. Challenges under Part II, Article 11 are evaluated under a rational-basis-like standard: plaintiffs must show the plan was enacted without a rational or legitimate basis.
Impossibility of Perfect Compliance. Echoing City of Manchester, the Court accepted that it is “impossible” to create a House map that fully satisfies Article 11’s dedicated-district mandate while also meeting other constitutional requirements (including equal-population principles). Both the enacted plan and Map-a-Thon’s alternative fell short of Article 11 in some respects.
No Maximization Mandate. The plaintiffs argued that the Legislature must maximize the number of Article 11-compliant dedicated districts and that only other constitutional constraints can justify any shortfall. The Court rejected this, holding that when no option fully complies, the Legislature may weigh and choose among trade-offs. Legislative policy preferences—beyond mere avoidance of constitutional violations—can constitute a rational and legitimate basis.
De Minimis Improvements Do Not Compel Judicial Override. The Court emphasized that in the three counties where standing was established, Map-a-Thon’s net gain of six dedicated districts came with significant costs: eliminating Durham’s dedicated district and diluting Madbury’s voting power by pairing it with Durham. With the difference in dedicated-district counts described as de minimis and both plans noncompliant, the Court refused to substitute its judgment for the Legislature’s policy choice.
Burden Not Met. The plaintiffs’ burden was not to show that a “more compliant” plan exists; it was to demonstrate that the Legislature lacked any rational or legitimate basis for the enacted plan’s deviations. Given the acknowledged trade-offs and the Legislature’s prerogative to balance them, the Court concluded the burden was not met.

Impact and Prospective Significance

This decision has several practical and doctrinal implications for New Hampshire redistricting:

Reaffirmed Deference. The Court reaffirms that redistricting is quintessentially legislative. Courts will interfere only upon a clear and substantial constitutional conflict. This keeps judicial review focused on extreme or unjustifiable deviations, not fine-grained policy balancing.
No “Maximization” Requirement Under Article 11. Litigants cannot premise Article 11 claims on the notion that the Legislature must always adopt the plan that maximizes the number of dedicated districts when perfection is impossible. “More” is not automatically “constitutionally required.”
Legislative Policy Preferences Are Legitimate. The Court expressly validates legislative policy judgments—such as preserving a town’s dedicated representation or avoiding the dilution of a small town’s voice when paired with a much larger neighbor—as legitimate bases to select among imperfect maps.
Importance of Record and Trade-Offs. Although the Court did not require extensive findings, it highlighted real trade-offs (Durham/Madbury) to demonstrate rationality. Future legislatures may benefit from articulating and documenting such policy considerations to fortify plans against challenge.
Higher Bar for Plaintiffs. Challengers must now do more than identify an alternative map with marginally higher Article 11 compliance. They must negate any rational basis for the Legislature’s selection—an exacting standard in a domain the Court characterizes as complex, data-intensive, and inherently political.
Guidance for Future Cycles. Heading into future redistricting cycles, this decision signals that courts will tolerate reasonable, policy-driven deviations from Article 11 when full compliance conflicts with other constitutional requirements, especially where differences are relatively small and linked to concrete, defensible trade-offs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Dedicated District (Part II, Article 11): The State Constitution says a town or ward whose population is “within a reasonable deviation from the ideal population” for one or more seats should have its own district. “Ideal population” is the statewide population divided by the number of House seats. The Constitution aims to give qualifying communities their own representative(s) rather than grouping them with others—but only insofar as that can be achieved while obeying other constitutional rules.
“Reasonable Deviation” and Equal Population: Redistricting must also honor equal-population principles (often called “one person, one vote”). This can make it impossible to draw lines that both give every qualifying town its own district and maintain sufficiently equal population across all districts.
Rational-Basis-Like Review: This is a highly deferential standard. The Court asks whether there is any rational or legitimate basis for the Legislature’s choices. If so, the plan stands. Plaintiffs lose if their argument boils down to “our plan is better.”
Presumption of Constitutionality: Courts start from the premise that statutes are valid. A challenger must show a “clear and substantial conflict” between the statute and the Constitution to prevail.
“De Minimis” Differences: The Court described the Map-a-Thon gains as “de minimis” in the affected counties—meaning small enough that they do not compel judicial displacement of the Legislature’s plan, particularly when those gains introduce other harms (like the loss of a dedicated seat for Durham and the dilution of Madbury’s voice).
Trade-Offs in Redistricting: Drawing districts implicates multiple values: equal-population targets, preserving community integrity, honoring political subdivisions, preventing vote dilution within merged communities, and more. Perfection is unattainable; a lawful map reflects a reasonable balance among competing aims.

Discussion of the Parties’ Positions

The plaintiffs contended that Article 11 effectively mandates maximizing the number of dedicated districts achievable within constitutional constraints, and that only conflicts with other constitutional requirements can justify any shortfall. They highlighted the Map-a-Thon plan, which would net six additional dedicated districts across the three counties at issue, as proof that the Legislature could have done more.

The State responded that when all available plans are imperfect, the choice among them is a policy decision for the Legislature. It argued that Article 11 does not impose a maximization rule, and that the enacted plan legitimately prioritized other considerations, such as preserving Durham’s dedicated representation and avoiding the dilution of Madbury’s electoral influence that would arise from pairing it with much larger Durham.

The Court agreed with the State, treating the plaintiffs’ theory as an invitation to substitute judicial preferences for legislative policy judgments in a context where the Constitution assigns primary responsibility to the Legislature.

Procedural and Doctrinal Notes

Scope and Standing: The Court’s discussion is limited to Strafford, Merrimack, and Hillsborough Counties, where the trial court found the plaintiffs had standing. Nonetheless, the governing principles apply statewide.
Dispositive Order Under Rule 20(3): The Court resolved the appeal by order rather than a full-length opinion, but it squarely applies and clarifies existing doctrine from City of Manchester regarding Article 11 challenges.
Burden of Proof: Plaintiffs must do more than demonstrate that a “more compliant” plan exists. They must demonstrate the absence of any rational or legitimate basis for the Legislature’s choice.

Practical Implications for Future Litigation and Mapdrawing

For the Legislature: Build a record of concrete policy reasons for key line-drawing choices—community integrity, preservation of dedicated representation where feasible, avoidance of pairing small towns with much larger ones when that would predictably dilute influence, and similar considerations. Such reasons are legitimate and will likely withstand Article 11 challenges under rational-basis-like review.
For Challengers: Future Article 11 plaintiffs will need to show that the enacted plan’s shortfalls cannot be explained by any legitimate policy or constitutional constraint—an exacting showing. Emphasizing marginal improvements in alternative plans, without negating the State’s policy rationales, will not suffice.
For Courts: This decision counsels restraint in judicial substitution of policy preferences. Courts should focus on whether a plan is supported by any rational, legitimate basis within the constitutional framework, not on whether the challengers’ alternative is better in some respects.

Conclusion

City of Dover & a. v. Secretary of State & a. solidifies a key proposition in New Hampshire redistricting law: Part II, Article 11 does not require the Legislature to maximize the number of dedicated districts when full compliance is impossible. So long as the Legislature’s choice among imperfect options rests on rational, legitimate policy considerations, courts will not displace it. The decision renews the core teachings of City of Manchester—presumption of constitutionality, rational-basis-like review, and deference to legislative trade-offs—and adds emphasis that marginal increases in dedicated districts do not compel adoption of an alternative plan when those gains come with countervailing harms.

The upshot is a stable doctrinal framework: redistricting remains primarily a legislative function; judicial intervention is reserved for clear and substantial constitutional conflicts; and Article 11 does not impose a judicially enforceable maximization mandate. In a field defined by “balance” and “trade-offs,” the Court’s message is clear—so long as the Legislature’s choices are rational, they will stand.