No Duty to Enhance Navigational Aids: Discretionary Function Immunity under the SIAA in Penny Barnett v. United States

Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Penny Jo Barnett v. United States, 23-2221 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2025), addresses the scope of sovereign immunity under the Suits in Admiralty Act (“SIAA”), the reach of the discretionary function exception, and the Coast Guard’s duty in maintaining aids to navigation. Mrs. Barnett sued on behalf of her late husband’s estate after Edward Barnett’s work boat (“Miss June”) allided with a dike on the Cooper River near Charleston, South Carolina. She alleged that the U.S. Coast Guard failed (1) to maintain and repair certain navigational lights, and (2) to improve brightness, flash sequence and mitigate background lighting, thereby causing the fatal crash. The government invoked sovereign immunity under the SIAA’s discretionary function exception. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that discretionary choices about brightness, flash rhythm and general scheme are immune, and that the single inoperable shore‐side light did not breach any enforceable duty or cause the accident, which was proximately caused by the vessel operator’s negligence.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel, in an opinion by Judge Quattlebaum joined by Judges Wilkinson and Heytens, reached these key conclusions:

Under 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a) and the related discretionary function exception, the Coast Guard enjoys immunity for policy‐driven decisions about navigational aid characteristics (brightness, flash sequence, background lighting).
Regulations such as 33 C.F.R. § 62.21(f)–(g) afford broad discretion and do not impose specific mandatory brightness or flash requirements.
A single charted light on the dike (the shoremost amber light) that was inoperable falls outside the discretionary exception, but its outage did not breach any enforceable duty: other lights on the dike and lateral channel markers were fully operational and did not mislead the mariner.
Maritime negligence requires (a) duty, (b) breach, (c) proximate cause, and (d) injury. Here, no breach or causation arises from the one inoperable light.
The vessel operator’s own grossly negligent conduct—high speed at night, failure to post a lookout, departure from the channel and non‐use of an available GPS plotter—was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
The district court’s denial of judicial notice and its allowance of a late bill of costs were well within its discretion.

The Fourth Circuit thus affirmed in full.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) – established that once the Coast Guard elects to install a light, it must keep it “in good working order” and not mislead mariners.
Magno v. Corros, 630 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1980) – held that the Coast Guard is not liable for the absence of extra lights so long as the charted marking at the channel end of a dike remains operative and non‐misleading.
Faust v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 721 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1983) – reiterated that maritime negligence of the Coast Guard is confined to defective or misleading aids, not failure to add enhancements.
McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. en banc 2004) – aligned the SIAA’s discretionary function exception with the FTCA’s, rooted in separation‐of‐powers concerns.
Indemnity Ins. Co. v. United States, 569 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2009) – explained that a “specific mandate” precludes the discretionary exception, whereas broad “recommendations” leave room for policy judgment.
Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2015) – clarified the two‐part Berkovitz test for discretionary function immunity.
Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States, 421 U.S. 397 (1975) – apportions liability by comparative fault in maritime collision cases.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in three stages:

Sovereign Immunity & the SIAA. The SIAA waives immunity for admiralty torts but incorporates a discretionary function exception, barring review of policy‐laden judgments.
Discretionary Function Exception.
- First prong: Whether the challenged Coast Guard conduct involved an element of choice. 14 U.S.C. §§ 541, 544, and 33 C.F.R. § 62.21 vest broad discretion in placement, characteristics and maintenance of aids to navigation; no regulation prescribes mandatory brightness standards.
- Second prong: Whether the judgments are grounded in public‐policy considerations. The court treated this as presumptive once agency discretion is shown; Barnett failed to overcome the presumption.
Thus, decisions on brightness, flash sequence and background lighting are immune. Only the single charted light that ceased functioning triggered any enforceable duty: the duty to repair and not mislead.
Maritime Negligence on the Inoperable Light.
- Duty & Breach. Under Indian Towing and Magno, the Coast Guard’s duty is limited to keeping charted lights in service and not inducing reliance on a false configuration. Four other lights marking the dike and channel were fully operational; the one out did not mislead.
- Proximate Cause. Factual findings (reviewed for clear error) confirmed that Mr. Barnett’s excessive speed, channel departure, lack of lookout, and non‐use of GPS were the unbroken, sole cause of the accident.

Impact

This decision solidifies key limits on coast‐guard liability for navigational‐aid decisions:

Policy choices regarding enhancement or modernization of aids are immune under the SIAA’s discretionary function exception.
Maintenance duty is not an open‐ended obligation to “improve” lighting but a concrete duty to repair charted aids and avoid misleading mariners.
Mariners and tort plaintiffs must show a defective or misleading aid, not merely a desire for brighter or differently flashing lights.
Vessel operator fault remains the chief concern in collision cases; federal immunity will stand where policy judgments predominate.

Future suits will likely focus on whether a light has wholly failed or given false indication, rather than on qualitative judgments about its efficacy.

Complex Concepts Simplified

SIAA Sovereign Immunity: The United States cannot be sued for admiralty torts unless it consents. The Suits in Admiralty Act gives consent except when policy decisions are involved (“discretionary function exception”).
Discretionary Function Exception: Two‐part test (from Berkovitz):
1. Was the act one of choice or judgment? (No mandatory rule.)
2. Is it grounded in policy considerations? (Budget/priorities or safety tradeoffs.)
Aids to Navigation (“ATONs”): Buoys, towers and lights marking channels and hazards. “Red right returning” is a mnemonic: red markers on starboard side when coming from sea.
Maritime Negligence Elements: Duty → Breach → Proximate Cause → Injury. Coast Guard’s duty is to maintain charted lights in repair and accurate function, not to enhance.
Proximate Cause vs. Superseding Cause: Proximate cause is the direct, unbroken link. A superseding cause is an independent, unforeseeable act by a third party that breaks the causal chain. Here, the operator’s own negligence was the proximate—and sole—cause.

Conclusion

Penny Jo Barnett v. United States reaffirms that the Coast Guard’s policy choices about the design and efficacy of navigational aids fall within the SIAA’s discretionary function exception. Once the Coast Guard elects to chart a light, it must keep it in repair and avoid misleading mariners, but it is under no duty to upgrade brightness, flash rhythm or overall perceptibility. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling underscores the balance between sovereign immunity, maritime safety, and individual vessel‐operator responsibility. In the broader legal context, this decision will curtail “second‐guessing” of resource and design judgments by the Coast Guard and channel tort claims toward objectively defective or misleading aids to navigation.