No Duty Beyond Article 4A: Fourth Circuit Clarifies Banks’ Liability for Elder Wire-Fraud (Commentary on Janine Satterfield v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 4th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Satterfield v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 23-1945 (Aug. 6, 2025) tackles a troubling factual backdrop—an elderly veteran’s loss of almost USD 3.7 million to an international “Amazon” impostor scam—yet reaches a legally austere result. The panel (Judges King, Rushing, Benjamin) affirms dismissal of all claims brought by the estate administrator, Janine Satterfield, against Wells Fargo Bank and Navy Federal Credit Union (“the Banks”), holding that:

Article 4A of the Virginia Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) exclusively governs rights and duties relating to wire transfers, pre-empting tort theories such as negligence and “assumption of voluntary duty.”
The federal Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) imposes reporting obligations to the government, not a private duty of care to customers, and creates no private cause of action.
Virginia’s Adult Protective Services (“APS”) statutes are permissive, not mandatory: a bank’s report of suspected elder exploitation to APS does not trigger a continuing common-law protective duty.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to rewrite unambiguous deposit-account agreements or to impose investigatory duties absent express contractual language.

By unflinchingly applying the Virginia Court of Appeals’ 2023 decision in Navy Federal Credit Union v. Lentz, 890 S.E.2d 827, the Fourth Circuit has entrenched a firm boundary: unless a bank expressly contracts otherwise, its liability for executing duly authorized wire transfers stops with Article 4A. Emotional appeal or public policy arguments concerning elder abuse cannot bypass that statutory scheme.

2. Summary of the Judgment

After a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in the Eastern District of Virginia (Judge Claude M. Hilton), Satterfield appealed three adverse rulings: (i) dismissal of the amended complaint; (ii) denial of her post-judgment Rule 59(e) motion, which relied on a new affidavit from an APS social worker; and (iii) a magistrate judge’s discovery stay. The Fourth Circuit:

Affirmed dismissal of all causes of action—voluntary-duty negligence, breach of the implied covenant, and related theories—because they are pre-empted by Article 4A or unsupported by contract.
Affirmed denial of the Rule 59(e) motion, finding no “newly discovered evidence” and no clear error or manifest injustice.
Declined to reach the discovery-stay issue because Satterfield had failed to file timely objections under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

Hence, the estate of Larry Cook is left without judicial recourse against the Banks, notwithstanding the tragic nature of his victimization.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Navy Federal Credit Union v. Lentz, 890 S.E.2d 827 (Va. Ct. App. 2023) – Central precedent; held that Article 4A pre-empts common-law negligence claims for mishandled wire transfers, and confirmed that the BSA and APS laws create no private duties.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) – Pleading-standard cornerstones; used to test plausibility.
AmSouth Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2004) and similar circuit cases – Support the proposition that the BSA contains no private right of action.
Ward’s Equipment, Inc. v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 493 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1997) – Limits on using implied covenant to rewrite contracts.
Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502 (Va. 1995) – Special-relationship doctrine; informs why “voluntary assumption of duty” fails.

By embracing Lentz, the Fourth Circuit aligns federal common-law analysis with Virginia’s statutory interpretation, reinforcing uniformity between state and federal fora—a crucial factor in diversity and supplemental-jurisdiction cases.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Statutory Exclusivity of Article 4A.
“Article 4A is intended to be the exclusive means of determining the rights, duties and liabilities of the affected parties.” – Va. Code § 8.4A-102 cmt.
Because Article 4A specifically regulates payment orders and wire transfers, any tort-based duty that would interfere with a bank’s prompt execution of duly authorized instructions threatens the statute’s delicate policy balance (speed/irrevocability vs. cost/risk). Consequently, negligence or “voluntary duty” claims contradict that legislative framework unless the bank’s agreement expressly adds protections.
No Private Duty Under the BSA. The BSA’s compliance obligations (e.g., suspicious activity reports) run to the federal government; customers cannot sue for alleged BSA violations. Recognizing a tort duty derived from BSA monitoring would back-door an implied private right, contrary to congressional intent.
APS Statutes Are Permissive. Va. Code § 63.2-1606 uses “may,” not “shall,” when describing a financial institution’s ability to report suspected exploitation. Therefore, reporting does not create additional legal duties; it merely grants immunity for voluntary disclosure.
No Special Relationship/Voluntary Undertaking. Under Virginia law, a duty arises when one party takes charge of another (e.g., jailer-inmate, innkeeper-guest). Filing an APS report never placed Cook under the Banks’ control; thus no special relationship existed.
Implied Covenant Limited to Contractual Terms. The deposit agreements apparently addressed execution accuracy and timing—not investigatory duties. Without inconsistency or ambiguity, the covenant of good faith cannot expand obligations.
Rule 59(e) Threshold Not Met. The APS investigator’s affidavit was available earlier (his name appeared on documents). Even if considered, it supplied no new facts capable of curing statutory pre-emption defects, and therefore could not alter the result.

3.3 Potential Impact on Future Litigation

Elder-Fraud Claims. Plaintiffs in Virginia and, by persuasive extension, other Article 4A states within the Fourth Circuit, will face an uphill battle suing banks for failing to detect scam-based transfers. The correct focus will be contractual—e.g., alleging the bank violated explicit protective provisions—rather than negligence.
Drafting of Deposit & Wire-Transfer Agreements. Financial institutions may remain confident that silence regarding monitoring duties shields them. Conversely, consumer advocates may push for regulatory or contractual reforms (e.g., opt-in transaction alerts, cooling-off periods) rather than litigation.
Discovery Strategy. The opinion underscores the necessity of pleading with contractual specificity and timely pursuing discovery; failure to object under Rule 72(a) forfeits review.
Federal-State Harmonization. The decision reinforces deference to well-reasoned state intermediate-appellate precedent (Lentz) on UCC interpretation, bolstering predictability.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Article 4A (Wire Transfers): The portion of the UCC governing electronic funds transfers between banks. It aims for speed and finality; once a payment order is “accepted” the bank’s job is largely mechanical.
Pre-emption (within State Law): Here, not federal pre-emption but statutory exclusivity: where the legislature supplies a comprehensive scheme, courts avoid overlaying inconsistent common-law duties.
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA): A federal anti-money-laundering framework requiring banks to file certain reports. Violations are enforced by regulators, not private lawsuits.
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: An obligation read into contracts requiring parties to exercise contractual rights honestly and not destroy the bargain’s benefits. It cannot create new duties beyond the contract’s express terms.
Rule 59(e) Motion: A post-judgment request for the trial court to alter or amend its decision, granted only for new law, new evidence, or clear error/manifest injustice.

5. Conclusion

Satterfield v. Wells Fargo Bank solidifies a bright-line rule in the Fourth Circuit: banks’ liability for customer-authorized wire transfers is circumscribed by Article 4A and the four corners of the parties’ agreements. Neither humanitarian concern for elder exploitation, nor generic negligence principles, nor regulatory regimes like the BSA can expand that duty. The decision invites legislative or contractual innovation as the path forward, and cautions plaintiffs to plead contract-based violations or statutory causes of action if they hope to survive dismissal.

No Duty Beyond Article 4A: Fourth Circuit Clarifies Banks’ Liability for Elder Wire-Fraud – Commentary on Satterfield v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (4th Cir. 2025)