No Due Process Bar from Post-Discharge Statutory Change; Mens Rea Under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) Requires Knowledge of Prior Conviction, Not Knowledge of Status

Introduction

In Joel Armen Underwood, III v. State of Minnesota (Minn. Aug. 27, 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved two recurring questions in prosecutions for “ineligible person in possession of a firearm” under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). First, the Court held that the State does not violate due process by prosecuting a defendant under a statute that the Legislature strengthened after the defendant’s probation discharge—so long as the original court order accurately reflected the law at the time it was issued. Second, the Court clarified the mens rea for § 624.713, subd. 1(2): the State need not prove that the defendant knew he was legally “ineligible”; rather, it must prove that the defendant knew of the historical fact of his prior conviction that, by operation of law, made possession unlawful.

The appellant, Joel Underwood, pleaded guilty after being found with a handgun in 2021. He argued that he reasonably relied on a 2000 probation discharge order that then-correctly told him he faced a 10-year firearm disability, while the law was later amended in 2003 to impose a lifetime ban on those convicted of a “crime of violence.” He also challenged the validity of his plea on the ground that he never admitted knowing he was legally ineligible. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and the denial of postconviction relief, setting important statewide precedent on due process limits and the elements of the offense.

Summary of the Opinion

• Due Process: No violation occurs when a defendant is prosecuted under a statutory amendment that postdates a discharge order which was accurate when issued. The government did not “actively mislead” the defendant; ignorance of later statutory changes is not a defense.
• Mens Rea: For § 624.713, subd. 1(2), the State must prove:
  • knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition; and
  • knowledge of the defendant’s own prior conviction (the historical fact), where that conviction is, as a matter of law, a “crime of violence.”
  The State need not prove that the defendant knew he was legally “ineligible” or that he knew the legal classification of his prior crime as a “crime of violence.”
• Plea Validity: Underwood’s plea was accurate and valid because he admitted knowing possession of a firearm and acknowledged his prior third-degree assault conviction; no admission of knowledge-of-status was required.

Factual and Procedural Background

Underwood pleaded guilty in 1998 to third-degree assault—classified by statute as a “crime of violence.” He was convicted and placed on probation in 1999. In 2000, a district court discharged him and restored civil rights, correctly stating—under then-existing law—that he could not possess firearms for 10 years and only if he avoided another crime of violence during that period.

In 2003, while Underwood was still within the 10-year prohibition period, the Legislature amended § 624.713 to impose a lifetime ban for persons convicted of a “crime of violence.” No official notified Underwood of this change. In 2021, police discovered a .32 caliber handgun on his person; he admitted carrying without a permit. He pleaded guilty to being an ineligible person in possession (Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2)) and received the statutory 60-month mandatory minimum (Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 5(b)).

In postconviction proceedings, Underwood claimed:

• due process was violated because he relied on the 2000 discharge order’s 10-year statement; and
• his guilty plea was invalid because he did not admit he knew he was legally ineligible to possess a firearm.

The postconviction court and the court of appeals rejected both claims. The Supreme Court granted review and affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Significance

1) Government Misadvice and Due Process

• Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965): The U.S. Supreme Court reversed convictions where government actors affirmatively misled individuals about what the law allowed. Convicting someone for conduct the government told them was permissible violates due process (“the most indefensible sort of entrapment”).
• McDonnell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1991): Minnesota adopted Raley’s logic. Police used an inaccurate implied-consent advisory that threatened criminal penalties for test refusal when none applied, rendering the license revocation unconstitutional due to active government misrepresentation.
• Application here: Unlike Raley and McDonnell, Underwood was not affirmatively misled. The 2000 discharge order was accurate when issued; later legislative changes did not transform it into misadvice. Thus, there is no due process bar.

2) Ignorance of the Law

• State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 1977) and State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 2001): Reinforce the longstanding rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; citizens are presumed to know laws affecting their activities. This principle undergirds the Court’s rejection of Underwood’s reliance argument.

3) Minnesota Court of Appeals Cases on Similar Themes

• Whitten v. State, 690 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. App. 2005): Relief was appropriate where a district court affirmatively and erroneously told a defendant he could lawfully possess a firearm. Distinguishable because Underwood received accurate information at the time.
• State v. Grillo, 661 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. App. 2003): A change in law making the defendant ineligible did not violate ex post facto or procedural due process. The Supreme Court references the same core logic: legislative change, absent active government misstatement, does not bar prosecution.

4) Statutory Interpretation and Mens Rea

• Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019): Interpreting the federal scheme (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2)), the U.S. Supreme Court required the government to prove knowledge of both possession and prohibited status. Minnesota distinguishes Rehaif because the federal statute contained an explicit “knowingly” requirement in a linked penalty provision; Minnesota’s § 624.713, subd. 2(b) has no analogous textual mens rea.
• In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2000); State v. Neisen, 415 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1987); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994): Strict liability offenses—especially felonies—are disfavored; courts generally impute a mens rea absent clear legislative intent to dispense with it.
• State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 2012); State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. 2015); State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 2017): Minnesota requires proof that a defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. Ndikum imputed a “knowing possession” mens rea where the statute was silent. Salyers and Harris confirm knowledge of the object possessed is required in firearm possession crimes.
• Plain-meaning/statutory-text cases: State v. Schwartz, 957 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2021); State v. Robinson, 921 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 2019); Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2015); State v. Bee, 17 N.W.3d 150 (Minn. 2025); Rodriguez v. State Farm, 931 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. 2019); Firefighters Union Local 4725 v. City of Brainerd, 934 N.W.2d 101 (Minn. 2019); Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014); Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 931 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 2019); State v. Morse, 161 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1968). Collectively, these cases drove the Court’s methodology: adhere to statutory text; do not add elements not present; treat headnotes as nonbinding; require clear legislative indication for strict liability.

5) Plea Validity and Review Standards

• State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 2010); State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 2007); State v. Jones, 7 N.W.3d 391 (Minn. 2024): A plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent; accuracy requires a factual basis establishing the elements of the offense. Underwood’s admission to knowing possession and to the fact of his prior conviction satisfied the elements as clarified by this opinion.
• Evans v. State, 8 N.W.3d 642 (Minn. 2024); Martin v. State, 969 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 2022); State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. 2012): Standards of review for postconviction rulings and due process claims informed the Court’s framing and de novo legal analysis.
• Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2014): Minnesota generally tracks federal constitutional minima unless a principled basis exists to expand protections. The Court saw no such basis here.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Due Process

The Court anchored its due process analysis in the “entrapment by estoppel” line of authority. That doctrine protects defendants who are affirmatively misled by public officials about the law as it exists at the time they act. Here, however, the 2000 discharge order conveyed the then-current statutory 10-year prohibition. The Legislature later extended the prohibition to a lifetime ban in 2003, while Underwood was still within the 10-year window. No official ever stated—let alone guaranteed—that the 10-year limit would govern forever. Because there was no active misstatement, and because citizens are presumed to know changes in law, prosecution under the amended statute did not offend due process.

2) Mens Rea Under § 624.713, subd. 1(2)

Turning to the mens rea question, the Court started with the text: subdivision 1(2) contains no explicit mental-state term and does not mention “ineligibility status.” The linked penalty provision (subd. 2(b)) likewise has no “knowingly” requirement. Rejecting an importation of Rehaif’s federal analysis, the Court applied Minnesota principles:

• Strict liability is disfavored, especially for felonies carrying a mandatory minimum five-year sentence and a potential 15-year maximum and $30,000 fine.
• Where a criminal statute is silent, courts typically impute a mens rea that the defendant knows the facts that make the conduct illegal.

Critically, the Court identified which “fact” must be known: not legal “ineligibility,” but the defendant’s own prior conviction. The statutory text prohibits firearm possession by “a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence.” The headnotes’ use of “ineligible” cannot add an element (Minn. Stat. § 645.49). Accordingly:

• The State must prove the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm or ammunition; and
• The State must prove the defendant knew he had previously been convicted of the predicate offense.

The State need not prove that the defendant knew his prior conviction legally qualifies as a “crime of violence”—that classification is a matter of law, not a fact for the defendant’s knowledge.

3) Application to Underwood’s Plea

Underwood admitted during the plea colloquy that he had a prior third-degree assault conviction (a statutorily defined “crime of violence”) and that he knowingly possessed the handgun. Those admissions supply the required factual basis. His refusal to concede that he “knew” he was legally prohibited was immaterial, because knowledge-of-status is not an element of the offense.

C. Impact and Future Implications

1) Statewide Clarification of Elements for § 624.713, subd. 1(2)

This decision definitively sets the mens rea for Minnesota’s ineligible-person-in-possession offense:

• Element 1: Knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition.
• Element 2: A prior conviction that is, as a matter of law, a “crime of violence” under Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5.
• Element 3: The defendant’s knowledge of the fact of that prior conviction.

Knowledge that one is “ineligible,” or that the prior conviction is legally categorized as a “crime of violence,” is not required.

2) Plea Practice and Jury Instructions

• Prosecutors and courts should ensure the record establishes the defendant’s knowledge of the historical prior conviction (e.g., through admissions, certified judgments, sentencing transcripts, or other reliable evidence tied to the defendant’s awareness).
• Pattern instructions (CRIMJIG 21.01 and related instructions) may require updating to reflect that, in addition to knowing possession, the State must prove the defendant’s knowledge of the prior conviction.
• Plea colloquies should include targeted questions such as:
  • “On [date], were you convicted of [offense]?”
  • “At the time you possessed the firearm, did you know you had been convicted of that offense?”

3) Limits of Entrapment-by-Estoppel/Notice Arguments

• Defendants who received discharge orders or communications that were accurate when issued cannot rely on those documents to bar prosecution after later statutory amendments.
• Due process defenses premised on official misadvice remain available, but only where a responsible government actor affirmatively and contemporaneously misstates the law.

4) Policy and Administrative Considerations

• Although the Constitution does not require individualized notice of statutory changes, agencies and courts may consider voluntary notification practices to improve public understanding of firearm disabilities. The Court’s decision leaves such measures to the political branches.

5) Open Questions and Compliance Guidance

• The opinion addresses subdivision 1(2) (crimes of violence). Whether the same knowledge-of-prior-fact approach applies identically to other disqualifying categories in § 624.713 (e.g., mental health commitments, protective orders) will likely be resolved by future cases patterned on the same reasoning.
• Proof of knowledge of a prior conviction can be fact-intensive. Courts will weigh admissions, documentary evidence, and reasonable inferences, mindful that knowledge of the conviction is different from knowledge of the law.
• The ruling underscores the difference between a mistake of historical fact (potentially exculpatory if genuine and material) and a mistake of law (generally not exculpatory).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Entrapment by Estoppel: A due process doctrine preventing conviction when a responsible government official affirmatively tells someone conduct is lawful and the person reasonably relies on that advice. It requires an actual misstatement of the law at the time of the conduct.
• Ignorance of the Law: A foundational rule that individuals are presumed to know the law; lack of awareness of legislative changes generally does not excuse criminal liability.
• Mens Rea vs. Strict Liability: Mens rea requires the defendant to know the facts that make their conduct unlawful. Strict liability imposes guilt regardless of mental state. Courts are reluctant to read felony statutes as strict liability absent clear legislative direction.
• Headnotes Aren’t Law: Statutory headnotes and catchlines (e.g., the word “ineligible” in captions) help organize statutes but are not operative law and cannot add elements.
• Status vs. Historical Fact: “Status” (e.g., being legally ineligible) is a legal conclusion. The operative “fact” for § 624.713, subd. 1(2) is the prior conviction itself, which the defendant must know about; the legal classification of that conviction is not an element the defendant must know.
• Manifest Injustice in Pleas: A court must allow withdrawal of a plea that is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Accuracy requires admissions sufficient to establish each element as the law defines them.

Conclusion

Underwood cements two important rules in Minnesota criminal law. First, due process is not offended when the Legislature later expands a firearm disability that was accurately described in a prior discharge order; prosecution under the amended statute is permissible absent affirmative governmental misadvice. Second, the Supreme Court clarifies the mens rea for Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2): the State must prove (a) knowing possession and (b) the defendant’s knowledge of the fact of his prior conviction; the State need not prove knowledge of legal “ineligibility” or that the defendant knew the prior offense is legally a “crime of violence.”

The decision provides concrete guidance for charging decisions, plea colloquies, and jury instructions. It narrows reliance-based defenses to situations involving true government misstatements and aligns Minnesota’s firearms-possession jurisprudence with longstanding principles disfavoring strict liability for serious crimes. As a practical matter, it directs future litigation to focus on proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the historical conviction rather than knowledge of legal classifications or disabilities.