No Duty Absent Unusual Circumstances: Delaware Supreme Court Holds Disputed Theft Details Are Immaterial in Third‑Party Injury Cases Involving Stolen Vehicles

Introduction

In Carroll v. Forewinds Garrisons Lake LLC and Forewinds Hospitality LLC (Del. Supr. Ct. Mar. 19, 2025), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for a golf course operator after a teenager was injured while riding in a stolen golf cart. The case squarely presented whether factual disputes about the timing and manner of the theft (daytime versus nighttime; keys left in the cart versus keys locked away; open area versus fenced storage) create a triable negligence claim against the vehicle owner. The Court held they do not—at least on the record here—because, under Delaware law, a vehicle owner owes no duty to third parties injured by a thief unless “unusual circumstances” make such harm reasonably foreseeable. The Court also enforced familiar appellate waiver principles, declining to consider new theories first raised in the reply brief.

The opinion is significant for premises operators, fleet owners, and insurers. It clarifies that the duty analysis in stolen-vehicle injury cases turns on the foreseeability of theft-related harm under unusual circumstances known to the owner—not on granular disputes about how, or precisely when, a thief happened to take the vehicle on the incident occasion.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed summary judgment for Forewinds, the manager of Garrisons Lake Golf Club, holding that it owed no duty to Megan Carroll, who was injured when a stolen golf cart tipped over while being driven by another minor.
Delaware follows the traditional rule: absent unusual circumstances, the owner of a vehicle owes no duty to a victim injured by a thief. A duty can arise only if the owner should have reasonably anticipated that its conduct created an unreasonably enhanced danger to someone in the plaintiff’s position.
Even assuming the theft occurred during the day, in an unsecured area, and with keys left accessible (as Carroll posited), the record lacked the “unusual circumstances” necessary to make harm to third parties foreseeable. An isolated attempted theft 12 days earlier did not suffice to create a duty.
Because the existence of a duty did not turn on the particular timing or method of the theft under either party’s version, those disputes were not “material” within the meaning of Superior Court Civil Rule 56.
Two additional theories—attractive nuisance and liability under 21 Del. C. § 6105—were waived because they were raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief.

Case Background

Garrisons Lake Golf Club sits near residential neighborhoods outside Smyrna, with homes abutting the course boundary. Before June 2021, the course had no history of golf cart thefts or attempts. On June 17, 2021, two teenagers attempted, unsuccessfully, to steal a cart. On June 28, 2021, Garrisons Lake reported two carts stolen overnight from its storage yard.

The next day, a group of teenagers, including appellant Megan Carroll (approximately 16–17 years old), Christian Bennett (15), and Brady Iddon (approximately 16), gathered at a nearby home. Iddon arrived with cart #36, stolen from Garrisons Lake. Carroll asked Bennett to drive her around the neighborhood; the cart tipped, landing on her leg and causing multiple open fractures in her right foot.

Iddon later confessed to stealing several carts from Garrisons Lake, including a range-picker. His accounts varied on times, locations, and whether the carts were secured. In a deposition taken about two-and-a-half years later, he admitted stealing cart #36 but could not pin down whether it was taken during the day or at night and gave inconsistent descriptions of the carts’ security conditions.

Carroll sued Forewinds for negligence, alleging it failed to reasonably secure its carts and keys despite foreseeable theft risks posed by neighboring teenagers. Forewinds moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to third parties for harms caused by thieves. The Superior Court granted the motion; the Supreme Court affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

The Court’s duty analysis is anchored in Delaware’s long-standing approach to third-party harm arising from stolen vehicles.

Vadala v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 397 A.2d 1381 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979): The seminal Delaware Superior Court decision articulates the traditional rule: owners generally owe no duty to persons injured by thieves, and theft can qualify as an unforeseeable intervening criminal act breaking the causal chain. A duty arises only under “unusual circumstances” where the owner should have anticipated that its conduct created an “unreasonably enhanced danger” to someone like the plaintiff. The Supreme Court explicitly quoted and applied Vadala’s framework.
Jewell v. Absher, 2002 WL 970464 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2002): Cited alongside Vadala as consistent Delaware authority declining to impose owner liability for injuries caused by a thief absent special circumstances. Together, these cases reflect Delaware’s reluctance to convert storage or key-handling missteps into a duty to unknown third parties without a robust foreseeability showing.
Robbins v. William H. Porter, Inc., 2006 WL 1313858 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 2006): Quoted by Carroll for the proposition that “vehicle owners have a duty to third parties to secure their property against theft.” The Supreme Court did not adopt this statement as a freestanding rule and instead reaffirmed Vadala’s “unusual circumstances” standard. Robbins therefore cannot be read to impose a generalized duty divorced from foreseeability; to the extent Robbins suggests otherwise, Carroll’s position did not prevail.
Summary Judgment and Appellate Standards: The Court reiterated settled principles: de novo review of summary judgment (Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc., 319 A.3d 878 (Del. 2024)); movant’s burden to demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact (GMG Ins. Agency v. Margolis Edelstein, 328 A.3d 302 (Del. 2024); AeroGlobal Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 871 A.2d 428 (Del. 2005)); nonmovant must show more than “metaphysical doubt” (Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995), quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574); and burden-shifting (Droz v. Hennessy Indus., LLC, 275 A.3d 257 (Del. 2022); Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679 (Del. 1979)). On appellate waiver, the Court applied Delaware Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi)(3).

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps: (1) defining the duty owed using a foreseeability lens colored by “unusual circumstances,” and (2) determining materiality of the factual disputes under that legal standard.

Duty turns on unusual, foreseeable risk—not theft chronology. The Court reaffirmed that “an owner of a vehicle owes no duty to a victim injured by a thief” unless circumstances make theft-related harm reasonably foreseeable. It quoted Vadala: a duty may arise where the owner should have anticipated that its conduct “would create an unreasonably enhanced danger” to someone in the plaintiff’s position. This framing treats foreseeability as part of the duty inquiry rather than as a mere proximate-cause issue.
The record lacked unusual circumstances. Even crediting Carroll’s proposed version—daytime theft, keys left in or accessible, cart out in the open—there was no demonstrated pattern of theft, warnings, or prior criminal activity plausibly putting Forewinds on notice that its carts were at a concrete risk of being stolen and then driven in a way that would injure third parties. The one-off attempted theft 12 days earlier was not enough to create a duty to prevent theft. The course had “never experienced a theft—or even an attempted theft—of a golf cart” before June 17, 2021.
Materiality analysis: the disputed facts do not matter under the controlling law. A fact is “material” only if it could affect the outcome under the applicable legal standard. Because the duty question did not change whether the theft occurred at night from a fenced, locked enclosure (with keys separately locked) or during the day while a cart and keys were accessible, the Court held that timing and method were not material. Under either scenario, Forewinds lacked notice that would make theft-related harm to the public foreseeable. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate.
Intervening criminal act frame remains available but unnecessary. Although Vadala notes that courts sometimes treat theft as an unforeseeable intervening criminal act breaking causation, the Supreme Court resolved this appeal at the duty stage. That approach streamlines analysis and avoids fact-intensive causation inquiries when the threshold duty is absent.
Waiver of new theories on appeal. Carroll raised two new arguments in her reply brief: attractive nuisance and liability under 21 Del. C. § 6105 (imputing a minor’s negligence to one who causes or permits the minor to drive on a highway). The Court deemed both arguments waived under Rule 14(b)(vi)(3), reinforcing the requirement that all substantive arguments appear in the opening brief.

Impact and Implications

For Delaware vehicle and equipment owners: This decision strengthens the protection against negligence claims arising from third-party criminal misuse of stolen vehicles or mobile equipment (including carts, ATVs, forklifts) unless plaintiffs can show unusual, foreseeability-enhancing facts. Owners should still implement reasonable security (locking keys, fenced storage), but the absence or failure of a security measure, without more, will not automatically create a duty to members of the public injured by thieves.
For plaintiffs in stolen-vehicle injury cases: The bar is high. To survive summary judgment, litigants must marshal evidence of unusual circumstances known or knowable to the owner such as repeated thefts, prior similar incidents, law enforcement warnings, specific threats, or other facts making harm to the public reasonably anticipated. Merely disputing whether keys were accessible or whether a fence was locked will often be insufficient absent a notice-based showing.
For trial courts: Carroll provides a clear template for evaluating materiality: when the existence of a duty does not turn on the disputed theft details, those disputes do not preclude summary judgment. Courts may address duty as a threshold legal question and reserve proximate cause for cases presenting the requisite “unusual circumstances.”
For insurers: The decision narrows exposure for insureds facing negligence claims arising from stolen property and may affect underwriting of premises with mobile equipment. Claim investigations should focus on an insured’s notice of theft risks (patterns, prior incidents, warnings) and the foreseeability profile at the time of loss.
Appellate practice reminder: Arguments not raised in the opening brief are forfeited. New theories—like attractive nuisance or statutory imputation under § 6105—cannot be saved by pressing them in a reply brief.

Unanswered Questions and Limits

What qualifies as “unusual circumstances”? The Court did not offer an exhaustive definition. Indicators may include a history of thefts or attempts, repeated security breaches, specific prior warnings, or patterns suggesting thieves target a particular location or class of property. The opinion signals that a single, isolated attempted theft is not enough. Future cases will refine this boundary.
Effect of egregious storage practices: The Court assumed, arguendo, that keys might have been left accessible and carts visible during the day, yet still found no duty absent notice-based foreseeability. It remains theoretically possible that extremely lax practices, paired with known theft risk factors, could create the “unusual circumstances” necessary to impose a duty.
Attractive nuisance and § 6105: Because both were waived, their applicability to mobile equipment like golf carts remains undecided. Attractive nuisance traditionally concerns injuries to child trespassers from conditions on land, not off-premises injuries following theft. Section 6105 imposes vicarious liability for causing or permitting a minor to drive on a “highway” (a term broadly defined in traffic laws), but its reach in stolen-equipment contexts is unresolved in Delaware appellate law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Duty of care: A legal obligation requiring a person or entity to conform to a certain standard of conduct to protect others against unreasonable risks. In negligence, duty is a threshold question of law for the court.
Foreseeability (as used here): Whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would anticipate the risk of harm to others from their conduct. Under Delaware law in stolen-vehicle cases, foreseeability must rise to the level of “unusual circumstances” that make theft-related harm to third parties reasonably anticipated.
Unusual circumstances: Contexts that meaningfully elevate the risk of theft and injury beyond the ordinary—such as prior similar incidents, known patterns, or specific warnings—so that an owner should anticipate the danger and take precautions.
Intervening criminal act: An independent criminal act (like theft) that can break the causal chain between a defendant’s conduct and a plaintiff’s injury. Courts sometimes resolve stolen-vehicle cases on this ground; the Supreme Court in Carroll resolved the case at the duty stage instead.
Material fact (for summary judgment): A fact that could affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Disputed facts that are not outcome-determinative are immaterial and do not bar summary judgment.
Summary judgment: A procedural mechanism to resolve a case without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The movant bears the initial burden; the nonmovant must then show concrete, outcome-relevant factual disputes.
Waiver on appeal: Arguments not raised in an opening brief are ordinarily forfeited and will not be considered if raised for the first time in a reply brief, per Delaware Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi)(3).

Conclusion

Carroll v. Forewinds reaffirms Delaware’s traditional approach to injuries by stolen vehicles: owners generally owe no duty to third parties unless “unusual circumstances” make theft and ensuing harm reasonably foreseeable. The opinion provides two practical clarifications. First, the particular timing and mechanics of the theft are immaterial where the record does not show unusual, notice-making circumstances; such disputes cannot defeat summary judgment. Second, appellate litigants must preserve all theories in their opening briefing or risk waiver.

The decision offers guidance to courts and litigants: focus the duty inquiry on notice-based foreseeability rooted in concrete, unusual facts—not on post hoc disputes about how a thief accomplished a theft. For businesses and property owners, the case underscores that while prudent security is wise, liability to third parties hinges on demonstrable foreseeability of theft-related harm, not merely on the presence or absence of a given security measure on a particular day.